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Foreword
Sustainable energy transitions involve the shift of resources between compet-
ing industrial sectors and political constituencies. Stakeholders in this process
have varying degrees of political and economic power, and understanding how
political economic factors inﬂuence clean energy transitions is crucial to
effective policy formulation and facilitating transitions to sustainable energy
systems. In partnership with the Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis
(JISEA), UNU-WIDER gathered together a substantial group of experts from
around the world—from both developed and developing countries—to launch
a multidisciplinary research project seeking to contribute to our enhanced
understanding of these factors. The project sought to facilitate an energy
transition that will generate very large environmental and economic beneﬁts,
particularly over the long run. The beneﬁciaries of clean energy transitions are
highly diffuse and include future generations not yet born.
This book is the distilled essence of the cross-cutting academic project.
I express my sincere and professional appreciation to the large group of expert
authors for their dedication to the project, and to my fellow editors in helping
bring together the book for readers to enjoy and absorb along with the ﬁndings
and policy implications.
Finn Tarp
Helsinki, January 2017
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Part I
The Political Economy of
Clean Energy Transitions

1Introduction and Synthesis
Douglas Arent, Channing Arndt, Mackay Miller,
Finn Tarp, and Owen Zinaman
1.1 MOTIVATION
Climate change is frequently referred to as one of the deﬁning challenges of
the twenty-ﬁrst century. We concur. In broad terms, the climate challenge is
relatively straightforward. Global average temperatures are rising as a conse-
quence of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. In the absence of
deliberate and global action to ﬁrst substantially reduce and then eliminate (or
even turn net negative) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, global temperature
rise within this century is very likely to surpass two degrees Celsius (IPCC
2014), which is the (somewhat arbitrary) threshold set by the international
community as a tolerable level of warming.1 Continuation of current levels of
emissions or (worse) continued growth in emissions throughout the twenty-
ﬁrst century could result in warming far above the two-degree threshold with
very bad implications for the environment of the planet and for human
societies, particularly poor people.
These observations constitute the core arguments for serious efforts to reduce
emissions, called mitigation policy, at the global level. A principal element to
mitigation policy relates to energy use. Speciﬁcally, energy use must transition
from technologies that emit substantial volumes of GHGs to technologies
with limited or zero emissions. A ‘clean energy transition’ refers broadly to a
substitution of technologies and associated fuel inputs across the full set of energy
subsectors and consumers of energy, both as intermediates and ﬁnal goods.
This is the ‘clean energy transition’ referred to in the title of this book.
1 A more ambitious 1.5-degree target has been set forth in recent negotiations arguing
that it is ‘a signiﬁcantly safer defense line against the worst impacts of a changing climate’
(UNFCCC 2015).
While the broad contours of the climate challenge, of which the mitigation
challenge is a subset, are well understood, the speciﬁcities of almost all aspects
of the climate challenge are deeply complex. Enormous efforts have been
dedicated to the science of global change (IPCC 2014, 2013). While much
remains to be learned, climate science provides solid foundations to the core
arguments for serious efforts to reduce emissions. The technical challenge of
inventing low emissions energy technology has been absorbing the attention
of some of the world’s top scientists and engineers for decades and has become
increasingly commercial over the past decade. Further, a new wave of prom-
ising technologies is forming.
But, in the end, a solid foundation for action derived from climate science
combined with an array of promising technologies for reducing emissions are
not likely to be enough to catalyse a clean energy transition. A key phrase in
the very ﬁrst paragraph of this introductory chapter is ‘deliberate and global
action’. A clean energy transition is highly unlikely to occur on its own.
Policies must be put in place that will foment a clean energy transition, and
these policies must be effective globally (as opposed to just shifting emissions
from one region to another). The challenge, perhaps the largest of them all, is
implementing policies and programmes that actually achieve the necessary
global emissions reductions. Here, political economy considerations take a
leading role. These perspectives motivate our focus on the political economy
of clean energy transitions.
1 .2 A NEW ERA
For the purposes of avoiding the potentially execrable outcomes associated
with climate change referred to in Section 1.1, a long series of global agree-
ments and meetings have taken place under the auspices of the United
Nations. In the jargon that sprouts from such efforts, the ﬁrst conference of
the parties (CoP1) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) took place in 1995 in Berlin. Through the twentieth
meeting (CoP20) in 2014 in Lima, relatively little was accomplished in terms
of actually changing the trajectory of the global emissions of GHGs that drive
climate change. CoP21 in Paris in late 2015 represents a potential break-
through that ushers in a new era for climate mitigation.
The successful conclusion of CoP21 reﬂects three features of the current
landscape that differ signiﬁcantly from previous major attempts to set the
planet on a more desirable GHG emissions trajectory. The most recent major
attempt, prior to CoP21, occurred at CoP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen. First,
CoP21 represented the culmination of a shift in the negotiation framework.
At CoP15, the negotiations retained more of a ‘top-down’ approach wherein,
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essentially, a global emissions trajectory was determined and negotiators
sought to parse country-level responsibilities for achieving this path.2
In contrast, CoP21 in Paris employed a ‘bottom-up’ offer system, wherein
individual countries propose what they perceive to be achievable and fair
emissions trajectories for their particular circumstances. These offers are
formally called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).
In this new negotiating framework, the resulting projected global emissions
trajectory is the sum of individual country INDCs.
Second, the rapid pace of technological advances in renewable energy tech-
nologies and systems, even if one considers just the past six years, is in the
process of inﬂuencing the political economy of clean energy transitions (USDOE
2015). Historically, governments aiming to take deliberate action to correct the
colossal market failure of GHG emissions have suffered from a ‘chicken and egg’
problem. Speciﬁcally, many technologies that offered long-run potential to
support a clean energy transition were also small-scale, immature, and relatively
high-cost. As a result, they were largely unattractive to private investors. While
these factors provide a solid economic rationale for government support, the
politics of supporting small-scale, immature, and relatively high-cost technolo-
gies are nonetheless difﬁcult. Difﬁcult politics inevitably constrains the ambition
of policies that are crucial for technology development.
In sum, a circle exists wherein politics drives policy, policy drives technol-
ogy, and the state of technology circles back to inﬂuence politics. Today, from
the perspective of advancing clean energy technologies, this circle shows
evidence of becoming virtuous as opposed to vicious. Since 2008, the year
before CoP15 notably failed to produce a move towards effective global
mitigation, the global solar module price index has fallen by a factor of nearly
four, a rate of technical advance vastly more rapid than nearly all predictions
(Feldman et al. 2014). Declines in the cost of wind power—while not as
dramatic—have been rapid by any common standard (Moné et al. 2015).
These advances both spur private investment and generally ease the politics
of supporting clean energy transitions. Investments in energy production have
reﬂected these shifts. In 2014, for the ﬁrst time in history, the amount of new
renewable generation capacity surpassed that of new fossil fuel-based systems
on a global basis (Sawin et al. 2015). This trend continued in 2015 with new
renewable capacity outstripping fossil fuels again (Frankfurt School-UNEP
Centre/BNEF 2016).
Third, the developing world confronts climate change issues with a far
deeper and more sophisticated knowledge base than in 2009 (Arndt and
Tarp 2015). In Copenhagen at CoP15, the critical role that developing coun-
tries must play in any effective global mitigation regime had become clear
2 CoP15 also arguably seeded the approach taken in Paris at CoP21 through the discussions of
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA).
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simply as a matter of arithmetic. Yet, the complex implications of climate
change impacts, adaptation policies, and mitigation policies had really only
begun to penetrate the major decision-making apparatuses of develop-
ing countries. For instance, the World Bank’s Economics of Adaptation to
Climate Change study, which was meant to serve as a critical input to develop-
ing countries for CoP15 in 2009, was only published in 2010, after the
Copenhagen CoP meeting had ended. In our experience at the time around
CoP15, work on climate change issues, particularly when one spoke to
personnel from the critical central ﬁnance and planning units in developing
countries, frequently amounted to delivering primers on climate change and
energy transition policy basics. The process of internalizing the information
and assessing appropriate policy responses had only just begun.
It would be an overstatement to say today that climate change information
has been fully internalized and appropriate policies assessed in developing
countries. Nevertheless, the process of doing so is much more advanced than it
was in 2009. In country after country, the central decision-making units have
engaged. This is critical. The profound economic transformations inherent in
a clean energy transition will need to be fully integrated into economic
decision-making. The contributions from developing countries in this book
are evidence of this increasingly sophisticated and nuanced view of the climate
challenge. The more than 160 INDCs on the UNFCCC website are perhaps the
most salient evidence.
India and China are cases in point. In 2009, it is fair to say that India’s
negotiation strategy aimed to position climate change as a developed country
problem. In contrast, India’s INDC offers serious attempts to reduce the
carbon intensity of its GDP. China has gone further, offering to peak emis-
sions by 2030 with declines thereafter. Taken as a whole, the INDCs presented
at CoP21 represent a decisive break from past emissions trends. Recent analysis
of the INDCs by the International Energy Agency (2015) indicates that nearly
every country will have a strong focus on emissions mitigation, driving clean
energy to more than 50 per cent of world energy by 2040. The scope and
ambition of these offers stem from long and often difﬁcult processes of
internalization and policy option assessment that has taken place within
both developed and developing countries.
These three shifts now combine to place country decision-making and
country policies at centre stage. Like it or not, there is no current prospect
for a uniﬁed global policy, such as a global carbon tax or cap-and-trade
scheme, to which all nations agree to adhere. Rather, nearly all countries on
the globe will set about to achieve their contributions in their own ways, and
their means for achieving these ends will vary enormously. For example, the
United States, a leading advocate in international fora for reliance on markets,
looks set to pursue a domestic policy of regulatory edict. China, the paragon of
the developmental state, announced intention for a nationwide cap-and-trade
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system in September 2015. Overall, the range of policies pursued, and hence
the degree of policy experimentation, looks virtually certain to be very large.3
Before proceeding, the technology drivers mentioned in this section merit a
closer examination.
1 .3 TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS
In controversies about technology and society, there is no idea more
provocative than the notion that technical things have political qualities
(Langdon Winner 1980).
The rate of technological advancement in the renewable energy space has been
notably rapid. Established institutions, once isolated from rapid change, are
now presented with a dynamic landscape of pathways for simultaneously
achieving decarbonization goals and sustainable development objectives.
With affordable low-carbon energy readily available or imminent in most
contexts, institutional innovation is arising—out of necessity—across public
policy, ﬁnance, business models, markets, planning, and other dimensions to
promote deployment. These innovations—and the technical and political
qualities they possess—are interacting with a range of incumbent actors and
interests, and inﬂuencing the political economy of the clean energy transitions.
Thus, a brief assessment of technology drivers is worthwhile.
The growing cost-competitiveness and advanced capabilities of renewable
energy technologies, predominantly wind and solar, is a key pillar of clean
energy innovation and technological advancement. We observe, in many
contexts, the price of a newly constructed wind farm or solar plant is now at
or below the cost of competing fossil fuel alternatives, even without consid-
ering the fuel price variability or environmental or health impacts (Stark
et al. 2015). With their geographically diverse and variable nature, these
resources are reshaping, in particular, how power systems are planned,
operated, governed, and even conceptualized (Miller et al. 2015). Furthermore,
the modularity of solar panels enables a viable alternative to the traditional
provider–customer relationship, quite literally empowering consumers through
technology, regulation, and business model innovation to create their own
energy.
The qualities of clean energy technologies also have implications for energy
security in both developed and developing country contexts. Renewable tech-
nologies offer the prospect of reducing dependence on fuel imports. Energy
3 Backsliding in policies to achieve a clean energy transition is also a clear possibility in
numerous countries.
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trade between countries may or may not decline, however. There are portfolio
effect gains from renewable energy generation over broad areas driven by the
simple observation that it is likely to be windy and/or sunny somewhere
(Keane et al. 2011). In addition, hydropower resources are often concentrated
in a few locations. Both of these factors point to increased regional energy
trade as a potential corollary to increased dependence on renewable energy
sources. As a result, energy security under a renewable energy future may take
on a much more regional hue (see Part VIII).
At the same time, the inherent dispersion of wind and solar resources,
combined with new technologies and business models, present increasingly
attractive pathways to expanding energy access from the bottom up,
potentially leapfrogging the need for some of the cumbersome and
difﬁcult-to-ﬁnance infrastructure investments associated with traditional
power systems. As will be discussed in Section 1.4, this dispersed nature of
renewable energy may be particularly relevant for rural zones and smaller
concentrations of demand located a distance from functional grids. Advances
in data systems, communication technologies, and energy storage costs are
accelerating decentralization and heterogeneity of the energy sector (Zinaman
et al. 2015).
While technology is a fundamental driver, it has become increasingly clear
that the availability of technology is not in itself sufﬁcient to accelerate a
clean energy transition; innovative and nationally-customized deployment
strategies—hinging on public policy and regulation, market reforms, private
sector engagement, and strong analytical tools and data—remain important
factors.
More often than not, regulation and governance lag behind technology
innovation, compelling forms of institutional innovation in order to play
catch up. Ongoing innovations in energy systems often require either adapta-
tions of established regulatory constructs to accommodate new technologies
(a form of incremental change) or broad-based reform of the regulatory
constructs themselves (perhaps via more reconstructive or evolutionary
approaches) (see, for example, Zinaman et al. 2015). Across all contexts,
addressing the techno-institutional complex perpetuating carbon-intensive
systems—termed by some as ‘carbon lock-in’ (see, for example, Unruh 2000)—
is a common theme.
Technology is highly likely to remain one of the key driving factors
inﬂuencing climate commitments and energy-related development goals,
both in terms of goal-setting and implementation. What is technically
possible and economically attractive today vis-à-vis decarbonization and
sustainable development is much greater than it was during (for example)
the Kyoto Protocol era. Continued rapid rates of technical advance are
expected. In order to seize the opportunities offered by this technical
advance, equally innovative approaches to regulation and policy are likely
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to be required. This highlights the inherent political economic factors to be
considered, as various pathways are weighed and implementation efforts
are mounted.
1 .4 CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING VERSUS
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
The political economy of energy transitions is of interest across both the
developed and developing worlds, and a deﬁning feature of this book is a
review of experiences from a diversity of contexts. As emphasized, the miti-
gation challenge cannot be addressed by developed countries alone. The
volume of current emissions from developing countries combined with their
rapid growth trajectories highlight the importance of developing countries in
any effective global mitigation regime.
Developing countries simultaneously confront enormous development
challenges. Eliminating absolute poverty is also a deﬁning challenge of the
twenty-ﬁrst century, as set forth in the Sustainable Development Goals.
Developing countries are highly unlikely to shelve their developmental aspir-
ations in favour of mitigation objectives. Thus, the political economy of clean
energy transitions in the developing world present some of the thorniest and
most important challenges.
With respect to the developed world, their historical emissions, relatively
comfortable material circumstances, institutional capabilities, and technical
knowhow lead to the expectation that they will lead the energy transition. This
means reducing absolute emissions in the near term and achieving very deep
cuts by mid-century. This change must be undertaken by energy systems
characterized by weak or even negative energy demand growth as well as
deeply entrenched actors and interests.
In sum, the challenges facing both developing and developed countries are
not to be taken lightly. While developed countries are expected to lead—for
example, with respect to government commitments to research, develop-
ment, demonstration, and deployment activities for new technologies—the
critical role of regulatory frameworks, policies, and institutions have already
been emphasized. These require localized solutions in both developing and
developed country contexts. The dividing line between these two broad
country groups is neither clear nor fast in other respects as well. Citizens
of developed countries expect economic progress through time along with
environmental stewardship, and developing countries certainly have their
share of entrenched interests.
Nevertheless, the broadly deﬁned challenges facing developed and developing
economies do differ in important ways. In particular, driven by population/
labour force growth, technological catch-up, a relatively high marginal product
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of capital and substantial growth aspirations, developing countries’ economies
can be expected to grow more rapidly than developed economies. Accordingly,
the demand for new energy supply is likely to be much greater in the developing
than developed world.
There are multiple edges to this challenge. On the one hand, the INDCs set
forth by developing countries point to a reorientation away from the well-
trodden path of employing massive fossil energy to fuel development. This
charting of a new path, or new paths, is almost surely less straightforward than
following prior recipes. As institutional and human capabilities in developing
countries are characteristically weak relative to developed countries, the need
to chart new paths and confront new challenges provokes legitimate concern.
On the other hand, fossil-based systems have a series of, by now, well-known
shortcomings. First, developing countries frequently encounter difﬁculties
implementing fossil-fuel-based systems, particularly for electricity generation.
These difﬁculties arise fromnumerous factors. The bottom line is that unreliable
power supply has long been a hallmark of many developing country cities and
is frequently pointed to as a substantial brake on economic development (see
Foster 2008). While intermittency in output is a characteristic of many renew-
able generators, that variability reduces substantially at a system level; and
meeting or improving upon the reliability levels currently attained in many
developing country contexts is often a fairly low bar of accomplishment. The
relatively modular nature and short investment lead times of wind and solar
power generation systems also favour developing countries where demand
growth tends to be much more variable and much less predictable than in
developed country contexts.
Second, fossil-fuel-based systems are poorly suited to rural areas. This is
particularly true of electricity generation. Around 1.2 billion people (about 17
per cent of the world’s population) lack access to electricity, and the vast
majority of these people live in rural areas of developing countries (IEA 2015).
Rural inhabitants in zones that lack access to electricity are frequently abso-
lutely poor. In short, existing fossil-based power systems serve the least well off
of the world’s population very badly. Various renewable technologies have
been shown to scale effectively in these areas. Biopower systems currently
serve dozens of villages in South Asia (Bhattacharyya 2014), and next gener-
ation bioenergy systems also hold out additional promise for rural zones. With
the rapid advances in solar and battery technology, distributed solar systems
provide a potentially unprecedented opportunity to extend electricity access to
some of the world’s poorest citizens.
Third, localized pollution impacts of fossil-fuel-based systems can be intense.
Poor air quality gives rise to serious health concerns. New Delhi and Beijing
are just the most recent examples of places where low air quality seriously
impacts wellbeing. Clean energy systems have the potential to diminish or
even effectively remove these real costs.
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Fourth, fossil-based systems both fuel and disrupt development. Experience
in countries with fossil fuel endowments indicate that they are not an
unalloyed boon for their economies in general and the welfare of their
citizenry in particular. The vagaries of fossil fuel prices, and concomitant
macroeconomic instability, combined with the tendency for revenues derived
from sale of fossil resources to concentrate in a few hands have not been
helpful for development patterns in many countries leading some authors to
proclaim a ‘resource curse’ (Frankel 2010). For most fossil fuel importers,
variations in fossil fuel prices have large impacts, often with implications for
political stability (e.g., Arndt et al. 2012).
Finally, developing countries may possess inherent advantages in terms of
clean energy endowments. Many developing countries are relatively well
endowed with sun, wind, and unexploited hydropower potential. In a world
dominated by clean energy systems, many developing countries may possess
an inherent comparative advantage in energy-intensive activities.4
For these reasons, a clean energy transition is not necessarily an impedi-
ment to the growth aspirations of the developing world. And, there are a series
of solid rationales for developed countries to assist developing countries in
realizing a clean energy transition. Not least, a failure on the part of developing
countries to transition to cleaner energy sources implies a failure to stabilize
the global climate, with negative implications for everyone.
Developed countries are also responsible for a disproportionate share of the
stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This would be highly problem-
atic if the lack of space for even greater stocks of atmospheric GHGs imposed a
tight trade-off between the development aspirations of the citizens of devel-
oping countries over the next few decades and a permanent alteration of the
global climate. The fact that the developed world has effectively claimed
squatters’ rights on the global atmospheric commons becomes a lot less
problematic if new paths to fuelling development are opened as the fossil
fuel pathway is foreclosed.
The practical and ethical arguments for assisting developing countries in
taking these new pathways are strong. At the same time, it is not a question of
simply willing a clean energy system into place whatever the cost. As empha-
sized, the changes inherent in a clean energy transition are profound, involving
the full economic system with implications for competiveness and economic
growth. Improperly done, those costs could easily be very high and would
likely sap the will for undertaking that very transition.
Hence, economic efﬁciency and reasonable equity are key. Efﬁcient and
relatively low-cost transitions to a stable global climate are widely viewed as
4 Of course, whether developing countries are capable of actually capitalizing on these
advantages (if they indeed exist) is another question. This is an important area for future
research.
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imminently possible.5 The cost estimations in the Fifth Assessment Report of
the IPCC indicate approximately a year or two of global growth by around
mid-century. In other words, global GDP per capita with mitigation would
reach the same level in 2055 as it would have attained in about 2053 without
mitigation. These calculations typically ignore the beneﬁts of mitigation in
terms of climate change impacts avoided as well as health beneﬁts from
reduced pollution. Also, there are real possibilities to enhance the equity of
the energy transition through, for example, more rapid rural electriﬁcation
and better urban air quality in developing countries.
1 .5 THIS BOOK
This book takes as a starting point that a new era of reducing emissions at scale
has begun. The proximate challenges of this new era are codiﬁed in the
emissions reductions offers (INDCs) from 165 countries available on the
UNFCCC website. To date, the scale of emissions reductions efforts has
been nowhere near adequate to the task. But, this does not mean that nothing
has been tried. Considerable experience has been gained, and many features of
the political economy of clean energy transitions have been revealed. It makes
sense to proﬁt from this experience in order to help meet the challenge of
greatly scaling up emissions reductions efforts.
As countries and regions grapple with the complex task of reducing emis-
sions in accordance with their INDCs while providing better lives for their
citizenry, the demand for sharing of experience and lessons learned looks
set to increase dramatically. This applies both to successes and to failures.
Advancing this process of knowledge-sharing, to the beneﬁt of all, but espe-
cially the most vulnerable of present and future generations, is the raison d’être
of this book.
This book presents 27 cases, reviewing country experience, regional experi-
ence (e.g., the European Union), and international experience/cross-cutting
issues, with a focus on the political economy aspects of the clean energy
transition.
The book’s parts are organized by major political economy subject matter
areas germane to characterizing clean energy transitions. While many of the
individual chapter topics are cross-cutting in nature, we, the editors, believe
this organizing framework to be a useful construct. A short introduction
to each part highlights the issues and the main points drawn from the
constituent chapters.
5 Llavador et al. (2015) disagree. They ﬁnd that global mitigation objectives can only be met
through reductions in the rate of growth of GDP.
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There are eight major parts.
In Part I, Chapter 1 introduces readers to the layout of the book. Chapter 2
examines the history and politics of energy transitions and draws lessons
for today.
Part II features policies designed to advance clean energy and combat
climate change from a global or general perspective.
Part III features chapters that explore how institutions and governance inﬂu-
ence the processes of energy innovation, deployment, and policy formation.
Part IV features chapters that raise key political questions about the role of
actors, interests, and institutions in the energy sector: who has the power to
change, who sets the terms of transition, and for whom?
Part V features chapters that explore relationships and tensions between
emerging clean energy sectors and incumbent stakeholders.
Part VI features chapters that discuss the drivers, obstacles, and implica-
tions of energy sector reforms which shift the balance of public and private
participation in clean energy transitions.
Part VII features chapters that explore the role of clean energy, as an enabler
of economic growth and development, and social inclusion.
Part VIII features chapters that explore how clean energy transitions chal-
lenge traditional national boundaries and differentially impact regions within
national boundaries.
1 .6 LOOKING FORWARD
A clean energy transition is not easy. This is amply illustrated in the case
studies. Even if the technical path is clear and fully illuminated, a clean energy
transition will involve the shift of resources between competing economic
sectors and political constituencies alongside changes in institutional and
policy frameworks. Stakeholders in this process have varying degrees of
political and economic power. Regardless of the society or the political system,
understanding how political economy factors inﬂuence clean energy transi-
tions is crucial to effective policy formulation and facilitating transitions to
sustainable energy systems.
Despite the challenges, this introductory chapter has adopted a purpose-
fully optimistic tone. This seems appropriate. CoP21 does represent a sub-
stantial break from the past. Technological change in clean energy sectors
has been very rapid. Institutional and policy changes are evident in many
countries. And, resource allocations are shifting as evidenced by the large
investments in clean energy systems that are occurring worldwide. In effect,
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the set of INDCs derived from CoP21 pledge an essentially global transition
towards clean energy systems. Put differently, global mitigation efforts have
begun in earnest.
While the ﬁrst steps have been taken, much more effort is required. Over the
next few years, countries need to follow through on their INDCs. Looking
further ahead, it is well known that the sum of the commitments in the
INDCs does not result in an energy system that is sufﬁciently environmentally
benign as to be compatible with a stable global climate. Even more ambitious
commitments/transformations will be necessary in future.
While a freewheeling ‘bottom-up’ approach appears to have been well
suited to getting started, it is likely that limitations to the highly dispersed
approach adopted in Paris at CoP21 will become apparent. For example, the
solicitation of INDCs is not an approach that is particularly well suited to
addressing the vexing and inter-related issues of international trade, carbon
trade, and footloose industries/carbon leakage. Thoughts on future stages of
the clean energy transition are discussed in Chapter 29. Chapter 29 also
provides forward perspectives on the research agenda.
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2The History and Politics of
Energy Transitions
Comparing Contested Views and
Finding Common Ground
Benjamin K. Sovacool
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Transitioning away from our current global energy system is of paramount
importance (Riahi et al. 2012: 1203–306). As Grubler (2012: 8) has compel-
lingly written, ‘the need for the “next” ’ energy transition is widely apparent as
current energy systems are simply unsustainable on all accounts of social,
economic, and environmental criteria’. Miller et al. (2013: 136) add that,
‘The future of energy systems is one of the central policy challenges facing
industrial countries’. Unfortunately, however, neither private markets nor
government agencies seem likely to spur a transition on their own (Fri and
Savitz 2014). Moreover, shifts to newer, cleaner energy systems such as sources
of renewable electricity (Painuly 2001; Sovacool 2009) and electric vehicles
(Sovacool and Hirsh 2009; Nielsen et al. 2015) often require signiﬁcant
changes not only in technology, but also in political regulations, tariffs, and
pricing regimes, and the behaviour of users and adopters.
Thus, the speed at which a transition can take place—its timing, or
temporal dynamics—is a critical element of consideration (Sovacool 2016).
According to the International Energy Agency (2012: 3), for example, if
‘action to reduce CO2 emissions is not taken before 2017, all the allowable
CO2 emissions would be locked-in by energy infrastructure existing at that
time’. In other words, if a transition does not occur quickly, or soon, it may
be too late. Giddens (2009) went so far as to call this the ‘climate paradox’,
the fact that by the time humanity may come to realize fully how much they
need to shift to low-carbon forms of energy, they will have already passed the
point of no return.
The notion of ‘energy transitions’ sits at the heart of this polemical discus-
sion. O’Connor (2010) once deﬁned an energy transition as ‘a particularly
signiﬁcant set of changes to the patterns of energy use in a society, potentially
affecting resources, carriers, converters, and services’. In other words, to those
subscribing to this deﬁnition, an energy transition refers to the time that
elapses between the introduction of a new primary energy source, or prime
mover, and its rise to claiming a substantial share of the overall market.
According to one view, energy transitions take an incredibly long time to
occur. As the geographer Vaclav Smil (2010a: 141–2) writes, ‘all energy
transitions have one thing in common: They are prolonged affairs that take
decades to accomplish, and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and
conversions, the longer the substitutions will take.’ Fast transitions, when
they occur at all, are anomalies, limited to countries with very small popula-
tions or unique contextual circumstances that can hardly be replicated
elsewhere.
Another view argues the opposite. Broadening the discussion beyond
simply national sources of energy supply and substantial shifts of their
composition, it suggests that there have been many transitions—at varying
scales, involving different things including fuels, services, and end-use
devices—that have occurred quite quickly, that is, between a few years and
a decade or so, or within a single generation. At smaller scales, the adoption
of cookstoves, air conditioners, and ﬂex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) are excellent
examples. At the state or national scale, almost complete transitions to oil in
Kuwait, natural gas in the Netherlands, and nuclear power in France took
only a decade, roughly, to occur. Indeed, the second part of this chapter
presents ten case studies of energy transitions that, in aggregate, affected
almost 1 billion people and needed only 1–16 years to unfold. Clearly, this
antithetical view proposes that some energy transitions can occur much
more quickly than commonly believed.
Which side is right? Similar to other controversies in the energy studies
literature (Sovacool et al. 2016), this chapter holds that both are. After pre-
senting evidence in support of both theses, it elucidates a common ground
consisting of four arguments. First, sometimes the ‘speed’ or ‘scale’ at which an
energy transition occurs has less to do with what actually happened and more
to do with what or when one counts. Second, what may seem a sweeping
transition can actually be a bundle of more discrete minor conversions or
substitutions. Third, energy transitions are complex, and irreducible to a single
cause, factor, or blueprint. Fourth, most energy transitions have been, and will
likely continue to be, path dependent rather than revolutionary, cumulative
rather than fully substitutive.
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2.2 ONE SIDE: ENERGY TRANSITIONS ARE LONG,
PROTRACTED AFFAIRS
This view holds that energy transitions—deﬁned by some as the time that
elapses between the introduction of a new fuel or technology (sometimes called
a ‘prime mover’) and its rise to 25 per cent of national market share—takes a
signiﬁcant amount of time (Smil 2010a). The Global Energy Assessment (GEA)
(2012: 788), a major international, interdisciplinary effort to understand energy
systems, notes that ‘transformations in energy systems’ are ‘long-term change
processes’ on the scale of decades or even centuries. This view holds that, as two
Stanford University scientists write, ‘it appears that there is no quick ﬁx; energy
system transitions are intrinsically slow’ (Myhrvold and Caldeira 2012: 1).
Support for this side comes from (1) the historical record, (2) the validity
of looking at the ‘big picture’, and (3) the literature on ‘lock-in’ and ‘path
dependency’.
2.2.1 History Shows Major Transitions Taking
Decades to Centuries
In the USA, crude oil took half a century from its exploratory stages in the
1860s to capturing 10 per cent of the market in the 1910s, then 30 years more
to reach 25 per cent. Natural gas took 70 years to rise from 1 per cent to 20 per
cent. Coal needed 103 years to account for only 5 per cent of total energy
consumed in the USA and an additional 26 years to reach 25 per cent (Smil
2012). Nuclear electricity took 38 years to reach a 20 per cent share, which
occurred in 1995.
Globally, we see even longer time frames involved with energy transitions.
Coal surpassed the 25 per cent mark in 1871, more than 500 years after the
ﬁrst commercial coal mines were developed in England. Crude oil surpassed
the same mark in 1953; about nine decades after Edwin Drake drilled the ﬁrst
commercial well in Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859. Hydroelectricity, natural
gas, nuclear power, and ‘other’ sources such as wind turbines and solar panels
still have yet to surpass the 25 per cent threshold—as Figure 2.1 depicts—with
only nuclear reaching the meagre 5 per cent mark.
Assessing prime movers rather than fuels, Smil (2010b) adds that steam
engines were designed in the 1770s, but didn’t take off until the 1800s, and
the gasoline-powered internal combustion engine, ﬁrst deployed by Benz,
Maybach, and Daimler in the middle of the 1880s, reached widespread
acceptance in the USA only in the 1920s, and even later for Europe and
Japan. As Smil (2012: 3) deduces from these examples:
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Energy transitions have been, and will continue to be, inherently prolonged affairs,
particularly so in large nations whose high levels of per capita energy use and whose
massive and expensive infrastructures make it impossible to greatly accelerate their
progress even if we were to resort to some highly effective interventions.
This is why he calls energy systems ‘a slow-maturing resource’ and jokes that
‘energy sources, they grow up so…slowly’ (Smil 2012: 2–3). As he remarks, ‘it
is impossible to displace [the world’s fossil fuel-based energy] super-system in
a decade or two—or ﬁve, for that matter. Replacing it with an equally extensive
and reliable alternative based on renewable energy ﬂows is a task that will
require decades of expensive commitment. It is the work of generations of
engineers’ (Smil 2012: 3).
The notion that energy transitions are inherently lengthy events ﬁnds
further support from energy analysts Peter Lund and Roger Fouquet. Lund
(2006) found that market penetration of new energy systems or technologies
can take as long as 70 years. Short ‘take-over times’ of less than 25 years are
limited to a few end-use technologies such as water heaters or refrigerators,
and are not common for major infrastructural systems like those involving
electricity or transport. A second study of Lund’s (2010a: 650) exploring ‘how
fast new energy technologies could be introduced on a large scale’ estimated that
the earliest wind could produce more than 25 per cent of world electricity, and
solar 15 per cent, would be 2050—40 years from the date of his study. As Lund
(2006: 3318) noted, ‘the inertia of energy systems against changes is large,
among others because of the long investment cycles of energy infrastructures
or production plants’ and the ‘rate of adoption of these new [renewable energy]
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Figure 2.1. Major transitional shifts in global energy supply, 1750–2015.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Smil (2012).
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technologies would not exceed that of oil or nuclear in the past’ (Lund 2010b:
3580). Analogously, Fouquet (2010) studied various transitions between both
energy fuels and energy services from 1500 to 1920, and found that, on average,
each single transition has an innovation phase exceeding 100 years followed by a
diffusion phase approaching 50 years.
2.2.2 Analysts Need to Focus on the Big Picture
Furthermore, proponents of this view argue that one must look at the ‘big
picture’, that is, the absolute change in energy systems, rather than discrete
growth within a particular market, and the overall impact on society.
For instance, an energy system can grow rapidly, in an absolute sense, but
still fail to grow in a comparative sense. Hydroelectricity in the USA was a
low-cost source of energy in the 1950s and 1960s, where it grew in capacity
threefold from 1949 to 1964. However, during this time, because other sources
of energy (and demand for electricity) grew faster, hydropower’s overall
national share dropped from 32 per cent to 16 per cent (O’Connor 2010).
Similarly, from 2000 to 2010, global annual investment in solar photovoltaic
(PV) power increased by a factor of 16, investment in wind grew fourfold,
investment in solar heating threefold. This sounds impressive—yet the overall
contribution of solar (heating and PV) and wind to total ﬁnal energy consump-
tion grew from less than one-tenth of 1 per cent to slightly less than 1 per cent
over the same period (Sovacool 2016), hardly a drop in the bucket.
Furthermore, part of a big picture approach means realizing that energy
transitions do not always produce desirable results. The massive energy
transitions that occurred in Japan from 1918 to 1945, North Korea in the
1990s, and Cuba in the 1990s saw societies grapple with sudden shifts in the
availability of energy. Japan lost upwards of 70 per cent of its oil imports due
to the US trade embargo of 1941, North Korea dropped 90 per cent of their oil
imports from the Soviet Union in 1991, and Cuba saw a decline of energy
imports from the Soviet Union of 71 per cent between 1989 and 1993. In each
case, national planners responded to energy scarcity with military force
(Japan) or by preserving the privileges of the elite at the expense of ordinary
people (North Korea and Cuba) (Friedrichs 2013).
2.2.3 ‘Path Dependency’ and ‘Lock-In’ Make Future
Transitions Difﬁcult
A ﬁnal thread of this thesis is that desirable energy transitions are so difﬁcult
to achieve because of the momentum, path dependency, or obduracy of the
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existing system exerts on actors. In the case of national energy systems, such
large sums of labour, capital, and effort are ‘sunk’ into them that they create their
own ‘inertia’ (Knox-Hayes 2012; Steinhilber et al. 2013). On top of that,
institutional legacies protect the status quo, and political regulations, tax
codes, and even banks and educational institutions come to support a particular
energy pathway, alongwith associated coalitions (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012).
The result is that energy transitions, breaking out of these embedded systems,
require a ‘long-term transformation’ that is ‘a messy, conﬂictual, and highly
disjointed process’ (Meadowcroft 2009). Collectively, these technological and
behavioural forces ‘lock’ us into a carbon-dependent energy system that
highly resists change (Unruh 2000). In the case of prime movers, we see
similar resistance. As Smil (2010a: 140) writes, ‘There is often inertial reliance
on a machine that may be less efﬁcient (steam engine, gasoline-fueled engine)
than a newer machine but whose marketing and servicing are well established
and whose performance quirks and weaknesses are known. The concern is
that rapid adoption of a superior converter may bring unexpected problems
and setbacks.’
In order to counteract this inertia, scholars looking at energy transitions
have argued that truly ‘transformative change’ must be the result of alter-
ations at every level of the system, simultaneously, that is, one must alter
technologies, political and legal regulations, economies of scale and price
signals, and social attitudes and values together, making transition a gruel-
ling process. Or to use parlance from sociotechnical systems theory, it is
rare that innovation niches become regimes and rarer still for those regimes
to inﬂuence the broader, global landscape (Geels and Schot 2007; Schot and
Geels 2008). This parallels what feminist scholar, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
(1993) termed, the ‘Christmas Effect’ to describe the way that institutions,
technology, and behaviour can coalesce around a common goal. During the
holidays, the institutions of Western society come together and speak ‘with
one voice’ for the Christmas holiday. Christian churches build nativity
scenes and hold a greater number of masses; state and federal governments
establish school and national holidays; and the media ‘rev up the Christmas
frenzy’ and ‘bark out the Christmas countdown’ (Sedgwick 1993). Such
sociotechnical inertia favouring the Christmas holiday exerts profound
and lasting inﬂuence over our behaviour, and the argument runs that a
similar alignment of values and incentives occurs with energy. This could be
why, in their forecasts about the future, the US EIA (2013) still predicted
in 2013 that in 2040, three-quarters of energy in the USA would come from
oil, coal, and natural gas. The International Energy Agency (2012: 51) similarly
projected that in 2035, under their ‘Current Policies’ scenario, 80 per cent
of total primary energy supply worldwide would come from ‘traditional’
fossil fuels.
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2.3 THE OTHER SIDE: ENERGY TRANSITIONS
CAN HAPPEN QUICKLY
Contrary to those emphasizing the longevity or difﬁculty of energy transitions,
an alternate view is that under certain conditions (or, if one chooses to count
different things), energy transformations can occur rather speedily. Argu-
ments in support of rapid transitions hold that (1) we have seen numerous
fast transitions in terms of energy end-use, (2) plentiful examples of national-
scale transitions litter the historical record, and (3) we can sufﬁciently learn
from these trends so that favourable future energy transitions can be exped-
ited. This section of the chapter explores no less than ten ‘quick’ energy
transitions, ﬁve of them focused on end-use devices such as lighting and air
conditioning, and ﬁve of them focused on national systems such as oil in
Kuwait and nuclear power in France. Table 2.1 provides an overview of these
cases, which collectively involved almost a billion people.
2.3.1 History Shows Speedy Transitions in
Energy End-Use Devices
At least ﬁve transitions in end-use devices, or prime movers, have occurred
with remarkable rapidity: lighting in Sweden, cookstoves in China, liqueﬁed
Table 2.1. Overview of rapid energy transitions
Country Technology/fuel Period of
transition
Number of years
(from 1 to 25 per
cent market share)
Approximate size
(population affected
in millions of people)
Sweden Energy-efﬁcient ballasts 1991–2000 7 2.3
China Improved cookstoves 1983–1998 8 592
Indonesia Liqueﬁed petroleum gas
(LPG) stoves
2007–2010 3 216
Brazil Flex-fuel vehicles
(FFVs)
2004–2009 1 2
USA Air conditioning 1947–1970 16 52.8
Kuwait Crude oil 1946–1955 2 0.28
Netherlands Natural gas 1959–1971 10 11.5
France Nuclear electricity 1974–1982 11 72.8
Denmark Combined heat and
power (CHP)
1976–1981 3 5.1
Canada
(Ontario)*
Coal 2003–2014 11 13
Note: * The Ontario case study is the inverse, showing how quickly a province went from 25 per cent coal
generation to zero.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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petroleum gas (LPG) stoves in Indonesia, ethanol vehicles in Brazil, and air
conditioning in the USA.
Sweden was able to phase in an almost complete shift to energy-efﬁcient
lighting in commercial buildings in about nine years (Lund 2007). Swedish
Energy Authorities arranged for the procurement of high-frequency electronic
ballasts for lights in ofﬁce buildings, commercial enterprises, schools, and
hospitals, devices which saved 30–70 per cent compared to ordinary ballasts,
in 1991. They used a multipronged approach of standardization and quality
assurance, direct procurement, stakeholder involvement, and demonstrations
to disseminate those ballasts. They began by collaborating with experts to
develop a list of lighting quality factors for commercial buildings, and then
asked for competitive tenders from manufacturers that met these standards.
Then, the government directly purchased almost 30,000 units in a pilot phase,
and worked with real estate management companies (for new buildings) and
owners of public, commercial, and industrial buildings (for retroﬁts) to ensure
that they were installed (Ottossen and Stillesjo 1996). After the pilot phase,
they promoted distribution through government subsidies, sponsored dem-
onstrations of the technology among the commercial sector, and involved
consumer groups in discounted bulk purchases. Due to these concerted
efforts, self-supporting volume effects were reached as early as 1996, catalysing
very rapid market penetration, which jumped from about 10 per cent that year
to almost 70 per cent by 2000. In essence, this meant that between 1991 and
2000, 2.3 million Swedish workers experienced changes in their ofﬁce lighting.
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture managed an even more impressive
National Improved Stove Programme (NISP), managed by the Bureau of
Environmental Protection and Energy (BEPE), from 1983 to 1998 (Smith
et al. 1993; Brown and Sovacool 2011a: 292–301). The BEPE adopted a ‘self-
building, self-managing, self-using’ policy focused on having rural people
themselves invent, distribute, and care for energy-efﬁcient cookstoves, and it
set up pilot programmes in hundreds of rural provinces. From the start of the
programme until 1998, the NISP was responsible for the installation of 185
million improved cookstoves and facilitated the penetration of improved stoves
from less than 1 per cent of the Chinesemarket in 1982 tomore than 80 per cent
by 1998—reaching half a billion people, as Table 2.2 shows. The cookstoves
being installed in China in 1994, during the height of the programme, were
equivalent to 90 per cent of all improved stoves installed globally. As a conse-
quence, Chinese energy use per capita declined in rural areas at an annual rate of
5.6 per cent from 1983 to 1990.
Indonesia also ran a large household programme focusing on the con-
version from kerosene stoves to LPG stoves to improve air quality. Under
leadership from their vice president, Jusuf Kalla, the Indonesian ‘LPG Mega-
project’ offered households the right to receive a free ‘initial package’ consist-
ing of a 3 kilogram LPG cylinder, a ﬁrst free gas-ﬁll, one burner stove, a hose,
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and a regulator. The government, in tandem, lowered kerosene subsidies
(increasing its price) and constructed new refrigerated LPG terminals to act
as national distribution hubs. Amazingly, in just three years from 2007 to
2009, the number of LPG stoves nationwide jumped from a mere 3 million to
43.3 million, meaning they served almost two-thirds of Indonesia’s 65 million
households (or about 216 million people). Six entire provinces, including that
of Jakarta, the capital, were declared ‘closed and dry’—meaning that the
programme reached all of its targets, and that all kerosene subsidies were
withdrawn (Budya and Arofat 2011).
Brazil has perhaps the fastest energy transition on record, though (to be
fair) it depends on what one counts. Brazil created its Proálcool programme in
November 1975 to increase ethanol production and substitute ethanol for
petroleum in conventional vehicles, and in 1981, six years later, 90 per cent of
all new vehicles sold in Brazil could run on ethanol—an impressive feat.
However, a more recent transition, connected in part to the Proálcool
programme, is even more noteworthy. The Brazilian government started
incentivizing FFVs in 2003 through reduced tax rates and fuel taxes. These
Brazilian FFVs were capable of running on any blend of ethanol from zero to
100 per cent, giving drivers the option of switching between various blends of
gasoline and ethanol depending on price and convenience. The ﬁrst year FFVs
entered the market in 2004, they accounted for 17 per cent of new car sales but
they rapidly jumped to 90 per cent in 2009—meaning 2 million FFVs were
purchased in total over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the programme (Brown and
Sovacool 2011b).
Air conditioning in the USA is a ﬁnal example. In 1947, mass-produced,
low-cost window air conditioners became possible, enabling many people to
Table 2.2. Households adopting improved stoves under the Chinese National
Improved Stove Programme (NISP) and afﬁliated provincial programmes
NISP households
(million)
Households under
provincial programmes
(million)
Total households/
year (million)
Total people/
year (million)
1983 2.6 4.0 6.6 21.1
1984 11.0 9.7 20.7 66.2
1985 8.4 9.5 17.9 57.3
1986 9.9 8.5 18.4 58.9
1987 8.9 9.1 18.0 57.6
1988 10.0 7.5 17.5 56.0
1989 4.5 5.0 9.5 30.4
1990 3.6 7.8 11.4 36.5
1991–1998 7.8 57.2 65.0 208.0
Total 66.7 118.3 185.0 592.0
Source: Author’s compilation based on Brown and Sovacool (2011a).
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enjoy air conditioning without the need to buy a new home or completely
renovate their heating system (National Academy of Engineering 2013). That
year, only 43,000 units were sold, but by 1953, the number had jumped to
1 million, as air conditioners became endorsed by builders eager to mass
produce affordable, yet desirable, modern homes and electric utilities that
wanted to increase electricity consumption throughout the growing suburbs
(Rosen 2011). Consequently, more than 12 per cent of people (occupying
6.5 million housing units) reported to the US Census in 1960 that they owned
an air conditioner, rising to 25 per cent in 1963, and 35.8 per cent in 1970,
representing 24.2 million homes and more than 50 million people (US Census
Bureau 1960, 1970). Since then, the presence of air conditioning in single-
family homes jumped from 49 per cent in 1973 to 87 per cent in 2009 (US EIA
2011). In hot and humid places such as southern Florida, its use grew from
5 per cent in 1950 to 95 per cent in 1990. American motorists also use 7–10
billion gallons of gas annually to air condition their cars. In aggregate, the USA
on an annual basis now consumes more electricity for air conditioning than
the entire continent of Africa consumes for all electricity uses (Cox 2012).
Or, in other terms, the USA currently utilizes more energy (about 185 billion
kWh) for air-conditioning than all other countries’ air conditioning usage
combined (Sivak 2013).
2.3.2 Fast Transitions in National Energy Supply Have Occurred
Proponents of this alternative view can also point to ﬁve other transitions that
have occurred at the national level: to crude oil in Kuwait, natural gas in the
Netherlands, nuclear electricity in France, combined heat and power (CHP) in
Denmark, and coal retirements in Ontario, Canada.
Two concurrent modiﬁcations, in electricity and transport, catalysed an
almost complete shift in Kuwait’s national energy proﬁle in about nine years.
Oil use catapulted from constituting a negligible amount of total national
energy supply in 1946 to 25 per cent in 1947, and more than 90 per cent in
1950 (Kuwait Ministry of Planning 1988). In 1938, when Kuwait was still a
small, impoverished British protectorate, geologists discovered the Burgan
oil ﬁeld, which proved to be the world’s second largest accumulation of oil
following Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar oil ﬁeld. Commercial exploitation began in
earnest (after a suspension of operations due to the Second World War) in
1946, increasing from 5.9 million barrels that year to 16.2 million barrels
in 1947, and 398.5 million barrels in 1955, in tandem with the development of
other oil ﬁelds (Al-Maraﬁe 1989). Within ﬁve years, 1945–49, the Kuwaiti oil
industry was transformed from one dependent on ﬁve gallon barrels being
distributed manually to customers, carried on camels, donkeys, or wooden
push carts to one characterized by huge volumes and scale economies that
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were dependent on motorized trucks and tankers, pipelines, and ﬁlling sta-
tions. Simultaneously, Kuwait began using oil for electricity generation. The
Kuwait Oil Company obtained and commissioned its ﬁrst 500 kW generator
in 1951 and in 1952, built a 2.25 MW steam power station at Al-Shewaikh,
essentially tripling national electricity capacity in three years. Demand for
such electricity grew considerably, doubling again by 1960, and then increas-
ing (in per capita terms) from 1473 kWh to 9255 kWh in 1985 (Al-Maraﬁe
1988). Thereafter, a rapid expansion of distillation units, reﬁneries, petrol
stations, and the establishment of the Kuwait National Petroleum Company
in 1960, the same year Kuwait helped form the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, saw oil’s rise continue so that in 1965, Kuwait became
the world’s fourth largest producer of oil (behind the USA, the Soviet Union,
and Venezuela, and ahead of Saudi Arabia). As even energy transition sceptic
Smil (2010b: 55) concedes, ‘In energy terms Kuwait thus moved from a
pre-modern society dependent on imports of wood, charcoal, and kerosene
to an oil superpower in a single generation’.
The Netherlands—thanks in large part to the discovery of a giant
Groningen natural gas ﬁeld in 1959—started a rapid transition away from
oil and coal to natural gas (Smil 2010b). That year, coal supplied about 55 per
cent of Dutch primary energy supply followed by crude oil at 43 per cent and
natural gas at less than 2 per cent. In December 1965, however, one year after
gas deliveries began from Groningen, natural gas supplied 5 per cent of the
Netherland’s primary energy, rising quickly to 50 per cent by 1971, an ascent
visually depicted in Figure 2.2. To facilitate the transition, the government
decided in December 1965 to abandon all coal mining in the Limburg
province within a decade, doing away with some 75,000 mining-related jobs
impacting more than 200,000 people. What made the transition successful was
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Figure 2.2. Coal, natural gas, and oil supply in the Netherlands, 1950–2010.
Source: Author’s illustration based on Smil (2010a).
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that the government strategically implemented countermeasures such as sub-
sidies for new industries, the relocation of government industries from the
capital to regions of the country hardest hit by the mine closures, retraining
programmes for miners, and offering shares in Groningen to Staatsmijnen
(the state mining company). After its peak output in the mid-1970s, extraction
of gas at Groningen was purposely scaled back to maximize the lifetime of the
ﬁeld, though natural gas continued to play a prominent role in the nation’s
energy mix. In 2010, for instance, natural gas still provided 45 per cent of total
primary energy supply, larger than any other source (EC 2010).
The French transition to nuclear power was also swift. Following the oil
crisis in 1974, Prime Minister Pierre Messmer announced a large nuclear
power programme intended to generate all of France’s electricity from
nuclear reactors to displace the Republic’s heavy dependence on imported
oil. As the maxim went at the time, ‘No coal, no oil, no gas, no choice!’ The
‘Messmer Plan’ proposed the construction of 80 nuclear power plants by
1985 and 170 plants by 2000. Work commenced on three plants—Tricastin,
Gravelines, and Dampierre—immediately following the announcement of the
plan and France ended up constructing 56 reactors in the period 1974–89. As a
result, nuclear power grew from 4 per cent of national electricity supply in 1970
to 10 per cent in 1978 and almost 40 per cent by 1982 (Araujo 2013). As Grubler
(2010: 5186) has noted, ‘the reasons for this success lay in a unique institutional
setting allowing centralized decision-making, regulatory stability, dedicated
efforts for standardized reactor designs and a powerful nationalized utility,
EDF, whose substantial in-house engineering resources enabled it to act as
principal and agent of reactor construction simultaneously’.
Though Denmark is perhaps more famous for a transition to wind energy,
a far more accelerated transition occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. This
transition, also partially in the electricity sector, was away from oil-ﬁred
electricity to other fossil fuels and CHP plants. From 1955 to 1974, almost all
heating in Denmark was provided by fuel oil, which meant the oil crisis had
particularly painful impacts on the country’s economy (Sovacool 2013). The
Danish Energy Policy of 1976 therefore articulated the short-term goal of
reducing oil dependence, and it stated the importance of building a ‘diver-
siﬁed supply system’ and meeting two-thirds of total heat consumption with
‘collective heat supply’ by 2002. Moreover, it sought to reduce oil depend-
ence to 20 per cent, an ambitious goal that involved the conversion of
800,000 individual oil boilers from natural gas and coal. In a mere ﬁve
years, 1976–81, Danish electricity production changed from 90 per cent
oil-based to 95 per cent natural gas- and coal-based. Stipulations in favour
of CHP were further strengthened by the 1979 Heat Supply Act, whose
purpose was to ‘promote the best national economic use of energy for heated
buildings and supplying them with hot water and to reduce the country’s
dependence on mineral oil’ (Sovacool 2013: 833). As a result, CHP production
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increased from trivial amounts in 1970 to supply 61 per cent of national
electricity and 77 per cent of the country’s district heating in 2010.
A ﬁnal example is intriguing because rather than transitioning towards
something it involves transitioning away. In 2003, the government of Ontario
in Canada committed to retiring all coal-ﬁred electricity generation by 2007,
something they accomplished a few years behind schedule. Ontario’s oldest
coal plant, the 1140 MW Lakeview facility, was closed in April 2005 followed
by sequential closures of Thunder Bay (306 MW), Atikokan (211 MW),
Lambton (1972 MW), and Nanticoke (3945 MW) from 2007 to 2014. Coal
generation thus declined from 25 per cent of provincial supply in 2003 to
15 per cent in 2008, 3 per cent in 2011, and zero in 2014, as Figure 2.3 illustrates.
The primary justiﬁcation for the closure, apart from its obvious climate change
beneﬁts, was public health. A government study estimated that shifting away
from coal would reduce some 333,660 related illnesses and more than 700
deaths related to coal pollution to fewer than 6 deaths and only 2,460 illnesses.
Put into monetary terms, the ‘coal switch’ was estimated to save US$4.4 billion
per year in health, environmental, and ﬁnancial damages along with US$95
million in displaced operating and maintenance costs (Ofﬁce of the Premier
2013). To achieve this transition, Ontario invested more than US$21 billion
in cleaner sources of energy including wind, hydroelectricity, solar, and nuclear
power, as well as US$11 billion in transmission and distribution upgrades
(Toronto Ministry of Energy 2013). Ontario is on track to see renewable
sources of electricity grow to 46 per cent of supply by 2025, and typical
residential customers are expected to save US$520 on their bills, and large
industrial customers to save US$3 million each on their bills, from 2013 to 2017.
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Figure 2.3. Generation from coal in Ontario from 2003 to 2014 (in %).
Source : Author’s illustration based on the Ofﬁce of the Premier (2013).
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2.3.3 Future Energy Transitions Can Be Expedited
The ﬁnal argument in favour of expeditious transition is that although some
may have taken a great deal of time, we have learned a sufﬁcient amount
from them so that contemporary, or future, energy transitions can be expedited.
As Araujo (2013: 12) has argued:
Countries can, in fact, alter their energy balance in a signiﬁcant way—stressing
low carbon energy sources—in much less time than many decision-makers might
imagine. Critical substitution shifts within [Brazil, France, Denmark, and
Iceland] were accomplished often in less than 15 years. Moreover, these transi-
tions were effectuated even amidst circumstances at times involving highly
complex energy technologies.
Former Vice President Al Gore encapsulated this type of thinking when he
argued, in 2008, that ‘today I challenge our nation to commit to producing 100
percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free
sources within 10 years’ (Revkin 2008: 2). Gore went on to say that a complete
change in energy production was ‘achievable, affordable and transformative’
within the course of one decade.
Therefore, it is possible that innovations in both technology and policy
design can accelerate technological change, and achieve an energy transition,
in ways not possible even just a few decades ago. Put another way, techno-
logical learning and innovation can result in new technologies and systems
with the potential for exponential growth. Previous transitions such as that
from wood to coal or coal to oil occurred without the accumulation of
knowledge we have currently about the sociology, politics, and economics of
energy transitions, that is, without the complex historical analyses conducted
by the likes of those such as Smil, Lund, and Fouquet arguing for caution.
Because we now possess this knowledge, we can apply it going forward to
minimize the unnecessary lag or delay of a future energy transition. Even
Fouquet and Pearson (2012: 2) write that ‘past energy transitions may not be
the best analogies for a future low carbon energy transition’.
2 .4 CONCLUSIONS: ENERGY TRANSITIONS ARE
PATH DEPENDENT AND CUMULATIVE
How can these two almost incommensurable views be reconciled? This ﬁnal
part of the chapter offers four synthetic conclusions.
First, sometimes the ‘speed’ or ‘scale’ at which an energy transition occurs
has less to do with what actually happened and more to do with what or when
one counts. The American transition to oil, according to Smil, took about 80
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years to reach a 25 per cent share, yet during the most accelerated phase of that
transition—from 1900 to 1925—oil grew from 2.4 per cent to 24 per cent,
justifying those who would call it ‘quick’ (Pratt 1981: 9–34). For air condition-
ing, whether one takes the time of ﬁrst conception (Nikola Tesla developed
electric motors that made possible the invention of oscillating fans in 1885), ﬁrst
invention (Willis Carrier invented the ﬁrst modern system in 1902), or ﬁrst
successful commercial application (when Henry Galson developed an afford-
able mass produced system in 1947) greatly alters the perceived rate of market
penetration (Oremus 2013). Brazil’s transition to FFVs, arguably, took one year
(from the start of the national programme to large-scale diffusion), more than
twenty years (from the ﬁrst invention of a FFV in 1980), almost thirty years
(from the start of their national ethanol programme), or more than eight
decades (from the ﬁrst invention of a Brazilian engine capable of using ethanol
in the 1920s).
In the case of national transitions, we see similar ambiguity. Kuwait’s
transition to oil can be said to have begun in 1934, with the ﬁrst concession
given to the Kuwait Oil Company; or in 1937, when the ﬁrst exploratory
wells were drilled in the Burgan ﬁeld; or in 1946, when commercial produc-
tion began (the starting point taken here); or even in 1949, when the ﬁrst
reﬁnery was established. Similarly the French nuclear power programme
could have defensibly begun in 1942 with the ﬁrst chain reaction under the
Manhattan Project; or in 1945, with the formation of the Commissariat à
l’Énergie Atomique; or in 1948, when their ﬁrst research reactor was com-
missioned; or in 1974, with the launch of the Messmer Plan (or with the
1938 experiments by Lise Meitner and Otto Hahn, or even earlier!). Decid-
ing what one counts includes within it normative assumptions about what
an energy transition is; the problem is that most analysts do not make these
assumptions transparent.
Second, what may seem a sweeping transition can actually be a bundle of
more discrete conversions. As O’Connor (2010: 34) concludes, ‘Big transitions
are the sum of many small ones. Looking at overall energy consumption will
miss the small-scale changes that are the foundation of the transitions.’ This is
because sometimes choices underlying technology adoption and fuel choice
occur in technology-fuel bundles—shifts to facilitate use of higher quality or
more advanced forms of the same or substitute technology. For instance, the
big ascent of oil discussed at the start of this chapter can also be interpreted as
a series of less grand changes involving:
• The switch from animal power to internal combustion engines for private
vehicles, and the non-adoption of electric vehicles.
• The conversion of steam engines on ships and locomotives to diesel for
marine vessels and trains.
• The shift from candles and kerosene for lighting to oil-based lamps.
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• The adaptation of coal boilers to oil boilers for the generation of
electric power.
• The exchange of wooden ﬁreplaces and coal stoves to oil and gas furnaces
in homes.
Similarly, the air conditioning transition in the USA was actually the result
of concurrent innovations in air circulation, heat exchangers, heat pumps,
halocarbon refrigerants, customization and mass production, and marketing
(National Academy of Engineering 2013). It is often these ‘minor transitions’
that, when they occur in a concerted manner, create the ‘major transitions’
that are so easily identiﬁable.
Third, energy transitions are complex, and irreducible to a single cause,
factor, or blueprint. They can be inﬂuenced by endogenous factors within a
country, such as aggressive planning from stakeholders in France (Messmer
Plan), Denmark (regulations for district heating), Indonesia (a high-level
initiative backed by the prime minister’s ofﬁce), or Ontario (city and munici-
pal planners), accelerated by political will and stakeholder involvement, or
exogenous factors outside of a country, such as military conﬂict (think of
the world wars spawning the French nuclear programme), a major energy
accident (Chernobyl, Fukushima), or some global crisis (the oil shocks of the
1970s, the collapse of communism in the early 1990s). Other transitions, such
as the adoption of air conditioning or ascendance of oil in Kuwait, were almost
entirely market-driven.
The implication is that, apart from transitions directly steered by strong
policy programmes in choreographing the diffusion of technologies, most
energy transitions have no magic formula. The UK, for instance, had the
same access to natural gas that the Netherlands did, yet it was unable to
cultivate the same type of changeover (Smil 2010b). The experience of tiny,
afﬂuent countries such as Denmark and Kuwait may be relevant for countries
in a similar class (such as Belgium, Brunei, and Qatar), but less so for India or
Nigeria. Moreover, the sociocultural or political conditions behind transitions
in Brazil and China, at the time military dictatorships and communist regimes
(respectively), are incompatible with the governance norms espoused in
modern democracies across Europe and North America. Furthermore, history
seems to suggest that past transitions—including many of the case studies
presented here—are based on either discoveries of new, signiﬁcant, and
affordable forms of energy or technology, or scarcity conditions created by
oil embargos or rapid political revolutions (Pratt 1981; Friedrichs 2013). Both
abundance and scarcity have played, and will continue to play, an important
role in future transition trajectories.
Fourth, and lastly, is that given these attributes of speciﬁcity, accretion,
and complexity, most energy transitions have been, and will likely continue
to be, path dependent rather than revolutionary, cumulative rather than fully
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substitutive. Older sources of energy—such as muscle power, animate power,
wood power, and steam power—still remain in use throughout the world
today; they have not entirely been replaced by fossil, nuclear, and modern
renewable energy. One analyst at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) recently commented that, ‘we’ll use renewable energy more as technol-
ogy makes it cheaper, but we’re likely to keep using more of the other sources
of energy, too’ (Bullis 2013: 4). The motorized automobile behind (in part) the
transition to oil in Kuwait and FFVs in Brazil is actually an amalgamation of
earlier inventions fused together: the internal combustion engine, the wheel,
the casting of steel, electric lights, tyres, the assembly line, and so on. The CHP,
geothermal, biomass, wind, and solar technology behind the transitions in
Denmark, and Ontario have beneﬁted from advances in the fossil-fuel chain
including combined cycle turbines, batteries, and compressed air energy
storage. Thus, transitions often appear not as an exponential line on a
graph, but as a punctuated equilibrium, which dips and rises. To borrow
from Strunz (2014), such dips and rises could even be interpreted as forms of
highly nonlinear pathways, such as switching from one equilibrium to another.
Perhaps future energy transitions, because they can draw on synergistic
advances in multiple domains at once—cutting across materials, computing,
combustion, gasiﬁcation, nanotechnology, biological and genetic engineering,
three-dimensional (3D) printing, and the Industrial Internet—can truly be
accelerated in ways that past transitions have (generally) not been, even if it is
the twin (and contradictory) factors of abundance and scarcity driving them.
In addition, past interpretations of the pace of energy transitions, once recon-
ciled, should affect how we view the prospects for conceiving and enabling a
large-scale, low-carbon energy transition on a global scale.
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Part II
Climate Policy
This part of the book offers unique insights into the complex terrain of climate
and clean energy policies. While many prior works have addressed the efﬁcacy
of carbon-pricing via either tax or cap-and-trade mechanisms and evaluated
sectoral, national, and cross-border implications, this new work adds insights
on three particular aspects. Recognizing that the transitions toward clean
energy futures are diverse, and a multitude of policy approaches have been
implemented in the past decades and that we will likely continue to experience
a broad range of approaches, including many that incorporate carbon pricing,
and some that may not, this part enhances our understanding of the dynamics
behind climate-related policy choices and trade-offs.
The chapters in this part capture the essence of this topic through thought-
ful illustration of political constraints, international/cross-border issues, and
the complexities of renewable energy policy within the broader climate policy
portfolio. In particular, Jenkins and Karplus evaluate climate policy in the face
of binding political constraints. They employ a stylized model of the energy
sector and offer intuition about the welfare-maximizing combination of CO2
price, subsidy for clean energy production, and lump-sum transfers to energy
consumers or producers under each constraint. Secondly, Bueb, Hanani, and
Le Clézio offer new insights related to cross-border issues and outline, espe-
cially in how border carbon adjustments (BCAs) may be used as an engine
of economic and energy transition, for developed and developing countries
equally. Finally, Gawel, Strunz, and Lehmann evaluate the challenges of
realizing critical steps in implementing a multifaceted approach to climate
policy and how clean energy policies have been considered as part of a
policy portfolio.

3Carbon Pricing under Political Constraints
Insights for Accelerating Clean Energy Transitions
Jesse D. Jenkins and Valerie J. Karplus
3.1 INTRODUCTION
For decades, the economically efﬁcient prescription for the severe conse-
quences of global climate change has been clear: establish a price on emissions
of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) that internalizes
the far-reaching external costs of climate change in market transactions
(e.g., Nordhaus 1992; Stavins 1997; Stern 2007). In sharp contrast to this
prescription, a diverse patchwork of climate policy measures has proliferated,
and where CO2 pricing policies do exist, the prices established typically fall far
short of the levels necessary to fully internalize the estimated marginal social
cost of climate damages.
The failure of governments to establish a pricing (or equivalent market-
based) approach to climate change mitigation—or to adequately price carbon
when they succeed in doing so—can be largely attributed to a variety of
persistent political economy challenges. In particular, climate changemitigation
is a global collective action challenge (Olson 1984), demanding coordination
among many disparate stakeholders (e.g., nations, emitting industries, individ-
ual consumers). Meanwhile, the beneﬁts of climate mitigation are uncertain,
unevenly distributed, and accrue primarily to future generations (IPCC 2014),
while the costs of climate mitigation are born immediately, with acute distribu-
tional impacts for particular constituencies (Burtraw et al. 2002; Bovenberg,
Goulder, and Gurney 2005; Rausch and Karplus 2014). Climate mitigation thus
has all the hallmarks of an intergenerational principal agent problem
(Eisenhardt 1989), with private costs of mitigation out of proportion to the
private beneﬁts for many actors. Furthermore, climate policy must be estab-
lished through political processes, which invoke classic challenges in public
choice (Arrow 1970; Black 1987; Buchanan and Tullock 1999; Downs 1957) and
are vulnerable to capture by vested interests (Stigler 1971). Voters frequently
express limited tolerance for measures that have salient impacts on their private
welfare (such as tax or energy price increases) (Kotchen, Boyle, and Leiserowitz
2013; Johnson and Nemet 2010). Industrial sectors with high concentrations of
assets that would lose considerable value under carbon pricing policies (e.g.,
fossil energy extraction, fossil electricity production, fuel reﬁning, concrete
production, and energy-intensive manufacturing) have also mounted vocifer-
ous and often effective opposition to climate policies. As a result of these public
choice dynamics, policy-makers tend to support policies that minimize salient
impacts on businesses and households, minimize burdens on strategically
important sectors, and/or redistribute rents in a manner that secures a
politically-durable coalition. In practice, policy-makers have thus preferred
command-and-control regulations that are narrowly targeted (and thus allow
for regulatory capture while reducing scope for opposition) and subsidies
(which allow for transfers of rents while spreading policy costs broadly and
indirectly across the tax base), rather than uniformly pricing CO2 (Gawel,
Strunz, and Lehmann 2014; Karplus 2011).
These persistent political economy constraints motivate a search for climate
policies that are politically feasible, environmentally effective, and economic-
ally efﬁcient (Jenkins 2014). As in many other domains of economic regula-
tion, second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) climate policy mechanisms
abound. By paying close attention to the distributional impacts of different
climate policy instruments and their interaction with potentially binding
political constraints, economists, political scientists, and policy-makers
can help design climate policy responses that are both palatable enough to
be implemented today and economically superior to politically feasible
alternatives.
In light of these challenges, this chapter aims to develop general insights
about the design of climate policy in the face of binding political constraints.
We employ a stylized partial-equilibriummodel of the energy sector to explore
the welfare implications of combining a CO2 price with the strategic applica-
tion of revenues to compensate for and/or relieve several potential political
constraints on carbon pricing policies. Speciﬁcally, we implement constraints
of varying severity on: 1) the maximum feasible CO2 price itself; 2) the
maximum tolerable increase in ﬁnal energy prices; 3) a maximum tolerable
decline in energy consumer surplus; and 4) a maximum decline in fossil
energy producer surplus. Under each political constraint, we identify the
CO2 price, subsidy for clean energy production, and lump-sum transfers to
energy consumers or fossil energy producers that maximizes total welfare.
This chapter begins by contrasting the range of carbon pricing policies
implemented across the world with estimates of the full social cost of carbon
(Section 3.2). We then introduce our model formulation and stylized repre-
sentations of four political constraints that could explain the relatively low
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carbon prices that have been achieved to date in real world policy-making
contexts (Section 3.3). We then present numerical results demonstrating that
improvements in total welfare and carbon abatement can be achieved by the
strategic application of carbon pricing revenues under each of the four polit-
ical constraints considered (Section 3.4). Finally, we discuss the implications of
these ﬁndings for climate policy and ongoing research (Section 3.5).
3 .2 CARBON PRICING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Economists generally conceptualize climate change as a conventional envir-
onmental externality caused by emissions of GHGs, which are globally-acting
stock pollutants. As such, the traditional economic prescription involves
establishing a Pigouvian fee (Pigou 1932) on GHG emissions that corrects
for the unpriced externality, either via an emissions tax (Metcalf andWeisbach
2009) or a market-based emissions cap and permit trading mechanism (Coase
1960; Stavins 2008). While there are conceptual and practical differences
between CO2 taxes and emissions trading programmes (Aldy et al. 2010;
Weitzman 1974), here we will refer to both instruments collectively as ‘carbon
pricing policies’. If these instruments successfully establish a carbon price that
internalizes the full climate-change-related external damages associated with
emissions of CO2 and other GHGs, the private costs of GHG emitting
activities will reﬂect their marginal social costs, theoretically restoring a level
of emissions that is Pareto optimal.
Marginal damage estimates for climate change are expressed in terms of the
social cost of CO2 emissions, or the ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC). There is great
uncertainty surrounding the true estimate of the SCC, both because damages
from climate change under a given level of warming are uncertain and because
calculating such ﬁgures involves normative judgements such as the appropriate
inter-generational discount rate. As shown in Figure 3.1, a review of the literature
(Tol 2011) suggests a price on the order of $75 per tonne CO2 (tCO2) in constant
2015 US dollars is necessary in order to internalize the full SCC. The US
Environmental Protection Agency also estimates the SCC under different dis-
count rates, which federal agencies apply to estimate the climate beneﬁts of
regulations. Average estimates assuming a 3 per cent discount rate increase
over the period 2015–50 from $41 to $80 per tCO2 (EPA 2015).
While a variety of jurisdictions have implemented some form of carbon
pricing instrument, real-world examples of CO2 prices that fall squarely within
the central range of SCC estimates are few and far between (Figure 3.1).
Sweden ($130 per tCO2), Switzerland ($62), Finland ($47–62, depending on
the fuel), and Norway ($53) are all at the very high end of the spectrum. Each
of these nations is relatively wealthy and has abundant supplies of low-carbon
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prices in markets around the world, compared to the social cost of carbon.
Note: Values adjusted to 2015 US dollars; by authors using the US Bureau of Labor Statistics inﬂation index.
Sources: Authors’ illustration. Social cost of carbon estimates from Tol (2011); CO
2
prices from Kossoy et al. (2015).
electricity. Yet even these nations frequently adjust carbon pricing policies in
light of political constraints. Sweden, for example, appears to have the highest
carbon price in the world. Yet the carbon tax was implemented as part of a
series of reforms in 1991 that simultaneously reduced existing energy
taxes by 50 per cent. The total effect was to lower overall tax rates on fossil
energy consumption (Johansson 2000). Furthermore, Sweden exempts trade-
exposed, energy-intensive industries such as pulp-and-paper and mining from
the carbon tax entirely, while other industrial emitters pay only half the
tax rate. Power plants and district heating are also exempt from the tax and
instead fall under the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS),
which imposes a price of just $8 per tCO2 (World Bank 2014). Switzerland
similarly allows industrial emitters to opt out of the carbon tax if they
participate in the country’s own ETS, in which CO2 permits trade for just $9
per tonne. Meanwhile, most countries and regions that have implemented
CO2 prices to date have established prices below $15 per tonne (Kossoy et al.
2015), including the most signiﬁcant carbon pricing policies established
by the world’s largest emitters: the EU-ETS, China’s ETS pilots, Japan’s
carbon tax, and two regional programmes in the United States, the US north
east’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California’s cap-and-trade
programme.
A central premise of this chapter is that political economy constraints
explain why the majority of carbon pricing policies around the world today
fall well below the central range of estimates of the full social cost of carbon.
Any effort to transform the energy system will create economic and political
winners and losers, and introducing a CO2 price is no exception. Climate
policy design and instrument choice must therefore contend not only with
efﬁciency concerns, but also with distributional impacts and the resulting
implications for political feasibility and durability. Attention to how clever
policy design can manage the distributional impacts and costs associated with
a clean energy transition while maximizing the efﬁciency of policy measures is
an important (and elusive) challenge.
3 .3 MODEL AND SCENARIO IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present a stylized model of the energy sector to simulate
CO2 pricing and policy strategies under political economy constraints. The
model is based on a single aggregate energy demand function and two energy
supply sub-sectors: a CO2-emitting fossil energy sector and a zero-emissions
clean energy sector (e.g., renewable and nuclear energy). For analytical tract-
ability, we assume constant linear slopes for both supply and demand curves.
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We further assume the two energy supply sub-sectors are perfectly competitive
and are perfect substitutes.
We parameterize the model to roughly approximate the current US energy
sector, with 100 Quadrillion British thermal units (Quads) of energy supplied,
80 per cent of which is initially supplied by the fossil energy sub-sector and 20
per cent by the clean energy sub-sector. The initial energy price is $10 billion
per Quad (or $10 per million British thermal units), yielding an aggregate
annual energy expenditure of $1 trillion. The fossil energy sector emits 5,276
million metric tonnes of CO2, equivalent to 2013 US energy-related emissions
(EIA 2014).
Policy decisions include the level of CO2 price established, a subsidy per
unit of energy supplied by the clean energy sub-sector, and lump-sum trans-
fers to fossil energy producers or energy consumers to compensate for the
private welfare impacts of policy decisions. The model is solved to maximize
aggregate social welfare over a single time period and is subject to market
clearing constraints and one of four stylized representations of commonly-
encountered political economy constraints: a direct constraint on the CO2
price; a constraint on the increase in ﬁnal energy prices; a constraint on the
decrease in net energy consumer surplus; or a constraint on the decrease in net
fossil producer surplus. The remainder of this section describes the mathem-
atical formulation of the core model (Section 3.3.1) and the political constraint
scenarios explored (Section 3.3.2).
3.3.1 Model Formulation
Energy demand and consumer surplus—The aggregation of household, com-
mercial, and industrial demand for energy is represented as a single aggregate
inverse demand function representing the marginal beneﬁt of consumption:
MBðqÞ ¼ d−1ðpÞ ¼ αd þ βdq; ð1Þ
where q = qf + qc or the sum of both fossil (qf) and clean (qc) energy consumed
and p is the market clearing price of energy. The marginal beneﬁt of con-
sumption is declining in the quantity consumed (βd < 0) and βd is parameter-
ized based on a plausible initial point estimate of the elasticity of demand.
The intercept, αd, is then set to yield 100 Quads of total consumption in the
no-policy case at an initial price of $10 billion per Quad.
Consumer surplus is then expressed as the cumulative beneﬁt of consump-
tion less expenditures on energy and net of the welfare value of any lump-sum
transfers (rd):
CSðq, rdÞ ¼
ðq
0
MBðqÞdq−pqþ φdrd ¼ αdqþ
1
2
βdq
2−pqþ φdrd: ð2Þ
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The parameter φd captures the ‘efﬁciency’ at which sums are transferred
to consumers. If this value is set to 1.0, each unit of revenues transferred to
consumers translates directly to one unit of increase in consumer surplus.
Alternatively, if φd < 1.0, consumers do not value transfers equivalently to the
beneﬁts of consumption, requiring greater lump-sum transfers to offset initial
private surplus losses. This parameter can therefore be used to capture loss
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) on the part of consumers.
Fossil energy supply and fossil producer surplus—Fossil energy supplies are
represented via a linear marginal cost curve with ﬁnal cost sensitive to the
imposition of a CO2 price (τ):
MCf ðqf , τÞ ¼ αf þ τρf þ βf qf ; ð3Þ
where ρf is the CO2 emissions rate of fossil energy supply. Marginal costs are
increasing with the quantity produced (βf > 0) and, as with consumer demand,
βf is parameterized based on an initial point estimate of the elasticity of supply.
αf is then set to yield 80 Quads of total fossil energy production in the no-
policy case at an initial price of $10 billion per Quad.
Fossil producer surplus is expressed as the sum of revenues less cumulative
production costs and tax payments and net of any lump-sum transfers (rf):
PSf ðqf , τ, rf Þ ¼ pqf−
ðqf
0
MCðqf , τÞdqf þ φf rf
¼ pqf−αf qf− 12 βf q
2
f −τρf qf þ φf rf :
ð4Þ
As with lump-sum transfers to consumers, φf represents the ‘efﬁciency’ at
which lump-sum transfers to producers offset producer surplus losses due to
climate policy decisions.
Clean energy supply and clean producer surplus—Clean energy supply is
likewise represented as a linear marginal cost curve with ﬁnal costs adjusted by
a per-unit production subsidy (σ) applied to all clean energy production:
MCf ðqf ; σÞ ¼ αc−σþ βcqc: ð5Þ
Marginal costs are increasing with the quantity produced (βc > 0), and βc is
again parameterized based on an initial elasticity of supply with αc then set to
yield 20 Quads of total clean energy production in the no-policy case at an
initial price of $10 billion per Quad.
Clean energy producer surplus is the sum of revenues and subsidy payments
less cumulative production costs:
PScðqc, σÞ ¼ pqc−
ðqc
0
MCðqc; σÞdqc ¼ pqc−αcqc− 12 βcq
2
c þ σqc: ð6Þ
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Note that this formulation applies subsidies to both inframarginal and
marginal clean energy production. A more targeted policy measure could
reduce the required revenues by applying to marginal production only,
reducing the required revenues (and the total transfer to clean energy
producers).
Aggregate supply function—The aggregate supply curve corresponding to
the marginal cost of supplying an additional unit of energy is the horizontal
sum of fossil and clean energy marginal cost functions:
MCtðq; τ; σÞ ¼ αc−σβc
þ αf þ τρf
βf
 !
βf βc
βf þ βc
 !
þ βf βc
βf þ βc
 !
q: ð7Þ
Government revenues and climate damages—Net government revenues pro-
duced by the CO2 tax after transfers to consumers and fossil producers or used
to fund clean energy subsidies contribute to overall welfare as follows:
Rðrf ; rd; σ; τÞ ¼ φgðτρf qf−σqc−rf−rd). ð8Þ
In this case, φg > 1.0 indicates that government revenues offset other distor-
tionary taxes elsewhere and therefore deliver a ‘double dividend’ (Goulder
1998), increasing their net impact on social welfare. Alternatively, if net
revenues are assumed to be utilized inefﬁciently, this value can be set such
that φg < 1.0.
Climate-related damages associated with CO2 emissions are a simple func-
tion of the quantity of fossil energy supplied:
Eðqf Þ ¼ ηρf qf ; ð9Þ
where η is the full social cost of carbon.
Objective function and constraints—The objective function (10) maximizes
total social welfare given as the sum of consumer and producer surplus and the
welfare value of government revenues less climate-related damages from CO2
emissions. The model is subject to equilibrium market clearing constraints
(11–12).
MaxWð⋅Þ ¼ CSðq, rdÞ þ PSf ðqf , τ, rf Þ þ PScðqc, σÞ
þRðrf , rd , σ, τÞ−Eðqf Þ ð10Þ
s:t:p ¼ MBðqÞ ¼ MCtðqÞ ¼ MCf ðqf , tÞ ¼ MCcðqc, sÞ ð11Þ
q ¼ qf þ qc: ð12Þ
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3.3.2 Political Economy Constraint Scenarios
and Analytical Solutions
Direct CO2 price constraint—The ﬁrst political economy constraint considered
is a direct constraint on the level of the CO2 price of the form:
τ  τ; ð13Þ
where τ is the maximum politically feasible carbon price level and where τ<η
(the full SCC).
In this case, social welfare (10) is maximized when the CO2 price approaches
the SCC as closely as possible (i.e., τ* ¼ τ). However, due to the political
economy constraint, the carbon price remains below the full SCC (i.e., τ*<η).
Therefore, un-internalized climate-related damages remain, which can be
reduced further by using revenues to subsidize clean energy adoption and
reduce fossil energy consumption. However, the imposition of a subsidy creates
several distortions in the market, including a distortion in total consumption, a
distortion in fossil energy production, and a distortion in clean energy produc-
tion. The optimal clean energy subsidy under this constraint is thus the value
that equalizes the marginal increase in deadweight loss due to distortions
introduced by the subsidy and the marginal decrease in unpriced external
damage from CO2 emissions due to the reduction in fossil fuel consumption
driven by the subsidy. See Jenkins and Karplus (2016) for a full derivation of the
optimal subsidy level and analysis of comparative statics for this case.
Energy price constraint—The second political economy constraint we con-
sider is a constraint on the change in the equilibrium energy price after policy
decisions. This constraint takes the form:
pðτ, σÞ  p0ð1þΔp), ð14Þ
where p(τ, σ) is the equilibrium energy price as a function of the CO2 price and
clean energy subsidy policy decisions, p0 is the equilibrium energy price absent
policy intervention (i.e., p(τ = 0, σ = 0)), andΔp is the maximum per cent
change in energy price permitted by political economy considerations.
Under such a constraint, a CO2 pricing instrument alone would be sub-
optimal. The CO2 price would be allowed to rise only until it exhausts the
political tolerance for energy price increases, internalizing a limited portion of
the climate-related externality. In this case, however, welfare could be further
improved by combining the carbon price with a clean energy subsidy, which
by reducing ﬁnal energy prices ceteris paribus, allows for a larger CO2 price to
be established than would otherwise be possible. At the same time, as in the
direct CO2 price constraint case, the subsidy itself leads to substitution of clean
energy for fossil energy, further reducing deadweight loss associated with any
remaining unpriced climate externality. The welfare-maximizing CO2 price
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and clean energy subsidy level under this constraint is thus the combination
that internalizes a greater share of the climate externality and induces further
reductions in unpriced damages while balancing these beneﬁts against dead-
weight loss due to market distortions induced by the clean energy subsidy.
Again, see Jenkins and Karplus (2016) for a full derivation of the optimal
subsidy level and analysis of comparative statics for this case.
Consumer surplus constraint—Limits on the decrease in energy consumer
surplus due to climate policy form an additional political economy constraint,
captured in our model as follows:
CSðτ, σ, rdÞ  CS0ð1−ΔCS), ð15Þ
where CS(τ, σ, rd) is ﬁnal consumer surplus as a function of the carbon price
and clean energy subsidy decisions and net of any lump-sum transfers, CS0
is the consumer surplus absent policy intervention, andΔCS is the
maximum per cent change in producer surplus allowed by political economy
considerations.
Assuming efﬁcient transfers, the ﬁrst-best solution is within reach under a
constraint of this form. The welfare-maximizing strategy under this constraint
is to establish a CO2 price equal to the full SCC (τ* ¼ η) while offsetting the
impact on consumer surplus via lump-sum transfers (rc). While a clean energy
subsidy can also reduce the ﬁnal impact on consumer surplus by reducing the
ﬁnal energy price paid by consumers, this strategy is less efﬁcient than a lump-
sum transfer, as the subsidy introduces several distortions into the market.
In the case that either φc < 1.0 or φg > 1.0, this strategy incurs additional
efﬁciency losses, which must be balanced against the reduction in climate-
related deadweight loss that results from relaxing the indirect constraint on
carbon prices. If φc < 1.0, representing loss aversion on the part of energy
consumers, the most efﬁcient strategy to mitigate the impact on consumer
surplus will include a non-zero clean energy subsidy, as the subsidy also
mitigates consumer surplus loss by reducing ﬁnal energy prices. Indeed, the
welfare-maximizing strategy when φc < 1.0 would equalize the marginal dead-
weight loss associated with distortions due to the clean energy subsidy with the
deadweight loss associated with the inefﬁciency of compensatory transfers to
consumers. Cases where φc < 1.0 could therefore also be considered a hybrid of
the energy price and consumer surplus constraints.
Fossil producer surplus constraint—The ﬁnal political economy constraint
we consider is a constraint on the decline in fossil energy producer surplus
induced by climate policy decisions:
PSf ðτ, σ, rf Þ  PS0f ð1−ΔPSf ), ð16Þ
where PSf ðτ, σ, rf Þ is ﬁnal fossil producer surplus as a function of carbon tax
and clean energy subsidy decisions and net of any lump-sum transfers, PS0f is the
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producer surplus absent policy intervention, andΔPSf is themaximumper cent
change in producer surplus allowed by political economy considerations.
As with the consumer surplus constraint, assuming transfers are friction-
less, the welfare-maximizing strategy is to impose a CO2 price equal to the full
SCC (τ∗* = η) while compensating fossil energy producers as required to satisfy
the political economy constraint via lump-sum transfers (rf). As a clean energy
subsidy would only further reduce fossil producer surplus and introduce
market distortions, σ* = 0 under this constraint.
Again, if either φf < 1.0 or φg > 1.0, transfers to producers incur additional
welfare losses. In this case, the optimal transfer would equalize the marginal
reduction in climate-related deadweight loss achieved by offsetting producer
surplus impacts and relaxing the indirect constraint on the carbon price on the
one hand, and the marginal deadweight loss associated with the inefﬁciency of
compensatory payments and the impact of distortionary taxes elsewhere in the
economy on the other.
3 .4 RESULTS
In this section, we present results for a numerical simulation using the model
presented in Section 3.3. To demonstrate the mechanisms by which strategic
allocation of carbon pricing revenues achieves superior performance, we
compare two cases for each of the four political constraint scenarios deﬁned
in Section 3.3.2. a case in which a CO2 price is introduced and all revenues
collected are retained by the state, and a case in which some portion of the
revenues from the CO2 charge are used to achieve either additional CO2
reductions by subsidizing clean energy or to offset the burden on producers
or consumers through government transfers. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate
the improvement in total welfare and CO2 emissions reductions, respectively,
under each of the four forms of political economy constraints considered
herein.
In all cases, we assume the full SCC is $75 per tCO2 (as per the median
estimate from Figure 3.1), initial elasticities of demand and supply of −0.8 and
0.8 respectively, and that φg, φf and φc equal 1.0 (i.e., all transfers are friction-
less). See Jenkins and Karplus (2016) for analysis of the sensitivity of outcomes
to alternative values for the price elasticities of supply and demand.
3.4.1 Direct Constraint on the CO2 Price
In a world where the politically-feasible CO2 price remains below the full SCC,
using revenues to subsidize clean energy results in additional welfare gain and
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CO2 emissions reduction, relative to the constrained no-subsidy case, as
shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. The largest welfare gains from the subsidy
occur when the CO2 price constraint binds at low levels. In the absence of
any carbon price at all, the welfare-maximizing clean energy subsidy achieves
11 per cent of the maximum reduction in CO2 and improvement in welfare
achievable under the ﬁrst-best carbon pricing level, given these parameters. If
the allowable carbon tax is constrained at very low levels, funding the optimal
clean energy subsidies may require additional revenues from elsewhere in
government budgets, and the policy as a whole will be revenue consuming
(see Figure 3.5). When the CO2 price rises, the welfare and emissions per-
formance improvements from the clean energy subsidy decline. This is
because the optimal subsidy level decreases as the damages associated with
emissions are steadily internalized by the carbon price. In all cases, a non-zero
subsidy improves overall welfare unless the carbon price equals the full
SCC. In addition, as revenues from the tax increase, the optimal policy
becomes revenue generating (see Figure 3.5).
The direct constraint on CO2 prices is in many ways the most challenging
constraint to overcome via the strategic use of carbon pricing revenues.
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Figure 3.2. Total welfare gain under four political constraint scenarios.
Source: Authors’ analysis and illustration.
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Subsidizing clean energy in this case does not relax the constraint itself, but
merely compensates for the low carbon price by delivering additional abate-
ment. However, this abatement comes at the cost of economic distortions
introduced by the subsidy, delivering relatively modest improvements in
overall welfare. By contrast, under the other constraints, use of revenues not
only generates additional abatement but also directly relaxes the constraint
itself, allowing for higher carbon prices to be achieved than would otherwise
be possible.
3.4.2 Constraint on Final Energy Price Increases
Under a constraint on the allowable energy price increase, employing carbon
pricing revenues to subsidize clean energy enables a signiﬁcantly higher price
of CO2, as demonstrated in Figure 3.4. As clean energy subsidies reduce ﬁnal
energy prices, ceteris paribus, deploying revenues to subsidize clean energy
alternatives effectively relaxes the constraint on the energy price increase. For
example, using clean energy subsidies to offset the rising costs of energy
enables a carbon price of $35 per tCO2 even when only a negligible increase
CO2 Price ($/ton) Consumer Surplus Loss (%)
Energy Price Increase (%) Fossil Producer Surplus Loss (%)
0
25
50
75
100
0
25
50
75
100
0 20 40 60 0 5 10 15 20
0 5 10 0 10 20 30 40 50
%
 o
f M
ax
im
um
 C
O
2 
R
ed
uc
tio
ns
Constraint Cases
CO2 Tax & Strategic Revenue Use
CO2 Tax Only
Figure 3.3. Total CO2 emissions under four political constraint scenarios.
Source: Authors’ analysis and illustration.
Carbon Pricing under Political Constraints 51
in ﬁnal energy prices is permitted. In addition, as in the carbon price con-
straint case, the clean energy subsidy drives additional abatement that would
not be achieved via the carbon price alone, further improving overall welfare.
These beneﬁts again trade off against the deadweight loss due to distortions
induced by the clean energy production subsidy.
In combination, the carbon price and clean energy subsidy deliver much
greater CO2 reductions than a carbon price alone, especially when the energy
price increase is constrained at low levels (Figure 3.3). Given the parameters
assumed here, nearly two-thirds of the optimal reduction in CO2 emissions
can be achieved without increasing ﬁnal energy prices at all. Employing
revenues to fund clean energy subsidies improves the environmental per-
formance of the policy intervention until the full social cost of carbon is
internalized. Overall welfare improves similarly when revenues are used to
subsidized clean energy production, achieving two-thirds of the optimal
welfare gain even when no increase in energy prices is permitted, rising to
nearly 90 per cent when a 5 per cent increase in ﬁnal energy prices is
tolerated (Figure 3.2).
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3.4.3 Constraints on Net Energy Consumer and Fossil
Producer Surplus Loss
Unlike the prior cases, where political constraints continue to result in a
second-best CO2 pricing level, redistributing carbon revenues as lump-sum
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transfers allows the private surplus losses for energy consumers or fossil
producers to be fully offset. As a result, under constraints on consumer or
producer surplus loss, the strategic use of revenues makes the optimal carbon
price immediately feasible, provided transfers are frictionless and available
funds are sufﬁcient. When compensatory transfers are utilized, the CO2
externality can be fully internalized, maximizing welfare (Figure 3.2) and
driving optimal CO2 emissions levels for all values of the constraint
(Figure 3.3). In contrast, if compensatory transfers are not employed, the
available CO2 price rises linearly under this form of constraint as the allowable
consumer or producer surplus loss increases, and welfare and emissions
outcomes are similarly constrained.
Importantly, this ﬁrst-best outcome depends on lump-sum transfers being
frictionless and consumers and producers exhibiting no loss aversion, two
assumptions which in practice may be unrealistic. These results thus raise
three important questions: 1) what is the real loss, if any, due to frictions or
administrative overhead, which would reduce the efﬁciency of transfers;
2) what is the opportunity cost of using revenues for transfers rather than to
reduce other distortive government taxes; and 3) what is the additional
compensation, if any, demanded by loss-averse consumers and producers
(i.e., do recipients of transfers demand more than a dollar of compensation
to offset each dollar of foregone surplus)? Our framework provides a way to
consider transfer inefﬁciency and loss aversion in calculations of deadweight
loss, which will have implications for the optimal CO2 price, CO2 emissions
abatement, and distribution of welfare impacts. We will leave a full analysis of
these implications for future work.
3.4.4 Disposition of Welfare
As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the distribution of welfare under the four political
economy constraint cases differs signiﬁcantly. As one might expect, con-
sumers and fossil producers are best off under the respective cases where
political constraints motivate direct transfers to offset any surplus losses they
incur due to policy intervention. At the same time, consumers are almost
equally well off when revenues are used to subsidize clean energy in the face of
a constraint on energy price increases. Here, clean energy subsidies drive
incremental substitution of clean for dirty energy and keep ﬁnal energy prices
low, insulating energy consumers from welfare losses. Similarly, as total
reductions in fossil energy use are modest under the case where the CO2
price is directly constrained, fossil producers are nearly as well off in this case
as they are under the direct constraint on fossil producer losses. Political
constraints on the carbon price or energy price increases may therefore be
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interpreted as the indirect expression of concern about producer or consumer
surplus losses, respectively, particularly in cases where consumers and produ-
cers exhibit signiﬁcant loss aversion and thus view compensatory payments in
an inferior light.
Clean energymarket share and the growth of clean energy producer surplus is
most signiﬁcant under the energy price constraint (Figure 3.5). If the size and
relative economic importance of clean energy production sectors positively
affects the political durability of coalitions that support climate mitigation
policy and increases tolerance for future increases in carbon prices, combining
a carbon price with subsidies for clean energy producers may yield additional
dynamic beneﬁts. Similarly, incrementally higher deployment of clean energy in
the near term could drive learning-by-doing, economies of scale, or induced
research and innovation, decreasing the cost of clean energy supply in the
future, although the magnitude of these beneﬁts is uncertain. Over time, the
result would be greater mitigation at a given cost, an important dynamic beneﬁt
to consider.
3 .5 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
POLICY AND RESEARCH
Global experience to date suggest that the distributional impacts of carbon
pricing policies on energy producers and consumers make it difﬁcult to
legislate CO2 price levels needed to fully internalize the climate change
externality. This reality points to two important ongoing agendas for research:
one aimed at improving on existing estimates of the social cost of carbon and
evaluating the impacts of fully internalizing these damages through CO2
pricing, and another that starts from the presently feasible set of alternatives,
taking political constraints as binding in the near term, and evaluates options
for improving welfare and expanding this feasible set over time. In the latter
case, the goal is to identify policy designs that are not too distant from the
efﬁcient frontier and that alter the relative inﬂuence of actors in ways that
support gradual convergence towards a socially optimal CO2 price. Although
methods for estimating the SCC are still hotly debated, as long as prevailing
CO2 prices remain below the lower end of the SCC range, as they do in many
CO2 pricing systems at present, focusing on political constraints is important
to answering the critical question: how do we begin to address climate change-
related externalities as efﬁciently and effectively as possible given today’s
political realities?
In this analysis, we investigated the impact of four different political
economy constraints on carbon pricing, focusing on how the stringency of
the constraints affect the welfare gain associated with alternative uses of CO2
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price revenues. We ﬁnd that in all cases, using revenues to subsidize additional
abatement or offset private surplus loss improves total welfare, relative to a
constrained case where revenues are simply used for general government
purposes. We show that compensating for a direct constraint on the CO2
price delivers modest gains, because the beneﬁts associated with additional
abatement are offset by deadweight loss resulting from over-consumption
induced by clean energy subsidies. In this respect, a constraint on the absolute
level of the CO2 price constitutes the most restrictive case. By contrast, greater
welfare gains are possible under a constraint on energy price increases, as
carbon pricing revenues can be used to subsidize clean energy and keep ﬁnal
energy prices low, allowing a higher carbon price to be achieved than would
otherwise be possible. Indeed, when revenues are deployed to subsidize clean
energy, a substantial CO2 price is possible even if no increase in ﬁnal energy
prices is tolerated at all. Finally, using revenues to offset consumer and
producer surplus loss supports a return to optimal CO2 price levels and a
ﬁrst-best solution—with the important caveat that compensatory transfers
must be frictionless and consumers and producers do not exhibit loss aversion.
While the analysis presented herein develops intuition about how con-
straints function individually and in an idealized context, reality is inevitably
more complex. An important question for decision-makers and political
scientists involves establishing which political economy constraints bind in
the jurisdiction in question and through which mechanisms they operate. In
practice, multiple political economy constraints may bind at the same time—
for example, a high CO2 price may be unavailable because covered parties are
concerned about the resulting energy price increase, or the magnitude of the
impact on consumer and producer surplus, or all of these. In the face of
multiple political economy constraints, one potential solution would be to dip
into government budgets to further subsidize CO2 abatement or to offset
reductions in consumer and producer surplus. However, this option requires
careful consideration of the opportunity cost of channelling additional funds
to relieve political economy constraints, as potential second-best solutions will
compete with each other, and with other possible uses of public funds, for
available government revenues. Ultimately, the political feasibility of this path
is constrained by public decision-making on appropriate spending priorities,
and the nature of the climate change problem is such that near-term public
investments with more concrete beneﬁts may be preferred.
Our analysis shows that it is possible to achieve the ﬁrst-best CO2 price if
revenues can be used to offset consumer and producer surplus losses. In
reality, however, none of the transfers discussed here are likely to be friction-
less. It is important therefore to also understand the real and perceived value
of these transfers to recipients and the general equilibrium implications of
changes in government revenues. Transfers to support clean energy subsidies
may also have associated frictions, which will magnify the relative inefﬁciency
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of the subsidy. On the other hand, more targeted subsidies which only apply to
supra-marginal suppliers could reduce the overall revenues required to drive
clean energy adoption and associated mitigation, an important consideration
in cases where subsidy programmes entail additional efﬁciency losses (i.e., due
to foregone opportunities to reduce other distortionary taxes). The nature and
magnitude of these frictions and their efﬁciency implications will be speciﬁc to
particular contexts, increasing the importance of understanding and quanti-
fying their impact on interests and incentives.
The main objective of this exercise was to put an analytical framework
around the question of how we can get started down a relatively efﬁcient path
to a lower carbon world. The answer will be different, depending on the
unique political economy of the climate issue across nations and regions.
We conclude by brieﬂy illustrating the guidance this framework would offer
policy-makers under different prevailing political constraints.
First, in jurisdictions without signiﬁcant domestic fossil energy production
sectors, political constraints are likely to centre on concerns about the impact
of climate mitigation policies on household incomes and the economic com-
petitiveness of domestic industries. In such cases, the prevailing constraint is
likely to be the unwillingness of energy consumers to bear the burden of higher
energy prices and associated surplus loss. Our results suggest that an effective
policy strategy in the face of such constraints would be to establish a carbon
price while employing revenues to make clean energy cheaper and mitigate the
impact on ﬁnal energy prices (i.e., via subsidies). Any remaining politically-
salient losses to energy consumers could be offset with lump-sum transfers as
needed (e.g., to trade-exposed industries or low-income households).
Second, in jurisdictions where inﬂuential fossil energy producers and indus-
trial energy consumers are aligned in opposition to CO2 pricing, neutralizing
opposition from industrial energy consumers by subsidizing clean energy adop-
tion and keeping energy input prices low could remove a major barrier to CO2
pricing, while allowing the CO2 price to rise to a meaningful level. Remaining
resistance from the fossil energy industry could then be addressed through
transfer payments—either taken from CO2 price revenues or elsewhere in the
government budget. This strategymay bemost viable in jurisdictions with strong
domestic fossil energy sectors and relatively large energy-intensive industrial
sectors, such as steel, aluminum, concrete, or pulp and paper production.
Under either case, if political constraints relax over time, whether as an
endogenous outcome of policy or a shift in stakeholder preferences, CO2
prices could rise towards the full social cost of carbon, achieving further
welfare gains. The dynamic impacts of near-term policy decisions on political
constraints over time is thus an additional key consideration worthy of future
research. For example, encouraging near-term deployment of clean energy to
an extent that realizes beneﬁts from scale economies, learning, and a growing
clean energy constituency with a strong interest in its own continued survival
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and growth could have signiﬁcant impacts on the political durability of climate
policy over time.
Clean energy transitions will inevitably create winners and losers. The scen-
arios and analysis presented herein suggest illustrative paths by which the costs
and distributional impacts of a clean energy transition could be smoothed over
time, gradually nudging the possible in the direction of the optimal.
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4Border Adjustment Mechanisms
Elements for Economic, Legal, and Political Analysis
Julien Bueb, Lilian Richieri Hanania, and Alice Le Clézio
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Paris COP21 has been presented as both a diplomatic success and a victory for
common sense, representing considerable progress in overcoming the dead-
lock the United Nations negotiation process had been in since Copenhagen
COP15. Its ambition is indeed great and unprecedented. However, upon closer
examination of the contents of the agreement, the COP21 epitomizes old, and
perhaps even growing difﬁculties that negotiators meet when discussing an
urgently needed global, strong, and binding compromise.
Proposed by many economists but absent from the Paris Agreement, is the
deﬁnition of an international price of carbon emission, which appears in
practice extremely hard to achieve and insufﬁcient to counter biodiversity
loss or achieve broad environmental goals. It is, nevertheless, very much a
precondition for international sustainable production and consumption, since
price is the foremost economic signal to help orient economic players. It
stimulates investments and innovation in cleaner production processes and
provides a new source of ﬁnancing for public policies, be they environmental
or developmental.
As of this writing, the most important regional greenhouse gas (GHG)
pricing system is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Spearhead of the European climate policy, this carbon market has since its
inception been used as a model by other countries and regions. However,
tradable emission markets are ridden with many structural ﬂaws, which result
in a ﬁnal pricing of the carbon tonne that is much too low. Prices thus lose
their incentive function and virtuous players—those economic agents who
have already started to invest in clean technologies—are found to be at a
disadvantage.
Among the many identiﬁable reasons accounting for international inertia in
the ﬁeld, it appears that the weakness of prices (i.e., taxes and carbon market
prices) might be related to a reasonable fear of competitiveness loss, notably in
heavy industries (Branger, Quirion, and Chevallier 2013). Indeed, one of the
predominant political arguments for such low prices to internalize environ-
mental externalities1 is the (real or conjectured) loss of competitiveness for
local businesses in a globalized economy. According to this argument, local
enterprises are confronted with international competitors that would indeed
be either exempt of environmental charges, or, if they exist, under less
constraining regulations. Businesses respectful of environmental regulations
are therefore forced to accept international competitiveness loss or offshore
their production to countries with less constraining frameworks, thus annihi-
lating efforts made in virtuous countries.
In order to avoid such perverse economic and environmental effects,
several developed countries, such as France and the United States (US),
have been devising adjustment systems to guarantee the efﬁciency of their
environmental policies. These mechanisms are called ‘border carbon adjust-
ments’ (BCAs). A BCA is a tariff measure that internalizes carbon emissions
into the price of a given imported product. It is, therefore, a ﬁscal instru-
ment, which is used in complement of carbon emissions reduction tools,
such as a carbon market or a carbon tax, and targets internationally traded
goods. Its primary objective is to level the playing ﬁeld between domestic
producers facing costly climate change measures and foreign producers
facing very few.
France and Italy have repeatedly demonstrated their interest in such
mechanisms at the European level: BCAs would be enforced in the most
energy-intensive sectors (e.g., those that bear simultaneously the weight of
environmental regulation and international competition), and would target
selectively those countries that have not undertaken appropriate commit-
ments, according to their capacity and responsibility in climate change,
within the international legal framework on climate change (France 2009:
article 2). Another example is the 2009 US Waxman–Markey Bill, which
set both a BCA mechanism and a tradable emissions permit market.2 Other
developed countries, such as Japan and Australia, are studying diverse solu-
tions, and will inevitably be inﬂuenced by their European and American
counterparts. In Europe, however, strong opposition to such initiatives
persists, most notably in the United Kingdom. The same obviously applies
to developing countries, although some voices have been raised in favour of
1 Externalities are external effects created by an economic agent’s activity trading a free
advantage, or a damage (climate degradation for instance), without monetary compensation.
2 The tradable GHG emissions permits market could have been created in 2012 at the federal
level in the US, but was rejected by the Senate (Schott and Fickling 2010).
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BCAs (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013) amidst a growing recognition of the
need for a satisfying global framework.3
In the scientiﬁc literature, BCAs are also controversial. The foremost
argument against their enforcement contends that such unilateral measures
are mere kludges. The universal enforcement of a carbon price would be
more relevant and efﬁcient (Markusen 1975). Houser et al. (2008), as well as
Dröge et al. (2009), further argue that it could slow down international
cooperation on climate change, trigger economic retaliation, and foster a
return to protectionism, or stimulate emission reduction costs transfers
through trade effects. However, considering the weakly binding and limited
country-level mitigation provisions reached under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), unilateral action
is likely more useful than the status quo (OECD 2014). Moreover, their
virtuous effect on competitiveness,4 and even in increasing global efﬁciency
(Böhringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford 2012), is well documented in the
growing economic literature (OECD 2014).
Based on the discrepancy between the urgency of climate issues and the
meagre results achieved in international negotiations, this chapter weighs
the usefulness of BCAs as a complement to strong regional or domestic
environmental regulation. This leads us to discuss the interplay of economic
competitiveness and climate change, before the economic challenges posed by
BCAs in order to reach fairness in its design and implementation (Section 4.2).
Section 4.3 sheds light upon the legality of BCAs according to international
trade law, while Section 4.4 provides an assessment of policy-related implica-
tions. It outlines, in particular, how BCAs could be used as an engine of a
necessary economic transition, for developed and developing countries equal-
ly, according to the common but differentiated responsibilities principle.
4 .2 BCA IMPLEMENTATION
Environmental policy instruments fall into two categories: they are either
of a regulatory (e.g., quotas, standards, certiﬁcations) or economic (e.g., taxes,
tradable emission permits—TEPs)5 nature. In both cases, they intend to
internalize environmental externalities. BCAs can be perceived as commercial
3 In 2010, India declared its intention to bring BCA measures before the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, but has since softened its stance, based on the
idea that developed countries cannot simultaneously commit to a signiﬁcant reduction of their
emissions and bear the weight of a large reduction of their economic activity (OECD 2014).
4 See, in particular, Demailly and Quirion (2008: 497–504). Other economists defend a
contrary position, as Weber and Peters (2009: 432–40).
5 TEPs can also be referred to as ‘tradable emission quotas’ or ‘carbon markets’.
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measures devised to level the playing ﬁeld between domestic and foreign
players whose position before environmental regulation is asymmetrical. For
instance, if European producers, notably those from energy-intensive sectors,
compensate rising costs linked to the implementation of the EU ETS on the
ﬁnal customer, they might lose domestic market shares to foreign competitors.
Conversely, if they do not apply such compensation, their proﬁts, and over
time, their investments will shrink, which will reduce their ability to win. In the
end, it may lead to a transfer of investments from European companies to
foreignmarkets, as well as a joint loss of market shares on domestic and foreign
markets, resulting in severe job loss and a rise of GHG emissions outside
Europe—in other words, in carbon leakage, with its two main components:
• An ‘operational leakage’; that is, the operational delocalization of a
domestic business, induced by environmental constraints, to less regu-
lated foreign markets.
• An ‘investment leakage’; that is, the redirection of investment ﬂows from
environmentally regulated domestic markets to foreign countries where
such regulatory framework is absent.
The implementation of a BCA requires a clear deﬁnition of its ﬁeld of
application, in terms of product scope, instruments, and countries, leading to
the following questions.
4.2.1 Which Regulating Instrument(s)?
Most climate policies use a combination of instruments, but market signals
have often been a major segment of such measures.6 Indeed, when dealing
with environmental issues and in debates regarding the implementation of a
BCA, economic instruments have largely been favoured instead of regulatory
instruments. They aim to encourage, through price signals, the voluntary
modiﬁcation of behaviours to reduce pollution.
In general, BCAs may consist in (i) a tax on imported products based on
taxes applied on similar domestic products (tax adjustment on imports);
(ii) tax credits on exported products (tax adjustment on exports); (iii)mandatory
acquisition of emission permits in sectors where carbon leaks have been
identiﬁed; or (iv) the allocation of free permits for those sectors subject to
high competition. The deﬁnition of a BCA depends as well on pre-existing
instruments in the regulated zone. A border carbon tax may supplement a
carbon tax on polluting activities of a given country or zone, or complement a
carbon market. Tradable permits cannot be added to a carbon tax because they
6 For an analysis of environmental taxes and carbon markets, see Bueb (2014).
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require an operating carbon market—they would take the form of purchased,
allocated, or restituted permits instead (see Figure 4.1).
4.2.2 How to Evaluate the Carbon Content of Imported Products?
Whatever form a BCA might take, it bears on processes and not products—it
is blind to the product itself. The global political sensitivity of BCA enforce-
ment renders precise deﬁnition of sectors and products extremely critical. It
is important to evaluate correctly the carbon content of products in order to
implement fair BCA measures. Carbon content is highly variable according
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Figure 4.1. Tradable emission permits.
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to countries’ regulations and throughout production processes and across
sectors:
• Considering country regulations, environmental constraints differ and
the application of distinct BCAs according to each target country is
difﬁcult due to the amount of information needed to correctly evaluate
and categorize environmental regulations.
• On the product side, two similar products from the same sector, pro-
duced by similar companies, can have starkly different emission rates.
Within a single sector, similar goods can also be produced with very
different methods and thus have very different carbon contents: the
quantity of energy used depends on where it is produced and/or trans-
ported; the quality of energy used relates to the primary source of energy
(gas or coal), even if the ﬁnal energy used is the same.
These differences of carbon content would entail varied BCAs on similar
products, which would be very difﬁcult to implement.
Moreover, all importers should be subjected to emissions reduction obli-
gations to prevent environmental dumping. Yet, prices (i.e., tax value or the
purchase price of a permit bought by importers) need to be uniform (for
instance, based on average values). In practice, such a uniform price may
suppress individual countries’ and/or individual companies’ initiatives
regarding emissions reduction, with virtuous players remaining compara-
tively unrewarded for their efforts. There would therefore be no incentive to
invest in clean technology. A differentiated BCA system would reward
efforts in emissions reduction, but in practice still appears unmanageable.
To lessen the problem, a ﬁrst alternative could be to encourage importing
companies to willingly pass an audit on the carbon content of their products.
Another option would be demanding that companies give veriﬁable evidence
of environmental regulation compliance, for instance through a certifying
body. Such a disposition might, however, prove difﬁcult to require from
small importers considering the high administrative costs involved, in add-
ition to possibly being considered discriminating, since not all companies
would be subjected to this requirement.
Two other approaches, applied in conjunction or independently, are pro-
posed in the literature: ‘top-down’ methods, using input–output analysis to
estimate embodied energy, CO2 emissions, pollutants, and land appropriation
of international trade activities, and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, based on the
calculation of embodied carbon through the examination of production pro-
cesses of speciﬁc products. The former seems too broad and, therefore, not
easy to apply. The latter, more realistic, involves two methods: the ‘best
available technology’ (BAT) and the ‘predominant method of production’
(PMP). According to the PMP method, the country of import would apply a
BCA by assessing the carbon embedded in an import in relation to its own
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domestic production processes (Zhang 2010: 19). As for the BAT method, the
country of import would apply a border adjustment by assessing the carbon
embedded in an import compared to what the carbon emissions would be if
the best available technology had been used (Ireland 2010).
The BAT is likely the best method. It serves as a reference to assess the carbon
content of imported goods, making carbon content evaluation by an independ-
ent organism easier through the application of a single procedure used as an
international standard. Furthermore, such a measure would elude the issue of
cleaner foreign goods than those manufactured in the regulated zone.7 Offering
an impartial criterion, the BAT could possibly obtain international approval and
allow for the deﬁnition of international standards of production. Such approach
to evaluate the carbon content of products leads, however, to a comparative
assessment of production methods and processes, which might admittedly also
be difﬁcult to put into practice. Bearing in mind that BAT references do not take
indirect emissions into account (for instance, emissions due to transportation)
and also because of the difﬁculties ﬁrms have in evaluating their energy mix, the
relevance of the BAT method for audits may be challenged.
4.2.3 Which Countries Would Be Affected?
Due to the existing differences in climate change regulation between devel-
oped and developing or emerging economies, BCAs would likely primarily
affect the so-called BRICS and other developing countries.
Least developed countries (LDCs) could nevertheless be exempted, in order
to protect their fragile development. However, exceptions of this kind are
probably not the best course of action because LDCs would thus run the risk of
being altogether excluded from the decision-making process. Besides, risks of
trade infringement through LDCs are real in globalized and fragmented
production processes, where it is difﬁcult to track products and component
parts, and this would considerably weaken such a BCA mechanism.
4.2.4 Which Flows?
In order to address climate change effectively, most sectors should in theory be
subjected to environmental policies. Whether a given imported product is
liable in whole or in part to a BCA will, however, naturally depend on the
instrument in use (tax or TEP). Carbon markets cannot deal with all
7 An over-allocation of TEPs or a subsidization of these products could be complementarily
considered in order to ensure positive discriminatory treatment to those products and avoid
discouraging progressive investment in cleaner technologies.
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emissions, in particular small ﬁrms’ emissions, given the need to standardize
TEP. Taxing by tonne of emitted carbon equivalent would therefore seem
more appropriate, allowing for larger product coverage.
Attention should also be drawn to exports outside an environmentally regu-
lated area. A BCA can only restore a fair level of competition within a regulated
area. Protecting environmentally regulated businessesmay, for instance, involve a
total exemption on their exports. Such a measure, however, would most likely
encourage big emitter plants to produce for export markets, while lesser emitter
plants would concentrate on domestic regulatedmarkets. An option to avoid such
effect might be to base the adjustment level for exports on a uniform benchmark,
such as a BAT.
BCA implementation encounters, therefore, numerous practical and eco-
nomic difﬁculties, carbon cost evaluation being particularly challenging.8
However, these challenges, far from hampering BCA implementation, can
steer the design of such measure towards the most efﬁcient and fairest
emission reduction mechanism, on the way to clean energy transition. Due
to its effects on international competition and the international market, a BCA
would, of course, also need to be compatible with countries’ obligations in
respect to International Trade Law.
4 .3 BCAS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A BCA adopted by a member of the WTO should comply with the obligations
undertaken by such member within the organization. The following sub-
sections brieﬂy present insights on the ways the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)9 allows contesting or legitimizing BCA mechanisms.10
4.3.1 Challenging a BCA under the GATT Principle
of Non-Discrimination
A core obligation established amongWTOmembers is the non-discrimination
principle. This principle is notably reﬂected in the ‘national treatment’ and the
8 To avoid these manageable challenges, France has devised the path to determine the level of
a BCA using the global GHG emissions volume per capita or per unit of gross domestic product
(GDP), rather than the amount of carbon contained in a product (OECD 2014).
9 For clariﬁcation purposes, questions regarding climate change within the WTO go beyond
the GATT framework, also reaching other WTO agreements. Moreover, a country wishing to
implement a BCA in its territory will need to comply with obligations it has also undertaken
under other international treaties, including bilateral and regional trade agreements.
10 As recalled by the OECD, ‘measures that attempt to correct for carbon leakage, such as
BCAs, are likely to be challenged by WTO members with export-oriented economies and
relatively lax carbon regulation’ (OECD 2014: 15).
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‘most favoured nation treatment’ obligations. With respect to trade in goods,
which is governed by the GATT, such obligations may be summarized as
follows:
• National treatment (article III of the GATT) prohibits discriminatory
treatment through internal taxes or other internal charges (article III: 2)
between national products and foreign products that are considered like
products or directly competitive or substitutable products. It also pre-
vents a WTOmember from applying a discriminatory treatment between
like national and foreign products through laws, regulations, and require-
ments (article III: 4) (GATT 1947: article III);
• The Most Favoured Nation treatment (article I of the GATT) requires
that a preference accorded to a product originating in or being exported to
aWTOmember be extended to similar products originating in or destined
for the territories of all other members (GATT 1947: article I).
Besides the non-discrimination principle, and in order to ensure market
opening and transparency, tariff restrictions are preferred to quantitative
restrictions (e.g., quotas, import or export licences). Indeed, according
to article XI of the GATT and subject to the exclusions foreseen in
that provision, WTO members are not allowed to adopt quantitative
restrictions to trade and quantitative restrictions must be administered in
a non-discriminatory manner (article III of the GATT). BCAs might be
associated to a quantitative restriction if a member decided to impose,
exclusively on importers, the obligation to buy quotas on the carbon
market, for example. It is, however, likely that a member would rather in
such a case establish a regulatory scheme applicable to its entire market,
including domestic producers, which would be examinable under article
III (OECD 2014: 19).
In case a BCA adopted by a WTO member is considered by another
member as altering the terms of competition existing in the international
market by granting beneﬁts exclusively to domestic producers, to the disad-
vantage of foreign producers, such BCAmechanismmight be contested before
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for alleged violation of the national
treatment obligation under the GATT. The WTO judge will ﬁrstly need to
assess whether the products at issue are ‘like products’ or ‘directly competitive
or substitutable products’ according to article III of the GATT. The ‘likeness’
of products is evaluated on a case-by-case basis in WTO law, according to
criteria taken from the GATT 1947 case law: ‘the product’s end-uses in a given
market; consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country;
the product’s properties, nature and quality’ (WTO 1996a: 20). Carbon-
intensity may be raised as a distinctive feature between a domestic and a
foreign product if a member demonstrates, for instance, that consumers have a
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preference for products with a lower carbon print, even if the products are
physically identical.11
It is also tenable that, as long as the BCA entails the same level of constraint
on importers and domestic producers, a BCA would not be discriminatory
under the GATT national treatment obligation and would comply with WTO
law in this regard. For instance, the GATT allows WTO members to apply a
tax adjustment at the border when it authorizes members to levy, at the
importation of a product, a charge equivalent to an internal tax, which directly
or indirectly affects national like products (article II: 2 (a) of the GATT). The
same rationale applies to tax adjustments at exportation when these adjust-
ments simply correspond to the exemption or refund of internal duties or
taxes applied to like products destined for consumption in the country of
origin or exportation. In practice, depending on the type of BCA, such
equivalency of treatment between domestic and foreign products can, how-
ever, be difﬁcult to demonstrate. A tax imposed on importers of goods while
national producers of like products are subject to a carbon market (and not a
tax) would probably be more difﬁcult to justify or to prove equivalency of.
In the event a BCA adopted by a WTO member was contested by another
member before the WTO judge based on the GATT national treatment obliga-
tion, the difﬁculties mentioned in Section 4.2 of this chapter would also
undoubtedly complicate the parties’ arguments and the assessment to be
made by the WTO judge (e.g., WTO-UNEP 2009: 101–3). In fact, in order to
evaluate the impact of a speciﬁc BCA on competitive foreign products, it would,
for instance, be necessary to measure precisely the carbon content of a product
and the foreign product it is compared to, as well as to justify the determination
of sectors and imported products, which are targeted by that BCA. On the other
hand, it is also defensible that those difﬁculties might become less signiﬁcant
with the progressive development and larger acceptance of norms and objective
BAT references for the calculation of carbon prints.
Based on the most favoured nation treatment obligation, violation of the
GATT might in addition be alleged with respect to differences in BCAs
applied according to the (foreign) targeted country of origin or destination
of a product. One of the exceptions to the most favoured nation treatment in
the WTO is the special and differential treatment in favour of developing
and least developed countries, enshrined in varied provisions of the WTO
Agreements.12 Its implementation is, nevertheless, dependent on certain
conditions. In fact, according to the WTO special and differential treatment,
11 This might be a difﬁcult task in practice, though. See OECD (2014: 16), which recalls that
‘some authors argue that market studies most often will show that consumers generally ignore
the processes and production methods (PPMs) of products’.
12 For an overview of the WTO special and differential treatment and recent discussions on
this theme, see WTO (2015).
Border Adjustment Mechanisms 69
a member wishing to favour LDCs when deﬁning its BCA mechanism would
need to employ well-deﬁned and reasonable criteria, which would further-
more need to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to every developing
country presenting the same circumstances.13
Finally, the choice of countries targeted by a BCA could also possibly be
challenged under the principle of ‘shared but differentiated responsibilities’,
recognized nowadays as a component of sustainable development (United
Nations 1992: Principle 7). In fact, this principle has been consecrated in the
UNFCCC and it is defendable that it has been integrated as well intoWTO law
through the concept of sustainable development, which is acknowledged as an
objective of the organization (WTO 1994: Preamble, emphasis added). Such
principle requires that different countries’ capacities, social and economic
situation, and historical contribution to climate change be taken into account.
It would therefore not be unlikely for a WTO judge assessing the design and
implementation of a BCA to consider those elements in their legal reasoning
and admit that the BCA may apply dissimilar treatment to different foreign
countries according to their speciﬁc circumstances and their historical contri-
bution to climate change.14
4.3.2 Resorting to the GATT General Exceptions Regarding
Health and Environment Protection
In the advent of a contested BCA brought before aWTO judge and considered
discriminatory by the latter, and therefore in violation of the GATT, the
member having adopted the BCA would likely attempt to justify it on the
grounds of the general exceptions under article XX of the GATT. These
general exceptions are part of the general balance of rights negotiated by
WTO members (EC—Hormones (DS26 and DS48) and US—Shrimp (DS58))
(WTO 1998a, 1998b) and aim, among others, to allow members to adopt
measures for health and environmental protection that might otherwise be
considered contrary to GATT obligations. Article XX (b) and (g) of the GATT
establish exceptions for measures ‘(b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health’ and ‘(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption’.
Article XX (b) requires the fulﬁlment of a necessity criterion, implying a
proportionality control of a measure with respect to the objective that a
13 See WTO (2004: §§ 160–7). For a brief chronological overview of the special and differ-
ential treatment at the WTO, see Richieri Hanania (2009: 137–40).
14 According to Morosini (2010: 717–25), border adjustment measures in the Waxman–
Markey Bill were inconsistent with WTO law, inter alia, because they did not respect the
principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities.
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member is pursuing, as well as the availability of alternative reasonable
measures that might be less restrictive to trade but as effective. Such inter-
pretation has been applied in the well-known cases Korea—Beef (DS161 and
DS169), EC—Asbestos (DS135), US—Gambling (DS285), and Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres (DS332), where the WTO judge explained that a measure
may be considered necessary based on the importance of the interest or value
it protects, its contribution to the materializing of the objective pursued
(effectiveness of the measure), and its degree of restriction to trade (WTO
2000: §§ 160). Once these conditions are all met, article XX (b) may be
considered applicable. When defending the non-applicability of article XX
(b) to a BCA, a WTO member would thus need to demonstrate that other
alternative, as effective and less trade restrictive options existed.
Regarding article XX (g), the expression ‘relating to’ has been interpreted as
meaning ‘primarily aimed at’ (US—Gasoline (DS2)) (WTO 1996b: 15–19),
which is larger than the notion of ‘necessary’. If a BCA is demonstrated to be
primarily aimed at environmental objectives (and not only competiveness
issues), article XX (g) might be considered applicable. Moreover, in the case
US—Shrimp (DS58), the WTO Appellate Body considered that the notion of
‘exhaustible natural resources’ should be read according to contemporary
concerns regarding the protection of the environment, as deﬁned in
recent international treaties (WTO 1998b: § 129). Such decision allows for
an evolutionary interpretation of general exceptions in the GATT and dem-
onstrates the WTO judge’s wish to take into account environmental objectives
as they are progressively established in International Law under the concept of
sustainable development. Environmental interests reﬂected in a BCA might
therefore be positively considered by the WTO DSB based on contemporary
environment-related concerns and recent climate change discussions.
However, the exceptions listed in article XX are to be interpreted together with
its introductory statement, the chapeau of article XX: a measure must not be
applied ‘in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade’ (GATT 1947: article XX). In fact, should
the challengedWTOmember succeed in demonstrating that its BCAmechanism
conforms to one of the exceptions of article XX, the chapeau of that same article
would still require the WTO judge to verify how the contested measure has been
applied. In a few words, the WTO judge would need to examine, cumulatively, if:
• The defendant has attempted to cooperate with other members in a non-
discriminatory manner in order to diminish the trade restrictive effects
that the contested measure may have.
• The measure is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to account for different conditions
existing among countries, even if it is not required from a WTO member
to expressly anticipate individual conditions of each member.
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• The conception, the base principles, and the structure of the measure do
not testify to protectionist purposes. The environmental objectives of a
BCA will need to be particularly highlighted in order for a member to
respond to this condition.
While the GATT principles exposed in this section may guide the design of
a BCA, its consistency with WTO rules may only be considered on a case-by-
case basis. In case of a dispute on the matter, the WTO judge will necessarily
examine the economic features and obstacles identiﬁed in the preceding
sections of this chapter for each type of BCA, in order to assess their con-
formity to International Trade Law. Since their effects on international com-
petition and their complexity may be signiﬁcant, it is likely that, while certain
BCAs might be considered as responding to the conditions required under one
of the paragraphs of article XX, their acceptability according to the chapeau of
that same article might be problematic. Any attempt to elaborate a BCA that
respects WTO Law should therefore take into account the three cumulative
criteria listed here (pp. 71–2).
Based on the economic and legal aspects put forward in Sections 4.2 and 4.3,
the following section discusses the acceptability of BCAs from a political
sciences standpoint.
4 .4 THE POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF BCAS
IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY TRANSITION
The objectives stated in the COP21 agreement—that is, capping at 1.5°C–2°C
the global temperature increase, as well as the reference to carbon neutrality—
seem vague since no speciﬁc emissions reduction targets have been agreed
upon by the Parties to respond to the urgency in limiting global warming. The
only measure which can be viewed as relatively constraining are the ‘Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDCs).
Consequently, the implementation of BCAs remains an effective tool for
countries ready to implement, or having already committed to, a bold energy
transition. BCAs can level the environmental commitment (INDC) among
countries facing similar responsibilities in climate change. Moreover, a well-
designed BCA should aim at answering the concerns of developed countries
while promoting growth in developing countries, and should be complement-
ed by sobriety policies.15
15 Referring to the principle of primary energy consumption reduction by using less of an
energy service, also called energy sparing, ‘sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of
consumption and production’ (COP21 Paris Agreement, Preamble), behavioural change, energy
saving, energy soberness, energy sobriety, and so on. The authors have chosen to use ‘sobriety’ in
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4.4.1 Energy Transition, BCAs, and Developing Economies
As BCAs are gaining more interest from both governments and academia, the
growing body of scientiﬁc literature has mainly focused on carbon leakage and
competitiveness issues. However, another obstacle to BCAs implementation
involves their potential consequences on developing economies. Indeed, BCAs
have also been interpreted as a commercial sanction towards developing
countries, making international negotiations related to this measure more
complicated. This question has become a recurring argument against BCAs,
but requires a more careful examination of the stakes for developing countries.
In an insightful analysis of climate change and trade policy, Mattoo and
Subramanian (2013) evaluate the different forms of BCAs and their conse-
quences from both a trade and an environmental perspective. The authors
suggest the ‘least undesirable’ form of a BCA: ‘[a] border tax adjustment based
on the carbon content in domestic production would broadly address the
competitiveness concerns of producers in high-income countries while inﬂict-
ing less damage on developing-country trade’ (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013:
113). To ensure developing countries do not remain vulnerable to trade policy,
the international climate change debate, rather than WTO negotiations alone,
should also cover international agreements on such trade impact.
At the global level, matters are much more intricate when considering the
energy transition and economic development nexus. Reframing the problem, and
therefore looking for viable solutions without hampering development oppor-
tunities, have become both necessary and urgent. Mattoo and Subramanian
propose to challenge what they dub the ‘narrative’ problem, that is the historical
perspective on the industrialized countries’ responsibilities in climate change and
the past ‘colonization of emissions space’ (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013: 1).
A decisive climate change issue for developing countries relates to technology
generation and transfer. Technology generation, diffusion, and management
policies are a key component of climate change mitigation and adaptation at
the global scale (IPCC 2014). Technological change, accelerated through inter-
national cooperation, could enable developing countries to meet emission re-
duction goals. This could be achieved by shifting from the sole ﬁnancing of
emission cuts to an investment in technology generation (Mattoo and
Subramanian 2013: 18). However, reaching consensus on international techno-
logical cooperation might prove to be as difﬁcult as achieving an agreement in
international climate negotiations. Considering the urgency of climate change
matters, the unilateral implementation of BCAs could represent, beyond a
the present study, the translation of the French term ‘sobriété’, because it best describes our
current energy overconsumption and its ‘hangover’ results. Sobriety differs from efﬁciency (or
efﬁcient energy use), which refers to using less energy for a constant service.
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palliative solution, a necessity. In fact, this type of measure could serve as an
instrument to discourage environmental dumping and promote international
involvement and signiﬁcant mitigation commitments (beyond INDCs) in the
framework of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, resulting in an increase in
prices in developed countries, BCAs limit consumption in the North and leave
resources available for the South. As inequalities (of access to goods and of
income) exacerbate environmental damage, in turn further increasing inequal-
ities (UNDP 2011), BCAs could play an important role in promoting equity and
development. A BCAwould, therefore, be one step among others towards energy
transition and serious efforts in addressing climate change.
4.4.2 BCAs, an Available Tool to Reshape the World
Climate change issues, and environmental concerns at large, also present a
social dimension, which includes inequality and development issues related to
burden sharing, ultimately translated into the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities towards a carbon-free world.
In order to address that objective, green growth is often advocated, not as a
means but as an end, in different forms (sustainable and inclusive growth or
green economy). It entails the ‘greening’ of economic activities according to a
particular logic that starts with renewable energy and ends with energy
efﬁciency facilitated by technology. Yet this reasoning overlooks four essential
elements. First, economic activity is parameterized by our ability to produce
energy: the more energy per capita, the higher the growth potential in devel-
oped countries (Giraud and Kahraman 2014). Second, the ability to substitute
the primary carbon energy consumed for renewable energy depends on the
availability of materials needed for windmills or photovoltaic panels, as well as
on the pace of deployment of these systems (Roman 2014). Actually, the
historical energy return on investments rates are decreasing, all energies
considered, and more energy is needed to produce energy and to extract raw
materials, since the most accessible deposits have been or are becoming
depleted. Furthermore, if renewable energy systems are deployed too fast,
the newly created energy will be used for the production of other units of
carbon-free energy production, rather than substituting current polluting
energies (Pearce 2009). Third, the focus on renewable energy and energy
efﬁciency conceals the issues of energy embedded in products16 and ‘grey
energy’.17 Fourth, technological solutions may prove hazardous. The beneﬁts in
energy efﬁciency achieved through technological progress are real, but remain
16 Embedded energy is the energy needed to produce a given good.
17 Grey energy is the sum of embedded energy and all other forms of energy used throughout
the lifecycle of a given good until its recycling.
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insufﬁcient, particularly given the environmental urgency. In addition, the
rebound effect, process by which greater energy efﬁciency may lead to an
increased energy use (‘buy a more fuel-efﬁcient car, drive more’ rationale) is
another issue for technological developments. Finally, since innovation cycles
continue to be variable and unpredictable, waiting for a major innovation that
could completely change energy use seems too precarious.
For these reasons, sobriety policies are as necessary as renewable energies
and energy efﬁciency in order to achieve energy transition. Often disregarded
because it entails a strong political will, this policy concept challenges certain
aspects of economic growth. Sobriety policies aim indeed at classifying prod-
ucts according to utility and regulating their production and use. For instance,
organic farming based on agroecological principles should be promoted, given
the fact that such type of production of agricultural goods involves lower
inputs and fewer cleanup operations. This is where sobriety collides with
growth: any activity involving an over-consumption of energy or even envir-
onment cleanup operations contributes positively to the gross domestic
product (GDP).
The implementation of sobriety policies, followed by energy efﬁciency
policies, and the deployment of renewable energies,18 reverses the traditional
reasoning applied to climate policy and underlines the need for a strong,
compelling regulation. Dealing with the complexity of the economical–
environmental–social nexus, itself embedded in a ﬂuctuating international
context, national regulators must resort to various instruments to foster
deﬁnite changes in behaviour. BCAs are an essential component of this
array of instruments. They contribute to the development of more local,
thus ‘sober’ activities.
In addition, limiting transportation has become a necessity, as the COP21
French ambassador underlined (Tubiana 1991). Sea transportation is still not
subjected to emissions reduction and a recent emissions stabilization agreement
for air transportation agreed to at the International Civil Aviation Organization
contains no mention of objectives of 1.5°C–2°C, despite the need for greater
regulation of those sectors. Transport reduction policies, perhaps supplemented
by trade reduction policies, would encourage local production, circular econ-
omy,19 economy of functionality,20 and thus development, at any development
18 Sobriety policies and energy efﬁciency would reduce primary energy consumption by 66
per cent. As a result, the need for renewable energies would be considerably reduced, paving the
way to smoother raw materials sharing at the international level (Association NégaWatts 2011).
19 The main goal of circular economy is to enable the production of goods and services while
preventing excessive consumption and squandering of raw materials, and as to facilitate
recycling.
20 A functional economy is one that optimizes the use (or function) of goods and services and
thus the management of existing wealth (goods, knowledge, and nature). The economic objective
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stage. Again, BCAs may be seen as regulatory instruments available for the
national regulator to foster behaviour change.
Moreover, the implementation of BCAs transcends the stakes of competi-
tiveness and level playing ﬁeld issues. Seeking to reach an equitable distribution
of commitment, and considering the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, it appears necessary to shift from national production-based
emissions counts to a consumption-based approach. Considering the amount of
GHG consumed rather than produced opens a fair route, between countries as
well as within social categories, and encourages sobriety behaviours. Addition-
ally, BCAs become incentive schemes for countries to adapt production to local
needs and rethink their environmental policy. BCAs would thus become an
essential component of social and environmental justice,21 helping to depart
from a business and macroeconomic logic.
In sum, BCA enforcement would be, in all likeliness, necessary, together
with paradigm shifts, breeding strong incentives to ease developing countries’
acceptance of this instrument. Also, funds collected via BCAs should be
reallocated to objectives such as the production of more sustainable goods,
innovation, technology, or skills transfer. The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
could equally be made the recipient of all or parts of these funds.
4 .5 CONCLUSION
The commitments agreed upon by the Parties during the COP21 should lay
the foundations for any energy transition strategy but also for economic
transition policies. However difﬁcult to meet, these commitments entail a
profound, and voluntary, transformation of our societies. The BCA mechan-
ism can enable our (over)consumption societies to move towards a sober, low-
carbon society, which uses energy and resources thoughtfully. BCAs turn out
to be more than a simple restraint towards a given trade partner. It is, actually,
a powerful means to share resources.
In fact, obstacles to climate negotiations are elsewhere. Developed countries
must assume their historical responsibilities in climate change through an
effective constraining commitment to limit emissions at the national level,
which entails important internal transformations to achieve energy transition
of the functional economy is to create the highest possible use value for the longest possible time
while consuming as few material resources and energy as possible.
21 Poverty and environmental destruction are highly correlated (Laurent 2011; Keucheyan
2014).
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effectively. They should respond to demands from developing and some
emerging economies for ﬁnancing, technology transfer, and sobriety policies.
Such requirements could be accommodated through the implementation of a
global carbon price. BCAs would be useful in balancing environmental efforts
with growing equity. Difﬁculties in implementation, which appear to be more
of an economic nature than legal or political, can be overcome. The French
proposal to apply BCAs according to the global GHG emissions volume per
capita or per unit of GDP, rather than the amount of carbon contained in a
product, seems to be not only feasible, but also fair since calculation would be
favourable to developing countries. The emission ratio by MWh created by the
International Energy Agency, which tracks average GHG emissions per coun-
try for each megawatt produced, could also be employed.
BCA implementation requires, nevertheless, a strong and durable political
commitment to environmental protection and its design calls for a careful
assessment of the numerous constraints exposed in this chapter.
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5Support Policies for Renewables: Instrument
Choice and Instrument Change from
a Public Choice Perspective
Erik Gawel, Sebastian Strunz, and Paul Lehmann
5.1 THE ENERGY TRANSITION AS A
POLITICAL CHALLENGE
In order to limit the risk of climate change, mankind needs to initiate the
transition away from fossil towards clean energies now—delaying mitigation
would imply ‘much more rapid scale-up of low carbon energy’ over the period
2030–50 if any chance is to remain of restricting global warming to 2° Celsius,
or even less (COP 2015: 2), compared to pre-industrial levels. From an
economic point of view, consequently, postponing policy interventions that
facilitate the transition is costly (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Kalkuhl, Edenhofer,
and Lessmann 2012). However, timely and rigorous policy efforts to curb
fossil energies are hampered by vested interests and institutional inertia
(e.g., Helm 2010; Spash 2010).
Against this backdrop, Germany’s energy transition is a particularly fertile
research topic. Germany has set itself very ambitious transition goals that
would, inter alia, completely restructure the electricity system around renew-
able energy sources (RES) by the middle of this century (Bundesregierung
2010). So far, the German transition pathway closely follows the envisaged
trajectory as regards RES electricity expansion.1 The RES share, measured
1 Outside the electricity sector, the transformation does not unfold equally rapidly. To the
contrary, progress in transforming transport and heating is rather slow (cf. Monopolkommission
2013): within the heating sector, at least some transformation efforts are present, while the
transport sector displays strong inertia. The variety of both stakeholders and policy instruments
across the different sectors is considerable. Hence, a detailed comparison between the different
sectors lies beyond the scope of this chapter, which focuses on the electricity sector.
against gross electricity consumption, has almost quadrupled from 7 per cent
in 2000 to 27.8 per cent in 2014 and will increase up to 80 per cent by 2050
(BDEW 2015: 15). Strong international attention is focused on the transition
process—it has been referred to as the ‘possibly globally catalytic “Energie-
wende” ’ (Stirling 2014: 87). There are three reasons a successful transition in
Germany might serve as a leading international example. First, Germany
represents a highly industrialized economy (industry’s share at gross value
added was 25.5 per cent in 2013 as compared to the European Union [EU]
average of 19.1 per cent).2 Second, the starting position for the transition has
not been particularly good, with only 4 per cent of gross electricity consump-
tion being renewable electricity during the 1990s. Third, similarly ambitious
long-term goals are not common in many other nations so far.
When initiating the energy transition, which policies did German regulators
choose and for what reasons? The theoretical framework that we employ to
address this question is the Public Choice perspective: it holds that policy
choices derive from the self-interest driven behaviour of political stakeholders
(e.g., McCormick and Tollison 1981; Niskanen 1971; Olson 1971; Stigler 1971;
Tullock 1967). The transition towards clean energy is no different in this
respect: energy policy choices also involve ‘rent management’, that is, (re)
distribution of resources among stakeholders (Schmitz, Johnson, and Alten-
burg 2013). In consequence, the internalizing of climate and other environ-
mental externalities from conventional energies (e.g., nuclear risks, leaking gas
pipelines, local air pollution) might not be feasible in a direct and timely
way. The ﬁrst objective of this chapter, therefore, consists in explaining why
speciﬁc instrument choices initiating the energy transition have been made in
Germany and why they have turned out to be successful so far.
Yet, increasing the share of RES is not sufﬁcient to achieve the sustainable
transformation of the electricity system. For instance, the reduction of energy
consumption via efﬁciency measures and altered consumption patterns con-
stitutes a complementary measure. Furthermore, the rise of RES brings along
new challenges, such as controlling the costs of RES deployment, the need to
adapt the system to ﬂuctuating feed-in from wind and solar energy or the
mitigation of environmental impacts from RES generation. In consequence,
‘ﬁrst-generation’ RES policies should evolve into ‘next-generation integrated
power system policies’ (Miller et al. 2013). From the regulator’s perspective,
however, this task is fraught with uncertainties related to, inter alia, RES
generation costs, patterns of technological change, external environmental
and system integration costs associated with RES deployment, or the response
of RES investors to public policies (Purkus et al. 2015). These uncertainties
2 See: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Gross_value_added_at_
basic_prices,_2003_and_2013_%28%25_share_of_total_gross_value_added%29_YB15-de.png>.
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imply that RES policy decisions taken today may turn out to be erroneous in
the future, as new information becomes available to regulators.
The second objective of this chapter, therefore, consists in shedding some light
on the question of how the chosen support instrument can be adapted to the
manifold uncertainties of the transition. While this sounds like an unequivocal
call for political ﬂexibility, potential trade-offs arising from reduced policy
stability need to be acknowledged. Stability is a key ingredient of successful
economic policy (Weingast 1993) since uncertainty may lead to inefﬁciently
low private investment (Dixit 1992; Hepburn 2006). Moreover, the adaptation of
instruments over time may be impaired by the fact that they inevitably create
technological and institutional path dependencies. Accordingly, instruments
have to keep up with changed circumstances in order to avoid carbon lock-in
(Unruh 2000) merely being replaced with a new RES lock-in.
We are thus faced with a challenging and rather complex set of require-
ments for policy intervention to facilitate the transition towards clean
energies: substantial transition policies need to be launched right away to
ensure timely climate mitigation; the emerging policy framework should be
ﬂexible enough to enable adaptation to unforeseen challenges (for example,
technological surprises) but it should also be stable enough not to curb the
deployment of clean RES. Even for a ‘benevolent dictator’, this task would
be far from trivial.
Summing up, we frame the overall challenge of ‘how to facilitate the
transition towards clean energies’ as a two-stage Public Choice problem
applied to the case of Germany’s Energiewende. The ﬁrst stage represents the
instrument choice problem of a regulator addressing climate and environmen-
tal externalities of energy use in the electricity sector. We demonstrate that
support policies for RES better conform to the Public Choice framework than
alternative policy options. An overview of the introduction and development
of Germany’s support scheme for RES corroborates the theoretical predic-
tions. The second stage concerns the problem of instrument change regarding
necessary adaptations of the RES support scheme: in the long run, fundamen-
tal changes are inevitable to promote market and system integration of
RES. One crucial question here is which possible solutions the Public Choice
framework offers for the trade-off between political stability and ﬂexibility
(i.e., rigidity vs. uncertainty; see Acemoglu et al. 2008; Rodrik 1996): the design
of transition policies, or ‘green industrial policies’, as they have been called,
needs to take the self-interested motivations of political stakeholders into
account—otherwise, policy recommendations may well turn out to be prac-
tically irrelevant (see Rodrik 2014; Schmitz, Johnson, and Altenburg 2013).
Certainly, the Public Choice perspective is only one among a number of
possible ways to frame the transition towards clean energies; yet it brings
with it the particular merit of highlighting the politico-economic restrictions
for any transition strategy.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the
problem of instrument choice is analysed against the background of Germany’s
support scheme for RES. Section 5.3 addresses the problem of instrument
change: how to adapt existing RES support schemes to enable market and
system integration of RES. In Section 5.4, we discuss our ﬁndings from
the German case and draw conclusions for the global challenge of clean
energy transitions.
5 .2 SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLES AS A SOLUTION
TO CRUCIAL CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY
CHALLENGES
5.2.1 The Problem of Instrument Choice
In principle, policy makers could choose a range of instruments to initiate the
phase-out of fossil energies. As Table 5.1 illustrates, these instruments differ
with respect to their rent management potential, redistributing resources in a
targeted way by ‘providing (and withdrawing) opportunities for above-average
proﬁts and investment’ (Schmitz, Johnson, and Altenburg 2013: 5). For
instance, a carbon tax might be considered the most direct way to internalize
climate damage. Yet carbon taxes trigger strong resistance by emitting indus-
tries that generally prefer cap-and-trade schemes because they provide more
possibilities to extract rents—(e.g., grandfathering of emission permits; see
also Spash (2010)). In other words, getting the carbon prices right might prove
to be impossible because of the bargaining power of emitting industries:
carbon pricing puts abatement costs directly on those stakeholders represented
by well-organized interest groups.
From a public choice perspective, then, regulators can be expected to choose
those instruments that maximize stakeholder support by enabling the most
targeted distribution of rents: politicians act as transfer brokers, redistributing
welfare between different stakeholders so as to maximize their chances of
electoral success and their personal income (McCormick and Tollison 1981).
Eventually, the best organized interest groups extract rents by steering regu-
lation in their favour (Olson 1971; Stigler 1971; Tullock 1967). This perspec-
tive implies strong restrictions on the feasibility of textbook climate and
energy policy instruments: climate policy essentially constitutes a ‘carbon
pork barrel’ that waits to be distributed among stakeholders (Helm 2010), all
of whom strive to obtain the largest possible share. Once a policy instrument
has been chosen, its implementation offers another possibility of rent-seeking:
bureaucracies also follow their special interests, such as budget maximization,
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and therefore may use any discretionary power over regulatory details in their
favour (Gawel 1995; Niskanen 1971). In sum, the instrument choice problem,
as framed through the Public Choice lens, reads: how can regulators meet the
demand for transition policies in a way that maximizes stakeholder support?
Against this backdrop, support policies for RES promise two main political
beneﬁts. First, by encouraging the switch away from fossil fuels without
directly increasing the emitters’ abatement burden, they face less political
resistance from organized fossil interest groups. Instead, the burden of the
transformation is to be borne by less organized groups (e.g., electricity con-
sumers). Within the EU emissions trading scheme, RES support lowers the
allowance price and therefore makes stricter emission caps even easier to
negotiate (Gawel, Strunz, and Lehmann 2014). Second, RES subsidies consti-
tute rents to be distributed; hence, they extend the ‘rent management’
(Schmitz, Johnson, and Altenburg 2013) potential of decision makers. In
addition to these political beneﬁts, support for RES may also increase the
overall efﬁciency of energy provision insofar as such energy sources help to
address other environmental externalities beyond climate change, for which
direct policy instruments with burdening effects may not be politically feasible
(Sijm et al. 2014).
Overall, there is a wide variety of ways to organize RES support. The annual
Global Status Reports on RES development catalogue all pertinent instru-
ments applied worldwide (see REN21 2015: 99ff.). As demonstrated in
Table 5.1, the decision to support RES also needs to be accompanied by a
series of more speciﬁc instrument design choices—for instance, regarding the
level of support granted to RES or the ﬁnancing mechanism. For all of these
speciﬁc choices about RES support, the targeted distribution of rents provides
a major design incentive. In the following, we will take a more speciﬁc look at
the characteristics of Germany’s RES support framework for RES as it has
emerged over the last 25 years.
5.2.2 Germany’s Support Policies for Renewables
Until 2012, RES support was exclusively based on a feed-in tariff, comple-
mented by prioritized feed-in for RES-generated electricity. This implied a
very high degree of investment security for RES producers in two respects.
First, they received a ﬁxed remuneration for every kWh produced over 20
years. Second, even when the electricity produced was ‘superﬂuous’ (such as in
times of negative prices on the spot market, or if looming grid overload
necessitates disconnection of a wind generator from the grid), the RES pro-
ducers have been (and still are being) compensated. Efforts recently initiated
to adapt this scheme will be addressed in Section 5.3.2 on instrument change,
while this section focuses on the introductory phase of instrument choice.
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Table 5.1. Transition instruments and their rent management potential: schematic
overview
Categories of
instrument
design
Characteristics of
transition instruments
Theoretical prediction:
targeted redistribution
of rents
Empirical observation
in Germany
Internalizing instruments:
Carbon tax, emissions cap-and-trade
Price and/or
quantity
regulation
Price regulation (tax) vs.
quantity regulation
(emissions cap)
Quantity regulation
more susceptible to
regulatory capture than
price regulation
No general CO2 tax,
only sector-speciﬁc (e.g.,
gasoline), emissions
trading scheme on EU
level
Differentiation
and
exemptions
Auctioning or
grandfathering of
emission permits, tax
discounts
Cap-and-trade with
grandfathering
Cap-and-trade with
initial grandfathering
and loopholes (e.g.,
Clean Development
Mechanism credits)
Support instruments for clean energy:
Tax credit, feed-in tariff, feed-in premium (ﬁxed or ﬂexible), quota scheme, tender scheme
Support level RES production costs as
benchmark
Production cost plus
mark-up to enable rent
management
Production cost plus
mark-up
Exposure to
market risks
From low (feed-in tariff)
to high (tender
schemes) exposure
RES groups favour no
exposure to market risk
1991–2012: feed-in
tariff (no market risk);
from 2012 on: phasing
out of feed-in tariff
(slow increase in market
risk)
Differentiation
within ﬁnance
mechanism
Financing source (e.g.,
public budgets or levy
on electricity prices) and
differentiation within
eligible group
Lobby groups aim at
minimizing their
constituents’
contribution, politicians
aim at concealing costs
RES levy on electricity
prices; generous
exemptions for energy-
intensive industries
Command-and-control instruments:
Emission standards, technical standards
Performance
and/or
behaviour
regulation
Mandate a certain
standard (e.g.,
prohibition of
incandescent light
bulbs, emission limits
for car engines)
Efﬁciency standards
(performance) instead
of consumption quotas
(behaviour)
No consumption
quotas; successful
lobbying against strong
emission standards
for cars
Source: authors, based on a review of public choice literature (e.g., McCormick and Tollison 1981; Schmitz
et al. 2013) and previous original work (e.g., Gawel et al. 2014).
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Atﬁrst glance, itmight seempuzzling that RES support has been introduced at
all (see Strunz, Gawel, and Lehmann (2016) for a more detailed account of the
following argument). Industry interest groups are mostly better organized than
environmental interests (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003), and therefore they
enjoy excellent access to policymakers. This asymmetry in political clout has also
paid off in ﬁnancial terms: conventional energies have beneﬁtted from cumula-
tive subsidies that amount to several times the cumulated RES subsidies
(1970–2014: €327 billion for hard coal, €219 billion for nuclear power, €102
billion for RES; Küchler andWronski 2015: 7). So why did or could conventional
utilities not prevent the rise of a competing RES industry? When RES ﬁrst
received direct (non-R&D) subsidies under a support scheme in 1991, they
were only minor niche technologies. Hence the ‘big four’, the oligopoly of
conventional utilities that dominated the German electricity market, underesti-
mated the long-term threat posed by RES. Legislators, in turn, by positively
supportingRES (and thus bringing purchasing power to the beneﬁtting sectors at
the public expense) rather than heavily taxing fossil resources (and thus cutting
rents for powerful pressure groups), could circumvent the opposition of well-
organized conventional industry groups. Thus, the RES support represented a
seemingly harmless, symbolic way of currying favour with the environmental
movement that had been growing since the 1980s in Germany.
Yet the extension of RES support in 2000 crucially affected economic and
subsequently political dynamics. The RES share, measured against gross
electricity consumption, has risen from 7 per cent in 2000 to 27.8 per cent
in 2014 (BDEW 2015: 15). In economic terms, the increased ﬁnancial subsid-
ies for RES contributed to relative price changes to the disadvantage of
conventional energy. As a result, the conventional utilities’ proﬁts have plum-
meted in recent years, whereas the sums distributed by the RES scheme are
continuously increasing. Over time, self-reinforcing dynamics emerged (see
Strunz 2014): RES support created RES constituencies that beneﬁt from and
rely on the support scheme: ‘green jobs’ in the RES industry, small-scale RES
producers such as PV (photovoltaic) homeowners, and so on. Consequently,
the political leverage of the RES sector now rivals the inﬂuence of the con-
ventional industry, which serves to perpetuate RES subsidies (see Section 5.3).
But while the RES industry has developed into an important political player
(Sühlsen and Hisschemöller 2014), the ‘big four’ are struggling to survive
within a fundamentally changed business environment (Kungl 2015).
As regards the speciﬁc design of RES support policies, the public choice
framework points to a very clear incentive structure—the more differentiated
a support scheme is, the more the associated rents may be distributed in a
targeted way. Hence, regulators have an incentive to devise a highly differen-
tiated scheme that allows for active rent management. We maintain that
Germany’s feed-in tariff results from such rent management: in contrast to
quota schemes and feed-in premiums, which do not guarantee a targeted
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allocation of a ﬁxed and secure level of rents, feed-in tariffs enable targeted
rent management, thereby maximizing stakeholder support (see Table 5.1).
What is more, the feed-in tariff is further differentiated along three dimen-
sions: technology, spatial scale, and ﬁnancing of the scheme.
First, technology differentiation ensures that support not only reaches the
cheapest RES at a given point in time, but all the technologies of the desired
portfolio. In other words, green industrial policy may be actively differentiated
into several strands. Indeed, Germany’s feed-in tariff is highly differentiated
with respect to technology. Differentiation occurs not only between technologies
(PV, wind, biomass, geothermal energy) but also within technologies: the tariff
distinguishes, for instance, between on- and offshore wind, or between small PV
installations and large PV installations. Hence, the basic set-up allows for
pinpoint distribution of rents to separate constituencies. A major beneﬁt for
RES industries from such a differentiated scheme is that it prevents competition
between RES technologies. The structural impacts of this ‘green industrial
policy’ may be sizeable: in 2011 there were 128,000 jobs within Germany’s PV
industry (BSW Solar, cited in Hoppmann, Huenteler, and Girod 2014: 1430).
Second, inGermany’s federally organized system, regional differentiationmay
cater to spatially heterogeneous interests. Although no formal differentiation
takes place (the scheme is implemented uniformly at the national level), there
exist indirect ways to account for regional stakes by affecting consecutive
reforms of the RES scheme (see Strunz, Gawel, and Lehmann 2016). In particu-
lar, the German Länder seize every opportunity to promote regional develop-
ment through RES deployment without impacting on their own state budgets.
Conversely, in cases where regional costs exceed regional beneﬁts—this may
materialize in the form of NIMBY (not in my back yard) protests—the Länder
aim at altering or affecting national policies in favour of the constituencies
concerned. Consider the example of Bavaria, which recently lobbied for amend-
ments to the federal grid expansion plan in reaction to local NIMBY protests.
Third, regarding the ﬁnancing mechanism, differentiated consumer sur-
charges may shield well-organized interests from fully contributing to the
scheme—at the expense of less organized groups. This is precisely the situation
with Germany’s feed-in-tariff: it is ﬁnanced via a levy on electricity prices
characterized by generous exemptions for energy-intensive industries (cf.
Gawel and Klassert 2013). Due to the energy-intensive industries’ organizational
advantage compared to dispersed consumers/voters, the former succeeded in
steering regulation in their favour. In fact, high-volume users are all but exempt
from paying the RES levy: while they represent only 4 per cent of all companies,
their respective electricity share, which is burdened with a minor fraction of the
full levy (as low as 1 per cent), accounts for 41 per cent of all electricity
consumed within the industry sector (BDEW 2015). The ofﬁcial criterion for
the ‘special exemption’ from the RES levy refers to ‘high exposure to inter-
national competition’. In practice, however, the energy-intensive industries
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have fully captured the scheme in this respect by transferring the burden to
small- and medium-sized companies and household consumers (Gawel and
Klassert 2013).
The gist of this instrument choice overview: speciﬁc instrument design
choices within Germany’s Energiewende project follow the presumptions of
Public Choice theory as laid out in Section 5.2.1. Continuous lobbying efforts
by affected stakeholders (such as energy-intensive industries, the states) with
heterogeneous interests and bargaining power account for the observed
characteristics of a highly differentiated RES support scheme.3
5 .3 THE LONG-RUN PERSPECTIVE: HOW TO
INTEGRATE RENEWABLES IN ENERGY MARKETS?
5.3.1 The Problem of Instrument Change
The widespread deployment of RES means that they have grown out of their
niche existence. This success yields new challenges. These, in turn, open up
the problem of how to adequately adapt RES support over time—what North
(1990) refers to as ‘adaptive efﬁciency’. There are two main reasons, why the
energy transition requires adaptations of the policy framework (see Table 5.2).
First, multiple technological changes, and possibly surprises, have characterized
3 This is not to say that that the public choice assumptions exclusively explain all aspects of
empirically observed RES support schemes. The variety of speciﬁc instrument conﬁgurations in
the EU demonstrates that country-speciﬁc factors, such as natural conditions or political culture,
may also bear a substantial impact.
Table 5.2. Schematic overview of major transition challenges beyond RES deployment
Time horizon of
transition challenges
Categories
Short run Long run
Economic Cap expenses for
RES deployment
Market integration: expose RES producers
to market risks
Systemic Avoid grid
congestion
System integration: adapt to technological
innovations; ensure security of supply with
volatile RES
Political Avoid lock-in,
maintain capacity
to adapt
Find the right balance between stability/
rigidity and ﬂexibility/uncertainty
Source: Authors, based on a review of energy transition literature (e.g., Miller et al. 2013).
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the energy sector and will continue to do so. This concerns not only the most
imminent aspect of RES production costs but also prospective developments
of storage options and demand-side management, as well as developments in
the fossil energy sector (see the shale gas boom). So, beyond the question of
how to adequately account for RES cost decreases in RES remunerations, the
issue of how RES can be aligned with complementary technologies needs to
be addressed. This leads to the second point, namely that RES support
policies cannot stop at the single aim of increased deployment of RES (see
Miller et al. 2013). Immature niche technologies might necessitate a narrow
policy focus on capacity increases, but as RES mature, new priorities emerge:
market and system integration. With increasing shares of RES, volatile feed-
in from wind and photovoltaic power, as well as cumulating expenses for
RES support are to be dealt with. In the long run, volatile RES must
guarantee security of supply, which is not merely a technological issue but
also one of incentives—at some point in time, RES producers will have to
face price and quantity risks. Consequently, RES support needs to evolve
beyond simple deployment of RES by ﬁxed feed-in tariffs, considering all
relevant systemic repercussions (both from a technological and a socio-
economic point of view).
In other words, the danger arises that energy transition policies replace the
‘carbon lock-in’ (Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, and Lessmann 2012; Unruh 2000) with a
RES lock-in. At the same time, however, political stability constitutes an
important factor for ensuring successful economic policy in general
(Weingast 1993) and technology policy in particular (Grubler et al. 2012).
While avoiding lock-ins, political ﬂexibility gives rise to political uncertainty
and may lead to inefﬁciently low private investment (Dixit 1992; Hepburn
2006). Thus, a trade-off holds, similar to the discussion about discretionary vs.
rule-based approaches in monetary policy (see Lohmann 1992). Optimally,
the RES support scheme would be ﬂexible enough to account for unexpected
developments concerning technologies and market structures, but also stable
enough so as not to undermine private investors’ contributions to the transi-
tion process via including RES in their portfolios.
This ‘adaptive efﬁciency’ perspective needs to be linked with the Public
Choice framework. Politicians are primarily motivated to win elections, so
their incentive to conceive of a coherent mix of systemic and anticipatory
policies (see Sovacool 2009) is low compared to the overwhelming incentive to
secure instantaneous stakeholder support. Given that the status quo of RES
support represents a balanced compromise resulting from careful political
brokering of different interests, path dependency looms. Furthermore, politics
generally responds to challenges in an ad hoc way because it is intently ﬁxed
on the media attention cycle. Consequently, challenges are not met according
to the objective risk they carry but according to the actors’ capacities to
respond to the media-induced level of stress (see Prittwitz 1990). As regards
Support Policies for Renewables 89
the transition challenges, the advisable ‘integrated power system policy’
(Miller et al. 2013) remains elusive. In sum, one important prediction of the
Public Choice framework is that some degree of path dependency of the main
RES policy characteristics can be expected.
Yet, interestingly, it is, even in principle, unclear what the optimal policy
solutions to the aforementioned challenges of market and system integration
would be. For instance, can spatial issues such as system-friendly allocation of
new wind parks be adequately addressed within the framework initially set up
for launching RES or does this require a wholly new support scheme? In the
following, we analyse the German RES scheme with respect to its history of
adaptation. On this basis, we set out future regulatory options that take
restrictions of political feasibility into account.
5.3.2 Adapting Germany’s Support Policies for Renewables
Since the introduction of the current feed-in tariff for RES in 2000, it has been
regularly updated and reformed. Overall, the observed reform process con-
ﬁrms the public choice framework’s predictions. The chosen policy pathway is
highly inert in that changes to fundamentally different policy regimes are not
politically feasible. Although recent reforms have been advertised as important
breakthroughs with respect to increasing the cost efﬁciency of the scheme (in a
narrow, short-term sense), they do not expose RES producers to market risks
in any signiﬁcant way. Consider the ‘market premium’ approach to encourage
direct marketing by RES producers, which was initially introduced in 2012 as
an option (cf. Gawel and Purkus 2013). From 2012 to 2014, RES producers
could choose between the ﬁxed feed-in tariff and a sliding feed-in premium.
The latter was calculated as the difference between the average value of the
electricity (monthly spot market averages) and the tariff level. In addition,
participating producers received a so-called ‘management premium’ to com-
pensate for costs incurred through market participation. As a consequence,
RES producers made signiﬁcant windfall proﬁts but overall market and system
integration was hardly improved.
The latest policy overhaul of the support scheme occurred in 2014 (see Gawel
(2014) and Gawel and Lehmann (2014) for a more detailed analysis). While the
reformwas boldly labelled as the Renewables Support Act 2.0 (Gabriel 2014), no
far-reaching or even game-changing innovation has occurred. Among the
innovations are target corridors for PV and wind deployment and a prototype
PV tender to gather experience with tendering schemes. Moreover, the ‘man-
agement premium’ has been repealed and tariffs for new installations have been
reduced. The association of RES producers has scorned the reform and warned
that it might ‘choke’ the further deployment of RES (BEE 2013). This is clearly
exaggerated. Most likely, the direct effect of these reforms will be minor as
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regards the overall trajectory of the transition. The prototype tender may, in
the long run, constitute one possible avenue for deeper market integration of
RES. It is important to note, in this respect, that the EU Commission is
increasingly pushing for tenders as standard for RES support schemes
(European Commission 2014).
Thus reforms of the RES support scheme proceed only incrementally.
Drastic policy changes, such as the harsh retroactive cuts in Spanish RES
support in 2011–13 in reaction to the ﬁnancial crisis and the change to a
conservative government, are not conceivable within Germany’s political
culture—unless there was some major shift in the economic environment. In
particular, retroactive cuts to RES support are all but ruled out because the
principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) enjoys inviolable
status. This might also be seen from the fact that even a rather soft form of
‘disguising’ rather than rescinding old contractual RES remuneration obliga-
tions has met sharp public criticism: some politicians had put forward the idea
of a partly debt-ﬁnanced fund to cover all old support grants. However, due to
the public outcry, this proposal to essentially transfer costs into the future has
not been implemented (see Gawel and Lehmann 2014).
In conclusion, the experience of past reforms suggests a narrowly restricted
future for any reform efforts in Germany. Generally, every policy change
implies a redistribution of rents and therefore needs to be implemented
against the protest of the losing stakeholders. At the same time, politicians
clearly feel the need to display reactive capacity and self-assertion—even if via
symbolic measures only (see Edelman 1964). Against this backdrop, how
might the reiterative process of lobbying and policy making unfold? Two
countervailing forces affect the long-run adaptation process. On the one
hand, beneﬁciaries of the conventional energy system still attempt to slow
down or even derail the transition towards RES. For instance, there have been
successful efforts of political agenda-setting, as demonstrated by recent public
discussions about an alleged ‘cost-tsunami’ due to the expenses for PV power
(Frondel, Ritter, and Schmidt 2010). On the other hand, as described in
Section 5.2.2, positive feedback, arising from the feed-in tariff scheme distrib-
uting ﬁnancial beneﬁts to a sizeable portion of the electorate, makes the RES
support scheme politically resilient (Strunz 2014).
The uncertainty over the best way to fully integrate volatile RES in the
electricity market (e.g., Winkler and Altmann 2012) while phasing out
fossil and nuclear electricity provides new opportunities to extract rents. For
instance, the alleged increased risk of black-outs due to volatile RES is brought
forward as an argument for capacity markets—an instrument to the particular
beneﬁt of conventional power stations, whose introduction would, however,
constitute an essentially irreversible act from a public choice perspective
(Lehmann et al. 2015). A related example of vested interests’ regulatory impact
can be seen in recently failed efforts to introduce a ‘climate levy’ to be borne by
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Germany’s oldest lignite power stations. Since the EU emissions trading
scheme sends only insufﬁcient decarbonization signals (due to the huge
oversupply of emission permits), Germany’s lignite industry has enjoyed an
upturn in the ﬁrst half of the 2010s. In consequence, so as to ensure that
Germany’s greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2020 will not be
missed, a climate levy had been proposed. However, through a concerted
lobbying action by industry associations and unions, the polluter pays prin-
ciple was converted to polluter proﬁts in that the planned levy was replaced by
‘capacity payments’ which will be awarded to owners of the oldest lignite
plants in exchange for taking their plants off the grid while keeping them in
some kind of strategic reserve—in other words, a classic ‘golden handshake’
(see Gawel and Strunz 2015).
So at every incremental transition step, rent-seeking by affected stake-
holders will impact on the process. As long as none of the crucial stakeholders
succeeds in full regulatory capture, this need not damage the process as a
whole. Rather, one might conceive of the process as a selection between several
possible scenarios: technologically, there might be both centralized and
decentralized ways to engineer a fully RES-based system. Yet it is primarily a
question of economic power and political inﬂuence within a highly dynamic
environment that determines which of the scenarios materializes. Schmid,
Knopf, and Pechan (2015) identify necessary conditions that would bring
different actors within Germany’s energy sector into a dominant position so
as to steer the overall process in a more (de)centralized direction.
5.3.3 Systemic Challenges
The energy transition does not only require RES deployment but also the
integration of newly built RES with other elements of the electricity system
such as remaining conventional production capacities and storage options. Yet
the most prominent related aspect concerns transmission grids. Rising RES
shares put pressure on the existing grid, particularly as regards electricity
generated in wind parks along the North Sea coast that needs to be transported
to consumption centres in southern Germany. Bottlenecks loom and the
transmission system operators increasingly need to ‘re-dispatch’ power in
order to prevent grid overload (Bundesnetzagentur 2014: 16). The precise
relations between RES deployment and grid extension are, however, debated
in both an academic context and the public domain. In fact, Nordensvärd and
Urban (2015) claim that Germany’s energy policy already suffers from a lock-
in that diverts investment away from the pivotal issue of grid extension and
retroﬁtting. Yet the argument that wind support is responsible for delays in
grid extension seems much too narrow because it neglects that grid extension
itself is a public choice issue.
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Although from a systemic point of view grid extension and RES deployment
are complementary, the distributional effects of upgrading and enlarging
transmission grids are complex: ‘expanding and interconnecting grids typically
works against the interests of some producers, by eroding the ability of incum-
bents to extract rents. It also gives politicians less scope to interfere with their
national and local energy systems’ (The Economist 2015: 10). One case in point
seems to be Bavaria’s efforts to prevent new transmission lines crossing into
this southernmost state. Instead, the Bavarian government aims to increase
biomass and gas capacities—thereby obviously favouring the local distribution
of rents and backtracking on previous agreements (Hecking 2015).
Yet while this citation suggests that new transmission lines only disadvan-
tage the incumbents (insofar as the new lines serve to transport electricity
from RES), they may also serve the incumbents: a heated discussion in
Germany as to whether new connections to the south from eastern Germany,
where a lot of electricity is generated from wind but also from lignite, attests to
this point. Gerbaulet et al. (2013) reject the idea that the new lines promote the
transition, as the Federal Network Agency holds, and argue that they would
rather foster lignite production in the eastern states. Sure enough, local
NIMBY activists who oppose these new lines jumped upon this argument.
Whether an objective answer to this dispute exists, remains doubtful.
Each stakeholder naturally uses those arguments that serve to back up his
private interests.
These issues indicate a crucial insight: the market and system integration of
RES cannot be treated as a purely technical problem for which an efﬁcient
policy solution needs to be found. On the contrary, stakeholder interests,
systemic requirements, and policy options are intertwined. Only very broad
formulations of that instrument change, which is needed, may ﬁnd consensus.
It is clear that the ﬁxed tariff scheme, combined with prioritized feed-in, has
been very effective in ramping up RES deployment without regard to systemic
consequences. While this is exactly what niche support is all about, with RES
becoming a major pillar of the electricity system, the systemic effects of RES
deployment need to be addressed. Beyond this general statement, the issue
becomes one of public choice rather than technology.
Given this assessment, what might realistic reform pathways look like? In
order to illustrate, let us consider the spatial allocation of new wind farms. The
existing feed-in tariff includes a small element of spatial regulation in that less
windy locations receive remunerations that are a bit higher than their more
windy peers: hence, there is a small incentive not only to build wind farms in
the north but also in the more southern back country. Now a range of options
might lend themselves to mitigating bottlenecks on the north–south axis:
market splitting (different price zones in the north/south to incentivize cap-
acity building in the high-price zone), grid extension, even higher differentials
for windy/less windy locations, or exposure of RES producers to quantity risks.
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The latter option could mean, for instance, that RES producers receive no
compensation when wind farms have to be taken off the grid to ensure grid
stability. This would incentivize RES producers to search for storage options
and/or to locate new installations only in areas that are not prone to grid
overload. Certainly, stakeholders would protest against a decrease in the
expected value of their payoff. However, such a policy adjustment would be
broadly in line with the overall requirement of our framework: it would not
fundamentally alter but only incrementally change the existing support scheme.
Furthermore, it would align with what is envisaged in the EU Commission’s
latest State Aid Guidelines (2014 C 200/01). In case of negative spot market
prices occurring more often due to high RES feed-in (cf. Bundesnetzagentur
2014: 123), the stakeholders’ argumentative leverage against such measures
would also decline.
5 .4 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have framed the transition towards clean energies as a two-
stage public choice problem of instrument choice and instrument change. Both
stages of the transition involve active rent management to reconcile the
interests of different stakeholders. The ﬁrst stage—instrument choice—
concerns the question how to incentivize substitution away from conventional
fossil energies. From the regulator’s perspective, support policies for RES bring
a twofold political beneﬁt as compared to taxing conventional energies or
capping emissions: most importantly, RES support creates new rents for (new)
power producers, rather than reaping existing rents of incumbent producers.
Thus the transition faces less opposition from conventional energies’ (or, more
generally, emitting industries’) lobbying protests and stakeholder support is
maximized. Moreover, RES support reduces abatement costs within existing
cap-and-trade schemes, which further improves the regulator’s negotiation
position against the conventional energies’ lobbies (Gawel, Strunz, and Leh-
mann 2014). An analysis of the introduction, speciﬁc set-up, and development
of Germany’s RES support scheme corroborates the main premises of the
public choice framework: the empirically observed, highly differentiated sup-
port scheme enables targeted rent distribution to a variety of stakeholders.
The second stage—instrument change—addresses the adaptation of the
chosen policy framework in line with new transition challenges. One import-
ant issue is how to integrate high shares of volatile RES into an existing system
without compromising security of supply. Adapting the RES support scheme
might prove difﬁcult due to path dependencies: the beneﬁciaries of RES
support constitute political stakeholders who would lobby against any change
of the support scheme leaving them worse off. Indeed, our investigation of
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Germany’s current efforts to foster the market integration of RES shows that
policy adaptations have been rather symbolic so far. Moreover, RES support
establishes a speciﬁc technological transformation pathway (i.e., the system is
adapted to the needs of these technologies), which, in turn, disadvantages
potential technological alternatives. In consequence, the Energiewende trajec-
tory exhibits self-stabilizing tendencies. Despite the risks of path dependen-
cies, one might argue that there is also a positive aspect to this inertia in that
the transition pathway becomes more resilient (Strunz 2014).
Acknowledging that under normal circumstances instrument change pro-
ceeds incrementally does not imply predictability. In the case of exogenous
shocks ormajor political shifts, windows of opportunitymay open and facilitate
rapid policy change—Germany’s nuclear phase-out in reaction to the Fukush-
ima disaster in 2011 is a case in point.4 Overall, one might thus conclude that
policy change unfolds erratically, rather than in a planned and purposeful way,
and depends both on windows of opportunity and politicians’ capacity to seize
them (see Prittwitz 1990). What are we to infer from this for the transition
process? The answer, crucially, depends on our reference point. Judging single
policy decisions against the standards of static and adaptive efﬁciency would
yield a bleak picture. Yet, should stakeholder rent-seeking be framed as an
aberration or rather, more realistically, as an essential characteristic of pluralist
democracies? There exists no silver-bullet against regulatory capture—even
deliberative accounts of democracy, which strongly value public debates on an
egalitarian footing, cannot get around addressing self-interest and power (see
Mansbridge et al. 2010). Hence, the important criterion for judging transition
policies simply reads: does the transition succeed? In the long run, the crucial
issue is not whether the transition follows some hypothetical ideal path,5 but
whether the challenges are addressed in a way that enables the transition to
proceed.
What policy advice can be drawn from this analysis for the speciﬁc task of
adapting Germany’s RES support scheme? Having already passed the ﬁrst
stage of niche development, the ‘next generation’ transition challenges become
more prominent (see Section 5.3.1; also Miller et al. 2013). Germany needs to
increasingly expose RES producers to market risks (even if only incrementally
so). One next step within a pragmatic rent management strategy could make
RES producers bear quantity risks: so far, RES producers are compensated
even when installations have to be taken off the grid in order to avoid system
overload. Exposing RES producers to the risk of remaining uncompensated in
4 To be sure, the anti-nuclear movement has a long history in Germany and a ﬁrst nuclear
phase-out law had been implemented in 2000. However, Chancellor Merkel had previously
watered down the old phase-out and performed a political U-turn in response to Fukushima.
5 We have repeatedly emphasized that the surrounding uncertainty cannot be resolved
ex-ante, so the ‘optimal’ transition path remains elusive.
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times of negative electricity prices would reward system-friendly strategies
(e.g., it offers an incentive to store electricity locally). By keeping the overall
policy framework of technology-differentiated feed-in tariffs intact in general,
such a policy might avoid strong resistance from concerned RES industry
stakeholders. As long as the effects are not concentrated regionally, it would
also be compatible with Germany’s federal organization, which constrains
every legislative proposition.
While the chapter has focused on Germany as an empirical case study, other
EU member states face very similar challenges because of the EU’s ‘Roadmap
2050’, its common long-run decarbonization pathway. What is more, feed-in
tariff schemes in favour of RES have spread internationally, and so has the
need for market and system integration of renewables, which are expanding
worldwide. This does not only hold for high-income countries; in fact, 62 per cent
of low-income countries have implemented some form of RES policy (as com-
pared to 82 per cent of high-income countries; see REN21 2015: 91). Thus, the
framework of instrument choice and instrument change might also be fruitfully
applied to other contexts than that analysed here.
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Part III
Institutions and Governance
The introductory chapter to this book highlighted the importance of ‘deliberate
and global action’ to foment a clean energy transition. This naturally engages
institutions—both public and private—and places demands on governance
systems. The chapters in this part of the book focus on ‘deliberate action’ with
examples from both developed and developing economy settings.
Two chapters focus on the political economy of energy innovation, with the
natural focus being in developed countries. Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini
focus on factors that affect incentives to devote resources to energy research and
development. In a complementary chapter, Sonnesenschein considers how
policies to support energy innovation should be evaluated. Remaining in a
developed country setting,Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs consider a speciﬁc
technology: wind power. Their chapter highlights the importance of state–
market coordination in both onshore wind, a relatively mature technology,
and offshore wind, which is much more nascent.
The developing country applications are notably diverse. Yuliani examines
feed-in tariff policies in Indonesia. Kere takes a cross-country approach to
consider the factors affecting bioenergy production. Finally, Agu and Ogbeide-
Osaretin focus on the ﬁscal implications of a clean energy transition for
Nigeria with a focus on state governments. These chapters are a reminder
that a clean energy transition will both bring in the new, as in feed-in tariffs
and opportunities in bioenergy production, and require adjustments within
existing frameworks, including such major items as the ﬁnancing of state-level
government in an oil-dependent economy.

6Varieties of Clean Energy
Transitions in Europe
Political-Economic Foundations of Onshore and
Offshore Wind Development
Stefan Ćetković, Aron Buzogány, and Miranda Schreurs
6.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a broad consensus among scholars and practitioners that a wide
range of new renewable energy technologies must be standardized and become
cost-effective if energy systems are to be decarbonized and excessive climate
change avoided (Verbong and Loorbach 2012). The question remains regard-
ing the motives and capacities of different countries to advance new technolo-
gies ‘to the shelf ’ and adopt the already advanced technologies ‘from the
shelf ’ (Sandén and Azar 2005). An extensive body of literature has emerged,
particularly within the studies on sustainability transitions (Smith and Raven
2012) and national innovation systems (Suurs and Hekkert 2009), exploring
how and why renewable energy innovations develop in a certain context and
what factors determine their successful diffusion to other institutional settings.
The major shortcoming of the existing literature is that national political-
economic institutions and interests and processes which underpin them have
often been neglected or discussed in a non-systemic manner. In addressing
this gap, a recent trend in studying sustainable energy policies has been to
identify common trends across countries and explain them in relation to the
particular type of national political-economic ‘logic’. The Varieties of Capital-
ism framework (VoC) (Hall and Soskice 2001) has been suggested as a prom-
ising approach for capturing and investigating the common types of national
market economies and how they inﬂuence technology and policy choices in
energy transitions (Ćetković and Buzogány 2016).
This chapter contributes to the literature which adopts the comparative
capitalism approach to clean energy transitions in two respects. First, it
develops further the theoretical rationale for applying the VoC framework to
understand and compare national renewable energy transition pathways. It
does so by bringing back the state in the analysis and enriching the VoC
framework with the literature on national innovation systems, state–industry
relations and the corporatism vs. pluralism debate. In addition, the chapter
extends the so-far applied categorization based on the distinction between
Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market Economies, by including a
largely neglected type of what we termed ‘simple Coordinated Market Econ-
omies’. Second, the chapter demonstrates the value of the proposed framework
by exploring the fate of two related renewable energy technologies which are at
the different stage of development: one mature (onshore wind) and one infant
renewable energy technology (offshore wind). Both technologies are seen as
central for achieving a clean energy transition. This should allow for discerning
the relative importance of national vs. sector-speciﬁc features in inﬂuencing the
diffusion of renewable energy technologies.
6 .2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Our starting point for analysing and comparing how different national
political-economic structures inﬂuence renewable energy transitions is com-
parative research that emphasizes the role of state–market relations as drivers
of sectoral innovation and policy change. We draw here mainly on the
‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective that stresses the institutional differences
among developed capitalist market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). These
differences concern the question of how the political institutional context
helps or hinders ﬁrms to solve their cooperation problems. The focus of the
approach is on ﬁrms and the institutional setting they are embedded into.
According to Hall and Soskice, most developed market economies cluster into
two distinct types of capitalism, ‘Coordinated market economy’ (CME) and
‘Liberal market economy’ (LME).
The distinctions between the two main VoCs enable the systematic identi-
ﬁcation of different characteristics and likely problems that occur in LMEs or
DMEs when ﬁrms innovate and new economic sectors emerge. LMEs favour
radical, path-breaking innovation processes and hold comparative advantages
in innovation-intensive high-tech industries and services (Hall and Soskice
2001: 40–1). Innovation in CMEs is mainly taking place in traditional industry
ﬁelds, such as machinery or chemical production. In contrast to LMEs, innov-
ation in CME countries is rather small-scale, incremental, but also more
continuous. It is often based on path-dependent cooperation between ﬁrms
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and the banking sector as well as science. In general, long-term perspectives
dominate over concerns of immediate proﬁtability, a feature that is typical of
LMEs. The path-dependent innovation process in CMEs is to a large extent
structurally predetermined: industrial relations in CMEs are more oriented
towards employee participation, trade unions have a stronger say, and labour
law gives less chances for hiring and ﬁring. The innovation path is supported
also by the system of vocational training, which emphasizes interactions
between industry and research and is able to produce highly skilled workforce.
By focusing on ﬁrms and sector-level innovation, the VoC framework
disregards the role of national institutions, which often play a central role in
the development and diffusion of new technologies (see Mazzucato 2015).
Emphasizing institutional stability rather than change, the VoC framework is
criticized for being static and deterministic in character (Hancké 2009). To
address this shortcoming, we complement the VoC framework with insights
from the literature on national innovation systems on the one hand, and
comparative political science literature differentiating state–industry–society
relations on the other hand.
The literature on national innovation systems suggests that the linear model
of innovation provides an inadequate picture of how technology innovations
emerge and becomewidespread (Bergek et al. 2015). This particularly holds true
for new renewable energy technologies. Although the provision of new know-
ledge through research and development (R&D) spending (‘push mechanism’)
is critical for developing and improving renewable energy technologies (Ragwitz
and Miola 2005), their market success is contingent on a number of additional
factors. These factors are described as ‘pull mechanism’ and serve to facilitate
market formation for new technologies. This includes stable and long-term
market demand, provision of necessary skills, ﬁnancing, and supportive legal
conditions (Fagerberg 2015). One should also add the necessity of legitimization
for new technologies (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004).
The second relevant literature, focusing on neo-corporatism, welfare states,
and political systems emphasizes the political conditions for policy stability
and strategic coordination (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lijphart 1999). There are
important afﬁnities between Lijphart’s classiﬁcation of political systems as
majoritarian vs. consensus-oriented and the VoC framework’s LME vs. CME
typology (Schneider and Soskice 2009). Taking into account Colomer’s
observation that the number of parties increases policy stability (Colomer
2012), we can summarize that LMEs can be typically found in two party-
systems with high levels of policy instability, whereas CMEs usually have
multi-party systems and feature higher levels of policy continuity. Thus,
institutional and party system factors can help explain the long-term and
stable support for certain policy issues or the lack of it.
One possibility to further differentiate the political institutional context has
been suggested by Schmidt (2012), who takes a polity-oriented perspective on
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European political systems and argues that the effects of institutional arrange-
ments can be conceptualized as being ‘simple’ and ‘compound’ polities.
Whereas in simple polities the state structure is centralized and governing is
concentrated in a single authority, compound polities feature multiple author-
ities. Drawing on these insights, we distinguish between simple and compound
varieties of LME and CME (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 5).
We restrict our focus to West European states across three subtypes of
capitalist market economies: Simple LMEs (the UK), Simple CMEs (Denmark,
Sweden, Netherlands), and compound CMEs (Germany).1 The case selection
of countries is inﬂuenced by the fact that they all have signiﬁcant onshore and
offshore wind potential. We make two central assumptions. First, due to the
mechanism of strategic coordination and consensus-based policy style, both
simple and compound CMEs are more conducive to exploring economic
opportunities through strategically advancing new renewable energy tech-
nologies than LMEs. Second, emerging renewable energy technologies require
sufﬁciently plural environments in which they can grow and mobilize political
support. This implies that compound CMEs are more open than simple CMEs
to experimenting with and embracing new energy technologies.
6 .3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
6.3.1 Onshore Wind
6.3.1.1 Compound CME (Germany)
Wind power has played a central role in renewable energy development in
Germany. Initially, the wind energy enthusiasts experimented with small-size
turbines for local use while the national government directed support towards
large-scale wind power (Bruns et al 2011: 265). Eventually, the government-
funded R&D programmes encompassed a variety of wind turbine models,
from small to large installations, supplied dominantly by German manufac-
turers (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006: 263). In 1989, the government began
supporting market creation by subsidizing 100 MW of wind power which in
1991 extended to 250 MW (Lauber and Metz 2004: 201). The ﬁrst Electricity
Feed-in Law adopted in 1991 laid the ground for rapid market expansion
of wind power by introducing ﬁxed preferential tariffs (Feed-in Tariff—FiT)
for renewable electricity producers. This was accompanied by supporting
programmes for research, demonstration, and project implementation at the
1 For a more extensive analysis which also includes the case of Norway, see Ćetković,
Buzogány, and Schreurs (2016).
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national, federal, and local levels (Lauber and Metz 2004). The Renewable
Energy Law of 2000 further improved the overall framework guaranteeing
ﬁxed technology-speciﬁc tariffs for renewable energy producers for the period
over 20 years. In 2010, the government adopted the Energy Concept, which
stressed renewable energy as a cornerstone of the future energy mix and set the
target of 80 per cent renewable energy in the electricity mix by 2050 (BMWI/
BMU 2010). The Renewable Energy Law has been amended on several occa-
sions, most recently in 2012 and 2014. Although the fundamentals of the
support scheme have largely remained intact, the regulatory adjustments in
2014 entailed important changes designed to ensure better planning and more
efﬁcient integration of renewable electricity into the market (Bundestag 2014).
The R&D spending on wind energy has been consistently high, both from the
public and corporate sources (European Commission 2013: 38–9).
The growth of onshore wind installations has witnessed a continuous
annual increase ever since the early 1990s (IWES n.d.). Despite regulatory
changes, Germany added 3.5 GW of onshore wind power in 2015, the second
best annual record after 2014 (BWE 2016). By 2016, Germany had as much as
41.6 GW of the installed onshore wind power (BWE 2016) (see Ćetković,
Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8). Not only has the German policy approach
been effective in creating a vibrant domestic market for wind energy, but it
has also signiﬁcantly enhanced industrial competitiveness, innovations, job
creation, and environmental beneﬁts (Pegels and Lütkenhorst 2014; Boeckle
et al. 2010). Based on the data from 2012, the wind industry in Germany
employs 117,900 people, out of which 18,000 are in offshore wind (GTAI
2014: 7) (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8).
All this signiﬁes remarkable policy stability and overall policy success.
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that renewable energy policy in
Germany has not faced challenges, opposition, and setbacks. In fact, it was the
political contestations and ‘battle over institutions’ (Jacobsson and Lauber
2006) that made the emergence of the wind energy sector possible. The
pluralist and federal political landscape allowed the early wind energy advo-
cates to experiment with wind energy technologies, attract the attention of
policy-makers at different levels of governance (local, federal, national), and
gradually mobilize government support. Once wind energy became more
widely embraced and began producing economic gains for both citizens and
the industry, its legitimacy became increasingly difﬁcult to dispute. Jacobsson
and Lauber (2006) illustrate how the alliance of wind energy supporters from
different spheres of politics and society successfully persuaded parliament
members to refrain from reducing wind energy subsidies. This was particu-
larly critical in the formative phase of wind energy during the 1990s. As the
wind energy industry matured, it was able to beneﬁt from the already present
mechanisms of strategic state–market interaction and industrial upgrading
in Germany, typical for CMEs. This included long-term technology-speciﬁc
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government support, export promotion, vocational training, local and national
ﬁnancing instruments, and close science–industry collaboration (Ćetković and
Buzogány 2016). Overall, it can be said that the pluralist political environment
has launched wind energy on the political agenda whereas the strategic and
locally embedded state–market interactions strengthened the legitimacy of
wind energy and turned it into a successful industrial policy.
6.3.1.2 Simple LME (UK)
The UK government began supporting research on wind energy in the mid-
1970s. Whereas the basic research and education on wind energy has been
assessed as good, there has been limited collaboration and networking among
scientiﬁc institutions as well as between science and industry (Simmie, Stern-
berg, and Carpenter 2014). The key obstacle to the growth of the wind energy
sector and domestic wind power technologies has been the lack of a credible
and long-term pull mechanism from the government that would facilitate
market formation.
In 2000, the government announced plans for achieving 10 per cent of
electricity from renewable energy by 2010 ‘as long as the cost to consumers is
acceptable’ (DTI 2003: 45). In 2009, the EU set the target for the UK of 15 per
cent of energy from renewable sources by 2020. The development of both
onshore and offshore wind is essential for achieving the national target (DECC
2011: 14). The government support for renewable energy evolved from
technology-neutral support schemes, embodied in the Non-Fossil Fuel Obli-
gation (NFFO) of 1989 and Renewables Obligation (RO) of 2002, to the more
technology-speciﬁc RO model adopted in 2009 and FiT for small renewable
energy plants introduced in 2010 (Simmie, Sternberg, and Carpenter 2014).
In 2013, the government enacted the Electricity Market Reform, which foresees
a gradual replacement of the RO model with the market-based support scheme
called Contracts for Difference (CfD) by 2017. Although ROwas planned to last
until 2017, the government has announced the decision to close RO for onshore
wind already in 2016. It has even been suggested that onshore wind will be
removed from future auctions under the CfD scheme implying the end of
subsidies for onshore wind projects (Howard and Drayson 2015: 8). Other
regulatory changes have further reduced the proﬁtability of renewable energy
projects, such as the decision in 2015 to remove the exemption from the climate
change levy for electricity from renewable sources (HM Revenue and Customs
2015). Long and cumbersome administrative procedures have posed further
barriers to onshore wind development (IRENA 2012: 130).
The ﬁrst commercial onshore wind farm in the UK was built in 1991. The
deployment of onshore wind energy was slow during the 1990s. Real progress
occurred in the second half of the 2000s due to a more supportive national
policy context and the adoption of the EU Renewables Directive in 2009.
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In 2010, R&D investments in wind energy reached the highest level (see
Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 7). The largest share of R&D spend-
ing on wind energy was performed by the state rather than by corporate actors
(European Commission 2013: 38–9). 2012 was the record year in terms of the
annually installed onshore wind capacity with 1,937 MW of onshore wind
power being connected to the grid (RenewableUK 2014: 19). The overall
installed capacity in 2015 was 8.5 GW (RenewableUK 2016) (see Ćetković,
Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8). The UK domestic wind energy industry has
struggled to develop (IRENA 2012: 130). In terms of job creation, the ﬁgures
from 2015 estimate that the number of workers directly employed in the wind
industry in the UK was 15,500 (RenewableUK 2015: 3). The number of
registered patents has also been considerably lower than in Germany and
Denmark (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8).
The centralization of political power and insufﬁcient state–market coord-
ination have decisively constrained the market and industrial expansion of
onshore wind in the UK. The unitary state structure and majoritarian political
system failed to provide policy certainty and offered little space for wind
energy stakeholders to win the hearts and minds of decision makers and the
local population. Unsurprisingly, the rapid deployment of onshore and off-
shore wind in the UK between 2010 and 2015 occurred under one of the rare
coalition governments composed of the Conservative Party and the Liberal
Democrats. Given the lack of policy commitment and long-term strategy at
the national level, onshore wind projects were mainly developed at the initia-
tive of foreign investors which often faced resistance by local communities
(Simmie, Sternberg, and Carpenter 2014). The weak legitimacy and local
acceptance of wind energy technology by local communities were, in turn,
used as an argument by political elites to justify the lack of support for onshore
wind development (Hackley 2015). The devolution of political power and
increasing authority of local and regional governments in energy planning
have proven favourable for onshore wind. This is particularly the case for
Scotland, which has been the most supportive of wind power as part of its
economic and industrial policies (IRENA 2012: 128–9; RenewableUK, 2015: 4).
Overall, the absence of credible market formation from the side of the UK
government, combined with inadequate provision of skills, knowledge, and
ﬁnance have constrained the emergence of domestic wind industrial capacities
and local value creation.
6.3.1.3 Simple CMEs (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands)
The policy strategy for promoting wind energy has been most comprehensive
in Denmark. The oil crisis hit Denmark particularly hard given that the
country was highly dependent on foreign oil and lacked reliable domestic
energy resources. Somewhat similar to the German case, in Denmark two
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technological wind energy subsystems have developed in parallel: 1) small-
scale wind turbines promoted by farmers, local communities, and wind energy
enthusiasts, and 2) large-scale wind turbine demonstration and production
supported by the state (Kamp 2008). However, it was the small-scale wind
energy that accelerated the legitimacy and technological development of
wind energy in Denmark. Private owners of wind turbines mobilized and
established in 1978 the Danish Windmill Owners’ Association (Danmarks
Vindmølleforening). In the same year, the Windmill Manufacturers Associ-
ation was created. The members of the two associations collaborated closely in
gradually improving the reliability and effectiveness of wind turbines (Garud
and Karnøe 2003). In 1979, the government introduced investment subsidies
to individuals and cooperatives for installing wind turbines, which enhanced
the domestic wind power market (Buen 2006: 3890). In 1981, the long-term
goal of installing 60,000 small wind turbines by 2000 was adopted (Buen 2006:
3890). In 1993, Denmark introduced a ﬁxed FiT for renewable energy power
producers (IRENA 2012: 56). The onshore wind power installations peaked in
2000 and 2002 followed by several years of stagnation due to the government’s
decision to liberalize the electricity market and replace FiT with more market-
based instruments (IRENA 2012: 57). In 2009, the new support scheme for
renewable energies was adopted and in 2011 the government outlined a
strategy to become independent from fossil fuels by 2050 with the interim
goal of 30 per cent of energy use supplied by renewable sources by 2020.
Wind energy is central for achieving these goals (IRENA 2012: 58–9). At
the end of 2015, Denmark had 3.8 GW of the total installed onshore wind
power capacity (EWEA 2016a, 2016b). The wind industry (both onshore
and offshore) employs nearly 29,000 people and contributes to more than
5 per cent of the country’s exports (Denmark 2015) (see Ćetković, Buzogány,
and Schreurs 2016: 8).
The oil crisis and the referendum decision to phase out nuclear energy in
1980 led to increasing public support for R&D in wind energy in Sweden.
However, market creation instruments and long-term targets were lacking.
This prevented the uptake of the domestic wind energy market (Söderholm
et al. 2007: 368). The R&D support was rather narrow focusing only on large-
scale wind power facilities (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004: 221). It was only during
the mid-1990s and early 2000s that the installed wind power capacity started
to grow due to the introduced technology-neutral green certiﬁcate scheme
(Söderholm et al. 2007: 369). The size of the domestic wind energy market
was still considerably smaller than in Germany and Denmark (Söderholm et al.
2007: 370) and lacked domestic suppliers of wind energy components
(Jacobsson and Bergek 2004: 223). The initial impact of the support scheme
was limited but wind power deployment rates have seen a steady increase in
recent years. Several factors contributed to this: the EU renewable energy
directive, the expansion of the green electricity scheme to Norway, cost
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reduction of wind energy andmore active state role (see Giest 2015). By the end
of 2015, Sweden had 6 GW of the total installed wind power (EWEA 2016b), of
which 0.2 GW was offshore (EWEA 2016a) (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and
Schreurs 2016: 8). Sweden has thus been able to develop its domestic wind
market recently but with the limited involvement of the domestic wind industry
and consequently small economic beneﬁts in terms of innovations, job creation,
and exports.
The promotion of wind energy in the Netherlands during the 1970s
and 1980s resembled the policy approach taken in Germany and Denmark,
characterized by broad R&D support, inclusion of local suppliers, and invest-
ment subsidies (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004: 222). The political commitment
decreased in the following period and the problems of building permits and
spatial planning at the local level hampered market creation (Jacobsson and
Bergek 2004: 226). Both large-scale and small-scale wind energy innovation
systems existed in the Netherlands (Kamp 2008: 281). The development of
large-scale wind turbines was almost entirely science-led with insufﬁcient
collaboration with the industry and electricity companies (Kamp 2008: 281).
The focus of the Dutch wind policy was on energy utilities as main project
developers (Wolsink 1996). The small-scale innovation system proved more
successful but investment subsidies for promoting the demand were intro-
duced only in 1986 (Kamp 2008: 283). Eventually, the progress was slow and
ultimately hampered by the problems of local resistance, spatial planning, and
the lack of willingness of central authorities to streamline administrative
procedures (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004; Kamp 2008). All but one wind
turbine manufacturer in the Netherlands disappeared from the market by
2000 (Kamp 2008: 283). In 1994, the budget for wind energy was signiﬁcantly
cut (Wolsink 1996: 1084) and reliance on a market-based approach gained
prominence in the light of the privatization and deregulation reforms. The
government adopted FiTs in 2003 aiming to reduce investment risks and
promote the domestic supply of renewable energy (van Rooijen and van
Wees 2006: 63). In 2010, the Netherlands had only 3.6 per cent of energy
from renewables (Statistics Netherlands 2010), compared to the national
target of 14 per cent by 2020. Following several changes to the support scheme,
in 2011 a so-called SDE+ scheme was introduced with the sole purpose of
meeting national targets in the most cost-efﬁcient manner. In 2013 a society-
wide consensus was reached on energy transition but it was acknowledged that
national renewable energy targets for 2020 are not achievable (PLB 2014). By
2016, the Netherlands installed 3.4 GW of wind power (EWEA 2016b), of
which 0.4 GW was in offshore wind (EWEA 2016a) (see Ćetković, Buzogány,
and Schreurs 2016: 8). The Dutch wind energy sector is not of national
signiﬁcance but it is relatively well positioned internationally, particularly in
operation and maintenance as well as manufacturing of small wind turbines
(IEA WIND 2014: 134).
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All surveyed simple CME countries, except Denmark, have failed to
promote innovations in and capture direct economic beneﬁts from onshore
wind. The growth of the domestic market was notable initially, followed by a
period of stagnation and relatively recent revival, especially in Sweden. How
can the analysis of the national political-economic setting account for this
development? In terms of the plurality of their political systems, simple
CMEs are positioned between compound CMEs and LMEs. They have a
multi-party system but with a unitary state structure and a strong tradition
of a consensus-seeking policy style. It is precisely this overly consensus-based
decision-making process that has hampered wind energy innovations. Both
Sweden and the Netherlands are characterized by powerful national energy
actors in hydropower (Sweden) and natural gas (Netherlands) with a rather
hierarchical structure and strong state involvement, particularly characteristic
for Sweden (Pettersson et al. 2010). It thus does not come as a surprise that
early efforts to promote wind energy were crafted along the existing policy
paradigm with energy utilities as natural partners. Such strategies not only
proved inadequate for promoting diverse wind energy innovations, but were
also ill-equipped to ensure market creation due to the reluctance of power
utilities to rethink their business models and invest in new and ﬁnancially
risky wind energy. The Danish situation was the exception due to the lack of
conventional domestic energy resources and a long tradition of distributed
energy generation and cooperatives (van der Vleuten and Raven 2006). This
created the space for domestic manufacturers to engage in developing and
incrementally expanding the production of wind turbines. All three countries
have strong systems of strategic state–industry–science–society coordination, but
only inDenmark could the wind energy industrymobilize the necessary support.
6.3.2 Offshore Wind
6.3.2.1 Compound CME (Germany)
Offshore wind energy was not the focus of decision makers in Germany for a
long time. There was insufﬁcient knowledge about the challenges and costs of
offshore wind technology. The initial FiTs and regulations for connecting
renewable energy power plants to the grid were not suitable for driving the
expansion of offshore wind projects. In 2002, the government published a
strategy for the use of offshore wind in Germany (German Government 2002).
It set the objective of 2–3 GW of offshore wind capacity to be installed by 2010,
followed by 20–25 GW by 2030. These targets soon proved overly ambitious.
Gradually, the regulatory and institutional changes were put forward to
streamline administrative procedures, connect important actors in the ﬁeld,
and make offshore wind energy projects more attractive for investors. In 2006,
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amendments to the regulatory framework were made to shift the responsibility
of providing grid connections from project developers to a Transmission
System Operator (TSO) (Fitch-Roy 2015: 7). In 2011, the responsible ministry
and state-owned development bank (KfW) launched the ‘KfW Offshore Wind
Energy Programme’ to facilitate the ﬁnancing of offshore wind energy projects
(KfW 2015). Following the disputes about the grid connections between
project developers and Tennet as the main TSO in 2012, the Federal Minister
of Economy played a pivotal role through the so called ‘AG Beschleunigung’
(Acceleration) initiative in bringing together the actors from the industry and
the government and resolving open questions. This resulted in the revisions to
the Renewable Energy Law in 2012 and 2014 which speciﬁed remuneration
FiT models for offshore wind parks. The revisions from 2014 also deﬁne more
realistic long-term targets for offshore wind energy development including
6.5–10 GW by 2020 and 15–25 GW by 2030 (Anzinger and Kostka 2015: 15).
The ﬁrst commercial offshore wind park in Germany was built only in 2011.
However, over the last two years, the German offshore wind market has been
the most dynamic in Europe, alongside the UK. In 2015, Germany installed
the highest amount of offshore wind power in Europe (2.3 GW) making the
total offshore wind power capacity of 3.3 GW (EWEA 2016a). The expansion
of the domestic offshore wind market has provided a boost for the already
highly internationally competitive national wind energy clusters located in
North-West Germany. The estimates from 2012 show that 18,000 people are
directly employed in the offshore wind energy sector in Germany (GTAI 2014: 7)
(see Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8).
The recent success and the relatively certain long-term prospect of offshore
wind energy in Germany represent a continuation of the German renewable
energy market and industrial policy, building on the previously secured legit-
imacy of wind energy technology, established industrial networks and know-
how, and the political consensus on the need for energy transition. The strategic
state–market–science coordination proved evenmore important than in onshore
wind, given the large scale, technology uncertainty, and high capital costs of
offshore wind energy projects.
6.3.2.2 Simple LME (UK)
Early interest and R&D initiatives in offshore wind energy in the UK started in
the mid-1990s, but the growth of the offshore wind sector was inhibited by two
main factors: 1) liberalization of the electricity market in 1990 which put
pressure on energy utilities to reduce costs, and 2) a technology-neutral support
scheme for renewable energy sources which provided little incentive for costly
and risky technology like offshorewind (Smit, Junginger, and Smits 2007: 6438).
The ﬁrst offshore wind park in the UK was built in 2001 but the rapid
deployment of offshore wind only commenced in 2009 with the improvement
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in the regulatory framework and a more active government role (Kern et al.
2014). The RO systemwas changed to providemore generous support for infant
renewable energy technologies (Kern et al. 2014: 638). The Crown Estate was
given the mandate to manage the seabed, grant consents for offshore wind
projects, and ensure proﬁt maximization for the state. The role of the Crown
Estate has been instrumental in improving the conditions for offshore wind
energy investments in the UK and facilitating project implementation (Kern
et al. 2014). The new support scheme CfD continues to provide necessary
support for offshore wind projects. However, the government has made the
support for offshore wind conditional on clear targets for cost-reduction.
Consequently, the government has not yet set the targets for offshore wind
development after 2020, implying high uncertainty for the sector.
Offshore wind is important technology for meeting the UK’s renewable
energy targets and promoting economic and industrial development (UK
Government 2013). Unlike the locally embedded offshore wind energy sector
in Denmark and Germany, offshore wind in the UK has largely been devel-
oped in an open-market international fashion under the leadership of foreign
companies and weak science–industry collaboration (Smit, Junginger, and
Smits 2007; Wieczorek et al. 2013). Since 2009, the government has directed
efforts towards promoting innovations, developing manufacturing capacities,
and involving domestic companies in the offshore wind supply-chain
(Ćetković and Buzogány 2016). However, the majority of components for
offshore wind farms in the UK are still produced in neighbouring countries,
particularly Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands (RenewableUK/The
Crown Estate 2013; Wieczorek et al. 2013). The estimated number of direct
jobs in the offshore wind sector in UK was 6,830 in 2013 (RenewableUK/The
CrownEstate 2013: 4). In terms of the installed capacity in 2015 theUKhad 5,098
MW of operational offshore wind power, which represents 45.9 per cent of the
entire EUmarket (EWEA2016a) (seeĆetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8).
The success of offshore wind market in the UK can be attributed to several
factors including the abundant natural potential and the pressure for meeting
national renewable energy targets. Perhaps the key explanatory variable is the
‘ﬁt’ between the offshore wind sector and the national political-economic
logic. Offshore wind development is associated with the construction of
large-scale, concentrated, infrastructural projects. The planning and imple-
mentation of such projects resembles in many ways conventional energy
projects. Such centralized energy planning is not only familiar to the national
government in UK, but it also allows the government to directly monitor and
manage the revenues from offshore wind investments (see also Kern et al.
2014). Nonetheless, the still prevailing market-based policy paradigm and the
related lack of strategic state–industry–science collaboration have hampered
the emergence of a genuine domestic offshore wind industry and failed to
provide long-term certainty for sectoral growth.
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6.3.2.3 Simple CMEs (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands)
The ﬁrst commercial offshore power plant was built in Denmark in 1991. Four
years later, the second offshore wind farm was implemented (Bilgili et al. 2011:
907). The development of offshore wind in Denmark was closely tied to the
onshore wind industry. Smit, Junginger, and Smits (2007: 6436) argue that
during this early period only the established Danish wind manufacturers and
project developers took responsibility for developing offshore wind technolo-
gies and projects. In the subsequent phase, due to the demonstrated feasibility
of offshore wind, the offshore wind innovation system expanded to include
government agencies, research centres, and component and service suppliers
(Smit, Junginger, and Smits 2007: 6436–7). This led to the ﬁrst action plan on
offshore wind power in Denmark outlined in 1997 in cooperation between
responsible ministries and the industry. The supportive policy instruments
and the role of the Danish Energy Authority facilitated the construction of
two large-scale offshore wind farms in 2002 and 2003 (Smit, Junginger, and
Smits 2007: 6437). As noted by Smit, Junginger, and Smits (2007: 6441), the
government’s approach fostered interaction and learning across all important
actors. The involvement of citizens and cooperatives was also signiﬁcant and
resulted in the implementation of fully of partly locally-owned offshore wind
farms (Smit, Junginger, and Smits 2007: 6437). The regulatory changes and the
transition towards a more competitive market-based support scheme led to
pausing offshore wind deployment in the mid-2000s. In the energy strategy
through 2050 adopted in 2011, the role of offshore wind is indicated as crucial
(Danish Government 2011). Between 2009 and 2013, several new large-scale
wind farms were connected to the grid leading to a total of 1.3 GW in 2015.
This makes Denmark the third largest offshore wind market, behind the UK
and Germany (EWEA 2016a) (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and Schreurs 2016: 8).
The development of offshore wind is supported by considerable domestic
investments in R&D, although the greatest share of R&D spending comes
from private companies (Megavind 2010).
Swedenwas the placewhere the ﬁrst offshorewind turbinewas constructed in
1990 (Bilgili et al. 2011: 207). Since then, several offshore wind farms have been
built, mainly as demonstration projects for acquiring knowledge and testing
the technology (Esteban et al. 2011). The policy incentive for constructing
commercial offshore wind farms in Sweden has been weak. The government’s
focus snot been on promoting wider utilization of offshore wind and cost-
reductions in the technology, but rather on enhancing knowledge accumulation
and testing through pilot studies. This should provide a basis for implementing
offshore wind once the technology becomes more mature and ﬁnancially
affordable (Söderholm and Petersson 2011: 522). The future of nuclear energy
in Sweden is questionable and there is a debate whether the country should
continue relying on the mature renewable energy technologies ‘of the shelf ’
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(e.g., onshore wind and biomass) for meeting energy needs or engage in actively
exploring innovation and industrial opportunities in infant technologies (e.g.,
offshore wind) (Södeholm and Petersson 2011; 4COffshore 2015). At the end of
2015, the size of the offshore wind market in Sweden was comparatively small
amounting to a total of 0.2 GW (EWEA 2016a) (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and
Schreurs 2016: 8).
The debate about offshore wind potential has a long tradition in the
Netherlands, mainly in the context of diversifying the existing offshore oil
and gas sectors (Verhees et al. 2015). Cooperation between government agen-
cies, electricity companies, local manufacturers, and research centres was an
important part of this process (Verhees et al. 2015). However, within the
national wind energy research programmes during the 1980s, little funding
was devoted to offshore wind, the focus being on more mature and less costly
onshore wind installations (Verhees et al. 2015: 819). The implementation
problems in onshore wind projects during the early 1990s renewed the
interest in offshore wind. The new Wind Energy Programme in the period
1992–5, for the ﬁrst time speciﬁed a goal of 200 MW of offshore wind
capacity by 2010 (Verhees et al. 2015: 819). The Netherlands implemented
the second commercial offshore wind power plant in the world in 1994
(Bilgili et al. 2011: 907). Although a clear legal framework was not in place,
the government, based on a parliamentary consent and long-term energy
planning, granted subsidies for two large offshore wind projects in 2001.
They were connected to the grid in 2006 and 2008 (Verhees et al. 2015: 821).
In 2002, an ambitious government target of 6000 MW in offshore wind
power by 2020 was declared. Nevertheless, progress in developing offshore
wind energy policy and a legal framework was slow (Verhees et al. 2015: 823).
The potential of offshore wind for innovation and industrial development has
been widely recognized, but the government has struggled to balance cost-
efﬁciency with the active promotion of innovations and market creation.
Since 2010, offshore wind has been deﬁned as one of the priority economic
sectors (Verhees et al. 2015: 825) and R&D funding for wind energy has almost
entirely been directed to offshore wind (IEA WIND 2014:135). In 2015, the
Netherlands had 426.5MW in offshore wind power, or 3.9 per cent of the entire
EU market (EWEA 2016a). The number of direct jobs in the offshore wind
industry is higher than the small domestic market would suggest. In 2013, 1900
full-time employed people were registered in the offshore wind sector and this
number increased to 2150 in 2014 (Ecofys 2014) (see Ćetković, Buzogány, and
Schreurs 2016: 8).
All three countries have engaged early in exploring offshore wind energy
potential relying on the state–industry–science cooperation. Similar to the
situation in the onshore wind sector, a shift in the policy paradigm that would
allow for enhancing the domestic market for offshore wind has been difﬁcult
to achieve. Where supportive policy conditions were present, Denmark and to
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a lesser extent the Netherlands, the offshore wind sector grew deeply embed-
ded in the network of domestic energy utilities, suppliers, and research centres.
6 .4 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of onshore wind development has largely supported the theoret-
ical assumption on the political-economic conditions for energy innovations.
It has been demonstrated that the rise and growth of the German onshore
wind energy sector can be attributed to the effective match between strategic
state–industry–science–society coordination and the sufﬁciently plural and
decentralized political environment. It is in this context that a variety of
bottom-up wind energy solutions could thrive and mobilize long-term sup-
port at different levels of government. Although characterized as simple CME,
Denmark proved capable of being a pioneer and one of the leading nations in
the wind energy industry. This was the result of the inherited tradition of
decentralized energy distribution. Some studies suggest that the Danish econ-
omy has evolved into a more decentralized coordinated market economy
(Campbell and Pedersen 2007). This further supports the argument about
the facilitating role of coordinated but decentral structures for energy innov-
ations. It also suggests that that there are variations in the level of decentral-
ization and plurality among similar forms of capitalism and that the
distinction between simple and compound polities should be reﬁned. Other
simple CMEs initially supported onshore wind development in a dominantly
centralized large-scale manner but the willingness to promote domestic
demand ceased quickly due to the resistance from established utilities, liber-
alization reforms, and the fact that Germany and Denmark were faster in
capturing the largest economic beneﬁts in the onshore wind industry. The
latter emphasizes the importance of economic interests as drivers of energy
transition and illustrates the barrier of the centralized consensus-seeking
neo-corporatist relations for new energy technologies. Sweden has recently
adopted onshore wind on a broader scale, as a result of the enhanced state role
and international climate and energy commitments. Finally, the case of
onshore wind in the UK provides evidence of how unitary market-led political
economies tend to be laggards in providing stable support for new more
decentralized energy technologies. Interestingly, and in support of the general
argument, the political devolution in UK and the entrepreneurial role of the
Scottish Government have facilitated onshore wind deployment, which draws
attention to the dynamic character and institutional changes of national
political economies.
The chapter has revealed similarities but also some differences between
onshore and offshore wind development. Although the offshore wind sector
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does not represent simple diversiﬁcation from onshore wind (Jacobsson and
Karltorp 2013), the countries with the strong onshore wind industry and the
secured legitimization of wind technology (Germany and Denmark) have also
been among the leaders in the domestic offshore market and industrial
competitiveness. Somewhat surprisingly, the UK has emerged recently as the
most dynamic offshore wind market. This can be explained by the large-scale
top-down character of offshore wind coupled with vast natural resources,
industrial objectives, and the pressure for meeting national renewable energy
targets. However, the long-term prospects for the offshore wind market have
proved less stable than in Germany and Denmark. Furthermore, due to
strategic coordination, CME countries have generated more locally embedded
offshore wind sectors, than is the case in the UK (see Wieczorek et al. 2013).
Another interesting ﬁnding is the increasing focus on promoting offshore wind
market and innovations in the countries that were laggards in onshore wind (the
UK but also the Netherlands). This reﬂects the motives to capture market share
in the emerging offshore wind sector and further underlines the critical role of
industrial and economic motives behind clean energy policies.
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7The Political Economy of
Energy Innovation
Shouro Dasgupta, Enrica de Cian, and Elena Verdolini
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Technological change directed towards more efﬁcient and eco-friendly
technologies is a priority for both developed and developing countries.
Insights on past trends and determinants of energy innovation, including
political economy factors and non-ﬁnancial drivers, are important to set the
basis for cost-effective climate and energy policies in the coming years. Issues
such as the role of institutions and lobbying as enabling or inhibiting factors
are critical factors that have been only marginally examined by the existing
literature.
This chapter uses two commonly used indicators of innovation, energy
industrial R&D and energy patents for 20 countries for the years 1995–2010
to examine the inﬂuence of political economy factors on energy-related innov-
ations using econometric analysis. Political economy factors can be broadly
deﬁned as those concerning the interactions and tensions between de jure and
de facto power, including the distribution of resources, the rules for the exercise
of power and the enforcement of contracts, the procedures and institutions for
settling conﬂicts over these rules, or the physical and organizational infrastruc-
ture supporting economic activities, transactions, and collective actions.1 We
focus on four aspects: the types and stringency of government support to
energy innovation (e.g., the various policy instruments implemented to this
end such as environmental and R&D policies); the quality of governance
(e.g., government effectiveness); the political orientation of the government;
and the distribution of resources across interest groups.
1 Stavins (2004) refers to political economy as the process through which political decisions
are made.
The role of these factors in relation to energy innovation dynamics, energy
transition, and sustainable development has been acknowledged by several
contributions both in the policy and in the economics realms (Anadón 2012;
Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013; Hughes and Lipscy 2013; IPCC 2014; IEA
2015a). More than other sectors, energy can be dominated by large incumbent
companies and utilities, which often seek to inﬂuence policy. Their invest-
ments, especially in new technologies are shaped by the incentives and regu-
lations set by policy makers (Lockwood 2013a). Moreover, the actual impact of
regulations and government policies is affected by the broader institutional
settings (Stavins 2004). Good governance is particularly important as many of
the government interventions are economic policies (Lockwood 2013a) and
bureaucrats are the actors ultimately implementing these policies (Lockwood
2013b).
The role of governance quality, political orientation of the government, and
distribution of resources across interest groups have received only marginal
attention and have not been explored jointly in the empirical literature on
energy innovation. In this speciﬁc domain, the role of public policies as drivers
of innovation has received more attention than institutions and political
economy factors. The multiple sources of market failures that characterize
the energy sector and the recent debate regarding the actions governments
should undertake to curb rising greenhouse gas emissions partly explains the
focus of the current literature on the role of environmental, energy, and
innovation policies. In the energy-environmental realm, state intervention is
motivated by the presence of environmental externalities (a gap between
private and social returns to pollution control), as well as of innovation
externalities (a gap between private and social returns to innovation). More-
over, in comparison to other sectors, energy R&D often entails large-scale
projects, which need public support (Anadón 2012).
This chapter contributes to the debate by jointly assessing the inﬂuence of
environmental and R&D policies, governance quality, political orientation,
and distribution of resources to energy intensive industries on energy innov-
ation. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses our
measures of energy innovation. Section 7.3 provides the empirical framework
and describes the main hypotheses explored in the empirical analysis.
Section 7.4 discusses the results. Section 7.5 concludes, highlighting policy
implications and future research needs.
7 .2 MEASURING ENERGY INNOVATION TRENDS
Studying innovation systems and dynamics using an empirical approach is
challenging, as innovation comprises both tangible and intangible outputs
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(e.g., new technologies, machines, products, patents but also ideas, process
innovation, managerial, and organizational innovation). Following a large
empirical innovation economics literature, we study the more tangible and
measurable aspects of the innovation process. While these constitute only a
part of the innovation output relevant for the energy system and sector, they
nonetheless provide important insights that can complement those from
qualitative and bottom-up case studies focusing on more intangible and less
measureable aspects such as organizational innovation.
Here we focus on R&D expenditures and patent counts.2 The former
informs on the inputs of the innovation process, while the latter is a proxy of
innovation outputs. Both indicators suffer from some speciﬁc shortcomings.
R&D investments provide insights on innovation effort but not on innovation
quality. Conversely, patent statistics provide a partial measure as not all
innovations are patented, even though they can be weighted using information
on several indicators to control for quality (for instance, claims or citations, see
Griliches 1990). Furthermore, patents may increase due to changes in patent
law or strategic reasons to signal in which companies to invest in, regardless of
innovative activity (Mazzucato 2013).
In the case of energy innovation, matters are further complicated by the fact
that it is unclear how clean innovation or even energy innovation are deﬁned
(Gallagher et al. 2011). A number of studies focus speciﬁcally on the energy
supply sector (Salies 2010; Sterlacchini, 2012; Costa-Campi et al. 2014) but
energy-saving R&D and innovation are pervasive. Energy is an input for
nearly all sectors of the economy and the way in which energy is produced,
transformed, and distributed depends on innovative activities well beyond
those of the energy supply sector itself. All R&D expenditures are inputs into
complex processes that ultimately lead to innovations that may or may not be
clean. In order to proxy for industrial R&D investments in energy, we rely on
the Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD)
database (OECD 2016), which provides information on the R&D expenditures
at the sectoral level for 30 countries for the years 1990–2013.3 We deﬁne
energy R&D investments in two ways. First, we focus on R&D spending in the
‘Electricity, water and gas distribution industry’, which represents the down-
stream sector for energy production (power R&D). Second, we deﬁne energy
investments as a combination of R&D expenditures from ‘Electricity, water
and gas distribution industry’ and ‘Mining’, which capture the combined R&D
effort in the upstream and downstream energy supply sector (energy R&D).
2 Arguably, R&D investments and patents represent only part of the full innovation process,
as they somewhat disregard the issue of technology diffusion. Speciﬁcally, patent data is an
imperfect indicator of technology diffusion, but nonetheless widely used in the literature to
proxy for the other, earlier stages of innovation (see, for instance, Hall and Rosenberg 2010).
3 Our analysis focuses on the 20 countries between 1995 and 2010 for which both policy and
institutional data are available.
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These measures arguably represent a lower-bound estimate of energy-
related innovation (Upstill and Hall 2006), as they only include the R&D
directly performed by the energy supply sectors. Indeed, non-energy sectors
indirectly contribute to energy-related innovation. For instance, improve-
ments in the manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products, and in
computer and electronics, contribute to the development of energy system
technologies, such as solar power or smart grids. These are ‘embedded’ in the
capital that is supplied to the energy supply sector. The sum of the direct and
‘embedded’ R&D can be considered an estimate of the upper bound of
industrial energy-related R&D in a given country. Input–output data can be
used to provide an estimate of energy-related R&D expenditures including
the research performed in other economic sectors that are embedded in the
capital purchased by the electricity and the mining sectors. Dasgupta, De
Cian, and Verdolini (2016) provide a detailed description and application of
this method.
While providing insights on the extent of energy innovation efforts, the
ANBERD statistics have some shortcomings. For instance, they report
R&D expenditure by sector of performance expenditure, regardless of
whether funds were provided by the private or by the public sector. This
means that industrial R&D reported by ANBERD statistics might include
a fraction of R&D expenditure funded by the government and therefore
reported in the government budget outlays as well. For this reason, we
refer to the R&D reported in the ANBERD statistics as industrial rather
than private R&D.
Another widely used proxy for innovation is patent counts, which is an
indicator of the output of the industrial R&D process (Griliches 1990).4 The
temporal and country coverage of patent data is often broader than that of
R&D statistics and makes it an attractive empirical proxy. In the speciﬁc case
of energy-related innovation, a further advantage of using patent data is the
possibility of assigning patents to speciﬁc energy technology classes in
the energy sector, which also include renewables (Johnstone, Ivan Haščič,
and Popp 2010) and efﬁcient fossil-based technologies for electricity gener-
ation (Lanzi, Verdolini, and Haščič 2011). We collect patent statistics from
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Patent Statistics Database (OECD 2015b) and count applications through
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) by the inventor country and priority
date. The technologies included in our patent counts are the following:5
4 Indeed patents are positively correlated with power R&D (correlation coefﬁcient for power
patents is 0.41 and 0.62 for environmental patents) and with energy R&D (power patents 0.50
and environmental patents 0.44).
5 Please refer to Haščič and Migotto (2015) and OECD (2015a) for more details about the
technologies included.
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(1) Power Patents: related to energy generation, they include both energy
generations from renewable and non-fossil sources and technologies
improving the efﬁciency of fossil fuels, such as Integrated Gasiﬁcation
Combined Cycle and improved burners. Both renewable and fossil-
efﬁcient technologies have signiﬁcant mitigation potential (IEA 2014).
(2) Green Patents: include power patents as well as the patents in the
technology domains of general environmental management, technolo-
gies speciﬁc to climate change mitigation, energy efﬁciency in buildings
and lighting, technologies with potential or indirect contribution to
emissions mitigation, emissions abatement, and fuel efﬁciency in
transportation.
7 .3 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Combining the data sources on our variables of interest described in
Section 7.2, we build an unbalanced panel of 20 countries for the years
1995–2010. Please refer to Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini (2016) for a
detailed description of the data and descriptive statistics. The literature has
used alternative methods to examine the role of political economy in the
context of energy technology choices and in the context of innovation, such
socio-technical transition studies (see Johnstone and Stirling (2015) for an
example of such approach and Turnheim et al. (2015) for a review of the
approach). Socio-technical transition studies can analyse multiple dimensions
of change, including economic, political, and socio-cultural aspects at different
levels and temporalities. Econometric analysis, speciﬁcally panel regression
analysis, can complement this approach and isolate the inﬂuence of environ-
mental policy, institutional quality, political orientation, and resource distribu-
tion conditional on each of the other factors, controlling for country-invariant
and time-invariant characteristics.
7.3.1 Empirical Model
We use our data to estimate the following general reduced form equation:
yit ¼ αi þ γt þ πitβ1 þ x2φit þ β3ρit þ β4θit þ Zitωþ εit; ð1Þ
where the subscripts i and t indicate respectively the country and the year, and:
• yit is a variable measuring the energy innovation intensity of the econ-
omy. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne yit as the share of one of our innovation
proxies discussed in Section 7.2 (i.e., industrial energy R&D, power
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R&D, power patents, or environmental patents) over total value added.
We scale all innovation proxies relative to the total value added to
account for the heterogeneity in the countries included in our sample.
This is in line with the general literature on this topic (see, for instance,
Popp 2002).
• πit is a vector of policy stringency measures, discussed in detail in
Section 7.3.2 and includes both market-based and non-market-based
instruments directly targeting the environmental externality, such as
taxes or standards, as well as government R&D investments in energy
innovation targeting the knowledge externality.
• φit is a proxy for institutional quality, measured either by government
effectiveness or by an aggregate indicator of governance quality discussed
in Section 7.4.
• ρit is a proxy of the political orientation of the government.
• θit is a proxy of the distribution of resources to the energy sector relative
to the rest of the economy, which in our framework inform on two
different aspects, market-size effect and the power of the energy lobby
within each country.
• Zit is a vector of other relevant control variables inﬂuencing innovation
investments, including an index for industrial energy prices and trade
openness. Higher energy prices are expected to increase innovation
incentives, net of any political economy consideration (Popp 2002),
whereas trade openness can have an ambiguous effect.
• αi and γt are country and year ﬁxed effects, while εit is a random error
term. Country ﬁxed effects control for time-invariant factors, including
persistent institutional factors, such as the democratic/autocratic charac-
teristics and system of government of countries. The time ﬁxed effects
control for inter-temporal trends that are uniform across countries, such
as the economic cycle.
The expectations about the roles of the variables of interest, πit, ρit , θit , is
detailed in the research hypotheses presented in Section 7.3.2. The regressions
are estimated using ﬁxed effect linear models, as both our R&D and patent
data are continuous variables.6 Due to the different nature of R&D invest-
ments and patents, we use a different lag structure in our models. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that R&D investments react faster to environmental policies
than patents. This is due to the fact that patents measure the output of
the innovation process. Applying for patent requires ﬁrst to put the R&D
investment to work and then develop and test new ideas. Thus, the
6 The patents from the OECD database are computed using fractional counting and hence are
continuous in nature.
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R&D speciﬁcations use a one-year time lag, while the patent equation uses a
two-year time lag.7
7.3.2 Research Hypotheses
We use the model presented in Section 7.3.1 to test a set of hypotheses inspired
by the existing literature. The four hypotheses of interest are discussed in
this section.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Environmental policy stringency ðπitÞ results in
dynamic efﬁciency gains. Stringent regulations provide long-term incentives
for innovation in energy-saving and pollution-reducing technologies.
Overcoming environmental issues requires addressing two market failures.
Since pollution is not priced appropriately, private ﬁrms tend to over-pollute
with respect to the social optimum. The environmental externality can be
directly targeted by using two different policy instruments: market-based
policies, such as a tax on pollution, feed-in tariffs, or trading schemes, and
non-market-based policies, such as standards or incentives for R&D invest-
ments in cleaner energy. Both instruments have been widely used in the
countries in our sample.
The available literature provides evidence on both market-based and non-
market-based instruments, together with innovation policies, supporting
cleaner technologies, and affecting the rate and direction of technological
change (Jaffe, Peterson, and Portney 1995; Popp 2002; Johnstone, Ivan Haščič,
and Popp 2010) but a priori their effectiveness may be different (Fischer,
Parry, and Pizer 2003; Newell 2010). Previous empirical studies on the
inducement effect of environmental and energy policy on innovation have
employed different measures of environmental stringency, policy instruments,
and innovation indicators (Brunel and Levinson 2013). Here we rely on the
recent environmental policy stringency (EPS) database of the OECD (Botta
and Koźluk 2014), which provides detailed cross-country information on
several instruments and on the International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy
7 Note that, incidentally, allowing for a one (two)-year lag structure in the R&D (patent)
equation also partly addresses concerns regarding the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
Regarding country-level variables such as good governance, the political orientation of the
government and the lobbying power of the energy sector, endogeneity corners are weak to
non-existent, since environmental innovation represents only a fraction of the innovative
capacity of the countries in our sample during the time period explored. Hence, it is unlikely
to be a major driver of country-level variables. Conversely, there may be concerns regarding the
endogeneity of the EPS policy indicators, as the availability of cleaner and more efﬁcient energy
technologies may be inﬂuencing the ability of countries to propose, pass, and adopt environ-
mental policies (Carrion-Flores and Innes 2010). Allowing for a time lag reduces concerns in
this respect.
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Technologies R&D database (IEA 2015b). The EPS aggregate policy indicator
(EPS-Total score) is constructed using information on both market-based and
non-market policies.8 For each policy instrument, countries are scored on a
scale from 0 to 6 depending on the stringency of the policy they implement.
Such scores are then weighted and aggregated to construct the aggregate
policy indicator.9
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Institutional quality, measured as good governance,
increases the incentives to invest in energy-related innovation.
The role of governance quality has been widely examined in the context of
investments by the literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) drivers and
to a lesser extent, by the general literature on innovation.10 The dominant view
is that good governance aids FDI (Ayal and Karras 1996; Globerman and
Shapiro 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006; Gani 2007; Staats and Biglaiser
2012).11 However, poor governance can also lead to more foreign investments
if combined with high levels of corruption (Bellos and Subasat 2012). The
literature on general innovation states that better institutions are likely to
promote general innovation and investments (Habiyaremye and Raymond
2013; Tebaldi and Elmslie 2013; Silve and Plekhanov 2015). We test whether
government effectiveness and more broadly good governance as measured by
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
2010)12 affect energy-related innovation. WGI institutional quality indicators
are measured on a normalized scale from (−)2.5 to (+)2.5, where the highest
value indicates better governance. We focus on government effectiveness,
which is an indicator of bureaucratic quality and speed. Low levels of govern-
ment effectiveness can be associated with excessive regulations, lengthy pro-
cesses, and lower transparency in the form of ﬂow of information.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The political orientation of the government inﬂuences
investments in energy R&D and patents. On the one hand, left-leaning
8 Market-based policies include feed-in tariffs (FITs—solar and wind), taxes (on CO2, SOx,
NOx, and diesel), certiﬁcates (White, Green, and CO2), and the presence of deposit and refund
schemes (DRS). Non-market-based policies include standards, such as emission limits for SOx,
NOx, and SO2 and on the sulphur content of diesel, as well as public R&D investment in energy
technologies.
9 We refer the interested reader to Botta and Koźluk (2014) for details about the indicators’
construction.
10 The general literature on the determinants of innovation in the manufacturing sector is
broad (Becheikh et al. 2006; Hall and Rosenberg 2010) and focuses on several key internal
factors, such as size, ﬁrm age, skills, and qualiﬁed personnel.
11 Good governance is deﬁned as a government that entails an independent judiciary and
legislation, fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, reliable public ﬁnancial
information, and high public trust (Subasat and Bellos 2011).
12 For more detailed information on the WGI, please see <http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> (accessed 12 October 2016).
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governments are more likely to implement regulations that attract innovation
and investment in energy-related R&D. On the other hand, right-wing-oriented
governments are more likely to take a laissez faire approach. Therefore, the
impact of political orientation can be ambiguous.
The role of government political orientation has been examined in the context
of environmental policy adoption (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2014;
Folke 2014) and to some extent, in the context of private investment and
FDI. In the former, the consensus seems to be that right-wing governments
generally oppose laws to support climate regulations (McCright and Dunlap
2011; Painter and Ashe 2012), while left-wing governments are more likely to
pass them (Neumayer 2003 and Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2014). On
the contrary, right-leaning governments are more inclined to allow the market
forces to stimulate investment efforts (Esping-Andersen 1990; Boix 1998). The
FDI literature, however, provides somewhat contrasting insights. Shleifer
(1998) states that right-wing governments consider the private sector to be
more conducive in terms of innovation and therefore tend not to intervene in
the market while Hawkins, Mintz, and Provissiero (1976) and Jensen (2006)
mention that left-leaning governments are more likely to expropriate foreign
assets, which discourages FDI. We use political orientation of governments
from the Database of Political Institutions 2012 (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001) as
proxies for political institutions, speciﬁcally, the political orientation of the
executive party with respect to economic policy. This is a categorical variable
that takes three values: right (1), centre (2), and left (3) orientations.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A higher share of energy intensive sectors will (a) give
rise to a market-size effect (i.e., higher demand for energy), (b) lead to more
lobbying power of the energy intensive sectors towards the government, and
(c) increase the coordination costs of such lobbying activities. Therefore,
the impact of resource distribution on energy-related innovation is not clear
a priori.
The distribution of resources across interest groups may give rise to several
dynamics. First, if an economy relies more on energy intensive sectors, the
market for new energy inventions will be larger. As a result, the value
associated with any innovation relative to energy goods will be higher, as it
is more proﬁtable to develop technologies that have a larger market (see, for
instance, the discussion of market-size effects in the directed technical change
literature in Acemoglu (2002)). This would suggest that larger energy-
intensive sectors will likely result in more energy-related innovation. Second,
energy intensive incumbent industries with access to signiﬁcant resources tend
to engage in lobbying for government support and seek to inﬂuence policy
decisions. For instance, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) argue that strong
industry lobbies may engage in corruption to reduce environmental policy
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stringency while Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf (2004) remark that
incumbent industries utilize their lobbying power to oppose structural trans-
formation. Third, larger sectors may imply more ﬁrms/actors, and this would
result in higher coordination costs of such lobbying activities (Olson 1965;
Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf 2004).
In line with previous literature (Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf
2004; Costa-Campi et al. 2014), we use the value-added share of energy-
intensive industries (Coke, Reﬁned Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, Chemicals
and Chemical Products, Rubber and Plastics, Water and Air Transport,
Electricity, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Mining)13 in the economy
computed using industrial value added data from the WIOD database
(Timmer et al. 2015) as an indicator of market-size, lobbying power, and
coordination costs.
Table 7.1 summarizes the main proxy variables that are used to measure the
key drivers behind the four hypotheses described in this section.
7 .4 RESULTS
The empirical results of our analysis using the two main indicators of innov-
ation described in Section 7.2 are provided in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Table 7.2
Table 7.1. Political economy factors: hypothesis and proxy variables
Hypothesis Proxy Variables
H1: Environmental policy
EPS-Market,
EPS-Non-market,
EPS-Total
H2: Governance
Governance effectiveness,
Governance Average WGI indicator,
Governance x EPS-Total
H3: Left-wing political orientation Political orientation
H4: Lobbying
Value added share of energy-intensive industries
Value added share of carbon-intensive industries
Value added share of electricity
Source: Authors’ conceptualization.
13 Energy-intensive sectors have been deﬁned as the sectors with energy intensity above the
75th percentile. As a robustness test, two other proxy variables have been considered; the value-
added share of carbon-intensive industries (other non-metallic mineral, inland, water, and air
transport, electricity, mining), and value-added share of the electricity or energy (electricity
+mining) sector. Carbon-intensive sectors have been deﬁned as the sectors with carbon intensity
above the 75th percentile.
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Table 7.2. Regression results using R&D intensity over value added as innovation proxy: one-year lag for all independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent Variable Log of R&D Intensity—Power Log of R&D Intensity—Energy
EPS Market Score 0.198+ 0.189+ 0.165 −0.006 −0.018
H1 (0.125) (0.121) (0.122) (0.111) (0.111)
EPS Non-market Score −0.089 −0.014 0.018 −0.058 −0.043
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.098) (0.098)
EPS Total Score 0.135 0.164 −0.079 0.006
(0.110) (0.162) (0.101) (0.148)
Govt. Effectiveness 0.964*** 0.769** 0.619** 0.666* 0.399 0.409 0.549+
H2 (0.323) (0.317) (0.312) (0.367) (0.294) (0.288) (0.338)
WGI 0.754 0.418
(0.538) (0.498)
Govt. Effectiveness*EPS
Interaction
−0.033 −0.098
(0.135) (0.123)
H3 Political orientation 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.112* 0.107* 0.111* 0.106*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
VA Share Energy-
intensive industries
0.710** 0.827** 0.814** 0.815** 0.822** 0.537+ 0.525+ 0.542+ 0.553+
H4 (0.356) (0.356) (0.363) (0.356) (0.358) (0.342) (0.348) (0.341) (0.341)
Energy price index −3.053*** −3.203*** −3.193*** −3.202*** −8.309*** −8.629*** −8.286*** −8.388***
(0.756) (0.760) (0.753) (0.756) (3.034) (3.029) (3.012) (3.017)
Trade openness 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.027*** −0.027*** −0.027*** −0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared 0.200 0.257 0.244 0.254 0.254 0.235 0.231 0.236 0.239
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
focuses on power and energy R&D intensity while Table 7.3 presents the
results for the power and environmental patent intensity speciﬁcations.
7.4.1 Role of Environmental Policy Stringency
Our results generally conﬁrm previous ﬁndings on the inducement effect of
environmental policies with respect to energy-related innovation activities.
We ﬁnd that the effect is weaker in the case of energy-related R&D and
stronger in the case of energy-related patents.
Focusing on the R&D speciﬁcation (Table 7.2), the coefﬁcient for EPS
variables is positive only if we consider investments in the power sector
alone (hence, electricity) and market-based policy instruments. Furthermore,
the coefﬁcient is only signiﬁcant at the 15 per cent level. Non-market-based
policies instead do not have any signiﬁcant effect on R&D, in line with Ulph
and Katsoulacos (1998) and Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003), who suggest that
stricter regulations fail to have any signiﬁcant effect on R&D.
Conversely, stronger results emerge when patent intensity (Table 7.3) is
used as the indicator for innovation. Both market and non-market-based
environmental policy stringency are positive and signiﬁcant for both types
of patents. The effect of market-based instruments is stronger in most speci-
ﬁcations and the inducement effect is larger when the broader deﬁnition based
on environmental patents is considered. Our results suggest that one unit
increase in the market-based score (corresponding approximately to one
interquartile range (IQR) change)14 increases power patents intensity by
between 1.3 and 1.4 per cent and environmental patent intensity by between
3 and 3.2 per cent. In the case of non-market-based policies, a similar change
increases power patents intensity by between 1.2 and 1.5 per cent,15 and
environmental patents intensity by 2.3 per cent. It should be noted that the
median improvement in policy stringency between 1995 and 2010 across the
20 countries has been approximately 1 unit for EPS market-based score and 2
units on a scale of 0–6 for EPS non-market-based score.16
These ﬁndings are in line with Johnstone, Ivan Haščič, and Popp (2010),
who show that increasing number of international climate policies have
resulted in an increase in renewable energy patents. These results are also in
14 In the case of EPS market score, moving from the 25th quartile (1.1) to the 75th quartile
(2.3) is equivalent to a one-unit increase in the EPS and is equivalent to moving from the policy
stringency of Belgium to that of Finland in 2010.
15 In the case of EPS non-market score, the IQR is larger than one. Moving from the 25th
quartile (1.1) to the 75th quartile (2.6) is equivalent to the increase in policy stringency observed
in Portugal between 1995 and 2010.
16 During 1995–2010, modest increases of 1 unit have been achieved in Italy, Australia,
Portugal, while more ambitious increases of 3–4 units have been achieved in South Korea and
The Netherlands, while Germany has achieved increase of about 2 units.
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Table 7.3. Regression results using patent intensity over value added as innovation proxy: two-year lag for all independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable Log of Patent intensity—Power Log of Patent intensity—Environment
H1 EPS Market Score 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.029**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016)
EPS Non-market Score 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.018+ 0.018+ 0.023**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.011) (0.110) (0.046)
EPS Total Score 0.017*** 0.004 −0.007 0.030** 0.020
(0.000) (0.587) (0.011) (0.277)
H2 Govt. Effectiveness 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.199*** 0.183***
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WGI 0.095*** 0.313***
(0.000) (0.000)
Govt. Effectiveness*EPS
Interaction
0.015** 0.012
(0.010) (0.416)
H3 Political Orientation −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007
(0.003) (0.395) (0.379) (0.330) (0.514) (0.006) (0.286) (0.314) (0.212) (0.256)
H4 VA Share Energy-
intensive industries
−0.003 −0.009 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012 −0.048 −0.061* −0.058+ −0.068* −0.069*
(0.014) (0.546) (0.557) (0.419) (0.380) (0.035) (0.089) (0.114) (0.061) (0.059)
Energy price index 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.027 0.058 0.032 0.053 0.056
(0.338) (0.544) (0.367) (0.309) (0.390) (0.640) (0.431) (0.413)
Trade Openness −0.000 −0.000+ −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001+ −0.001 −0.001
(0.170) (0.130) (0.175) (0.277) (0.180) (0.127) (0.189) (0.224)
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared 0.662 0.666 0.651 0.657 0.663 0.634 0.638 0.623 0.630 0.630
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
line with ﬁndings from some of the previous literature including Lanjouw and
Mody (1996) and Popp (2002), namely that the number of environmental
patents tends to increase as the cost of pollution abatement rises. Finally, the
apparently stronger results in the case of the patent speciﬁcation than in the
R&D speciﬁcation are in line with the evidence presented by Rubashkina,
Galeotti, and Verdolini (2015), who focus on overall patenting within different
sectors of the economy. A reason for the stronger evidence of induced
innovation when using patents as opposed to R&D in the present work
might be due to the different ways patents and R&D are deﬁned. Patents
explicitly refer to clean and energy-saving innovations while the deﬁnition of
energy R&D does not specify the purpose of the expenditure. Overall, with
respect to Hypothesis 1, our regression results suggest that more stringent
environmental policies provide dynamic efﬁciency gains and incentives for
innovation in energy-saving and pollution-reducing technologies.
7.4.2 Role of Good Governance
Good governance appears to be an important driver of innovation. Depending
on the governance proxy used, a one-unit increase in government effectiveness
is associated with between 62 per cent and 96.4 per cent increase in power
R&D intensity (Table 7.2) and between 6.5 per cent and 31.3 per cent increase
in patent intensity (Table 7.3). This suggests that stronger economic institu-
tions promote innovation and are in line with the existing literature (Ayal and
Karras 1996; Habiyaremye and Raymond 2013; Tebaldi and Elmslie 2013;
Silve and Plekhanov 2015).
The marginal effect of governance might appear substantial given the coef-
ﬁcient interpretation provided in the paragraph above. However, a one-unit
increase in the governance proxy is a rather signiﬁcant change. It is comparable
to moving from the governance quality of a country such as Portugal (1.02) or
Slovenia (1.03) to that of countries such as Sweden or Finland (2.01 and 2.25) in
2010. Historically, the biggest improvements in governance quality have been
achieved by South Korea and Estonia, where the governance WGI score
increased by 0.6 and 0.5 between 1995 and 2010, respectively.
Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 2, our regression results suggest that
improvements in governance and government effectiveness provide incentives
for energy-related innovation.
7.4.3 Role of Political Orientation
Political orientation seems to be a more important factor for the input rather
than the output of innovation, as the variable has a statistically signiﬁcant
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effect only in the case of power and energy R&D intensity. A change in the
political orientation of the government from right towards a left-leaning
position, which corresponds to an IQR change in our sample, is associated
with an increase in industrial R&D of 11 per cent (power) and 22 per cent
(energy), respectively. To put these effects in perspective, countries such as
Portugal in our sample moved from a right-leaning orientation in 1995 to a
left-leaning government in 2010, while countries such as Canada, The Nether-
lands, and Sweden underwent the opposite change.
Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 3, left-leaning governments are more
likely to implement regulations that attract energy R&D investments, but this
does not translate into higher patent intensity.
7.4.4 Role of Resource Distribution, Market-Size
Effect, and Lobbying
The size of the energy sector, measured as the value-added share of energy-
intensive industries, has a positive impact on R&D intensity, suggesting that
either industries will allocate more resources towards R&D due to the larger
size of the potential market for energy innovations, or a larger energy sector
will be able to lobby for more resources to be allocated to energy R&D. A 1 per
cent increase in the value added share of energy intensive industries, approxi-
mately corresponding to an IQR change, increases power R&D intensity by
between 0.54 and 0.83 per cent. It should be noted that a 1 per cent increase is
a rather modest increase in this case. Between 1995 and 2010, changes in the
share of energy intensive industries in our sample varied between (−) 62 per cent
to (+) 28 per cent in France and Australia, respectively.
The smaller marginal effect on energy R&D intensity might reﬂect a
different relevance of political economy factors within the energy sector
itself.17 As explained by Hughes and Lipscy (2013), power markets tend to
be more concentrated within domestic markets whereas many oil and gas
companies are vertically integrated and international in scope. Therefore, the
political economy factors that matter for electricity are likely to differ from
those relevant for the oil and gas industry, which are included in our deﬁnition
of energy R&D. Factors such as lobbying are therefore more relevant for the
more inward-oriented sectors, such as power. Since the size of the energy
sector is a proxy of the lobbying power of energy-intensive industries, it has
the opposite effect on patent intensity, indicating that a larger energy sector
reduces the incentive to carry out energy-saving and clean innovation.
17 Including the mining sector (oil and gas extraction).
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Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 4, the larger the size of the potential
markets for energy innovation, the larger the inducement effect for industries
to invest in energy R&D. At the same time, larger energy sector has power to
lobby for more resources to be allocated to energy R&D. These effects seem to
prevail over coordination costs, however, market-size effects or lobbying from
the energy sector do not result in a larger number of cleaner patents. This
could mean that R&D investments are either used less effectively, or that they
are used to improve other aspects of the technologies, which are more
intangible and which are not codiﬁed in patents.
7.4.5 Role of Other Factors
We brieﬂy comment here on the coefﬁcients associated with our additional
control variables, namely the energy price index and trade openness. The
energy price index has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on both
power and energy R&D intensities. A possible explanation in this respect is
that higher energy prices increase energy expenditure, both in the private and
public sectors, reducing resources available for other uses, including
R&D. Energy prices provide a positive incentive for patents, but the coefﬁ-
cients are not statistically signiﬁcant. Although the evidence is only impre-
cisely estimated, it suggests that even though fewer resources are allocated as
input to innovation, the innovation process is more efﬁcient at delivering new
inventions.
Trade openness has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on energy R&D
intensity, suggesting that countries with developed trade relationships have
fewer incentives to allocate resources to power and mining R&D and that
technology adoption and imitation displace domestic innovation. Note that the
effect is only signiﬁcant when the deﬁnition of energy R&D include the mining
sector, which is more outward-oriented than power, making the energy aggre-
gate sensitive to changes in trade exposure.18
7 .5 CONCLUSION
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of political economy and
institutional factors on the incentives to innovate in the energy sector. We
propose four empirical proxies that can measure energy-related innovation,
namely power R&D, energy R&D (consisting of the investment of the power
18 Refer to Dasgupta et al. (2016) for additional regressions and robustness tests.
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and mining sector), power patents (related to renewable and energy efﬁcient
technologies for power production), and environmental patents (including
energy patents as well as patents generally aimed at environmental protec-
tion). We focus on the empirical analysis of the role of four political economy
factors, namely environmental policy, good governance, political orientation,
and the distribution of resources to energy intensive industries that can induce
effects of both market-size and lobbying.
The analysis suggests that all abovementioned factors affect the incentives to
devote resources to energy R&D and to create new clean and energy efﬁcient
technologies. Speciﬁcally, market-based incentives, and to some extent also
non-market based incentives, results in dynamic efﬁciency gains. Countries
with better governance are characterized by higher levels of energy-related
R&D, while left-wing governments are more likely to devote R&D resources
to the energy sector but this does not translate into higher power-related patent
intensity. A larger distribution of resources towards energy-intensive sectors
can inducemarket-size effects and havemore power to lobby formore resources
to be allocated to energy R&D but this does not translate into higher patent
intensity.
The empirical analysis described in this chapter shows that political econ-
omy factors can act as barriers even in the presence of stringent environmental
policy. This implies that in order to favour changes towards a greener econ-
omy, countries should combine environmental policy with a general strength-
ening of institutional quality, consider the inﬂuence of government’s political
orientation on environmental policy, as well as the size of energy intensive
sectors in the economy, which affect both the lobbying structure and the
demand for energy innovations. These results point to the need to move the
literature on the determinants of energy-related innovation beyond the focus
on environmental policy instruments that has dominated the environmental
economics literature in recent years.
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8Is Feed-In-Tariff Policy Effective for
Increasing Deployment of Renewable
Energy in Indonesia?
Dewi Yuliani
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is an archipelago rich in renewable energy resources including
geothermal, hydro, biomass, solar, and wind energy. Due to its location in
the ‘Ring of Fire’, geothermal energy is its main potential source of renewable
energy, amounting to 29 GW—40 per cent of the world’s total. Of the total
potential, up till now only 1,340 MW (less than 5 per cent) has been installed
for electricity generation, with another 1,500 MW at various stages of devel-
opment (DGNREEC 2015). Hydropower is another major source of potential
in Indonesia and is estimated to be around 75,000 MW. At present, some
6,000 MW has been installed as large Hydro Electric Power, mostly in Java.
Included in this category is small hydro (up to 10 MW). 217.16 MW of small
hydropower plant has been installed in 2015, a large portion of which is used
not for proﬁt but for electrifying remote areas (DGNREEC 2015).
For a country on the equator, solar energy is considered the most under-
utilized source of energy in Indonesia. Only around 71 MW is installed but
mostly belongs to the state-owned electricity company (SEC or Indonesia’s
PLN) for electrifying remote islands in the eastern parts of Indonesia. At
present, the imported amount of solar photovoltaics (PV) is still considerably
high, so the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has attempted to boost the local
production of PV systems and encourage investors to build PVmanufacturers.
As an agricultural country, biomass is the other major potential source of
Indonesia’s renewable energy. This is thought to have a potential 32,000 MW,
of which 1,740 MW is planned to be installed in the near future (DGNREEC
2015). Biomass sources include palm oil, cassava, sugar cane, and so on, which
can be the source of bioethanol and biofuel production.
Despite this abundant potential, the development of renewable energy in
Indonesia still faces a hard battle, mostly because of the long legacy of the
government’s energy subsidies for fossil fuels. According to the Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR), Indonesia’s energy demand has
been increasing faster than its economic development growth, which
amounted to 7 per cent in 2014 (DGNREEC 2014). This demand is currently
met largely by fossil fuels, which in turn bleeds the country’s ﬁnances as
Indonesia has become a net importer of both crude oil and reﬁned products
since 2004.
As a response to the increasing demand for energy and for cleaner energy due
to climate issues, in January 2014 The National Energy Policy was adopted by
the House of Representatives in the form of Government Regulation No 79/
2014 (Government of Indonesia 2014), in which the GOI projected that renew-
able sources would supply at least 23 per cent of Indonesia’s energy needs in
2025. The GOI is also committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by
26 per cent by 2020 to combat global climate change (MEMR 2015).
Many efforts have been undertaken to increase the deployment of renew-
able energy (RE), especially to support the increasing electricity demand.
These include: obligating the SEC to buy generated electricity from small-
scale producers, prioritizing the use of RE, tax incentives, tax holidays for
exported equipment, and simplifying the procedure for licences. Lastly, since
around 2010 the GOI has implemented its feed-in-tariff (FIT) policy in
order to encourage the private sector to develop renewable electricity. The
FIT policy ensures that developers get a relatively fair price for electricity
generation from renewable energy resources, which are now being used
widely in many countries.
This study undertakes exploratory research that aims to evaluate whether
the implementation of the FIT policy is effective for the purpose of increasing
deployment of renewable energy in Indonesia. A number of ofﬁcial documents
and supporting policies set out the plans for renewable energy development in
Indonesia. However, no critical study has been carried out into the real
outcome of policy implementation in the ﬁeld. Data analysis is expected to
show whether the FIT policy is sufﬁcient, and if not, what are the reasons for
this and what can be done to improve it.
This chapter is organized as follows. After the introduction, which describes
Indonesia’s renewable energy situation and outlines the purpose of the study,
Section 8.2 brieﬂy reviews the FIT policy, its principles, case studies, and
barriers to implementation. Section 8.3 outlines the methodology used for
data collection and the locations covered by the site survey for the purpose of
data veriﬁcation. Section 8.4 provides the data ﬁndings and undertakes data
analysis to identify factors that hinder the deployment of renewable energy.
Section 8.5 offers conclusions and recommendations for better implementa-
tion of FIT policy in the future.
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8.2 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE FEED-IN-TARIFF POLICY
8.2.1 What is FIT Policy?
Historically, to spur the growth of renewable electricity, European countries
set a price for electricity that is attractive to investors. This policy, which was
subsequently called feed-in-tariff (FIT) policy, has three components: a ﬁxed
price which is sufﬁcient for a return on investment, a guaranteed grid con-
nection, and a long-term contract to ensure the stability of the investment
(Mendonça 2007). By using this policy, investors do not have to deal with the
cumbersome process of various incentives and tax exemptions, as applied in
America (Farrel 2009: 6). This price is reviewed annually and it can be lowered
if it attracts too many investors or creates windfall proﬁt, and vice versa. Later
on, this ﬁxed price policy is accompanied by a mandate for utility companies
to connect renewable electricity to the grid. In Europe, the cost of connection
to the higher voltage is borne by the utility company, and the contract for
selling electricity is short and uniform (Farrel 2009: 6).
According to IRENA (2012), there are four categories of deployment
policies, namely: ﬁscal incentives, public ﬁnance, regulations, and access
policies (Mitchell et al. 2011). The FIT policy falls into the price-driven
public ﬁnance policy category (IRENA 2012). Deployment, which is deﬁned
by IRENA (2012) as the stage of commercial roll-out, is a stage preceding
full competition and maturity in the development of a new technology. In
the commercial roll-out stage or deployment, economic support is needed to
correct market failure and/or inadequate policy requirements. In the renew-
able energy market, failure comes from the discrepancy between the average
production costs of electricity from fossil fuels or conventional energy and
the production costs using renewables. Without consideration of the cost
of research and development, externalities related to climate change, and
other barriers to mass production, there is no way that renewable energy
technology can compete with the energy price produced by conventional
technology.
Another beneﬁt of FIT policy implementation includes support for local
ownership of renewable plants because of its simplicity, and thus it creates
more jobs and increases the economic impact for the community. If we look at
the experience of European countries, about half of wind turbines in Germany
and about 80 per cent in Denmark are owned by local residents (Farrel 2009).
8.2.1.1 Examples of FIT Implementation
The most notable success story of FIT policy is Germany’s and Denmark’s
experiences in FIT implementation. Germany started to apply FIT policy in
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1990, when the law required electricity utilities to connect renewable electri-
city to the grid and to buy the electricity at a price ranging from 65 per cent to
90 per cent of the average tariff for consumers (Mez 2012: 24). The imple-
mentation of FIT since then has spurred the expansion of wind turbine power
plants in particular, from 20 MW in 1989 to more than 1,100 MW in 1995
(Lauber and Mez 2006 in Mez 2012: 24). In addition, Germany has also
implemented a wind power programme and provides several kinds of subsid-
ies and ﬁnancial incentives for renewable energy investors. This policy, along
with the implementation of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (RESA) in
2000, which was passed in order to achieve the targeted 25 per cent reduction of
carbon-dioxide emissions, has resulted in an almost tenfold expansion in renew-
ables from 1.3 per cent in 1990 to nearly 11 per cent in 2011 (Mez 2012: 26).
In 1988, Denmark applied a price policy for renewable electricity that
paved a way for FIT policy, in which utility companies are required to set a
fair price, purchase, and connect to the renewable electricity produced. This
policy was successful in triggering the establishment of wind turbines,
reaching 300 MW of capacity. The FIT policy was formally applied in
Denmark in 1993, when the purchase price of renewable electricity was set
at 85 per cent of the average production and distribution cost and connec-
tion to the grid and purchase of power was guaranteed. This policy, along
with an exemption for cooperatives from paying, has resulted in 28 per cent
of Danish energy coming from renewables with wind turbines producing
almost 3,000 MW of electricity. However, in 2004 the Danish ended the FIT
policy and nowadays investors in renewable energy have to follow the
renewable energy portfolio standard with tradable credits, such as applied
in the USA (Farrel 2009).
8.2.1.2 Barriers to FIT Implementation
Klein et al. (2010) warned that FIT policy should be kept transparent and
not too complex, and their study evaluated the structure of electricity tariffs
in several countries that could act as barriers to FIT implementation. In the
USA, Farrel (2009) complains that the contract for electricity purchase can
exceed 100 pages, while in Germany, for instance it is kept short to 4–5 pages.
Another potential barrier is the condition of the electricity market, such as
liberalization of electricity in New Zealand (White, Lloyd, and Wakes 2013).
However, another study in the European Union has suggested that the
poor effectiveness of FIT policy is mainly caused by failure to tend to non-
economic barriers, such as uncertain and lengthy administrative processes,
and difﬁculties in gaining access to the grid (IRENA 2012: 13). Research by
ECORYS (2008) into European Union member states showed that there are
some non-cost barriers that negatively impact the deployment of renewables
to a different degree. One of the barriers most impacted is the administrative
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hurdles which include many issues, such as lack of coordination between
institutions, length of time for obtaining authorization, the incoherence of
procedures and regulations, big overhead costs, insufﬁcient spatial planning,
and social opposition. Other signiﬁcant barriers are difﬁculty in getting
grid connection and access, and limited information and awareness related
to renewable energy among civil servants and the community in general
(ECORYS 2008).
8.2.2 FIT Policy in Indonesia
In Indonesia, a policy, which is similar to FIT, was issued in 2002 for small-
scale hydropower plants. The MEMR issued a requirement for the SEC to
buy electricity at 60 per cent of regional electricity production costs for
low-voltage, and 80 per cent for middle-voltage connection. However, there
have been some obstacles encountered in its implementation, one being the
difﬁculty of determining the regional standard of production cost, and another
being because energy production (especially of petroleum) was still heavily
subsidized by the GOI, so that the utility company did not need to prioritize
the use of renewable energy. The policy was improved in 2006 to include
higher-scale hydropower plants (up to 10 MW), and then underwent some
revisions in 2009 to include a more attractive tariff. Hasan and Wahjosudibjo
(2014) argue that the obstacles to FIT implementation are mainly because
there is no guarantee of long-term contracts and nor that the utility company
will accept the contract.
A more formal kind of FIT policy was issued in 2011 and 2012, when the
MEMR required the PLN to buy electricity from geothermal power plants at a
ﬁxed tariff of US$0.97/kWh. Subsequently, the FIT for other renewable energy
sources, such as solar and biomass, was issued in 2013 and 2014. In general,
FIT regulation is targeted at reducing the time required for negotiating a price
with the SEC (which, at times, can be several years), and making investment
more attractive and long-term planning possible, thereby making RE invest-
ment viable. Table 8.1 shows the different FIT regulations for various RE
sources, their original version, and the revisions.
It can be seen from Table 8.1 that the GOI made several attempts to adjust
and readjust the RE selling price; in some cases revisions were made more than
once. In small hydropower plants, for instance, there were at least four MEMR
regulations with different electricity prices which had been revised due to
inputs from related parties, adjustment for inﬂation, and exchange rates. From
the many revisions of FIT regulation, it can be concluded that the GOI puts
in a lot of effort, and thus relies on this policy, to accelerate deployment of
renewable energy.
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Table 8.1. Regulation of feed-in tariff in Indonesia for various RE sources
No RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCE
FEED-IN TARIFF REGULATION NOTE
Original Version Electricity Price
(US$/kWh)
Revised Version Electricity Price (US
$/kWh)
1 Micro/Mini Hydro MEMR Regulation
No. 12 year 2014
<10 MW = 8 cent MEMR Regulation
No. 22 year 2014
<10 MW = 8 cent 7.2 cent if using public
infrast, i.e., irrigation
>250 kWh = 9.4
cent
>250 kWh = 9.4 cent 8.4 cent if using public
infrast, i.e., irrigation
MEMR Regulation
No. 19 year 2015
<10 MW = 12 cent 10.8 cent if using public
infrast, i.e., irrigation
>250 kWh = 14.4
cent
13 cent if using public
infrast, i.e., irrigation
2 Geothermal MEMR Regulation
No. 02 year 2011
on high volt. only
9.7 cent
MEMR Regulation
No. 22 year 2012
on high volt. 10–17
cent
depend on location
on med. Volt.
11.5–18.5 cents
3 Biomass MEMR Regulation
No. 04 year 2012
9.75 cent MEMR Regulation
No. 27 year 2014
8.5 cent med volt. Interconn.
13.5 cent 11.1 cent low volt. Interconn.
Biogass 9.75 cent 8.5 cent med volt. Interconn.
13.5 cent 10.4 cent low volt. Interconn.
Municipal Waste 10.5 cent MEMR Regulation
No. 44 year 2015
16.55 cent high & med volt. Intercn.
13.98 cent 20.16 cent low volt. Interconn.
4 SOLAR PV MEMR Regulation
No. 17 year 2013
up to 25 cent local content < 40%
up to 30 cent Local content > 40%
Note: Prices converted from rupiahs rely on its annual exchange rate.
Source: Based on data from MEMR (2015).
8.3 DATA ACQUISITION
Effectiveness is deﬁned as ‘the extent to which intended objectives are met,
for instance, the actual increase in the output of renewable electricity
generated or shares of renewable energy in total energy supplies within a
speciﬁed time period’ (IRENA 2012: 12). In this study, the effectiveness of
the FIT policy is measured by the increase in deployment of renewable
energy power plants over the period since the policy was made in 2010 to
date (a ﬁve-year period), compared with the GOI’s target for achieving its
share of the national energy mix. As suggested by IRENA (2012), in analys-
ing the effectiveness of a policy, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth
analysis to elaborate factors that support or hinder the outcome of the policy,
such as external factors or indirectly related barriers to the success of policy
implementation.
8.3.1 Study Location
Indonesia is made up of 17,000 islands and has one of the longest coastlines in
the world. Most of the regions in Indonesia, especially in the eastern part, still
have very poor infrastructure conditions. However, with a population of about
300 million and relatively stable economic growth (4–6 per cent per annum
over the last ﬁve years), it is a country with many interesting prospects.
Politically speaking, Indonesia can be categorized as a country in transi-
tional democracy, because, after its independence on 17 August 1945, demo-
cratic transition did not start to happen until 1998 when the long reign of
General Suharto was toppled by students’ demonstrations after 30 years of
authoritative governance. After the so-called reformation era, Indonesian
society has undergone a drastic change, including a shift from centralized to
decentralized governance. Nowadays the people of Indonesia are enjoying a
new sense of democracy. This new-found freedom allows them to freely
question or even disobey what the government wants. This understanding of
the political situation is important in comprehending the real condition of
governance related to the deployment of renewable energy power plants.
This study uses a quantitative and qualitative research approach. The
quantitative study is conducted by collecting, comparing, and analysing data
from various institutions related to the targeted deployment of renewable
energy power plants and its realization in the ﬁeld. The comparison is followed
by site visits to several locations for the purpose of conﬁrmation. Due to
limited time and budget, the conﬁrmation ﬁeld surveys were only conducted
in West Java, a province adjacent to Jakarta, to gain a deeper perspective from
players in renewable energy in real circumstances.
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One reason for choosing West Java for site conﬁrmation is because it is the
province where the development of RE is considered to be the highest, and it
has been a pioneer in RE development in Indonesia, such as in geothermal,
micro-hydro, biogas, biofuel, and so on. It is densely populated with about 46
million people inhabiting some 35,000 square kilometres of land. With 6.5 per
cent annual economic growth in 2012, its energy consumption has continued
increasing to around 8–11 per cent for all sectors, implying that the usage of
energy is still inefﬁcient. Thus, serious efforts to lower energy consumption, as
well as efforts to diversify fossil-fuel energy with more renewable kinds of
energy have been conducted since 2001. Some renewable energy technologies,
such as micro-hydropower plants, are considered to be relatively successful.
8.3.2 Quantitative Data
Data analysis from several data resources (MEMR, SEC, local government)
resulted in a wide discrepancy between targeted installed capacity and its realiza-
tion.Most commercial RE projects have been delayed by one to ﬁve years. As has
been stated before, the comparison between projected and real data for small
hydropowerplants is only conducted forWest Java,which is considered tomirror
Indonesia’s condition. As per IRENA’s deﬁnition (2012), deployment of renew-
able energy power plants includes the commercial operation of the plant, not just
installation. The ﬁnancial stage includes preparation of funding sources, negoti-
ating and signing of a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) with the SEC, the
process of obtaining various kinds of permits (from central government aswell as
from local government), and the construction stage, which includes land acqui-
sition, community preparation, mobilization, and other construction activities.
Meanwhile, number of permits refers to the sum of permits related with small
hydro power plants, issued either by central government (SEC, DGNRE, and
DGE), or local government in the form of location permits. Figure 8.1 shows the
actual installed capacity and the various stages of renewable energy power plant
deployment from 2010, or since the FIT implementation, until December 2015.
Ofﬁcial data issued by central government institutions are not consistent.
For instance, for small hydropower, one published report says that there are
only 19 small hydropower licences in West Java, while another institution
states there are 31, and yet another says 34 licences. When these data are cross-
checked with data from local government (regency), the compilation from
regencies which have small hydropower sites suggests there are 61 small
hydropower licences in West Java.
Another interesting result of the data analysis is that, on average, only 10 per
centof permits issued for powergeneration from the renewable energy source, are
already at the commercial operation stage or deployed. Some of the permits had
been issued for more than ﬁve years. Thus, there must be some problems in the
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ﬁeld that prevent the FIT policy from having a positive effect on the deployment
of renewable energy power plants. To delve deeper into this discrepancy, quali-
tative surveys were conducted using semi-structured interviews. The identities of
all those interviewed in this study, including experts, developers, and public
authorities, are conﬁdential due to the sensitivity of the issue.
8.3.3 Qualitative Data
From the collected data and results of the analysis, an attempt to elaborate the
causes of the discrepancy between projected goals and the real situation is
conducted using semi-structured interviews. It is worth noting that not every-
one contacted who was directly involved in the deployment of RE was willing
to be interviewed, especially government ofﬁcials and developers. Some were
eventually willing to give information when the interview was conducted
outside of their ofﬁces, some objected to the interview being recorded, and
most of them agreed to be interviewed with the promise that their names
would not be revealed. On average, the interviews lasted between about 15
minutes and 2 hours; some were recorded while others were ﬁeld-noted.
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Figure 8.1. Deployment status of renewable energy power plants after FIT policy.
Source: Author’s data compilation from various institutions and ﬁeld surveys.
Note: For Small Hydro, data only from West Java Province.
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In total, there were 22 key respondents, consisting of 5 investors (4 small
hydropower developers, 1 geothermal), 14 government ofﬁcials (5 from central
government, 2 from provincial government, and 7 from regency (local) govern-
ment), and 3 respondents from related agencies (1 SEC, 1 expert, 1 practitioner).
Table 8.2 shows a general guidance questions to semi-structure interviews
conducted, which are slightly different for each group of respondents.
The analysis is focused on the evaluation of FIT policy in Indonesia:
whether it is effective in increasing the usage of RE, whether there is any
room for improvement, and if not effective, then what are the alternatives.
For deﬁnition purposes, deployment of renewable energy means the power
plant is not just already installed and producing electricity, but it also has
generated income from selling electricity.
8 .4 ANALYSIS
8.4.1 Effectiveness of FIT Policy
It is interesting to note that since around 2011 when the FIT policy was ﬁrst
made, investment in renewable energy has been increasing signiﬁcantly.
However, the study results showed a totally different outcome regarding real
deployment of renewable energy power plants. Take geothermal energy, for
instance: from 51 licences issued by the MEMR, only 3 are operational
Table 8.2. List of guidance questions for key respondents
Guidance questions for investors/developers:
1. How has the introduction of FIT policy affected your decision to invest in RE power plant?
2. Is the current structure of FIT policy sufﬁcient to foster deployment of RE? if not, why?
3. What obstacles do you ﬁnd in the deployment of RE power plants?
4. Is there any suggestion you want to propose to overcome those obstacles?
Guidance questions for government ofﬁcials (central, regional, and local government):
1. Is there any special treatment for the issuance of permits for RE investment, compared with
other kinds of permits?
2. Do you know the government’s target for increasing the usage of RE sources?
3. What obstacles do you ﬁnd in the deployment of RE power plants?
4. Is there any suggestion you want to propose to overcome those obstacles?
Guidance questions for government ofﬁcials (expert, practitioner, and utility company):
1. Is the recent structure of FIT policy sufﬁcient to foster deployment of RE? if not, why?
2. What are the obstacles to implementing FIT policy in Indonesia?
3. Is there any suggestion you want to propose to overcome those obstacles?
Source: Author’s illustration.
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commercially in 2015. This means that the amount of delayed deployment of
geothermal power plants exceeds 90 per cent. For solar PV and biomass, data
for real deployment of power plants are not very different. For small hydro-
power plants, the data, which are taken only from West Java, show that the
rate of successful deployment is no better, with only 6 out of 61 licences having
been fully deployed commercially.
Those at the construction phase (representing a total 56.69 MW from nine
companies) report that the delayed construction stage is mostly caused by
difﬁculties in obtaining a location permit or a building permit from local
(regency) government, hard negotiations of land price, and the demands of
local communities. In West Java, there are no biomass (domestic waste to
energy power plant), solar PV, or wind turbine power plants which are fully
operational in a commercial sense. Some small MWs have been installed (solar
PV and biomass), but negotiations of price and other related processes are
still underway.
The 19 small hydropowers that are in the ﬁnance phase (total 88,174 MW)
report several problems including difﬁculties in obtaining PPA with the SEC
and the long process of permit issuance for surface water usage, in which the
two processes are intermingled. It is interesting that policies for river usage
permits, which depend on where the river is located, are different from one
locality to another, and from local government to central government.
One unique example is a small hydropower plant of 600 kW in a region of
Central Java, which has been fully constructed but has not been operational
because it has not obtained the PPA from the SEC. And the SEC cannot issue
the PPA because the related institution has not been issued with a permit for
water resource utilization. There has been much confusion over who is
authorized to issue the permit: initially it was thought to be the responsibility
of local government, but, then it was clear that the speciﬁc watershed’s
authority belongs to central government (Ministry of Public Works). However,
up until now the permit has not been issued by the minister, with no clear
explanation.
When asked whether the structure of FIT policy has met their expectations,
all respondents from investors of RE power plants admitted that the structure
and the selling price have been sufﬁcient to make the project (on paper) seem
viable, and this has greatly affected their decision to invest in renewable
energy. Especially for small hydropower investors, who enjoy a high price of
electricity and for whom the domestic content of the technology is relatively
high, the structure of small hydropower has caused a surge of domestic
investors who are interested in investing. This attractiveness of RE investment
has been conﬁrmed by the US Department of Commerce report (US Depart-
ment of Commerce 2010) and the UNDP (United Nations Development
Programme) report (UNDP 2015). However, the investors convey that, in
the process of development, the many additional costs incurred by the many
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kinds of permits that have to be obtained before they are fully operational, and
the long delays caused by them, have eroded the proﬁtability of RE projects.
8.4.2 Procedure for Obtaining a Renewable Energy Licence
In delving deeper into the permit procedure, the research is focused on small
hydro development in West Java only, due to limited time and budget. There
is no coherent data between institutions and no transparency of information.
At the lower level of government, which is provincial and regency govern-
ment, this is even worse. That is why interviews were conducted covertly and
some of those interviewed agreed to be interviewed only on condition that
their names would not be revealed. Figure 8.2 displays the general procedure
to be conducted in order to obtain a small hydropower plant licence. The ﬂows
of procedures at the lower levels of government (province and regency
government) are simpliﬁed and compiled from practices existing in different
regencies.
The upper part of the procedure illustrates the ﬂow of applications for
power plant licences according to MEMR Regulations No 22/2010, where the
developers of on-grid power generation must submit an application to the
Directorate General of Electricity and must previously have had a memoran-
dum of understanding with the SEC that the planned location of the devel-
opment is already included in the Master Plan. Then, the developer must
submit a deposit of 5 per cent of total investment to the Directorate General of
New and Renewable Energy, in order to obtain Approval for Hydro Utiliza-
tion. Thereafter, a temporary permit for small hydropower generation is
issued. Based on this temporary permit, the developer must then go through
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Figure 8.2. Procedure for the issuance of licences for small hydropower generation.
Source : Author’s illustration.
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the procedure at the lower level of government (province government and
related regency government).
This is where matters get more complicated, because, in order to conduct
land acquisition, the developer must go through several processes, often very
tiring, with no time limit, and a lot of additional (and unofﬁcial) cost. To make
matters worse, there is no standard procedure for this land acquisition
between regencies, and the process may vary greatly from one place to
another. When there is forest land included in the design, the matter is even
more complicated because the timeline of the procedure to obtain permission
to use the land often exceeds the length of the permit.
In general, there are at least 14 kinds of licences and permits (and other
permit-like processes) that have to be obtained before a developer can start the
construction of a RE power plant: four from central government, one from
provincial government, and nine from regency government. There are also
some associated recommendations from related bodies which are a must-have
requirement before a permit can be issued (this includes community approval).
For geothermal investment, this number may well be higher, especially for
foreign investors. It is worth noting that the costs associated with permit
issuance are generally not stated clearly; sometimes they need to be negotiated,
and sometimes they require much higher costs than expected. Although some
RE investors admit that they have prepared for such excess costs, nevertheless
the negotiation process requires time, delays schedules, and lowers the proﬁt-
ability of RE investments.
8.4.3 Obstacles to Deployment of Renewable Energy
8.4.3.1 Incoherent Regulations between Related Institutions
Incoherent knowledge about renewable energy, different agendas, and over-
lapping policies between ministries and moreover between central govern-
ment and local government, surfaced several times in the elaboration of
obstacles to renewable energy deployment. One provincial government ofﬁcial
who was authorized to issue water utilization permits complained that the
MEMR issued a permit to build small hydropower without stating the exact
location, with the result that local government, in certain areas of West Java,
issued two permits for one exact same location. This disturbs the steady ﬂow
of the river and potentially could conﬂict with rice ﬁeld irrigation. He then
questioned whether the river discharge usage permit should come before or
after a small hydropower plant permit is issued by the MEMR. However, when
questioned about this problem, the regency government ofﬁcial seemed not to
recognize this problem, stating that they only process location permits as they
are proposed, and that there is no clariﬁcation process with the higher level of
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government or with related institutions whatsoever. Thus, if there is overlap-
ping of location permits, it is not their problem.
The institutional problem becomes worse when an RE power plant is to be
built in a conservation or protected forest area because the clearance and permit
to use the forest area must come from the Minister of Forestry. Even though
they know that renewable energy plants would not damage the forest (unlike
mining, for instance), still there is no special treatment for the so-called
sustainable energy and non-sustainable usage of the forest. Even though, re-
cently, there has been a revision for geothermal energy that enables protected
forest to be used for geothermal power plants, a geothermal investor respondent
still complained that the issuance of the permit is long and complex.
8.4.3.2 Long Process of Electricity Purchasing
Investors also convey that the signing of a PPA with the SEC is extremely
complex and technical and bargaining is tough. Sometimes the process took
longer than a year. A geothermal power plant investor stated that he has to
wait four years before the agreement is reached. Another investor even
suspects that the SEC is reluctant to buy electricity from renewable energy
sources because it then has to cover additional costs compared to when it uses
coal-ﬁred power plants (personal interviews, August–September 2015).
Meanwhile, in reply to questions about the many difﬁculties experienced in
obtaining PPAs, the Director of Business Ventures of the SEC (personal
interview, September 2015) denied that the SEC is reluctant to buy electricity
from RE sources, stating that it is mandatory for the SEC to buy in accordance
with the MEMR regulations. However, as a state-owned company, there are
several requirements that have to be met before issuance of a PPA including,
among others, obtaining all related permits, land clearance, and agreement
with the local community. In reply to questions about the proﬁtability of
trading electricity from RE sources, she admitted that the price is considerably
higher than coal-generated electricity (average production cost of around
US$0.5). At present, the buying price of electricity from RE varies between
US$0.10 and US$0.17, which is sold to the public at an average price of around
US$0.8 to US$0.9, and this makes the discrepancy in cost a burden for the SEC
to cover from elsewhere.
Another complaint from the SEC is that while they have to pay instantly the
electricity price as generated, reimbursement from the government is
dependent on the national budgeting agenda. Reimbursement is sometimes
delayed for several months and sometimes is not provided at the exact amount
that has been disbursed by the SEC. Thus, she proposed that there should be
an independent agency to manage the ﬁnancing of electricity from RE sources
which deal with the electricity price negotiations, payments of power purchasing,
and all related matters. Learning from the case of Malaysia and Thailand, this
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agency would ensure that the discrepancy in cost between the average pro-
duction cost and the selling price from conventional power plants, which is
reimbursed in the form of government subsidy, can be managed effectively
without depending on political processes in the annual national budgeting
agenda.
8.4.3.3 Problems with Community and Land Acquisition
Another factor that hinders speedy deployment of RE power plants is that in
some locations the community does not wish to sell its land due to lack of
knowledge about renewable energy. This is especially true for geothermal
energy, where in West Java at least, there are four locations where geothermal
plants are delayed due to various kinds of conﬂict. Yuliani (2013) stated that
community resistance in many locations of geothermal development in Indo-
nesia represents the major obstacle to renewable energy deployment. Similarly,
Hasan and Wahjosudibjo (2014) suspected that there are several issues other
than the electricity tariff that have to be addressed by the government in order to
improve geothermal power plants.
It is worth noting that, after some 30 years of relatively authoritarian
governance, since around the 2000s, the Indonesian people have been enjoying
a more democratic atmosphere in what is called the reformation era, where
governance is more decentralized, public policy is more bottom-up and
participatory, and there is a new-found freedom of speech among the people.
Yuliani (2013) noted that this new condition in a community sometimes
brings problems for the development of infrastructure, especially when there
is no sufﬁcient preparation for the community to accept new things, such as
renewable energy technology. Even respondents from local government ofﬁ-
cials (regency government) show that this lack of information is not only true
for the layman but also for bureaucrats.
In the deployment of small hydropower plants, community conﬂicts are
usually about the amount of water used for irrigation, which mostly can be
solved by good communication. However, unavailability of a standard price
for land, especially in remote areas, often delays the land acquisition process
and if the price wanted by the community exceeds the expected ﬁgure this can
lower the economic viability of the project. It is worth noting that, for the
foreign investor, this problem of the price of land skyrocketing may worsen,
and needs to be carefully considered.
8.4.4 Miscellaneous: Unanticipated Impacts of FIT Policy
The signiﬁcant increase in renewable energy investment, especially for small
hydropower, creates several unanticipated impacts which are not always positive.
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Government ofﬁcials, as well as developers, report that there is some kind of
rivalry between institutions related to the importance of their role in permit
processes. The struggle to acquire the most proﬁtable sites for hydropower plants
has created a situation where power plants are located very near each other. On
the supply side, it is a worrying situation, because there is no capacity cap that
limits how much of the generated electricity the electricity company is willing
to buy.
Related to land acquisition, a growing number of people play the role of a land
realtor, hoping that they can beneﬁt from discrepancies in land prices. This, in
turn, makes the price of land uncontrollable in some regions. One developer
complained that government ofﬁcials are also players in land acquisition deals.
Before the implementation of FIT, small hydropower was used to electrify
communities in remote regions, usually with aid from the government.
However, with the massive emergence of hydro investors and the ﬁght for
the best locations, these community-based small hydropower plants are left
behind. In West Java, there are at least two locations where micro-hydro
plants were ready to be constructed but eventually failed because the power
plant licence for the exact location had been issued by the MEMR.
8.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.5.1 Conclusion
Indonesia is an example of a country where FIT policy, which is considered
quite successful in developed countries, is duplicated without careful consid-
erations of the existing sociopolitical conditions. The FIT policy in Indonesia,
which has been formulated in eight ministry regulations (four original
versions and ﬁve revised versions) has not signiﬁcantly improved deployment
of its renewable energy. It is true that investment interest in renewable energy
has soared to a level which has never been seen since its implementation
around the 2010s. However, data conﬁrmed through ﬁeld reports shows that
about 90 per cent of scheduled deployments of renewable energy power plants
are delayed, and targets are far from realized.
Many complaints related to difﬁculties in obtaining a PPA, lack of a guaran-
tee of grid connection, and complex contract structure, indicating that some of
the FIT policy principles are not being met, although the price of electricity is
satisfactory. The study also reveals several other issues that pose obstacles to
renewable energy deployment, which can be grouped into three big problems:
unclear and inconsistent policies both horizontally (between ministries) and
vertically (between levels of government), the complex requirements of many
permits, and difﬁculties related to land acquisition which includes conﬂict with
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the community. Adding to those problems in the ﬁeld is the corrupt behaviour
in permit issuance processes, which has made the calculation of the economic
scale of a project difﬁcult.
To sum up, the FIT policy when applied in a less developed country such as
Indonesia must work in tandem with other efforts. The complex structure of
governance, lack of community knowledge about renewable energy, and inco-
herent coordination between related institutions, all add up to difﬁculties of
implementation in the ﬁeld. If Indonesia is serious about achieving its projected
goals for renewable energy deployment, then efforts must be strengthened and
calculatedmeasures must be taken. On the other hand, the study also underlines
the importance of narrowing the wide gap in transitioning to cleaner energy,
where less developed and developed countries both face very different challenges.
8.5.2 Recommendation
In order to enhance the effectiveness of FIT policy in increasing the success of
renewable energy deployment, it is recommended that the GOI simpliﬁes the
licence procedures, either at the central government level ormost especially at the
local government level. This will require an exceptionally strong commitment
from all parties, because every institution holds to its own laws and regulations,
and may not have the same agenda for the development of renewable energy.
The existence of speciﬁc budgets allocated for renewable energy subsidies, as
implemented by many countries, can play a signiﬁcant role in lessening the
burden of developers. The subsidy which is intended to pay for the discrepancy
of production costs between renewable energy and conventional power plants
has to be independentlymanaged, and not be dependent on the political process
in the national budget planning which is decided annually. One realistic option
is to form an independent body which is given the mandate to facilitate the
permit process, formulate and ﬁnalize PPA, andmanage various aspects related
to pricing and payments of the government subsidy for renewable energy.
It is also recommended that the GOI should not abandon community-based
efforts in renewable energy deployment. The excessive focus on investment to
boost renewable energy deployment is not sustainable because it does not
create a sense of belonging from the surrounding community. On the other
hand, there is a lot of under-utilized renewable energy potential which is most
suitable to be used for domestic energy, such as biomass.
8.5.3 Suggestions for Further Research
Due to the limited time and budget for conducting this ﬁeld survey, in-depth
investigation of locations for the deployment of renewable energy power
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plants has only been conducted at a limited number of sites. It is suggested that
a thorough assessment is conducted in other parts of Indonesia, including of
all kinds of renewable technologies. Field practices at the lower level of
government may vary from place to place. Thus, a comparison between
regions is recommended in order to obtain a general description of how
permit procedures are carried out at local government level, and eventually,
to suggest the best option for simplifying procedures and increasing the
effectiveness of deployment. There are at least two small hydropower plants
which are said to have been operational in published reports by related
institutions; in reality, they are still in the process of becoming fully oper-
ational commercially. Thus, it is best to check the location of development on
the site to assess the real situation, especially for solar PV and biomass power
plants which are located in remote areas of Indonesia.
The availability of low-interest loans dedicated to renewable energy develop-
ment from various banking and ﬁnancial institution, both national and inter-
national, must also be scrutinized. The fact that about 90 per cent of power plant
licences have not shown any progress after several years, raised some concerns
about prejudice from several of those surveyed that the licences are used to
obtain loans to be invested elsewhere. In this study, the researcher does not have
access to any banking personnel and, under the bank privacy principle, it could
be difﬁcult to get any information. However, in order to create a healthy
investment climate for renewable energy, it is suggested that measures are
taken to ensure that renewable energy loans are used appropriately.
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9Do Political Economy Factors
Matter in Explaining the Increase in
the Production of Bioenergy?
Éric Nazindigouba Kere
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The international political and economic context is characterized by a growing
awareness of the need to ﬁght against global warming (due largely to the
increase in greenhouse gas emissions, according to the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) and to ﬁnd alternatives to fossil
fuels. Indeed, the increase in temperature, the multiplication of natural disas-
ters (storms, droughts, ﬂoods, etc.), and the volatility of oil prices are signals
that should encourage states to act against global warming.
In such a context, the ‘bioenergy with carbon capture and storage’ (BECCS)
technology appears as an alternative to fossil fuels. Indeed, these energies have
a very favourable carbon footprint because they are produced from agriculture
and forestry biomass.1 They are mainly used to produce heat, biofuels, and
electricity. For these reasons, many countries have chosen to respond to
environmental and energy challenges through increased production of bio-
energy. For example, the United States, with the Renewable Fuel Standard
Program (RFS2) and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, set the
goal of incorporating a minimum of 36 billion gallons of biofuels into the fuel
market by 2022 (EPA 2010). According to data from the United States Energy
Information Administration (EIA 2015a), illustrated in Figure 9.1, world pro-
duction of bioenergy (ethanol and biodiesel) has increased dramatically over
the last decade. Global bioenergy production increased from 300,000 barrels
per day (BPD) in 2000 to 1.9 million BPD in 2012. This increase was primarily
1 If they do not generate indirect land use changes.
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Figure 9.1. Evolution of bioenergy production and number of producers.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EIA (2015a).
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due to strong growth in ethanol production: 1.47 million BPD in 2012 versus
299,000 BPD in 2000. Biodiesel production increased from 15,000 to 431,000
BPD between 2000 and 2012. At the same time, the number of bioenergy-
producing countries quadrupled between 2000 and 2011, followed by a slight
decline in 2012.2 Despite this progress, the IPCC (2014: 82) recommends a
fourfold increase in investments in BECCS in order to limit global warming to
2°C. Therefore, a better understanding of the determinants of bioenergy pro-
duction is essential to promote the transition to clean energy.
To the best of our knowledge, only Gan and Smith (2011) have empirically
analysed the macroeconomic determinants of bioenergy. In the OECD (Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, they showed
that gross national product along with bioenergy market deployment policies
have signiﬁcant and positive impacts on the per capita supply of renewable
energy and bioenergy. Surprisingly, the impact of political economy factors was
ignored in their study, even though several papers have shown that the quality of
political and economic governance inﬂuences economic activity (including
bioenergy production) through its impact on investment and entrepreneurship
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Baum and Lake 2003; Christopoulos
and Tsionas 2004; La Porta et al. 2008; Nelson and Singh 1998).
We classify political economy factors into two categories: governance qual-
ity and macroeconomic policies. Quality of governance reﬂects the quality of
political and economic institutions, and can be captured by the following
indicators: environmental policy stringency (EPS) instruments, bureaucracy
quality, corruption, investment proﬁle, democratic accountability, govern-
ment stability, and law and order. Furthermore, according to La Porta, de
Silanes, and Shleifer, ‘the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correl-
ated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with
economic outcomes’ (2008: 285), and thus, indirectly, with the economic and
political conditions in which bioenergy is produced. High-quality governance
helps to create institutional and political dynamics, a transparent and predict-
able framework that encourages economic actors to invest in growth sectors of
the future, including bioenergy. Macroeconomic policies (ﬁnancial develop-
ment, interest rates, trade openness, and oil scarcity) may also play an
important role in increasing the production of bioenergy. Indeed, ﬁnancial
development facilitates the ﬁnancing of future projects at low cost. It results in
low interest rates and high credit volume. Open trade facilitates access to
technology, increases competition, and provides new market opportunities for
2 Countries (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Jamaica, Honduras,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Singapore, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Serbia, Costa Rica, Cambodia,
Switzerland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Norway) that have stopped production of bioenergy
between 2011 and 2012 account for only 0.4 per cent of production; hence the small effect on
global production. This phenomenon can be explained by the increase in agricultural prices
in 2012.
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bioenergy, whereas the increasing scarcity of physical oil (high prices and low
reserves) stimulates the transition to clean energy (Grafton et al. 2012; Heun
and de Wit 2012). Finally, the amount of renewable energy produced is an
important determinant of biofuels production. Energy transition can be
achieved through specialization in the production of bioenergy and/or renew-
able energy based on the comparative advantages of each country.
This study tries to ﬁll the gap in the literature on the macroeconomic drivers
of bioenergy by examining the impact of political economy factors, oil pro-
duction, renewable energies, and macroeconomic factors. First, we present a
simple theoretical model in which oil, renewable energy, and bioenergy are
produced simultaneously. This formalization allows us to highlight the theor-
etical connections between oil production, supply of bioenergy, and political
economy factors. We show that the supply of bioenergy depends positively on
governance quality, ﬁnancial development, land yields, and market conditions
(price, income). On the negative side, oil reserves and renewable energies tend
to reduce bioenergy supply. Second, we empirically highlight the determinants
of the supply of bioenergy using an unbalanced panel dataset of 112 countries
for the period between 2000 and 2012. Motivated by the fact that ‘zeros’
represent a large fraction of the bioenergy data (40 per cent), we use a ﬁxed
effects Tobit model (Honoré 1992) to address the censoring problem, as well
as unobservable heterogeneity speciﬁc to each country. Third, we make
separate estimates of the supply function of bioenergy for all the countries
in our sample of developed and developing countries. This allows us to analyse
and compare the effects of political economy factors on bioenergy production,
depending on the level of development. Finally, given that most countries do
not produce bioenergy, we analyse the determinants leading to the decision of
whether or not to produce bioenergy by using a random effects probit model.3
We show that political economy factors (governance quality and macroeco-
nomic policies) are central in deciding whether or not to produce bioenergy,
but their impact on production size is limited. Indeed, when the decision to
produce is made, market size and production conditions have a greater
inﬂuence on the amount of bioenergy. Using a long-term analysis, we ﬁnd
that the countries whose laws are of Germanic, Scandinavian, and French
origin produce relatively more bioenergy, whereas those whose laws have a
Socialist origin produce less than other countries.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 outlines
the theoretical model, the empirical strategy, and data. Section 9.3 discusses
the results and their implications. Section 9.4 concludes by indicating how
political economy factors can facilitate the transition to clean energy.
3 There are several countries that produce bioenergy throughout the period and others that do
not produce anything. Using a discrete choice model with ﬁxed effects removes these countries
from the analysis. This is why we choose a random effects model.
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9.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
9.2.1 A Simple Theoretical Model
To motivate the empirical analysis in this section, we develop a function of
bioenergy supply taking into account the governance quality, macroeconomic
policies, energy demand, and supply of oil and renewable energy. First, we
assume that bioenergy, oil, and renewable energy are perfect substitutes in
producing energy. The total energy demand DE is decreasing with the price of
energy P and increasing with national income Y: DE = (P,Y). Based on the
Hotelling (1931) rule, we deﬁne the function of oil supply SO as an increasing
function of price P, interest rates r, and oil reserves R: SO = (P,r,R). If the
country is not an oil producer, oil supply will be provided by imports and will
depend on world oil reserves and international prices. Signiﬁcant global
reserves of oil and low international prices will make imports cheaper. How-
ever, a non-oil-producer is more likely to promote the development of
bioenergy for reasons of energy sovereignty. Second, we suppose that for
each unit of bioenergy sold, the producer receives PB = P + τ, where τ  0, a
premium price for bioenergy. This prime can be the willingness of consumers
to pay more for, or a state to subsidize, bioenergy. Finally, we assume that
bioenergy is produced by a representative ﬁrm whose proﬁt function is:
Π ¼ ðP þ τÞBioE−CTðBioE, L, Gov,MPÞ, ð1Þ
where BioE represents the quantity of bioenergy supplied, L the productivity of
the land, Gov the indicator of the quality of governance, MP the macroeco-
nomic policies, and CT(BioE,L,Gov,MP) the total cost of production. We
assume that the marginal cost is positive (CTBioE > 0) and decreases with the
quantity produced (CTBioE,BioE < 0). In addition, the marginal cost of produc-
tion decreases with productivity of land (CTL < 0), governance quality (CTGov
< 0), and macroeconomic policies (CTMP < 0). Indeed, the better the govern-
ance and macroeconomic policies, the more conducive the conditions for the
development of economic activities, including the production of bioenergy. In
addition, good governance and macroeconomic policies can lead a country to
invest more in the energy transition.
Let DE(P,Y) represent the demand of energy and Renew the amount of
renewable energy produced. At equilibrium, demand equals supply: DE(P,Y) =
SO(P,r,R)+Renew+BioE. This means that BioE=DE(P,Y) − SO(P,r,R) − Renew.
As a result, the demand for bioenergy can be deﬁned as the difference between
the total energy demand and the supply of oil:
DBioEðP, Y, r, RÞ ¼ DEðP, YÞ−SoðP, r, RÞ−Renew: ð2Þ
By inserting the inverse demand for bioenergy, P(BioE,Renew,Y,r,R)=P
(DBioE), in the proﬁt equation (1) we get:
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max
BioE
Π ¼ ½PðBioE, Renew, Y, r, RÞ þ τBioE−CTðBioE, L, Gov,MP). ð3Þ
On the basis of the ﬁrst-order conditions of this maximization programme,
we have:
½

∂PðBioE, Renew, Y, r, RÞ

=∂BioEBioE þ PðBioE, Renew, Y, r, RÞ
þτ ¼ CmðBioE, L, Gov,MPÞ: ð4Þ
At the optimum, themarginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of bioenergy is equal to
the marginal cost of the unit. The optimal bioenergy supply can be expressed as:
BioE* ¼ BioEðP, Renew, Y, r, R, τ, L, Gov,MP). ð5Þ
Using simple linear functions, a comparative static analysis allows us to better
understand the insights of this result.
Let SO(P,r,R) = δ1P + δ2R + δ3r, DE(P,Y) = γ1Y - γ2P, CT(BioE,L,Gov,MP) =
(ν1 − ν2L − ν3Gov + ν4MP)BioE. Therefore, the demand for bioenergy equals
DBioE(P,Y,r,R) = γ1Y − γ2P − δ1P − δ2R − δ3r - n1Renew and the optimal
bioenergy supply can be expressed as follows:
BioE*¼1
2

γ1Y−n1Renew−δ2R−δ3rþðγ2þδ1Þðτ−v1þv2Lþv3Govþv4MPÞ

ð6Þ
A comparative static analysis can be conducted by differentiation of Equation
(6) with respect to each of the explanatory variables. Differentiation yields:
∂BioE*
∂Renew
¼ − n1
2
< 0
∂BioE*
∂Gov
¼ ðγ2 þ δ1Þv3
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂τ
¼ ðγ2 þ δ1Þ
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂MP
¼ ðγ2 þ δ1Þv4
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂Y
¼ γ1
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂R
¼ − δ2
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂r
¼ − δ3
2
> 0
∂BioE*
∂L
¼ ðγ2 þ δ1Þv2
2
> 0:
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The political economy factors (governance quality and macroeconomic pol-
icies) have a positive impact on bioenergy supply. These factors will promote
the establishment of the necessary conditions for investment in growth sectors
of the future, including bioenergy. The premium price for bioenergy favours
the production of bioenergy. Indeed, the higher the premium price, the higher
the country internalizes the environmental and social beneﬁts of bioenergy. It
also appears that biofuels and renewable energy are substitutable. Oil reserves
have a negative effect on the supply of bioenergy. In addition, the interest rate
has a negative effect on the production of bioenergy. According to the
Hotelling (1931) rule, a high interest rate increases the incentive to exploit
the oil reserves, investing the income from the sale of oil in a more proﬁtable
alternative. In addition, a higher interest rate discourages new investments. In
the long term, however, the extraction of fossil fuels may cause oil scarcity.
Then prices will rise making proﬁtable renewable energy as in the case of low
interest rates. The supply of bioenergy also depends positively on income.
According to the environmental Kuznets curve, income growth leads to higher
preferences for environmental goods. Finally, agricultural productivity has a
positive effect on the production of bioenergy.
9.2.2 Econometric Model
One of the aims of this chapter is to estimate the supply equation of
bioenergy obtained in the theoretical model (Equation (5)). However, there
are some challenges, particularly regarding censoring of the dependent
variable and how the unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Bio-
energy production (BioEit) is a latent variable because it is observable only if
production is positive. If the optimal production is negative, the country
does not produce. The dependent variable is limited by a positivity con-
straint. In our sample, only 11 per cent of all countries were producing
bioenergy in 2001 and 48 per cent in 2012. Censoring is important and must
be taken into account. It may therefore be argued that a Tobit model is the
preferred estimator (Greene 2002; Wooldridge 2010). The model to be
estimated can be written as follows:
BioEit ¼ βXit þ αi þ εit, ð7Þ
whereas the observed value of the bioenergy variable, BioEit, is given by:
BioEit ¼

BioE*it if BioE
*
it > 0
0 if BioE*it0,
ð8Þ
where the BioEit variable is greater than zero only when the latent
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BioE*it variable exceeds zero (which represents cases where a country’s will-
ingness to produce bioenergy is positive), X represents the matrix of explana-
tory variables, β the vector of the coefﬁcients associated with X, αi country
ﬁxed effects, and εit the term error, which is independently and identically
distributed.
Equation (8) can be estimated using a Tobit model with random effects, if
the country-speciﬁc effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables.
Otherwise, a ﬁxed effects model must be used. In this case study, ﬁxed effects
are essential to control for unobserved heterogeneity speciﬁc to each country
that does not vary over time (at least in the short term), such as institutional
framework or preferences for bioenergy. The introduction of ﬁxed effects
allows us to take these factors into account in our regressions. To avoid the
‘incidental parameters problem’, we use the ﬁxed effects Tobit model suggested
by Honoré (1992). This method is based on the work of Powell (1984, 1986), on
least absolute deviations estimation for the censored regression model and
symmetrically trimmed least squares estimation for Tobit models.4 To deter-
mine whether the ﬁxed effects or random effects model is appropriate, we use a
Hausman speciﬁcation test. For all speciﬁcations, the test statistic χ2 allows us to
reject the null hypothesis of independence between errors and explanatory
variables, and accordingly opt for a ﬁxed effects model.
9.2.3 Data Description
This study examines the drivers of per capita supply of bioenergy (see
Appendix Table 9.A1 for a description and Kere (2016: appendix D1) for
summary statistics of the data).5 Owing to the availability of data,6 we use
ethanol, biodiesel, and total bioenergy (ethanol + biodiesel) as a proxy of
bioenergy. So this assumption excludes mainly fuelwood and biogas. The
study sample contains 112 countries over the period between 2000 and
2012. Data on bioenergy, renewable energy, international price of oil, and oil
reserves are from EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2015b).
The other explanatory variables are from World Development Indicators
(WDI 2015): gross domestic product (GDP), population density (Pop_dens),
percentage of urban population (Urban) and cereal production (Cereal_yield),
agricultural land (Agri_land), and ﬁnancial development (Financial). In this
study, we do not use the production of sugarcane as an explanatory variable
4 Fixed effects Tobit models developed by Honoré (1992) was implemented with STATA
‘pantob’ and is available at: <http://www.princeton.edu/~honore/stata/#1._Pantob_version_0.6>
(accessed 15 October 2016).
5 The list of countries represented in the estimates is available in Kere (2016: appendix A3).
6 For example, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd homogeneous data on fuelwood production by country.
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because there are too many missing data. North America is the largest
bioenergy producer, followed by Latin America, Europe, and Central Asia.
Latin America and North America are the largest producers of ethanol
whereas Europe is the largest producer of biodiesel.
Governance is an index of the overall quality of governance, constructed
using six dimensions of governance of the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG 2015): bureaucracy quality, corruption, investment proﬁle, democratic
accountability, government stability, and law and order. We combined these
indicators using the ﬁrst two principal components (81 per cent of the overall
variance) of the vector of six indicators of governance. We standardized the
index by the following method: Governance = [Index − max (Index)]/[max
(Index) − min(Index)]. The results of the principal component analysis are
available in Kere (2016: appendix table B1). The renewable energy variable and
governance index are lagged by ﬁve years to avoid endogeneity problems.
Biofuel mandates are a prime targeted mechanism to stimulate the produc-
tion of biofuel. Unfortunately, there are very few panel data on these policies.
Moreover, these mandates do not vary much over time; therefore, they are
captured by ﬁxed effects of our empirical model. For these reasons and as a
proxy, we use the composite indexes of EPS elaborated by Botta and Koźluk
(2014): market and non-market instruments. These policies are the instru-
ments used to achieve the mandates. The market component of the EPS
includes taxes and charges applied on input or output of a production process
(diesel) or pollution source (CO2, NOx, and SOx); trading schemes (green
certiﬁcate, white certiﬁcate, and CO2 trading); feed-in tariffs (solar and wind);
and deposit refund scheme (waste). The non-market component of the EPS
includes standards (emission limit values: NOx, SOx, PMx, and sulphur in
diesel content limit) and research and development subsidies. Both indices can
be used as a proxy of premium price because they allow internalizing the
market and environmental externalities. Unfortunately, these variables exist
only for OECD member countries. In developing countries, energy policies
include policy statements on the development of bioenergy, often without
concrete strategies or the institutional framework necessary for implementa-
tion (Jumbe et al. 2009).
Our measurement of ﬁnancial development is the ratio of domestic credit
allocated to private sector to GDP (excluding credit to central government and
public enterprises and credit issued by central banks). This measure goes
beyond the market interest rates because it allows us to account for the quality
and capacity of the domestic ﬁnancial system to ﬁnance the private sector.
Oil_reserve, representing the crude oil proved reserves, is an exogenous
variable that does not vary much over time. The international price of oil
(Inter_Oil_price) is the result of the interaction between global oil supply and
demand. It is exogenous but does not vary across countries. Using these terms,
we generate a new variable dividing oil reserves by the international oil prices
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(Oil = Oil_reserves/Inter_Oil_price). Oil is the relative value of oil reserves
compared to international oil prices. This new variable is exogenous and varies
over time and between countries.
Our deﬁnition of the legal origin of laws is based on the distinction made by
La Porta et al. (1999). According to the historic and legal tradition of company
law, or commercial code, countries are classiﬁed as: British law (or common
law), French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and socialist law.
These traditions historically come from Great Britain, France, Germany,
Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union, respectively. For our purposes, the legal
origins are represented by binary variables that identify the legal origin of a
country’s laws as French, German, Scandinavian, or socialist, with British law
as the omitted group.7
Based on the results of the theoretical model, the literature on the deter-
minants of bioenergy production, and political economy literature, we classify
the determinants of bioenergy production into seven sets of explanatory
variables: indicators of governance quality, EPS instruments, legal origins of
law, macroeconomic policies, substitute products, agricultural policy factors
(supply factors), and market size (demand factors) (Table 9.1).
Table 9.1. Expected signs of the explanatory variables
Explanatory variables Indicators Expected
sign
Quality of governance Governance (index of overall governance quality) +
EPS Market-based instruments +
Non-market-based instruments +
Legal origins British Reference
German +
Scandinavian +
French +
Socialist −
Substitute products Oil scarcity (oil reserve to oil price ratio) −
Renewable energy production (hydroelectric,
geothermal, wind, solar, waste, tide, and wave)
−
Macroeconomic policies Financial development +
Trade openness (trade to GDP ratio) +
Agricultural productivity Cereal yield +
Market size GDP per capita +
Population density +
Urban (%) +
Source: Author’s compilation.
7 See Section 9.3.4 for further explanation of the expected signs of legal origin.
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9.3 DETERMINANTS OF THE PRODUCTION
OF BIOENERGY
9.3.1 Bioenergy and Political Economy Factors: Naïve Evidence
In this section, we give an insight into the relationships between our variables
of interest. Figure 9.2 provides a combined visual analysis of the relationship
between bioenergy and political economy factors over the entire sample of
developing and developed countries. The graphs (Figures 9.2a–f ) suggest that
there is a strong positive effect of governance and EPS instruments on
bioenergy production. They also show that the United States and Brazil have
levels of bioenergy production higher than other countries. These countries
can be considered outliers. Indeed, the United States and Brazil are the world’s
largest producers of bioenergy, and have developed proactive policies of
bioenergy production. For example, Brazil has committed to increase the
share of ethanol to 27.5 per cent in its overall energy balance, and, as
mentioned in the introduction, the United States set the goal of incorporating
a minimum of 36 billion gallons of biofuels into the fuel market by 2022 (EPA
2010). For robustness, we will test the sensitivity of our results to the presence
of these countries in our regressions.
Figure 9.2d analyses the average per capita production of bioenergy by legal
origin.8 This graph shows that countries with laws of Scandinavian and
Germanic origin produce more bioenergy than others, whereas those of
French and Socialist origin produce relatively less bioenergy. Taking into
account the characteristics of the origin of a country’s laws, highlighted by
La Porta et al. (1999; La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer 2008), these statistics
are consistent with our expectations. Indeed, we think that countries following
Scandinavian and German civil law are most likely to promote the production
of bioenergy. The interventionist stance of their laws, and efﬁciency of their
bureaucracy, will allow them to opt for clean energy, despite pressure. We
expect countries subject to the French civil law to be intermediate regarding
the adoption of clean energy. In these countries the bureaucracy is powerful
and largely unconstrained, which helps in the implementation of environ-
mental policies. However, this system typically generates more corruption, low
ﬁnancial development, and unemployment, which tends to reduce the effect-
iveness of environmental policies. However, laws of British origin rely on
strong private property rights and low regulation, which promotes the devel-
opment of private activity with low regulation. Therefore, binding environ-
mental policies will be difﬁcult to implement. Finally, countries with laws of
8 This analysis is a simple correlation that does not take into account other factors, such as
mandates on both ethanol and biodiesel production, which can have a signiﬁcant impact on the
relationship between bioenergies and the legal origin of laws.
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Socialist origin have the least effective environmental policies because of the
high probability of corruption associated with them.
Figure 9.3 shows the impact of macroeconomic policies on bioenergy. As
expected, these results show that ﬁnancial development and oil reserves
inﬂuence the production of bioenergy positively and negatively, respectively,
whereas the impact of trade openness is negative. Indeed, the least competitive
countries may choose to import bioenergy from the most competitive coun-
tries and therefore reduce their own productions. However, this result seems
counterintuitive because bioenergy trade is not very developed.
9.3.2 Results of Tobit Model with Fixed Effects
The estimation results using the Tobit model with ﬁxed effects are presented
in Table 9.2 and random effects results are available in Kere (2016: appendix
table C1). The drivers of bioenergy production can be classiﬁed into four
categories: governance quality, macroeconomic policies, size of market, and
agricultural factors.
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Figure 9.3. Correlation between bioenergy and macroeconomic policies of (a) ﬁnan-
cial development, (b) trade openness, and (c) oil scarcity.
Note: Biofuel is measured in 1,000 barrels per year.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EIA (2015a) and WDI (2015).
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9.3.2.1 Governance Quality
Across the entire sample, the index of the quality of governance has a
signiﬁcant positive effect at 5 per cent level on the production of biodiesel.
When looking at the results by level of development, governance quality
promotes the production of bioenergy. According to our results, quality of
governance signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the production of ethanol in developing
countries and biodiesel in developed countries.
Regarding the impact of EPS instruments, non-market-based instruments
positively affect the total production of bioenergy and biodiesel in developed
countries whereas market-based instruments do not have a signiﬁcant effect.
Such results are not surprising. Indeed, non-market-based instruments
(standards and research and development subsidies) provide research support
for the introduction of new technologies and improve the proﬁtability and
social acceptance of clean energy including bioenergy. In contrast, market-
based instruments (taxes on carbon, diesel, or sulphide and feed-in tariffs for
solar and wind) are intended for promoting renewable energy such as solar
and wind.
9.3.2.2 Other Energy
Oil reserves have a negative effect on the production of bioenergy in the
overall sample and on biodiesel in developing countries. Large oil reserves
represent a guarantee of availability of oil at low cost, which tends to discour-
age the production of bioenergy. However, oil reserves signiﬁcantly promote
the production of ethanol and biodiesel in developed countries. In fact, the
rich oil-producing countries tend to invest more in clean energy.
Renewable energy has a signiﬁcant negative impact only on the total
bioenergy production in developing countries. Unlike developed countries,
these countries lack the ﬁnancial capacities to invest in both renewable energy
and biofuels.
9.3.2.3 Macroeconomic Policies
The impact of macroeconomic policies is contrasted with the level of devel-
opment. Our results show that ﬁnancial development positively inﬂuences
the production of bioenergy in developing countries. These countries
face enormous difﬁculties ﬁnancing their economies, yet they have vast
unexploited fertile farmland. A structured and efﬁcient ﬁnancial system
would allow projects for bioenergy production to be ﬁnanced at a lower
cost. Financial development has no impact on the production of bioenergy
in developed countries because they have little problem ﬁnancing promising
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projects. Finally, as expected, trade openness has a positive impact on bio-
energy and ethanol, but only in the subsample of developing countries.
9.3.2.4 Market Size
In developed countries, the size of the market plays a key role in the develop-
ment of bioenergy. Per capita income, urbanization, and population density
promote energy demand. Given the relatively high income in these countries,
according to the environmental Kuznets curve, a part of the energy demand
will be transferred to clean energy, including bioenergy.
Market size factors do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the production of bio-
energy in developing countries. This result can be explained by the relatively
higher cost of bioenergy; they are mainly produced using subsidies. It is
difﬁcult for developing countries, which have other priorities such as food
security or ﬁghting against poverty, to engage in subsidized bioenergy
production.
9.3.2.5 Agricultural Factors
Cereal yield is an important determinant of bioenergy production. As expected,
it has a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the production of bioenergy,
ethanol, and biodiesel in the total sample of developing and developed
countries.
9.3.2.6 Estimation Results without the United States and Brazil
As a test of robustness, we excluded Brazil and the United States in our sample
because their production of bioenergy represents a large portion of total
world production. For example, in 2012, these two countries accounted for
30 per cent of the world’s production (EIA 2015a). In addition, as shown in
Figure 9.2a, these two countries can be considered outliers. The results are in
line with the previous results.9 Therefore, these countries have no inﬂuence on
the quality of our results.
9.3.3 Decision to Produce Bioenergy: Results of
Random Effects Probit Model
To identify the inﬂuence of political economy factors on the decision of
whether or not to produce bioenergy, we use a random effects probit model.
9 The results are available in Kere (2016: appendix D1).
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Table 9.2. Tobit model with ﬁxed effect of bioenergy supply
Variable All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel
Governance quality
Governance 0.4132 (0.2684) 0.2917 (0.2450) 0.3858** (0.1540) 0.3593** (0.1747) 0.3124** (0.1400) 0.0924 (0.0970) −0.1823 (0.4606) −0.4648 (0.3381) 0.3385* (0.1948)
EPS market −0.0323 (0.0304) −0.0782* (0.0426) 0.0107 (0.0111)
EPS non-market 0.0464* (0.0273) −0.0023 (0.0238) 0.0555*** (0.0149)
Other energy
Renewable −0.0280 (0.0310) −0.0532 (0.0564) 0.0126 (0.0214) −0.0408*** (0.0125) −0.0261 (0.0238) −0.0200 (0.0163) −0.0403 (0.0421) −0.0147 (0.0301) −0.0034 (0.0221)
Oil −0.0009*** (0.0002) −0.0006 (0.0004) 0.0003 (0.0004) −0.1230 (0.0897) −0.0693 (0.1380) −0.0380** (0.0176) −0.0003 (0.0003) 0.0009 (0.0006) 0.0009** (0.0004)
Macroeconomic
policies
Financial 0.0028 (0.0018) 0.0027 (0.0018) 0.0013 (0.0009) 0.0056*** (0.0017) 0.0046* (0.0025) 0.0029*** (0.0010) −0.0009 (0.0015) −0.0012 (0.0009) 0.0000 (0.0010)
Openness 0.0025 (0.0018) 0.0064 (0.0044) 0.0002 (0.0008) 0.0023* (0.0012) 0.0040** (0.0020) 0.0003 (0.0005) −0.0022 (0.0033) 0.0024 (0.0050) −0.0003 (0.0015)
Market size
GDP 0.0342*** (0.0109) 0.0330*** (0.0085) 0.0209*** (0.0056) −0.0062 (0.0111) 0.0412 (0.0456) −0.0008 (0.0067) 0.0481*** (0.0148) 0.0114 (0.0417) 0.0177** (0.0078)
Population density 0.0881** (0.0449) 0.0572** (0.0287) 0.0568* (0.0313) 0.0097 (0.0573) 0.0271 (0.0653) 0.0026 (0.0352) 0.1789*** (0.0641) 0.1150 (0.1796) 0.0523** (0.0259)
Urban 0.0193 (0.0376) 0.0056 (0.0116) 0.0285*** (0.0110) 0.0062 (0.0090) −0.0026 (0.0139) 0.0063 (0.0068) 0.1381 (0.1267) 0.3337** (0.1438) 0.0169 (0.0146)
Agricultural
productivity
Cereal yield 0.1099** (0.0450) 0.1745** (0.0772) 0.0307*** (0.0080) 0.0575*** (0.0189) 0.0616*** (0.0182) 0.0181 (0.0133) 0.1129** (0.0488) 0.1467*** (0.0277) 0.0236*** (0.0083)
Observations
(Hausman test)
1338 1338 1338 1021 1021 1021 243 243 243
χ2 59.827 389.80 40.151 90.113 146.83 15.421 279.42 165.83 221.30
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EIA (2015a); ICRG (2015); Botta and Koźluk (2014); and WDI (2015).
Table 9.3. Random effects probit model of the decision to produce bioenergy
Variable All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel
Governance quality
Governance 2.2511*
(1.1825)
1.7955
(1.1439)
3.0700**
(1.2867)
0.6822
(1.3074)
−1.2634
(1.3792)
0.8945
(2.3536)
18.622***
(5.6353)
12.840***
(3.7821)
16.779***
(5.8535)
EPS market 0.8480
(1.0153)
0.1780
(0.2827)
2.5593**
(1.1744)
EPS non-market 3.1558***
(0.8699)
0.7220***
(0.2601)
4.8830***
(0.9087)
Other energy
Renewable 0.3149**
(0.1571)
0.1021
(0.1048)
0.0828
(0.1570)
0.4512**
(0.2102)
0.3105
(0.2392)
0.2981*
(0.1710)
0.2232
(0.3653)
−0.0584
(0.1603)
−0.1196
(0.2798)
Oil −0.1013***
(0.0158)
−0.0322**
(0.0163)
−0.0166**
(0.0067)
−0.0880**
(0.0345)
−0.0731**
(0.0298)
−9.9969***
(2.4561)
−0.0748**
(0.0318)
−0.0160
(0.0169)
−0.0186
(0.0136)
Macroeconomic policies
Financial 0.0353***
(0.0051)
0.0297***
(0.0047)
0.0351***
(0.0054)
0.0182***
(0.0069)
0.0189***
(0.0073)
0.0221**
(0.0107)
0.1022***
(0.0265)
0.0233***
(0.0086)
0.0492***
(0.0189)
Openness 0.0210***
(0.0064)
0.0126**
(0.0064)
0.0150**
(0.0062)
0.0158**
(0.0067)
0.0081
(0.0077)
0.0208*
(0.0119)
0.0762
(0.0483)
0.0093
(0.0153)
−0.0020
(0.0338)
Market size
GDP 0.0831**
(0.0381)
−0.0117
(0.0371)
0.0386
(0.0426)
0.9492***
(0.1796)
0.7657***
(0.1378)
1.3620***
(0.2674)
0.0760
(0.1658)
0.0032
(0.0824)
0.4271***
(0.1517)
Population density 0.0433*
(0.0255)
0.0198
(0.0328)
0.0329
(0.0227)
0.0480**
(0.0200)
0.0420**
(0.0199)
0.0744***
(0.0269)
−0.5121***
(0.1645)
−0.1143*
(0.0628)
−0.2221*
(0.1335)
Urban 0.1437***
(0.0167)
0.0707***
(0.0244)
0.1555***
(0.0283)
0.0253
(0.0255)
0.0021
(0.0302)
0.2007***
(0.0472)
0.1818
(0.1821)
0.1227*
(0.0678)
0.1799
(0.1185)
Agricultural productivity
Cereal yield 1.0549***
(0.1592)
0.7913***
(0.1655)
0.9557***
(0.1913)
1.0669***
(0.1928)
0.9406***
(0.2337)
0.9855***
(0.3672)
0.7682
(0.5729)
0.1918
(0.3176)
0.4427
(0.5389)
lnσ2μ 4.0946***
(0.2055)
3.3494***
(0.2250)
3.7872***
(0.2097)
3.5999***
(0.2561)
3.5530***
(0.2605)
4.8731***
(0.3027)
4.3027***
(0.4997)
2.0114***
(0.5537)
4.7753***
(0.4480)
Constant −21.00***
(1.0763)
−14.74***
(1.1142)
−23.25***
(1.1590)
−12.88***
(1.0807)
−10.37***
(1.2486)
−27.23***
(2.5000)
−49.60***
(13.4772)
−25.46***
(6.4594)
−55.44***
(9.8595)
Observations 1338 1338 1338 1021 1021 1021 243 243 243
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EIA (2015a); ICRG (2015); Botta and Koźluk (2014); and WDI (2015).
More than half the numbers of countries in our estimation sample do not
produce bioenergy; therefore, it is important to study the determinant of this
decision to better target energy policies.
The results presented in Table 9.3 show that governance quality is an
important factor in the decision to produce bioenergy in developed countries.
Indeed, governance has a positive effect on all types bioenergy production
(total bioenergy, ethanol, and biodiesel) in developed countries, bioenergy and
ethanol in the total sample, and no effect in developing countries. EPS
instruments favour the production of bioenergy in developed countries.
Non-market-based instruments have a positive impact on all types of bio-
energy whereas market-based instruments only favour biodiesel production.
The impact of governance quality and EPS is more important in the decision
to produce bioenergy in developed countries because they create favourable
conditions that encourage the development of business and investments. The
high level of income and subsidies increase demand and proﬁtability of
bioenergy.
Among factors of macroeconomic policies, ﬁnancial development promotes
the production decision of all bioenergy types, whatever the level of develop-
ment. Our results also show that trade openness promotes all types of bio-
energy in the total sample and developing countries.
Oil reserves reduce the production of all types of bioenergy in the overall
sample and the developing countries sample, but only bioenergy production in
developed countries. In contrast, the production of renewable energy favours
the decision to produce bioenergy in the total sample. It promotes bioenergy
and biodiesel production in developing countries, but it has no signiﬁcant
effect in developed countries.
Finally, both the size of the market and agricultural factors increase the
likelihood of producing bioenergy, excluding the density of the population
that negatively inﬂuences bioenergy developed in the country.
9.3.4 Long-Run Analysis: Impact of Legal Origins
on Bioenergy Production
The energy transition generates a signiﬁcant additional cost. The production
of bioenergy is currently more expensive than that of gasoline or diesel. To
be competitive, bioenergy needs to be widely supported and provided tax
exemptions, duty incorporation in fuels, and so on. However, the cost of
inaction with regard to climate change is much more important. Therefore,
the development of clean energy requires signiﬁcant investment, a political
will, along with the state’s willingness to impose binding environmental
standards on its industries, as well as capacity for the economy to absorb
additional costs in the short term (Table 9.4).
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Table 9.4. Long-run analysis: impact of legal origins on bioenergy production
Variable All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel Biofuel Ethanol Biodiesel
Legal originsa
French -0.0049 (0.0329) -0.0139 (0.0361) 0.0093 (0.0124) 0.0189 (0.0423) 0.0370 (0.0493) -0.0021 (0.0132) 0.0165 (0.3089) -0.0802 (0.2983) 0.0962** (0.0345)
Socialist 0.0265 (0.0411) 0.0125 (0.0458) 0.0175 (0.0149) 0.0502 (0.0480) 0.0602 (0.0566) 0.0142 (0.0140) 0.0000 (.) 0.0000 (.) 0.0000 (.)
German -0.0663 (0.0624) -0.1013 (0.0644) 0.0266 (0.0216) -0.0899 (0.3219) -0.2259 (0.3111) 0.1349** (0.0356)
Scandinavian -0.0341 (0.0764) -0.0742 (0.0786) 0.0521* (0.0266) 0.0176 (0.2907) -0.1790 (0.2812) 0.1959*** (0.0404)
Governance quality
Governance 0.0629 (0.1458) -0.1022 (0.1548) 0.1169** (0.0538) -0.0477 (0.1854) -0.1479 (0.2051) -0.0010 (0.0542) 1.0546 (0.9761) 0.4204 (0.9307) 0.6348*** (0.1529)
EPS market 0.8480 (1.0153) 0.1780 (0.2827) 2.5593** (1.1744)
EPS non-market 3.1558*** (0.8699) 0.7220*** (0.2601) 4.8830*** (0.9087)
Other energy
Renewable 0.0043 (0.0057) 0.0064 (0.0058) -0.0002 (0.0021) 0.0197 (0.0132) 0.0205 (0.0138) 0.0008 (0.0037) -0.0090 (0.0189) 0.0023 (0.0181) -0.0113** (0.0033)
Oil -0.0019 (0.0014) -0.0016 (0.0013) -0.0007 (0.0005) -0.0044 (0.0030) -0.0035 (0.0026) -0.0049* (0.0029) -0.0003 (0.0041) -0.0020 (0.0040) 0.0017** (0.0006)
Macroeconomic
policies
Financial 0.0005 (0.0003) 0.0006* (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0007 (0.0005) 0.0009* (0.0005) -0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0008) 0.0003 (0.0007) -0.0005** (0.0001)
Openness -0.0007** (0.0003) -0.0010** (0.0004) -0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0010* (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0020) -0.0003 (0.0019) 0.0002 (0.0002)
Market size
GDP 0.0002 (0.0018) 0.0009 (0.0020) -0.0005 (0.0006) 0.0057 (0.0072) 0.0053 (0.0080) 0.0018 (0.0020) -0.0002 (0.0082) 0.0003 (0.0078) -0.0005 (0.0013)
Population density -0.0020 (0.0013) -0.0015 (0.0013) -0.0004 (0.0004) -0.0009 (0.0015) -0.0000 (0.0014) -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0033 (0.0062) -0.0030 (0.0061) -0.0002 (0.0009)
Urban 0.0012 (0.0008) 0.0012 (0.0009) 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0010 (0.0011) 0.0011 (0.0012) 0.0005 (0.0004) -0.0011 (0.0051) 0.0018 (0.0046) -0.0029** (0.0009)
Agricultural
productivity
Cereal yield 0.0666*** (0.0093) 0.0627*** (0.0100) 0.0291*** (0.0054) 0.0360*** (0.0083) 0.0404*** (0.0084) 0.0122*** (0.0043) 0.0625*** (0.0169) 0.0659*** (0.0178) 0.0170** (0.0074)
σ 4.0946*** (0.2055) 3.3494*** (0.2250) 3.7872*** (0.2097) 3.5999*** (0.2561) 3.5530*** (0.2605) 4.8731*** (0.3027) 4.3027*** (0.4997) 2.0114*** (0.5537) 4.7753*** (0.4480)
Constant 0.1065*** (0.0097) 0.1082*** (0.0110) 0.0368*** (0.0037) 0.1042*** (0.0121) 0.1082*** (0.0140) 0.0286*** (0.0039) -0.7818 (0.7648) -0.6046 (0.7333) -0.1786 (0.1098)
Observations 112 112 112 86 86 86 20 20 20
Note : a British civil law is excluded. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Source : Author’s calculations based on data from EIA (2015a); ICRG (2015); Botta and Koźluk (2014); La Porta et al. (1999); and WDI (2015).
Since legal origin does not vary over time, we analyse its impact on the
production of bioenergy in the long term. Moreover, we believe that the
impact of these historical factors should be more noticeable over the long
term. To do this, we take the average of all the variables used in the estimation
across the reporting period. This produces a new bioenergy variable that is
censored (44 and 54 per cent of countries do not produce bioenergy in the
overall sample and the developing countries sample, respectively). We use a
Tobit model in cross-section to estimate the impact of legal origin in these two
samples and ordinary least square of developed countries.
Legal origin only affects the production of biodiesel in the total sample. It
has no effect on biodiesel in developing countries, but it affects the production
of bioenergy in developed countries. As expected, countries whose laws are of
Scandinavian origin produce relatively more biodiesel than countries whose
laws are of British origin. Other legal origins have no signiﬁcant effects on the
production of bioenergy.
9 .4 SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The adverse effects of climate change and the need to ﬁnd an alternative to
fossil fuels have signiﬁcantly increased the interest of states and investors in
bioenergy. The objective of this study was to analyse the impact of political
economy factors on bioenergy production. Our methodological contribution
is a theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of bioenergy
production.
First, we showed theoretically that governance quality and premium price
(EPS instruments) promote the development of bioenergy production. We
also showed that the factors favouring oil production (oil reserves and low
price of oil) negatively inﬂuence the development of bioenergy production.
This result is due to these products being substitutable. The conditions of
production (cereal yield) and demand (GDP, population density, and urban-
ization) tend to favour the production of bioenergy.
Second, we showed empirically that the political economy factors (gov-
ernance quality, EPS instruments, and macroeconomic policies) create the
necessary conditions (subsidies, standards, less corruption, strong properties
rights, effective governance, etc.) for development and investment in bio-
energy. However, once the investment decision is made, factors of supply
and demand determine the quantity produced. Indeed, cereal yield increases
production by reducing production costs when the purchasing power of the
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population (per capita income), urbanization, and population density in-
crease demand.
Third, we showed that bioenergy production is guided by the factors of
demand (market size) in developed countries, but in developing countries the
impact of supply factors (cereal yield, ﬁnancial development, and governance
quality) is more important.
Bioenergies are not a magic solution to the ﬁght against climate change
due to the relatively high costs of these energies and indirect changes in
land uses that could cause increase in greenhouse gas emissions. However,
they can contribute to the ﬁght against global warming and the ﬁght against
poverty in developing countries if technical innovations reduce their pro-
duction costs and measures taken to minimize indirect land use changes.
Therefore, in developing countries, global and national efforts should be
made to attract more investors in this area, including: (i) research and
innovation to reduce production costs, (ii) adding bioenergy to national
energy policies, (iii) creating a legal framework for their development, (iv)
promoting the development of the application, and (v) providing a basis
for learning more about the development of viable and sustainable bio-
energy models. In this context, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has an import-
ant role to play. It is lagging in the production of bioenergy, despite its
enormous potential (<1 per cent of world production). According to
Fischer and Shah (2010), 445 million hectares of land area is available
for agriculture worldwide, 201 million hectares of which is in SSA. These
are not protected areas or forests, they are not yet being used for
agriculture, and they have a low population density (less than 25 inhab-
itants per square kilometre). The development of these lands could signiﬁ-
cantly increase the production of bioenergy and contribute to the growth of
these countries. For example, using a computable general equilibrium model,
Arndt, Msangi, and Thurlow (2010) showed that the expansion of biofuels
production in Mozambique and Tanzania can contribute to boost growth,
reduce the dependence on imports of fossil fuels, increase investment, and
positively inﬂuence the agricultural sector and processors downstream.
However, as pointed out by Jumbe, Msiska, and Madjera (2009), bioenergy
development in SSA could have a negative impact on food security. Fur-
thermore, no regulatory framework should come at the expense of small
rural farmers. In this context, it is important for each country to develop its
own bioenergy policies, taking into account the need to provide food at
acceptable prices for its citizens. Such policies should encourage local and
foreign investments that beneﬁt the entire agricultural sector, while protect-
ing small farmers.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES OF DATA,
SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND LIST OF COUNTRIES
Table 9.A1. Description and sources of data
Variable Description Source
Bioenergy Bioenergy per capita (1000 barrels per year) EIA (2015a)
Ethanol Fuel ethanol per capita (1000 barrels per year) EIA (2015a)
Biodiesel Biodiesel per capita (1000 barrels per year) EIA (2015a)
Renewable Renewable energy per capita (billion kilowatt-
hours)
EIA (2015a)
Governance Aggregated governance index Author’s calculations using
ICRG (2015) data
Bureaucracy
quality
Bureaucracy quality ICRG (2015)
Government
stability
Government stability ICRG (2015)
Corruption Corruption ICRG (2015)
Investment
proﬁle
Investment proﬁle ICRG (2015)
Law and order Law and order ICRG (2015)
Democratic
accountability
Democratic accountability ICRG (2015)
EPS market Market-based instrument of environmental
policy stringency (EPS)
Botta and Koźluk (2014)
EPS non-
market
Non-market-based instrument of EPS Botta and Koźluk (2014)
Legal origin Dummy variables identify the legal origin of
law of a country as British, French, German,
Scandinavian, or Socialist
La Porta et al. (1999)
Financial Domestic credit to private sector by banks
(percentage of gross domestic product, GDP)
WDI (2015)
Openness Trade openness: imports plus exports in
percentage of GDP
WDI (2015)
Oil Per capita crude oil proved reserves
(barrels)-to-crude oil prices ratio
EIA (2015a)
GDP Real GDP per capita (USD 1000, constant
2005)
WDI (2015)
Pop_dens Population density (1000 people per square
kilometre of land area)
WDI (2015)
Urban Urban population (percentage of total
population)
WDI (2015)
Cereal_yield Cereal yield (1000 kilogrammes per hectare) WDI (2015)
EIA: Energy Information Administration (United States); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; WDI:
World Development Indicators; GDP: gross domestic product.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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10
Understanding Indicator Choice for
the Assessment of RD&D Financing of
Low-Carbon Energy Technologies
Lessons from the Nordic Countries
Jonas Sonnenschein
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Many climate scenarios show potential pathways to limit global warming to two
degrees as stipulated in the Paris Agreement of 2015 (Edenhofer et al. 2014).
These scenarios have in common that in order to decarbonize industrialized
economies, further research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of
low-carbon energy technologies (LCET) and of technologies inducing ‘negative
emissions’ are urgently needed (Clarke et al. 2014; Anderson 2015). In addition
to new technological solutions, the speed of deployment and the integration of
solutions into the energy system are critical factors in climate changemitigation.
When decarbonization scenarios go beyond technological feasibility and
economic factors are accounted for, the focus is often on costs and additional
investment needs (Gupta et al. 2014). The importance of low abatement costs
is well-reﬂected in some of the main climate policy instruments, such as
carbon-energy taxation, carbon trading, and green and white certiﬁcate
schemes (Somanathan et al. 2014), which induce marginal changes in price
structures. From a national perspective, the focus on low-cost abatement is
justiﬁed as domestic climate change-related beneﬁts do not outweigh the
costs of the unilateral adoption of more expensive abatement options
(Stavins 2014). Weak (carbon) price signals and—in the case of trading
schemes—price ﬂuctuations do not create sufﬁcient incentives to ﬁx the
market failures in the generation of LCET change (Jaffe, Newell, and
Stavins 2005), leading to underinvestment in RD&D and innovation. Due to
spill-overs the social rate of return of RD&D investments is often higher than
the commercial return rate (Griliches 1992). Moreover, it is in many cases
particularly difﬁcult to ﬁnance LCET as it has high capital requirements and a
long time to market (Ghosh and Nanda 2010).
In order to scale up RD&D activity in this area, it is critical to know if
governmental intervention can correctly identify RD&D initiatives with high
social returns that are under-supplied with ﬁnancing from the market. Thus, it
is relevant to understand both the motivation for setting up new public RD&D
support instruments and how their success is assessed and measured.
As success is a normative concept, different stakeholders may have their
own speciﬁc criteria or indicators for success of public RD&D in this context.
While there are various methods for evaluating the performance of RD&D
support policies, many of them rest on few aggregated indicators, such as public
and private RD&D expenditure as well as patent counts (Bozeman andMelkers
1993). These indicators alone do not reﬂect the complexity and dynamics of
public RD&D, let alone innovation processes (Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar
2006). The quantitative estimation of innovation policy indicators has been
frequently criticized for rarely coming to conclusions with high policy relevance
(Bergek et al. 2008).
The approach of evaluating indicators addresses this criticism without
completely abolishing the indictor-based method. Indicator evaluation in the
ﬁeld of LCET RD&D is neither very far developed nor tested. Notable attempts
are: Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar (2006), who discuss the merits of various
input, output, and outcome metrics but do not apply a uniform indicator
evaluation framework; Wilson et al. (2012: 781), who roughly estimate the
suitability of various indicators to research ‘directed innovation efforts in
response to climate change mitigation’; and Carley, Brown, and Lawrence
(2012), who propose an evaluation framework for ‘energy-based economic
development’ which includes the categorization of relevant indicators but not
an actual indicator evaluation.
The purpose of this study is to assess the performance of indicator-based
evaluation in the context of LCET support policies and to contribute to the
structured assessment of potential indicators.
The Nordic countries have been chosen as a geographic area of study.
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark have innovation ecosystems in
place which provide dedicated support to LCET. They perform well on
indexes related to eco-innovation, such as the Global Green Economy Index
2016 (Dual Citizen LLC 2016), the 2014 Global Cleantech Innovation
Index (WWF and Cleantech Group 2014), and the EU Eco-Innovation index
(European Commission 2015). However, in Finland and Sweden in particular,
the gaps between the evidence of emerging cleantech innovation and the
evidence of commercialized cleantech innovation are large (WWF and
Cleantech Group 2014). Within cleantech the sub-sector of LCET is
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particularly challenging due to long times to market and high capital require-
ments (Ghosh and Nanda 2010). Both the success of their cleantech industry
and the remaining challenges in commercialization make the Nordic countries
a suitable case study to identify and analyse indicators for the assessment of
RD&D support policies.
Section 10.2 in this chapter includes the research design. In Section 10.3 the
analysis of the indicator-based evaluation framework is presented. Section 10.4
discusses policy implications of indicator choice and Section 10.5 concludes.
10 .2 RESEARCH DESIGN: THE INDICATOR-BASED
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The researchwas framed as an exploratory case study of public RD&D ﬁnancing
of LCET in the Nordic countries. The study is constructed around indicator-
based evaluation, confronting a literature review of indicators in RD&D
policy evaluation with the actual usage of indicators in the Nordic countries.
In order to enhance the understanding of indicator choice, an assessment of
the indicator-based evaluation method was performed. Both primary and
secondary data were collected to understand the respective funding instru-
ments, their performance, and indicators used for their evaluation.1
10.2.1 Conceptualization of Indicator-Based
RD&D Policy Evaluation
The multitude of indicators that is used in the assessment of RD&D policy can
be categorized in different ways. A common differentiation is made between
input, outcome, and impact indicators (Fischer 1995; Guedes et al. 2001;
Neij and Åstrand 2006; Miedzinski et al. 2013). Another (complementary)
approach to conceptualize the use of indicators is to view them as a way to
operationalize criteria for policy evaluation (Mickwitz 2003). Relevant criteria
that were used to structure this study are administrative capacity, effectiveness,
and additionality.
It is debatable whether administrative capacity should be seen as an evalu-
ation criterion as such or as a ‘determinant of implementation’ (Vedung 2000:
226). Following the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
(Kolstad et al. 2014), it was used as a criterion in this study. Effectiveness refers
1 Further information about the case study, data collection and limitations of this study can be
found in Sonnenschein (2016).
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to the degree to which ‘achieved outcomes correspond to the intended goals of
the policy instrument’ (Mickwitz 2003: 426). For this study also indicators
were included, which were de facto used to assess the effects of a ﬁnancing
instrument but for which no explicit goals were formulated. Due to the large
number of potential indicators for effectiveness this criterion is frequently
subdivided into environmental effectiveness, technological progress, and com-
mercial effectiveness (Carlsson et al. 2002: 243; Carley, Brown, and Lawrence
2012: ﬁgure 2). The additionality criterion complements effectiveness. It is the
degree to which achieved outcomes differ from a baseline development that
assumes the absence of the respective policy instrument. The challenge of
attributing speciﬁc developments to individual policy instruments is large
(Scriven 1991). Still, additionality is a core criterion to establish accountability
for the success or failure of RD&D support policies.
10.2.2 Indicators Used in the Evaluation of LCET Support Policy
A comprehensive review of potential indicators used to assess LCET RD&D
support is presented in Table 10.1. The table excludes social indicators and
environmental indicators other than the ones related to greenhouse gas emis-
sions. It differentiates between national level indicators and programme-level
indicators and is structured according to the evaluation criteria presented in
Section 10.2.1.
10.2.3 Key Indicators in the Context of Public RD&D
Financing of LCET in the Nordic Countries
In order to reduce the scope of this study and increase its relevance, only the
most salient indicators in the case study of LCET RD&D support in the Nordic
countries were analysed. Moreover, only numeric indicators were chosen; and
indicators included in the analysis had to be relevant at both national
and programme level. Selected indicators included RD&D spending, CO2
emissions, patents, commercial indicators (turnover, exports and jobs), return
on investment (ROI), and the ratio of public and private RD&D. Further
clariﬁcation about indicator choice follows (while the actual analysis of these
indicators is presented in Section 10.3):
• The indicator ‘CO2 emissions’, in this case, refers to CO2 emissions from
fossil fuel combustion determined with a production-based approach.
• The commercial indicators ‘turnover’, ‘exports’, and ‘jobs’ were grouped
together as they are typically part of the same accounting system at the
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Table 10.1. Indicators used in the literature on LCET support policies
National level Programme level
Administrative
Capacity
RD&D spending
RD&D staff (and their formal
qualiﬁcation)
RD&D spending
RD&D staff (and their formal
qualiﬁcation)
Effectiveness
Environmental
effectiveness
CO2 emissions CO2 emissions
CO2 intensity of energy supply
CO2 intensity of the economy
Technological
progress
Patents (ﬁled, granted, cited) Patents (ﬁled, granted, cited)
Scientiﬁc papers (incl. PhD
theses)
Scientiﬁc papers (incl. PhD theses)
Learning rates
Technology/abatement costs Technology/abatement costs
Technology performance/
efﬁciency
Technology performance/efﬁciency
Energy efﬁciency/intensity of the
economy
Commercial
effectiveness
Jobs Jobs
Exports Exports
Turnover Turnover
Turnover/employee (productivity)
Proﬁts Proﬁts
Return on investment Return on investment
Number of enterprises
Energy cost savings Energy cost savings
Other Energy self-sufﬁciency
Share of renewable energy in
energy supply
Additionality
Ratio of public and private
RD&D spending
Ratio of public and private RD&D
spending
Jobs per energy output
Net employment effect
Macroeconomic multipliers
Scale and timing of private sector
RD&D activity
Source: Author’s compilation based on Stosic et al. (2016);Wilson et al. (2012); Carley et al. (2011) ; Carley et al.
(2012); Gallagher et al. (2006); Neij and Åstrand (2006); Jacobsson and Rickne (2004); Spangenberg (2004);
Kleinknecht, Van Montfort, and Brouwer (2002); Schoenecker and Swanson (2002); and Grupp (2000).
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national level; also at the programme level they are often measured and
presented together.
• As well as RD&D budgets, administrative capacity, in terms of knowledge
and skills, was highlighted in the interviews as a key input factor for the
success of public interventions, but did not seem to be reﬂected in
evaluations. Input indicators related to administrative capacity, such as
the number and qualiﬁcation of fund managers and public ofﬁcers
in RD&D schemes (Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar 2006), were not
frequently used.
• Technological output indicators, other than patent counts, are bibliometric
indicators and the number of supported PhDs, neither of which were
explicitly used in this speciﬁc case and are potentially subject to large biases
(Jacobsson and Rickne 2004).
• Only one additionality indicator was chosen to be part of this study, since
no data on output and outcome additionality of publically ﬁnanced
RD&D programmes could be obtained.
10.2.4 Assessment of the Indicator-Based Method
Once indicators used to assess RD&D support to LCET in the Nordic countries
were identiﬁed, categorized, and selected, they were analysed in order to assess
the indicator-based evaluation method. The analysis focused on the acceptance
of relevant stakeholders, on the ease of monitoring an indicator, including
measurability and data availability, and on an indicator’s robustness against
manipulation. This evaluation approach was inspired by the ‘RACER frame-
work’ for indicator choice in impact assessments (European Commission 2005).
RACER stands for relevant, accepted, credible, easy to monitor, and robust.
Both relevance and measurability were also suggested as criteria for the assess-
ment and selection of green growth indicators (GGKP 2013).
The acceptance of an indicator was included in the analysis, since the results
of an assessment that is based on poorly accepted indicators is not likely to
resonate with key stakeholders and tends to have less policy impact. Moreover,
indicators that are difﬁcult to monitor or can only be monitored at very
high costs are less likely to be applied in evaluations. The more expensive it
gets to monitor the development of indicators, the harder it gets to justify
resource use for evaluation. In contrast, the robustness of an indicator does
not have immediate inﬂuence on programme evaluation, as less robust
indicators can still be inﬂuential if they are widely accepted and monitored.
Still, robustness is crucial from the academic perspective as indicators that
are not robust may not provide conclusive indications for the (re-)design of
LCET support schemes. Moreover, manipulation of indicators may eventu-
ally erode acceptance.
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10.3 ANALYSIS: INDICATORS FOR PUBLIC RD&D
FINANCING OF LCET IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
As outlined in Section 10.1, the development of the LCET sector in the Nordic
countries is generally perceived as a success story. In contrast, the role of
public RD&D ﬁnancing in this story is more difﬁcult to grasp as it has not
been comprehensively researched. This study contributes to the evaluation of
RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET in the Nordic countries by scrutinizing the use of
indicators rather than by presenting a comprehensive indicator-based evalu-
ation as such. Hence, speciﬁc performance data from the case study is merely
used to illustrate the use of indicators and their assessment.2
Indicators are analysed and ranked according to the criteria acceptance,
ease of monitoring, and robustness (see Table 10.2). The estimation of indi-
cators is presented on an ordinal three-point scale (zero, one, or two stars).
The results represent the speciﬁc case of RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET in the
Nordic countries. Generalizability beyond LCET in the Nordic countries is
particularly limited in the case of acceptance, while similar results can be
expected for the criteria ease of monitoring and robustness if the study is
repeated in a different context.
While most of the results are indicator-speciﬁc, there are some cross-cutting
results, in particular with respect to robustness. First, the assessed performance
may vary signiﬁcantly depending on the deﬁnition of LCET, which is sometimes
also referred to as green energy or clean energy technology. The decision to
include controversial and capital-intensive technologies such as carbon capture
and storage (CCS) or nuclear energy in the deﬁnition can make a large
difference. Time-lags are another aspect that inﬂuences the robustness of
indicators. While inputs into LCET RD&D are visible right away, outcomes
and impacts of RD&D support programmes manifest themselves only after
several years. Finally, for all aggregated indicators there is the challenge of
attribution. It is virtually impossible to separate the effects induced by individual
support schemes from other factors such as larger business cycles and general
technological progress. In Sections 10.3.1–10.3.6, the schematic overview of
results (Table 10.2) is substantiated for each of the six indicators.
10.3.1 RD&D Spending
10.3.1.1 Acceptance
RD&D spending is a widely accepted indicator in the Nordic countries. Policy
makers have stressed the leading role of the Nordics in LCET RD&D by
2 Further case-speciﬁc data and ﬁgures are included in Sonnenschein (2016).
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referring to budget allocations, academics have frequently used RD&D budget
data in econometric studies of innovation activity, and public ofﬁcers in LCET
support programmes as well as fund managers stressed the particular role of
public RD&D budgets for energy technology innovation in the interviews. At
the level of individual programmes, larger public budgets are mostly, but not
always, perceived as desirable. The success of commercialization support pro-
grammes, for instance, largely depended on the existence of suitable innovative
enterprises. By increasing budgets and, hence, the number of supported enter-
prises, the risk of picking less-promising enterprises increases.
10.3.1.2 Ease of Monitoring
Comprehensive data on national energy RD&D spending of Nordic countries
is reported to and published by the International Energy Agency on an annual
basis (IEA 2015b). The resolution of the data is ﬁne enough to differentiate
Table 10.2. Overview of assessment indicators for public RD&D support to LCET,
their acceptance, ease of monitoring, and robustness
Indicator Acceptance Ease of monitoring Robustness
Administrative Capacity
RD&D budgets ** ** *
Effectiveness
CO2 emissions * */** *
Patents * ** **
Turnover,
exports, jobs
** * o
ROI o * o
Additionality
Ratio of public
& private
RD&D
** * *
Legend
Indicator is: Indicator is: Indicator:
two stars (**) widely accepted by
various stakeholders.
measurable and data
is available.
is difﬁcult to
manipulate.
one star (*) partially accepted by the
stakeholders.
measurable but good
data is not available.
can be manipulated but
robustness can be tested.
no star (o) only brought forward by
one type of stakeholder.
not measurable. is very prone to
manipulation.
Source: Author’s analysis.
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between LCET and other energy technologies. RD&D spending data is also
available at the programme level, even though it is scattered, so that it requires
some data-gathering effort to obtain a systematic overview.
10.3.1.3 Robustness
The particular presentation of RD&D spending data leaves room for manipu-
lation. Today’s share of LCET RD&D in GDP is, for instance, very high in the
Nordic countries compared to other industrial states (IEA 2015b). However,
when comparing to historic data, it was three times higher in Sweden in the
early 1980s, which has to be seen in the context of the oil crises (IEA 2015a).
RD&D spending on LCET can also be compared to overall public RD&D
spending, which represents about 3–3.5 per cent of GDP in the Nordic
countries (as compared to 0.03–0.11 per cent for LCET). At the time of the
oil crises, energy R&D made up more than 10 per cent of overall R&D both in
Europe and the Americas, a ratio that has dropped to 2 per cent and 3 per cent
respectively (IEA 2015a).
Absolute RD&D spending is very low in the Nordic countries as compared to
larger countries. The US loan guarantees of US$535m to solar cell producer
Solyndra and of US$465m to electric car manufacturer Tesla (Rodrik 2014)
exceeded the current capacity of the Nordic countries’ RD&D budgets, which
seem even smaller in comparison to the support that China grants to some of its
renewable energy companies, for example US$9.1bn to LDK Solar, US$7.6bn to
Suntech Power, and US$7bn to Yingli Solar (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013).
Moreover, RD&D ﬁnancing for LCET may well be concentrated in a few
lighthouse projects, as, for example, CCS funding is in Norway, which made
up more than half of RD&D to LCET between 2009 and 2012 (IEA 2015b).
In contrast, it was observed that there was too little public funding for
early stage enterprises that have already received seed-funding but often
have difﬁculties securing follow-up ﬁnancing (Grünfeld, Iverson, and
Grimsby 2011).
Finally, RD&D spending is not adjusted for the respective costs of conduct-
ing RD&D, for example the costs for employing research staff, which are
signiﬁcantly higher in countries like Sweden as compared to many other
European countries (Jacobsson and Rickne 2004).
10.3.2 CO2 Emissions
The most apparent indicator for assessing the environmental effectiveness of
public RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET in the Nordic countries is the development
of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. It is often presented in relation
to GDP growth in order to account for the size of the respective economy.
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Both CO2 emissions and the emissions intensity of the economy fell in all
Nordic countries but Norway between 2000 and 2014 (IEA 2015c).
10.3.2.1 Acceptance
CO2 emissions are not widely accepted as a signiﬁcant impact indicator.
On the one hand, investigated policy programmes and the laws in which
they are enshrined do refer to the reduction of CO2 emissions, and also
academics comprehensively discuss the role of technology push policies for
reducing CO2 emissions. On the other hand, emission reductions do not play a
major role at the programme and project level. The interviews revealed that
the reduction of CO2 emissions is seen as a ‘by-product’ of the (economic)
success of supported enterprises and not as an indicator for success in itself.
10.3.2.2 Ease of Monitoring
CO2 emissions data is certainly measurable and available at the national level
in the Nordic countries but difﬁcult to measure at the programme level, as the
lion’s share of emission reduction typically does not take place in RD&D
projects but indirectly through selling and deploying LCETs on domestic and
international markets. Only few programmes included CO2 emissions in their
assessment, for example Enova Norway’s support for ‘new energy technology’,
which monitored energy savings and CO2 emission reductions both in abso-
lute terms and in relation to provided funding (Enova 2015).
10.3.2.3 Robustness
While national-level emissions data is rather robust and an established system
for monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation is in place in all Nordic countries,
there is a lot of room for manoeuvre at the programme level. Either direct or
induced emissions reductions may be monitored, at both the national and
international level. Moreover, the choice of the baseline for evaluating reduc-
tions, and not merely monitoring them, leaves room for manipulation. Base
years may vary and business as usual scenarios rest on many assumptions.
10.3.3 Patents
All Nordic countries multiplied their share of low-carbon technology patents
in total patents between 1999 and 2011, reaching about 10 per cent in 2011
(OECD 2015). This suggests that within the Nordic countries LCET became a
more signiﬁcant area of innovation, which may be partly driven by additional
public RD&D ﬁnancing in this sector. This trend is not restricted to the
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Nordic countries, but it is likely more pronounced than in many other
countries, so that the ‘relative technological advantage’ of Nordic countries
in LCET may well have strengthened in this period (Haščič and Migotto
2015: 30).
10.3.3.1 Acceptance
At the national level, patents are frequently used as proxies for technological
progress, both by academics and government agencies. The situation is dif-
ferent at the programme level where patents are mainly regarded as a means to
an end. Even if not seen as ends in themselves, patents and the process of
protecting intellectual property rights do play a role in the RD&D support that
is provided to LCET in the Nordic countries. Patents are simply not regarded
as a relevant indicator for success at the programme level.
10.3.3.2 Ease of Monitoring
Patent data of LCET is available at the national level and published regularly.
In contrast, patent data is not made available in a systematic way at the
programme level, so that the attribution of patents to public support instru-
ments becomes difﬁcult. The Finnish national innovation funding agency
TEKES monitors the overall number of patents registered by supported
organizations but does not provide a speciﬁc breakdown for LCET (TEKES
2015). A Danish study of the green economy compares innovation activity and
patenting of green enterprises to all enterprises, showing that the trading of
patents and intellectual property rights plays a larger role in green enterprises
than in the overall economy (Danish Energy Agency 2012: 38).
10.3.3.3 Robustness
Patents are a robust indicator. Data is available, it can be rather easily veriﬁed
so that there is little room for manipulation, and patents can to some extent be
attributed to RD&D projects. Still there is a risk that funding agencies account
for a full patent in cases in which they provided only a minor share of the
overall project budget.
10.3.4 Turnover, Exports, Jobs
Turnover in the LCET sector, its jobs and exports are frequently used indica-
tors in the context of RD&D ﬁnancing instruments. The most developed and
standardized way to measure the commercial development of subsectors of the
green economy is provided in national statistics about the Environmental
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Goods and Services Sector (EGSS), which is deﬁned in the statistical guidelines
of Eurostat (Eurostat 2009).
10.3.4.1 Acceptance
Various stakeholders stress the commercial dimension of RD&D ﬁnancing of
LCET. There is virtually no public support programme in the Nordic coun-
tries that does not explicitly refer to economic development. The political
emphasis of commercial aspects is a view that was reafﬁrmed in the inter-
views where public ofﬁcers stressed the role of commercialization potential.
Even in academia the focus is increasingly put on the commercialization
aspect of publically funded RD&D (Jacobsson, Lindholm-Dahlstrand, and
Elg 2013).
10.3.4.2 Ease of Monitoring
Turnover, jobs, and exports in the LCET sector are measurable and some data
is available at both the national level (in statistics on the EGSS) and at
programme level. However, available data is scattered and cross-country
comparisons are not possible. Sweden is the only Nordic country that has
collected comprehensive data on its EGSS for more than a decade, including
speciﬁc data on the subsectors renewable energy, and energy savings. The
Danish EGSS statistics only cover the years 2012–14, the Finnish statistics do
not include the subsectors renewable energy and energy efﬁciency, yet, and in
Norway the statistics ofﬁce is preparing for the ﬁrst publication of EGSS data
in 2017. The lack of ofﬁcial data from statistics ofﬁces is partly compensated
for with data from industry associations (Mellbye and Espelien 2013;
Cleantech Finland 2014).
Speciﬁc programme evaluations sometimes also include the economic
outcomes of RD&D support programmes. The Danish Business Innovation
Fund, which ﬁnanced mainly green economy enterprises in 2010–12, required,
for instance, all supported enterprises to communicate ﬁve-year turnover and
employment targets. These targets were summarized and followed up in a
mid-term evaluation (Deloitte 2012), but no further evaluation with actual
data is available, yet. This example illustrates a typical challenge of programme
evaluations. Once temporary support programmes are ﬁnalized, little priority
and resources are given to evaluation.
10.3.4.3 Robustness
As well as data availability, quality of commercial data also varies. Due to the
fact that there is no standardized way to measure commercial indicators for
LCET (and the whole EGSS) the data may vary between different sources.
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In particular, data from grey literature tends to be less robust. One example is
Norway’s renewable energy sector, for which industry sources frequently
report employment of 50,000, a turnover of NOK200 bn and approximately
2000 companies in 2010. This is far higher than the ﬁgures published in a
more elaborated study, which found 13,700 employees, NOK85bn turnover
and 860 companies in 2010 (Mellbye and Espelien 2013).
Furthermore, economic data about the LCET sector does not reﬂect that
employment, turnover, and exports could also be generated in other sectors.
The actual ﬁgures do not reﬂect the net effect of the respective support
policies, that is its additionality, but only their gross effects. The claim that
the Danish wind power sector employs more people than the Swedish auto-
motive industry is often made in the context of job creation. This is potentially
misleading as it does not say anything about the net employment effects of
past wind power support policies in Denmark.
10.3.5 Return on Investment (ROI)
In the case of public equity ﬁnancing instruments, ROI is an additional
commercial indicator under consideration. There is no exclusive public ven-
ture capital (VC) fund for LCET in the Nordic countries, but several public VC
funds have LCET companies in their portfolio. These funds typically stress
that they operate like private funds and that their main objective is ROI. This
supports the ﬁndings of Yang and Sollen (2013), who found strong evidence
for a de facto proﬁt motive in state-owned VC in the Nordics.
The track record of public VC to LCET enterprises has a rather poor image
among analysts in the Nordic countries, some of whom call it a complete
absence of success stories. Due to ‘poor ﬁnancial returns on Cleantech invest-
ments’ (Murray and Cowling 2014) the Danish Growth Fund has not made
any initial VC investments into cleantech since 2011, and neither has the
Norwegian public VC fund Investinor. Even the performance of private VC
funds that invest in cleantech is at best mixed in the Nordic countries (Wang
2015). The absence of success may have other reasons than public VC being an
inappropriate support instrument, including the poor timing of investments
with respect to economic cycles and long lead times in this sector, which
means that there have not been many exits, yet (Murray and Cowling 2014).
10.3.5.1 Acceptance
With the exception of (state-owned) VC fund managers, little support could be
gathered for taking ROI into consideration as an indicator for the effectiveness
of public RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET. Several stakeholders argued that the state
should support those ventures that are too risky for the private sector but
Understanding RD&D Financing of Low-Carbon Technologies 199
potentially beneﬁcial for society. These are most likely not the ones that promise
the highest returns. While it is widely accepted that proﬁt-orientation should be
the modus operandi for public equity funds, a general proﬁt target is not
accepted at all. In the interviews it was suggested that beneﬁts to the state
could be assessed in a different way, that is by looking at ﬁnancing costs and
at the indirect impact on tax revenue that is triggered by additional commercial
activity.
10.3.5.2 Ease of Monitoring
The returns from public VC investments into LCET are measurable, which is
straightforward after a portfolio company has been sold (exit). There are,
however, large methodological challenges in estimating the current value of
existing portfolios. LCETs have a long time to market so that several of the
public investments in the Nordic countries could not be exited yet, which
impedes the calculation of ROI. Good data for public VC investments in the
Nordic countries is not available, and even less so for LCET investments in
particular, since LCET investments are typically part of larger VC funds that
are not specialized into energy or cleantech.
10.3.5.3 Robustness
Due to the lack of data, it is not possible to assess the actual robustness of the
indicator ROI. Still, it is rather clear how the data could be manipulated and
why. Fund managers have strong incentives to overestimate the current value
of their portfolio, while entrepreneurs also have to portray their respective
ventures as a success story in order to receive continued ﬁnancing.
10.3.6 The Ratio of Public and Private RD&D Financing
Merely looking at effectiveness is not sufﬁcient to assess the success of a policy
intervention. RD&D ﬁnancing instruments in the Nordic countries showed a
clear attempt not only to be effective but also to both ensure the additionality of
the intervention and, to a lesser extent, monitor this additionality effect. The
most common indicator for the additionality of Nordic RD&D support schemes
was the ratio of public and private RD&D ﬁnancing, that is the consideration of
whether public ﬁnancing has crowded in or crowded out private ﬁnancing.
10.3.6.1 Acceptance
The ratio of public and private RD&D was clearly the indicator that was used
most to investigate additionality. Its role as input indicator, however, slightly
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reduced acceptance, as after all additional effects on the environment, tech-
nology, and economy were sought after rather than additional ﬁnancial input,
as such. Furthermore, the indicator is not always easy to interpret, which
further reduced acceptance.
10.3.6.2 Ease of Monitoring
Both public and private RD&D ﬁnancing are measurable and data is partially
available, even though data on private sector RD&D spending is less compre-
hensive. There is no comprehensive study about private versus public sector
RD&D for LCET in the Nordic countries. At the programme level the evidence
from evaluations, reports, and interviews clearly suggests very high addition-
ality of public RD&D to LCET in the Nordics. Gaps in the innovation
ﬁnancing cycle of cleantech were identiﬁed by various private and public
investors (Finnsson 2011). Evaluations of TEKES’ (Finland) ﬁnancing of
environmental technology (Valovirta et al. 2014) and of Innovation Norway’s
Environmental Technology Scheme (Espelien et al. 2014) found high degrees
of additionality. In the latter case NOK1 of ﬁnancing ‘triggered’ NOK3.6 in
private investments. Moreover, in the case of Sweden, public funding seems to
crowd in private capital for cleantech investments; and co-investments are
particularly common in the sub-sector of energy (Yang and Sollen 2013: 59).
While, at the programme level, data on private co-investments in RD&D is
collected and, in many cases, even has to be collected, this does not provide
any information about private RD&D activity outside publicly co-ﬁnanced
projects.
10.3.6.3 Robustness
The ratio of public and private sector RD&D ﬁnancing is a simple input
indicator and as such it avoids some of the difﬁculties in assessing the
additionality of programme outcome. However, interviewees pointed out
that the interpretation of the indicator is not self-evident. Additionality of
public funds is likely if the share in total RD&D ﬁnancing (public and private)
remains the same or even decreases. It is more difﬁcult to interpret when the
share of public RD&D increases. This could be either due to a crisis in private
RD&D ﬁnancing, hence pointing towards a high degree of additionality, or
due to crowding out, indicating a low degree of additionality.
One example for an increased share of public ﬁnancing is the development
of cleantech VC in Sweden. Private VC cleantech investments in Sweden
dropped from their peak at nearly 700 million SEK in 2008 to about 50 million
SEK in 2014, while dedicated public VC funds increased from about 25 million
SEK to 100 million SEK (Tillväxtanalys 2015). The collapse of private VC
investments despite slightly increasing dedicated public VC funds provides
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indication for a high degree of additionality of public funds, even though they
were not successful in crowding in much private funding.
Besides its ambiguity, the robustness of this indicator is further challenged
by the fact that private sector RD&D ﬁnancing data is largely based on
self-reporting. Companies have many options for manipulating the data
they report, for example increasing their budgets by inﬂating the staff hours
they put into an RD&D project.
10 .4 EFFECTS OF INDICATOR CHOICE: POTENTIAL
BIASES AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis of six common indicators in the context of RD&D ﬁnancing of
LCET showed that even a basic structured assessment does not result in a
clear-cut indicator-based evaluation framework. Trade-offs between compre-
hensiveness, acceptance, ease of monitoring, and robustness are impossible
to avoid.
An argument in favour of indicator-based monitoring and evaluation is
that it helps to establish accountability of policy makers. If evaluations of
RD&D programmes for LCET are carried out at all, they are typically
based on indicators. Accepting that these indicators only represent a
subset of all available indicators, moreover a subset that is faced with
heavy trade-offs, it becomes clear that the mere selection of indicators can
have a major impact on evaluation results. These results then feed back
into the policy-making process and may trigger changes in programme
design and strategic focus.
The active selection of indicators may introduce bias into indicator-based
evaluation. It is important to note, though, that certain biases might be
justiﬁed as the speciﬁc objectives of different programmes (e.g., technological
progress or economic growth) may differ. Flexibility in the computation and
presentation of indicators (i.e., lack of robustness) introduces further uncer-
tainty about the validity of assessment results. In Section 10.4.1 to 10.4.3, some
potential biases and uncertainties in the evaluation of Nordic RD&D ﬁnancing
of LCET are discussed and possible policy implications are mentioned.
10.4.1 A Focus on Short-Term Economic Performance and ROI
In the case study, the growth of jobs, exports, and turnover, and also proﬁt-
ability appeared to be increasingly important indicators of the public ﬁnancing
of RD&D and its commercialization. At the same time private RD&D spend-
ing in the Nordic LCET sector has recently decreased and public RD&D
202 Institutions and Governance
spending has levelled off. The interviews made clear that, in particular, public
VC instruments have moved away from cleantech due to low proﬁt expect-
ations and long times to market. Hence, dedicated support for LCET is not
likely to perform well in assessments if much attention is paid to the indicators
ROI and the (short-term) development of jobs, exports, and turnover.
A bias towards these indicators largely disregards social beneﬁts related to
the development and deployment of LCET, such as resource conservation and
climate change mitigation. This improves the position of other sectors in the
competition for public funds. The information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) sector is, for instance, less capital-intensive and has shorter devel-
opment cycles.
However, LCET-speciﬁc support and commercial success do not exclude
each other in the Nordic countries. Analyses of the Danish wind energy sector
and the Swedish bioenergy sector have shown that ‘medium-sized countries
can be within the world’s leading nations in a speciﬁc ﬁeld of energy technol-
ogy, if appropriate supply and demand side policies support a certain tech-
nology’ (Bointner 2014: 738). In order to be commercially successful, public
RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET likely has to be part of a more comprehensive policy
mix. Accordingly, fund managers and public ofﬁcers stressed in the interviews
that the business plans of several supported companies could only be worked
out if demand side policies were in place. Demand-side measures include feed-
in-tariffs for renewable energy in Denmark and Finland, the common green
certiﬁcates market of Norway and Sweden, CO2 taxes, and deployment sub-
sidies for various LCETs. The main policy implication of a strong focus on
short-term economic performance is, hence, that (further) dedicated support
to LCET is difﬁcult to justify if there are no additional demand side policies
in place.
10.4.2 Stressing the Additionality of Financing
Despite the lack of workable indicators, additionality was strongly emphasized
in both interviews and reports. This was slightly surprising as there was virtually
no evidence for ‘crowding-out’ private capital from the Nordic LCET sector.
The perceived importance of additionality can be traced back to regulatory
requirements stipulated in EU state aid regulation. The investigated support
instruments included various institutional mechanisms to make sure that the
state does not ﬁnance ‘too much’, including co-investment provisions, max-
imum aid intensities, and limited opportunities for follow-up investments.
It would be an exaggeration, though, to understand these mechanisms as a
result of a bias towards additionality in evaluation. While the importance of
additionality was indeed frequently stressed, actual monitoring happened, if at
all, mainly for the input indicator ‘ratio of public and private funding’. This
supports the thesis that ‘additionality can be treated ex ante as a design criterion
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and ex post as an area where some evidence can be collected but where full
measurement may be impossible and in any case is not justiﬁed in resource
terms’ (Georghiou 2002: 64). It would require further discourse analysis to
better understand how the frequent discussion of additionality has inﬂuenced
the design of RD&D ﬁnancing measures in the Nordic countries.
The main policy implication of a large emphasis on additionality indicators
in the assessment of RD&D support schemes is that it may favour cautious
state intervention rather than strong industrial policy push for LCET.
10.4.3 Disregarding Decarbonization
Decarbonization was a very prominent objective in the justiﬁcation and
communication of LCET support measures in the Nordic countries, while at
the programme level climate aspects were overtrumped by innovation object-
ives. Accordingly, most RD&D support to LCET companies was managed by
dedicated innovation agencies like TEKES, Innovation Norway, and Vinnova.
The challenge to place LCET support within a certain policy domain is
well-illustrated by an evaluation of the Norwegian Environmental Technology
Scheme (Innovation Norway). The hierarchy between the scheme’s objectives
‘environmental effect’ and ‘commercial potential’ was not clear and the evalu-
ators recommended ‘design[ing] explicit objectives including a clear goal
hierarchy as soon as possible’ (Espelien et al. 2014: 6), being very outspoken
that priority should be given to commercial potential. This reﬂects a frequently
expressed view in the case study, that is that commercial success is the best
strategy to assure positive environmental impact.
Moreover, previous econometric studies have shown that little direct inﬂu-
ence of public RD&D ﬁnancing on CO2 emissions from energy can be
expected (Garrone and Grilli 2010). Considering further that there are serious
methodological challenges to attribute emission reductions to speciﬁc RD&D
support schemes (Miedzinski et al. 2013), it was not surprising that the
indicator ‘CO2 emissions’ was largely disregarded in evaluations of the ana-
lysed instruments.
The potential policy implication of disregarding CO2 emissions as an
assessment indicator lies in the selection of LCETs that are worth supporting.
There is a risk that the mitigation potential of a technology becomes secondary
concern in the selection of support-worthy RD&D projects and enterprises.
10 .5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main objective of this study was to assess the performance of indicator-
based evaluation in the context of public RD&D ﬁnancing of LCET. The
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Nordic countries provided an interesting case to study the choice of indicators
in policy evaluation, their acceptance, the ease of monitoring them, and their
robustness. The analysis clearly showed that a structured assessment of indi-
cators can help to point up the trade-offs and limitations that are inherent in
indicator-based evaluation. Selecting indicators can introduce bias. The dis-
cussion of LCET RD&D ﬁnancing in the Nordic countries illustrated how a
focus on short-term economic performance may hinder (further) dedicated
support to LCET, how stressing the additionality aspect of public ﬁnancing
may lead to rather cautious state intervention, and how the partial neglect of
CO2 emissions in evaluation may shift the focus away from the abatement
potential of supported technologies.
If such biases happen to correspond with the policy objectives behind the
respective instruments and programmes, they can be justiﬁed. If, on the other
hand, the ambition is to act according to the targets of the 2015 Paris
Agreement, more dedicated support to LCET with substantial abatement
potential and bold state interventions are needed.
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An Enquiry into the Political Economy of the
Global Clean Energy Transition Policies and
Nigeria’s Federal and State Governments’
Fiscal Policies
David Onyinyechi Agu and Evelyn Nwamaka Ogbeide-Osaretin
11.1 INTRODUCTION
There is currently a common problem facing all economies of the globe,
developed and developing economies alike, which can only be solved by the
collective efforts of all nations. In the views of the European Renewable Energy
Council (EREC) (2004), climate change is the major challenge to sustainable
development worldwide, manifesting in various forms and affecting various
aspects of each of the economies. The effects of climate change propelled the
United Nations (UN) to convene a summit that discussed the implications of
the issue of climate change and how best to tackle the problem. The resolution
of the summit is today referred to as the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UN 1998).
It is true that the protocol stipulates some speciﬁc objectives targeted at
reducing the prevalence of climate change within a set amount of years.
However, it is also clear that not all those objectives can be achieved within
the set time without profound commitments of the national governments that
make up the UN. For instance, EREC (2004) recognizes that one of the key
tasks faced by all the national governments in mitigating climate change is a
profound transformation of the current energy system over the next few
decades, replacing fossil fuels with renewable energies, and dramatically
increasing energy efﬁciency.
However, practical experience shows that the actual level of commitment to
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol may vary signiﬁcantly from the
required level of commitment. Some such deviations are seen from the point
of economies that depend more on fossil fuel for energy and revenue. To such
economies moving away from the use of fossil fuel means reduction in their
current revenues and that may come with overbearing consequences on the
national governments.
As a member state of the UN that has signed the Kyoto Protocol, Nigeria
depends signiﬁcantly on revenues from fossil fuel. Statistical ﬁgures from
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2012) shows that the contribution of oil
revenue to Nigeria’s total federally collected revenue ranged from 60–70 per
cent annually in the early 1980s to an annual average of 75.5 per cent in the
1990s. However, the contribution reached an all-time peak of 88.6 per cent
of total revenue in 2006 and has maintained a prominent place since then.
Even the ﬁgure presented by CBN (2013) does not mean much deviation
from the status quo. According to that ﬁgure, about 30 per cent of total
federally-collected revenue came from non-oil sources, implying that oil
revenue still contributed to about 70 per cent of total federal government’s
revenue in 2013.
Given the level of dependence of Nigerian governments on oil revenue, it
is important to enquire into the willingness and implications of their imple-
menting the Kyoto Protocol. Eleri, Onuvae, and Ugwu (2013) observed that
the federal and state governments in Nigeria have outlined several policies
and programmes in response to the achievement of clean energy policies.
However, the scholars also observed that there is a general lack of capacity or
political will to implement the outlined policies and programmes. Some of
the policy documents like the Renewable Energy Master Plan and the
National Energy Policy are yet to receive legislative attention or presidential
endorsement. Although the National Policy on Climate Change and Re-
sponse Strategy (NPCC-RS) was approved in 2015, implementation has yet
to take place.
Many developed and developing countries are fast transitioning to clean
energy. For example, while countries in North America reduced their imports
of reﬁned petroleum products from 3.083 million barrels per day in 2005 to
1.678 million barrels per day as of 2012 (that is, 45.57 per cent reduction),
Nigeria rather increased her imports of reﬁned petroleum products
from154,324 barrels per day in 2005 to 180,921 barrels per day in 2012 (that
is, 17.23 per cent increase). On the other hand, countries in North America
increased their consumption of biofuels from 276.675 thousand barrels per
day in the same 2005 to 941.86 thousand barrels per day in 2012 (US EIA
2015). Therefore, the decline in petroleum imports may not necessarily imply
reduction in total energy needs of the countries in North America, but a
function of a shift from fossil fuels to biofuels due to investment in clean
energy sources. The same trend is observed in energy imports of other
developed regions of the world. Hence, the sharp glut in global market oil
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prices of 2014 until now is attributed to a shift in energy demand from fossil
fuel to clean energy sources.
On this basis, it is not out of place to wonder what could be the factors
behind the lack of political will needed to implement the energy policies and
programmes outlined by the federal and state governments in Nigeria. It is
therefore pertinent to ask some critical questions and investigate the situation
properly:
• First, how prepared are Nigerian governments to handle the ﬁscal shocks
that will be associated with the implementation of clean energy transition
policies?
• Second, what is the implication of deciding not to implement the clean
energy transition policies especially when other national governments are
fast implementing policies?
Therefore, this study provides evidence-based answers to these questions,
which entails critically reviewing the various policies and programme docu-
ments, and the extent of implementation so far. The chapter further answers
other important questions about the preparedness or readiness of Nigerian
federal and state governments to handle the ﬁscal shocks that may be
associated with clean energy transition. In addition, the study provides
answer to the questions of the implications of the preparedness or otherwise
of Nigerian governments, especially as many national economies are fast
investing in research and development (R&D) targeted at hastened transi-
tion of global economies to clean energy so as to mitigate the effects of
climate change.
As such, the success of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol depends
critically on the readiness and willingness of national governments. Without
such readiness and willingness, the convention will be mere paper work that is
not translated to any sustainable development of the global environment.
Therefore, this chapter helps to reveal the extent of readiness of the Nigerian
government, with the aim of showing Nigerian governments the necessary
steps to take in implementing their clean energy policies without having
adverse effects on their ﬁscal policies.
11 .2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section is devoted to reviewing the various literature arguments that exist
in the area of clean energy transition on one hand, and global/national political
economy on the other. The section starts with the theoretical arguments before
proceeding to the empirical ones.
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11.2.1 Conceptual Issues
11.2.1.1 Concept of Climate Change
Climate is the average weather in terms of its mean and variability over a
certain period of time and a given area (IPCC 2001). According to the IPCC
(2007) Fourth Assessment Report, ‘climate change is a change in the state of
the climate that can be identiﬁed from changes in the mean and/or the
variability of its properties persisting for a long period usually for decades or
longer’. Adejuwon (2006) deﬁned climate change as ‘observed changes in
climate caused directly or indirectly by human activities, changing the compos-
ition of the global atmosphere, as well as natural climate variability observed
over a given time period’. Climate change can be caused by human and natural
factors. The activities of the natural factors include change in solar radiation,
while the human factors include agricultural activities that lead to over use of
land, high levels of deforestation, industrial and technological activities
leading to shifts from organic fuel to high use of fossil fuels, land and air trafﬁc,
and so on.
Climate change has been differentiated from climate variability or ﬂuctu-
ation. Climate ﬂuctuation or variability is deﬁned as ‘the variations in the
mean, standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, and so on, of the
climate on all spatial and brief periods but beyond weather events’ (Umar
and Ibrahim 2011). Umar and Ibrahim (2011) went further to note that
climate change and variability may be internal variability as a result of natural
internal processes within the climate system or external variability, variations
in natural or anthropogenic external forces. The major differences between
climate change and ﬂuctuation are mainly the time, the degree of variability,
and the impact of variability. For all these factors, climate change is sterner.
11.2.1.2 Climate Change Mitigation
Climate change mitigations are actions put in place to reduce the intensity of
radioactive emissions in order to reduce the potential effects of global warm-
ing through the control of sources of climate change. It involves the reductions
of the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs), either by reducing their
sources or by increasing their sinks. This is, however, different from global
warming adaptation, which is simply tolerating the effects of global warming/
climate change. According to the IPCC (2001), climate change mitigation is
deﬁned as attempt by humans to reduce the anthropogenic force of human
behaviour on the climate system using such measures as reducing GHG
emissions as well as their relative sinks. Similarly, IPCC (2007) deﬁnes adap-
tation as the ability for a system to adjust to climate change to moderate
damage and cope with some of the results. Mitigation of climate change can be
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accomplished using low carbon sources, such as renewable energy, the use of
energy efﬁcient technology, or the protection of natural environment such as
forests (Nordensvärd and Urban 2011). The concept of climate change miti-
gation is closely related to climate change adaptation.
Adaptation seeks to reduce the impacts of climate change, make the nega-
tive effect moderate, and exploit beneﬁcial opportunities (Farauta et al. 2011).
Adaptation is a proactive measure while mitigation is a corrective measure.
11.2.2 Theories of Climate Change
The theories of climate change are basically concerned with the major causes
of the change in climate. These include the anthropogenic global warming
(AGW), Bio-Thermostat, human forces besides GHGs, Planetary Motion
theory, Ocean Current, and Solar Variability theory.
Anthropogenic global warming is the most common of the theories. This
theory holds human emission of GHGs (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, and
nitrous oxide) through activities such as burning wood and fossil fuels, and
cutting down or burning forests as the main causes of climate change. This is
accomplished through the mechanism called, enhanced greenhouse effect.
IPCC (2007) maintains that water vapour is identiﬁed as the major green-
house gas, responsible for about 36–90 per cent of the greenhouse effect, while
CO2 accounts for about 26 per cent. While it is believed that other external
factors such as variation in solar radiation can lead to climate change, they
argued that the effect could not account for rising temperatures. Though the
forces of man-made gases are small, yet the cumulative positive feedback they
exert leads to great climate change (IPCC 2007).
The bio-thermostat theory states that the negative effect of biological and
chemical actions offset the effects of rising carbon through the mechanism of
global bio-thermostat. Carbon enhances the productivity of plants, thus the
more there is, the better the plants will grow. The theory thus concludes that
neither carbon nor the biological processes are harmful to earth.
Another theory posits that the highest human inﬂuence on climate is the
transformation of earth through deforestation, urban formation from popu-
lation growth, as well as coastal developments. The IPCC estimated that
about one-quarter to one-third of anthropogenic CO2 emissions are due to
deforestation. Following this theory, the ocean current theory posits that
changes in global temperature are highly attributed to the slowdown of the
ocean’s thermohaline circulation (THC), while the planetary motion theory,
ﬁrst published by Milankovitch in 1941, states that climate change is mainly
attributed to the natural gravitational and magnetic oscillations of the solar
system. These oscillations alter the solar system and inﬂuence the earth to
cause a change in climate. Similarly, solar variability theory states that solar
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variations account for most or all global warming. The effect of the variation in
the sun affects the earth through solar wind on cosmic rays, which affects
ocean surface temperatures and wind patterns.
11.2.3 Global Political and Policy Issues on
Climate Change Mitigation
11.2.3.1 Global Political Economy of Climate Change Mitigation
The efﬁcacy of climate change mitigation requires a global agreement. Actions
need to be taken by different nations, such that the level of commitment of a
nation will be at least proportional to its level of development and the level of
emissions. There is resistance to a comprehensive global approach and global
political acceptance has been seen as a major obstacle. In addition, low-income
countries are faced with ﬁnancial constraints given the high cost of clean
energy, high-income countries are faced with political and consumers’ unwill-
ingness to pay the high price for clean energy and many developing countries
are against any level of commitment that will affect their ability to grow.
Moreover, despite agreements by nations to reduce emissions, the high cost of
clean energy left nations uninspired by the Kyoto Protocol’s targets.
Bailey and Preston (2014) opined that economic condition, resource
endowment, and structure of a country determine management policies.
These signiﬁcantly affect the political acceptance of the country for low-carbon
emission while the size and strength of the economy determine the resources
available for the development of low-carbon energy as well as the political will
to do so. Nations that are endowed with fossil energy will not be willing to
carry out actions on low-carbon development because of the revenue accruing
to the government. For instance in Russia, 28 per cent of total government
revenue comes from fossil energy (Bailey and Preston 2014), while in Nigeria it
accounts for about 70 per cent of federal government’s revenue and about 90
per cent of foreign earnings (CBN 2013). Russia, as the fourth world largest
GHG emitter, only ratiﬁed the Kyoto Protocol in November 2004, and placed a
legal limit to gas ﬂaring at 5 per cent from 2012 with implementation under
way and estimated to be delayed by two to three years (Korppoo and
Vantansever 2012).
Politicians will always pursue policies that they expect to gain or maintain
support from political constituencies, thus they acquire more power by doing
what the people will like rather than pursue climate change mitigation that will
impose additional costs through carbon tax and loss of jobs for those in the
carbon sector. Bailey and Preston (2014) further noted that while high-income
countries are focusing on jobs, real incomes, and deﬁcits, middle-income
countries are focusing on economic development, inequality, and expansion
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of services, and low-income countries are concerned with poverty reduction,
health, and education. The global awareness of climate change is also very low.
The lack of information and knowledge about climate change has led to
reluctance in the acceptance of the reality in most of the developing countries,
Nigeria included. People are undereducated on carbon-pricing, carbon tax, or
other tools for the reduction of emission rates. Hence, climate change mitiga-
tion only has little global political support.
Thus apart from the problems associated with global frameworks, the
domestic political economy in the various countries matters much, since
many countries only depend on the domestic support they can muster from
their citizens to implement such a global treaty. This is especially so whenever
a current administration is seeking re-election. An administration may accept
irrational policies that may be contrary to global clean energy policies just to
please the citizens and win their votes. Therefore, any discussion on global
clean energy transition policies must also consider the national political
economy angle in the subject matter (Löschel, Sturm, and Vogt 2010).
11.2.3.2 Conﬂicts between National Policies and Global Policies
Mitigating climate change has not witnessed much commitment as compared
to the expectation from Kyoto Protocol in 1997 of reduction in emissions to
about 30 per cent below what would have occurred under business as usual.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed with legal commitment given to
developed countries to reduce carbon emission by 5 per cent below 1990 levels
over a ﬁve-year period. This was followed by Copenhagen negotiations in
2009. German Watch (2011) noted that since the Copenhagen negotiations in
2009, many countries have not been able to deliver on their commitments to
the climate change campaign as compared to the early years of the campaign.
Mitigating climate change has been identiﬁed as a public good with its
complex externality problem. As a public good, it is characterized with the
free-rider problem hence each country will be expecting the other to shoulder
the responsibility while they concentrate on their own national policies.
Auerswald, Konrad, and Thum (2011) noted that a unilateral reduction in
emissions by one country reduces the uncertainty associated with emission-
related damages. The commitment level of countries towards the mitigation of
climate change is attributed to two factors: the category that the country falls
into, whether Annex 1 countries or not (i.e., industrialized and transition
economies or otherwise); and the source of GHG emissions, whether from
energy use in the form of transport and other related acts or from industrial
and agricultural processes, such as deforestation and industrial wastes, or a
combination of both. Majority of the Annex 1 countries are working on all
policies effective in the reduction of the causes of climate change. On the other
hand, Non-Annex 1 countries are only looking at available policies as
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recommended by Kyoto, probably because they were not made to pledge their
commitment given their level of development (Ekins and Speck 2011). Some
countries are attempting to reduce global carbon emission, while many others
are subsidizing fossil fuels to the tone of about US$500 billion in 2011 and by
estimated to rise to US$544 billion in 2012. The policy makers supporting
subsidies believed that it is needed for price stabilization and economic
security (Clements et al. 2013 in Stepp and Nicholson 2014).
Domestic policies conﬂicting with global policies are evident in some
countries that are major GHG emitters, major economies, and have a heavy
reliance on fossil fuels due to abundant domestic resources such as the US,
China, and Malaysia (Nordensvärd and Urban 2011). They have not been able
to introduce a low carbon economy despite their efforts even when they
consider its importance for their domestic economy and their international
competitiveness. They are more concerned with policies that will make their
industries more competitive, thus carrying on the global policies of mitigating
emissions would be a disadvantage relative to other competitors who have
done nothing. For instance in the USA, government has failed to provide strict
national policies on climate change. It was observed that while the USA
accepted the UN Climate Change Convention in 1992, they failed to accept
the Kyoto Protocol of 1998. They have only presented a weak target of 17 per
cent reduction in carbon emissions as compared to other developed countries.
Malaysia is at odds with their desire to promote climate change mitigation
versus the government’s national policy aimed at enhancing their level of
economic growth, which encompasses exploiting natural resources, utilizing
fossil fuels through palm oil production, and conserving the nation’s resources
by creating policies of environmental protection and development. Hiding
under the coverage of Non-Annex 1 countries, Malaysia has been unwilling to
commit itself to tackling climate change. Though the country has accepted
both the UN climate change convention and the Kyoto Protocol since 2002,
it has not accepted the Copenhagen Accord. Furthermore, the country is yet to
develop any national climate change policies (Nordensvärd and Urban 2011).
Ozor (2009) observed that Nigeria had no effective climate change policy, and
bills that should enhance good practices for sustainable environment were yet
to be implemented. This is evident in the fact that the deadline to stop gas
ﬂaring in Nigeria was moved from 2008 to 2009, and then 2011.
Dolsak (2001) opined that the existence of conﬂict in policies to be imple-
mented between the public and private sector in some countries has led to
conﬂict between national policies and global policies. This has made some
countries chose to continue in their old ways of energy use, others ready to act
but requesting international ﬁnancial assistance, and yet others ready to spend
their own resources and publicly committed to the reduction of emissions. There
is thus need for national policies to be in line with international policies if the
global goal of mitigating climate change will be achieved. These inconsistencies
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in and conﬂict between national policies and global policies greatly hinders
effective global policy implementation and the target set at the international
level for clean climate.
11.2.4 Empirical Studies
Several studies have been carried out on climate change ranging from the
economic implication of its impact to the different national and global policies
of mitigating climate change. These studies seem to present conﬂicts between
national policies and global policies towards climate change. Dolsak (2001)
carried out an empirical investigation on factors affecting the level of commit-
ment of different countries on themitigation of climate change for 91 countries,
both developing and developed. This was assessed using the variance between
the signature and ratiﬁcation of the Framework Convention onClimate Change
and its actual implementation. Applying a logistic regression model, the result
of the study showed that the level of commitment of a country is more
signiﬁcantly affected by incentives to the national government than the national
government’s ability to affect global climate change through the various miti-
gation actions. It was also found that the economic beneﬁts from climate change
do not affect a country’s commitment to the mitigation of climate change.
In a study carried out by Löschel, Sturma, and Vogt(2010) on the empirical
assessment of demand for climate protection using Germany, the researchers
noted that policies towards climate change have political dimension and
national policies on it have to be politically accepted. The study employed
the willing to pay (WTP) approach for climate protection to examine willing-
ness of the individual to climate protection. The result of the study found that
the willingness to pay was very low amounting to about €12 per tonne of CO2.
Speck (2010) analysed the debate between climate change policies, politics,
and the media in Australia. In a pilot study using interviews from some leaders,
it was found that climate change mitigation action has been very slow in
Australia because of the media’s information about uncertainty in the climate
change science, weak leadership in the country, as well as the unpleasant cost of
policies towards climate change mitigation from their political view even when
such policies were found effective at the national and international levels.
Ayinde et al. (2010) analysed the impact of climate change on agricultural
productivity in Nigeria, and examined the linkage between agricultural prod-
uctivity and climate change parameters. Employing time series data for the
period 1975–2005, a descriptive statistics and granger causality analysis were
carried out on the data for the variables. The result showed that the climatic
parameter (changes in rainfall) positively affected agricultural production
while temperature was found relatively constant and does not affect agricul-
tural output.
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Koblowsky and Speranza (2010) analysed the institutional challenges to
developing an effective climate change policy in Nigeria. Reviewing the roles
of existing and planned institutional and legal frameworks in promoting or
hindering policy implementation, the study used primary data collected
between autumn 2009 and spring 2010, and found that there had been lack of
agreement between political initiatives and institutions. The study also found a
weak implementation of environmental laws and directives, and concluded
that a policy framework on climate change is still non-existent for Nigeria as a
result of divergent interest among the parties.
Furthermore, Akuru, Okoro, and Chikuni(2013) carried out a study on the
impact of renewable energy deployment on climate change in Nigeria, and
reviewed energy sources used in Nigeria as well as their impact on climate
change. The study found that Nigeria is over-dependent on fossil-generated
energy, which has had adverse effects on the environment, and thus recom-
mended the integration of renewable energy into Nigeria’s energy use. Amobi
and Onyishi (2015) looked at the public policy perspective of governance and
climate change in Nigeria, pointing out the problem of climate change within
the governance scope. They showed that there is a direct relationship between
the characters of the state and governance system on one hand and Nigeria’s
response to climate change on the other.
11 .3 FINDINGS
There are many issues with the political economy of clean energy transition of
Nigeria’s governments—national and sub-national alike. Some of the issues
have to do with ﬁscal policy implication of such transition policies. First, we can
assume that the country is very willing and ready to transition. The readiness
and willingness come with heavy ﬁscal policy implications. Secondly, we can
also assume that the country is not very willing and may not be ready to
transition to clean energy. These also comewith heavy ﬁscal policy implications.
We therefore present the current efforts and situation, observing some possible
factors that explain the current rate of transition to clean energy inNigeria, so as
to be able to present the ﬁscal policy implications of the current efforts.
11.3.1 Nigeria’s Fiscal Policy Stance and Current Efforts
towards Clean Energy Transition
In order to transition from the current fossil energy regime to a more
environmentally friendly energy regime, governments ought to take some
speciﬁc steps towards clean energy transition, such as the ﬁscal policies.
The role of ﬁscal policy in determining the political economy direction of any
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government cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask two
very important questions: What is the current ﬁscal policy stance of Nigerian
governments and how do their ﬁscal policies translate to clean energy transition
efforts? It is suitable to open the discussion with the observed skew in the
two broad categories of expenditures among Nigerian governments—recurrent
expenditures (mainly, the personnel that will run government institutions) and
capital expenditures (relevant activities of the institutions that will deliver
the policy mandates of the governments).
Information from theCBN Statistical Bulletin (2014) reveals that the propor-
tion of capital expenditures in total expenditures of the Federal Government of
Nigeria consistently declined in the ﬁrst democratic era of 1981–3. However, the
proportion was still better than what was obtained in subsequent military
administrations of 1984–5 and 1985–93. On the contrary, the military admin-
istration of 1993–8 raised the proportion of capital expenditures on annual
basis, but the tempo was not sustained in the subsequent military regime of
1998–9. Notably, since the return of democracy in 1999, the proportion of
capital expenditures in total expenditures has decreased and remained very low.
Particularly in 2014, the proportion of capital expenditures reduced to as low as
17 per cent of total expenditures of the federal government.
Establishing a link between the issues raised here and the main point of
discussion, it is important to emphasize that clean energy transition policy is
capital intensive. Good policy coordination will observe that the heavy ﬁnan-
cing needed for clean energy transition may not necessarily entail increase in
total expenditures of the government, but a refocus on certain priority items
that have to take greater proportion of the expenditures. Therefore, greater
proportion of recurrent expenditures as observed in the beginning of this
section may not guarantee the needed ﬁnancing for research and development
in Nigeria’s clean energy transition programme. The cost of governance takes
a very large chunk of the recurrent expenditures in Nigeria (BOF 2014a).
Clean energy transition programmes of Nigeria must necessarily affect the size
of government, thereby reducing current trend in the cost of governance,
effectively investing in clean energy sources, and reducing the reliance of the
country on fossil fuels as both sources of energy and revenues.
On the contrary, the ﬁscal policy position of state governments in Nigeria
contrasts with that of Nigeria’s federal government within the study period.
In 1999, there was a wide gap between the share of capital expenditures and
the share of recurrent expenditures in total expenditures of State governments.
The gap between the two classiﬁcations of expenditures continued declining
until 2012, when the proportion of capital expenditures in total expenditures
exceeded the proportion of recurrent expenditures. This was not the case with
federal government expenditure proﬁle. State governments in the democratic
era of 1999–2014 seem to commit more proportion of funds to capital expend-
itures than the federal government did within the same period. The proportion
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of Federal Government’s capital expenditures in total expenditures main-
tained a downward trend, while the proportion of State governments’ capital
expenditures in total expenditures maintained an upward trend. Thus, we
have established the existence of greater proportion of recurrent expenditures
than that of capital expenditures in total expenditures and it is not clear how
this trend of expenditures can affect the overall goal of clean energy transition
policies of the governments in Nigeria.
To take appropriate steps towards clean energy transition, the federal gov-
ernment of Nigeria has set up several agencies and commissions charged with
the responsibilities of researching alternative energy sources. One such agency is
the Energy Commission of Nigeria (ECN) with the mandate of coming up with
alternative sources of energy. However, one of the major challenges of the
federal government of Nigeria is the duplication of institutions with similar
responsibilities. For example, the law that established the ECN provides that the
commission shall consist of fossil fuel department, nuclear energy department,
solar energy department, and any other energy department that the government
may determine from time to time. This implies that atomic energy may as well
be determined to be relevant and therefore be made a department of the energy
commission of Nigeria. However, instead of following this law, another
commission was established with the mandate of developing and promoting
nuclear technology—Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC). With such
duplication of institutions and agencies, it leaves the federal government of
Nigeria with the option of committing insufﬁcient funds to each of the agencies
leaving the agencies with little to no output.
Statistical facts gathered from the federal government budgets of 2010–14
reveal that greater proportion of the annual budgets of Energy Commission of
Nigeria goes to recurrent than to capital. In 2014, about 75 per cent of the
Commission’s total budget went to recurrent expenditures leaving only about
25 per cent to capital (BOF 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a). This means that
the main responsibilities of the commission may not be achieved, since the
proportion that goes to capital expenditures will be too insigniﬁcant to invest
in renewable energy sources or renewable energy research. Thus, it becomes
necessary to ask if the whole idea of establishing such a commission is for
employment creation or for deliberate efforts to transition to clean energy.
If the goals of the enabling laws of ECN are to be actualized, then it is
necessary to restructure the expenditure pattern of the commission in order
to allow for efﬁciency. It is also possible that one of the factors contributing to
the nature of expenditure is the existence of a parallel institution. Supposing
the money allocated to the two different institutions is channelled to only one,
the ratio might probably change, thereby freeing up some more money for
capital projects of the single commission.
In addition, actual expenditures widen the gap between capital and
recurrent expenditures. For instance, Energy Commission of Nigeria as a
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government agency is under the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology.
The 2014 budget implementation report of the Budget Ofﬁce of the Federation
(BOF) (2014b) reveals that only 48.19 per cent of all the budgeted capital
expenditures of the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology and its
agencies were released and cash-backed. Given the nature, manner, and timing
of the releases and cash-backing, only 93 per cent of the released funds were
utilized. This implies that as at 2014, only 45.21 per cent of budgeted capital
expenditures of the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology and its
agencies were effectively implemented. The same report shows that almost
100 per cent of the budgeted recurrent expenditures of most ministries,
departments, and agencies of the government were released.
The implication is that the gap between recurrent expenditures and capital
expenditures of the energy commissions is so high that the commission may
not fully discharge its statutory obligations. Based on the issues raised in this
section, we may say that Nigeria’s public institutions established for renewable
energy may not have been effective due to lack of funds. This could have been
alleviated by streamlining the institutions based on their statutory functions
and responsibilities.
11.3.2 Possible Factors of the Observed Efforts towards
Clean Energy Transition in Nigeria
The focal point of all the issues presented in Section 11.3.1 is that the
institutional framework set up by the government in order to promote clean
energy transition in Nigeria has not been strengthened enough to carry out
their statutory obligations. Therefore, it is pertinent to ﬁnd out if the inability
of the government to strengthen these institutions is connected to the
governments’ dependence on oil revenue.
Sachs and Warner (2001) observed that it has been empirically proven that
countries with abundant natural resources tend to perform poorly in terms of
growth. Available statistical ﬁgures fromCBN (2014) reveal that Nigeria has been
reliant on revenue from fossil fuel. The portion of oil revenue in total federally
collected revenues oscillated between 62 and 89 per cent during 1999–2014 ﬁscal
years, and it reached its peak in 2006 at 89 per cent. Sachs and Warner (2001)
explained the reason for such poor performance as crowding-out effect of natural
resources—otherwise referred to as natural resource curse hypothesis.
The crowding-out effect manifests in two ways in Nigeria as: (1) absence of
accountability and efﬁciency of government, and (2) neglect of the productive
sector. In Section 11.3.1, we showed the proportions of federal and state
governments’ expenditures that go into recurrent expenditures, especially
administration costs (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial arms). John
(2011) shows that in countries where natural resources account for more
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than 80 per cent of total government revenue, governments are likely to
neglect the productive sector since the government does not really depend
on them for taxes. As such, the private sector operators that are rarely taxed
will not have any moral right to hold the government accountable to the people.
This means that there is a connection between neglect of the productive sector
and absence of accountability in government.
The situation of over-dependence on oil revenue also prevails among the
sub-national governments in Nigeria just as with the federal government.
Available statistical facts from CBN (2014) also reveals that the proportion
of revenue from federation account in the total revenues of all the states in
Nigeria reached a peak level of 70.5 per cent in 2001 and the lowest level of
37.6 per cent in 2009, but remained high at an average of 58.21 per cent
throughout the period of 1999–2014.
Although governments in Nigeria (national and sub-national alike) depend
heavily on oil revenues, there has been little effort on the part of the govern-
ments to invest in alternative energy sources. The shift in global emphasis
from fossil fuel to renewable energy due to climate change effect should have
sent a serious warning to the governments in Nigeria to diversify their energy
sources rather than setting up several institutions with none of them coming
up with any clear output on alternative energy sources.
One important observation is that Nigeria’s federal government of Nigeria
did not take the issue of transition to clean energy seriously until the second
half of 2014, when the global oil price moved in a downward trend. It also
dawned on the sub-national governments in Nigeria that fossil fuel may soon
be abundant in Nigeria, yet not demanded in the global market given the
current trend in research into alternative energy sources. This reawakening
made many sub-national governments start emphasizing internally generated
revenues against the previous reliance on federation accounts. The federal
government has therefore started emphasizing non-oil revenue. This has
spurred the governments to involve private sector operators in their
decision-making process through consultations. The current cooperation
between private sector operators and the government will probably produce
greater commitment to the implementation of the renewable energy master
plan than is currently experienced in the country. This means that if the price
of oil in global market had continued rising, Nigerian governments would
have continued treating the issue of clean energy transition with reluctance.
11.3.3 Fiscal Policy Implications of Nigeria’s Delayed Transition
While Other Economies Transition to Clean Energy
Other nations of the globe are fast transitioning to renewable energy sources,
and this holds great opportunities and threats for the ﬁscal policy regimes of
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Nigerian governments. It is therefore important to determine the ﬁscal policy
implications of the current rate of transition policies in Nigeria while other
national governments are fast shifting to clean energy regime.
Global oil price remained low during 1999–2003 (between US$20 and
US$30 per barrel). However, the price started increasing on annual basis
from 2004 until 2007 (when it exceeded US$90 per barrel). As an erratic
market, the price was affected by the global economic/ﬁnancial crisis of
2008–9 by forcing a sharp decline in oil price in 2008 from about US$90 per
barrel in 2007 to about US$40 per barrel in 2008. Nevertheless, the global oil
price picked up again from 2009 and continued on an increasing trend up to
2013. The period of 2008–11 seemed to be a period of incubation of concerted
efforts towards renewable energy sources. The period of 2011–13 seemed to
be the period of investment in efﬁcient renewable energy sources of which
some may take time to yield results, while others started yielding results in
very short time. This could explain the relatively stable price of oil during
2011–13. This also implies that once the global investments in alternative
energy sources start yielding expected returns, then the price of oil is bound to
fall as witnessed in second half of 2014.
Available statistical ﬁgures from Index Mundi (n.d.) reveal recent prices of
crude oil in the global oil market. It seems the global investments in alterna-
tive/renewable energy sources have started yielding returns. The data show
that global oil price has been on the decline with highest rate of decline
recorded between June 2014 and January 2015, when global oil price declined
from about US$112 per barrel to about US$48 per barrel—a decline of about
57.14 per cent within six months.
The ﬁscal policy implications of such severe decline in global oil prices are
profound for Nigerian governments. First, with a decline of 57.14 per cent in
the price of the major source of revenue for Nigerian governments, it
therefore means that about 40 per cent of federal government of Nigeria’s
revenue has been eroded by a fall in global oil prices (taking the average of
70 per cent of total revenue discussed earlier). Secondly, this decline implies
that there is a shift in demand from fossil fuel to alternative energy sources.
This means that, as long as Nigeria does not invest in alternative energy
sources, the country will soon move from being an energy exporting country
to an energy importing country. This scenario will pose great threat to the
ﬁscal survival of the governments in Nigeria, especially in view of severe
decline in the revenue base.
Nigeria is a net exporter of energy—especially crude oil, though the country
imports reﬁned petroleum products. Most of the country’s imports (including
energy imports) are funded with proceeds from oil exports. However, US EIA
(2015) shows that many developed countries are shifting their demand for
fossil fuels to demand for renewable energy. The implication is that renewable
energy will soon replace fossil fuels globally. Therefore, should Nigeria not
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invest heavily in clean energy, it will soon move from net energy exporter
country to net energy importer country, which has severe implications on the
ﬁscal policy stance of the country at all levels of government due to the
relevance of oil revenues as discussed in Section 11.3.2.
As a net exporter country, Nigeria has not been able to fund clean energy
programmes and projects appropriately. It therefore seems difﬁcult (if not
impossible) for Nigeria to ﬁnance clean energy research and development as a
net energy importer country. This is especially true for a country that depends
heavily on energy (fossil fuel) as a source of government revenues.
11 .4 CONCLUSION
From the ﬁndings presented in Section 11.3, we can conclude that Nigerian
governments’ future ﬁscal outlooks could be considered threatened except
there is a major departure from the current expenditure pattern. We also
conclude that recent occurrences in the global scene have forced global oil
prices down with possibility of further decline in oil prices in the near future.
This means that Nigerian governments’ current disposure in handling the
ﬁscal shock associated with ﬂuctuations in the global oil market may no longer
be adequate. As a way of absorbing the ﬁscal shocks that may be associated
with ﬂuctuations in the global oil market, the Federal Government of Nigeria
sets the Oil Price benchmark below the minimum projected oil price for the
year during the annual budgeting. Whatever is sold in excess of the benchmark
price is deposited in the Excess Crude Account. However, the account has
been mismanaged in recent times, leading to depletion of the savings.
We recommend that, in order to survive the ﬁscal policy shocks associated
with the current global clean energy transition policies, the Nigerian govern-
ments should not ignore the following:
• Since oil revenues collected by the federal government are shared among
the various tiers of government, investment in energy sources should not
be restricted to only the federal government. This means that instead of
having only the Energy Commission of Nigeria and Nigerian Atomic
Energy Commission, funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the
state governments should be free to have their various energy centres
where research into clean energy is funded and their outputs form part of
the policies of the sub-national governments.
• The current trend of expenditure among the various tiers of government
in Nigeria, in favour of recurrent expenditures should be revised. Emphasis
should be placed on capital expenditures with the target of equipping
the energy institutions and agencies to come up with home-grown
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alternative energy sources. In addition, the institutions and agencies that
have overlapping responsibilities should be streamlined so as to ensure
efﬁciency.
• Effective and efﬁcient tax regime should be adopted to increase the
volume and proportion of non-oil revenues in the face of dwindling oil
revenue in order to meet up with the demand of the required investment
for clean energy transition.
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Part IV
Actors and Interests
Whether actors and interests are operating within a democracy, as in India,
or in a one-party state, as in China, stakeholders will confront varying
incentives and, depending on the nature of the incentives, will both drive
and erect barriers to a clean energy transition. Isoaho, Goritz, and Schulz
consider these issues for these two most populous economies in the world.
Davidson, Kahrl, and Karplus maintain the focus on interests and actors under
differing institutional constructs while concentrating on wind power, with a
particular focus on China. They ﬁnd that, despite an array of institutional and
industry characteristics that are unique to China, China still encounters a
series of political economy factors that are common across countries who have
made signiﬁcant wind power investments. Rennkamp and Bhuyan turn the
attention to South Africa and the large, potentially predominant, role of inter-
ests and actors, as opposed to technical merits, in the South African nuclear
power programme. Finally, Heshmati and Abolhosseini take a different tack
focusing attention on Europe’s interests with respect to energy security and the
role that renewables might play in an enhanced energy supply security
framework.
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12.1 INTRODUCTION
China and India face a tremendous dilemma in addressing their developmental
goals. Both need to respond to demands in poverty reduction, energy access,
and urbanization, while reconsidering their development pathways that
have been highly coupled to fossil fuel use. Renewable energy technologies
(RETs) offer a solution for this dilemma. Decoupling economic growth from
unsustainable resource consumption through the development and deployment
of RETs would enable the transition to a clean energy economy, helping to
reduce China and India’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while allowing
societal and economic development (Altenburg and Pegels 2012). The rapid
innovation and fall of prices in the RET sector indicates that a shift to RETs is
becoming economically and technologically more feasible (World Energy
Council 2013). Yet, broad consensus exists round the view that a full transition
to RETs requires radical and ‘deep structural’ changes in the energy system
(Geels and Schot 2007). This chapter analyses the key drivers and barriers for
the promotion of RETs in the electric power systems of China and India.
It does so by looking at how a governing coalition’s ability and willingness
to promote RETs is shaped by its power and cohesiveness, societal pressures,
as well as a country’s institutional framework, and how these factors vary between
sub-national units.1
1 For an extensive version of the chapter including detailed overviews of national RET
governance structures and policy, see Isoaho, Goritz, and Schulz (2016).
12.2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A clean energy transition is characterized by a shift from a fossil fuel energy
regime to a cleaner one.2 We consider a clean energy transition occurring if
the share of renewable energy in the power mix is growing faster than those of
other energy sources. The vast majority of transition literature explains the
processes of such shifts by analysing socio-technical and techno-economic
means throughwhich a transition could occur (Geels and Schot 2007). Recently,
however, scholars are increasingly stressing the importance of political econ-
omy factors and geography-based analyses (Bridge et al. 2013; Meadowcroft
2011). While being attentive to the geographical context in which transition
occurs, we align particularly with the more political economy-oriented
literature.
In this study, we argue that a governing coalition’s willingness and ability to
implement successful RET policies is a function of three interconnected
political economy factors. First and foremost, rulers are interested in staying
in power. It is when this interest is seriously threatened by a speciﬁc policy
problem that governing coalitions will be willing to solve it. Translating this to
RET policy, a change towards a clean energy transition would be likely to
occur if the governing coalition faces pressure from (potentially) powerful
groups in society that are negatively affected by the current energy regime or
that proﬁt from promotion of RETs. This being said, relevant societal pres-
sures could also be less RET-speciﬁc, for example about providing broad
access to electricity. When this can be feasibly addressed using RETs (e.g.,
because of geographical advantages or technological advances), then they are
likely to be promoted as well. Importantly, however, the political survival of
the governing coalition will also depend on powerful groups interested in
keeping the fossil fuel dominated status quo (Tsebelis 2002; Moe 2010). Only
when the societal pressures demanding the departure from the status quo are
more threatening than those demanding its preservation—or if these two
pressures can be somehow reconciled—are governing coalitions willing to
actively promote RETs.
Second, how power is distributed within and outside the governing coali-
tion shapes its ability to develop and implement policy effectively (Khan
2011). Generally, once decision-makers in a governing coalition have decided
to implement a certain policy, they will be more able to do so the less
fragmented the coalition is and the less external opposition it faces. This is
because weak and fragmented governing coalitions are more likely to have to
2 Energy efﬁciency, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies play a
signiﬁcant part in the debates around clean energy transition, but we perceive RETs as more
radical. We deﬁne RETs as ‘modern technologies based on solar, wind, biomass, geothermal, and
small hydropower’ but focus primarily on solar and wind energy (Martinot et al. 2002: 310).
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allow policy (or rent) capture in order to hold together factions within the
governing coalition and to coopt other social organizations in society as a
survival strategy (Migdal 1988). Thus, while certain distributions of power can
strengthen a government’s policy implementation capacity, others can act as a
barrier.
Finally, certain institutional setups—such as constitutionally deﬁned
structures—are hard to change but strongly shape policy-making and imple-
mentation. Whether the central government can push sub-national governments
to implement RETs, for example, is highly dependent on how federal ‘rules of the
game’ structure the polity (North 1990). Some institutions, however, are easier to
change, for example the allocation of budgets and responsibilities to different
ministries. Section 12.3 analyses how these factors matter for China and India.
12 .3 CHINA
12.3.1 Drivers
China’s energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels. In 2014, coal accounted for 66
per cent of total energy consumption, followed by oil (18 per cent), hydro-
electricity (8 per cent), natural gas (6 per cent), and nuclear power (1 per cent).
Non-hydropower renewable energy only accounted for 2 per cent of the
energy mix (BP 2015).3 Yet, this rather bleak picture is contrasted with recent
developments to push renewable energy. For the ﬁrst time, China’s new
renewable power capacity surpassed new fossil and nuclear capacity in 2013,
and the same was achieved in the following year (REN21 2015). In 2014,
China also emerged as the world leader in clean energy investment with
US 83.3 billion invested (FS-UNEP 2015). Strikingly, China’s GHG emissions
stagnated for the ﬁrst time in a decade (IEA 2015a). First results from 2015
estimate that coal consumption fell by 5 per cent (Greenpeace 2014).
12.3.1.1 Shift towards Promoting RET Policy
These developments indicate that the Chinese government has been actively
moving towards promoting RETs. A clear shift took place in 2005 with the
establishment of the renewable energy law (Chen 2012). It developed pion-
eering measures ranging from targets in installed capacity to direct ﬁnancial
3 China counts large- and medium-scale hydropower projects (i.e., dams with an individual
capacity of >50MW) as renewable energy. We do not consider these as renewable energy because
of their negative effects on sustainability.
Governing Clean Energy Transitions: China and India 233
support policies. Since then, China has developed comprehensive renewable
energy policies and included RET targets in its Five-Year Plans (FYPs), the
government’s key strategic social and economic development initiatives. The
twelfth FYP (2011–15) set the objective to reorient China’s economic growth
towards sustainability, and also clearly identiﬁed new energy (i.e., hydro,
nuclear, solar, and wind) as one of the key ‘emerging strategic industries’ to
replace old pillar industries such as coal (Wang 2014).
This active promotion of RET policy has translated into concrete achieve-
ments. China is estimated to be on track meeting its 2020 RET targets from the
twelfth FYP (CAT 2015a). The target of installing 30 GW in wind capacity has
already been achieved, with installed capacity amounting to 89–91 GW in
2013 (Schoen 2013). In 2013, China had installed 12 GW of solar photovoltaic
(PV) projects, which largely surpassed the ofﬁcial goal for solar power of 1.8
GW by 2020 (FS-UNEP 2015). Chinese authorities have estimated that the
total cumulative installed wind capacity reached 145 GW and solar 38 GW by
the end of 2015 (Hu 2015).
Of course, RET development has also been incentivized by decreasing
costs, demand from the world market—especially in the case of solar PV
development—and economic slowdown hitting the fossil-fuel-intensive indus-
try (Spratt et al. 2014). In China, both small and large hydropower projects are
the most competitive RETs, followed by biomass, wind power, and solar PV
(IRENA 2014). Owing to the abundance of coal and rather low costs required to
install conventional power plants, the RET industry still requires some support
to compete with fossil fuel technologies (Liebreich 2015).
12.3.1.2 Societal Pressures: Pollution
China’s ambition to promote RET policy can be partly explained by changes in
societal pressure and elite priority resulting from increasing concern over air
pollution. In 2012 <1 per cent of the 500 largest Chinese cities met the World
Health Organization’s air quality standards (Zhang and Crooks 2012). Recent
studies estimate that pollution is causing the death of 1.6 million people
per year (Rohde and Muller 2015). As a reaction to this environmental
degradation, Chinese citizens have been increasingly voicing their complaints
in letters to the government and through large-scale protests—something very
unusual in China’s repressive context (Tong and Lei 2014).
Most coal reserves and the majority of currently operating plants are located
in the north and north-east of China, which is why they also have the most
polluted cities (Cornot-Gandolphe 2014). In these provinces, the need to
respond to high energy and electricity demands while simultaneously improving
air quality is particularly acute. Serving as an indicator of increasing societal
pressures, the cities of Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, Chongqing, and
Shaanxi have pledged to reduce their coal use by 2017 and have set absolute
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coal consumption targets in order to address air quality issues (Greenpeace
2014). The leadership now acknowledges that, if not adequately addressed,
societal pressures regarding emission reduction could have destabilizing
effects on the political regime. Yet, regional differences in societal pressures
have become clear recently: whilst senior authorities vowed to shut down
coal plants in the Inner Mongolia region—the hub of coal production—
because of social unrest over pollution (The Japanese Times 2015), they
announced to build more power plants in inland provinces that are more
underdeveloped.
Concern over pollution is also visible in China’s cleaner growth discourse at
international level, most recently in the United States–China Joint Agreement
and the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) for the Paris
Climate Summit (COP21). As part of the former, China announced newpolicies
to tackle fossil fuel use, such as a cap on coal consumption at 4.2 billion tonnes
until 2020, and a nationwide emissions-trading scheme to reduce the price gap
between coal and clean energy sources (White House 2015). In the INDCs
China added, inter alia, a target to make carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions peak
by 2030 or earlier (CAT 2015a). During COP21, China released a national
policy recommendation to further reduce coal-ﬁred generation at the same time
as Beijing city government issued a red pollution alert, the most serious level as
per air quality index, for the ﬁrst time ever (Phillips 2015). These changes
suggest a shifting elite preference from purely high economic growth towards
incorporating environmental concerns in the governing coalition’s strategy to
stay in power.
12.3.1.3 Increasing Institutional Capacity
Bureaucratic and institutional changes have also been a key driver for China’s
RET policy development. In general, the State Council (i.e., the central
government) sets the broad directions for policy development, whereas the
ministries are responsible for policy drafting and formulation (Chen 2012).
However, considerable changes to recentralize energy management at the top
level occurred in the early 2000s, in parallel to the period when the problem of
air pollution started to get more serious.
The National Leading Group on Climate Change Energy Conservation and
Emissions Reduction (NLGACCERCER) was established in 2007 to act as an
advisory and coordinating body in energy-related areas where several admin-
istrative bodies under the State Council have purview over clean energy
policies (Zhang et al. 2013). Moreover, in 2008, the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC)—the highest rank ministry in charge of
China’s macroeconomic and social development—was granted more power in
the ﬁelds of energy, climate, and carbon reduction policy. In a ﬁrst step, the
National Energy Administration (NEA) was established under the NDRC to
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function as the agency responsible for RET formulation and implementation
at the national level. The NLGACCERCER’s climate change department was
placed under the NDRC as well, thus assigning the NDRC a central role in
climate policy formulation in addition to addressing energy questions.
Finally, the National Energy Commission (NEC) was created in 2012 to
further streamline energy policy decision-making. The NEC functions as a
‘super ministry’, and is in charge of drafting the national energy development
strategy (Bao and Gordon 2013). Locating clean energy and climate policy
within the most inﬂuential agencies at the top level can be seen as an attempt
to avoid the struggles and buy-ins that often emerge when clean energy policy
drafting is dealt with within weaker ministries.
12.3.2 Barriers
Despite these positive policy and institutional developments, the implemen-
tation of central policies, especially in the case of energy, remains highly
complex. This is, in part, visible in the regulatory, institutional, and political
failures that China has faced in RET development.
12.3.2.1 Insufﬁcient Grid Capacity
A major barrier for power generation from RET is the insufﬁcient grid
infrastructure, which is not able to absorb a large share of their power capacity
(IRENA-GWEC 2013). The NDRC has aimed to prioritize renewable energy
over coal by proposing green power dispatches and pilot trading platforms
that allow energy generators and big end-users to negotiate prices (Chu 2015;
White House 2015). To better integrate RETs in the current system, and help
take power from distant western regions to major cities in the east, many
smart grid lines are also under construction in line with the 12t FYP goal of
developing an ultra-high-voltage power transmission (UVH) grid across the
country (Mathews and Tan 2015). In 2015, however, an estimated 15 per cent
of wind and 9 per cent of solar output were still curtailed due to grid
constraints. As a result, Chinese regulators suspended the approval of new
wind projects in 2016 in the most wind resource-intensive regions (Song and
Hong 2016). Hence, much of the RET energy that should be replacing fossil
fuel power is still going to waste in the current system.
12.3.2.2 Vested Interests
Political and institutional barriers also help explain why moving towards high
penetration of RET in the energy power system has not been advancing as fast
as it could have. One of the key political barriers is that China’s energy strategy
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is still in many ways guided by the requirements of agencies that promote
conventional energy: actors with strong vested interests in the power sector
have signiﬁcant political inﬂuence at the top levels of the CPC (Communist
Party of China). Although it is difﬁcult to accurately analyse the internal
composition of the CPC owing to its secrecy, there is strong evidence that
these actors have built powerful factions within the party (Xiaofei 2013).
The power sector is particularly prone to political corruption (Moses 2014).
A case in point is Li Peng, former Chinese premier from 1988 to 1998, and his
family, who are considered ﬁgureheads of the oil and coal factions of the CPC
(Hornby 2014). Li Peng ran China’s energy monopoly throughout the 1990s,
stafﬁng the top management positions with his relatives, running what Bezlova
(2002) calls a ‘family ﬁefdom’. While the monopoly was broken up into ﬁve
power generation ﬁrms, Li’s children, Li Xiaopeng and Li Xaolin, became the
heads of two of them. In 2012, Li Xiaopeng was then promoted to governor of
the coal-rich Shanxi region (Hornby 2014). Liu Zhenya, president of China’s
largest power SOE (state-owned enterprise) State Grid Corporation, is another
example of the overlap of vested interest in the electric power sector and political
power in the CPC. Liu, who has been openly opposing the central government’s
plans to break up the ﬁrm he heads (Zhu and Lague 2012), is also an alternate
member of CPC’s central committee, one of China’s top ruling bodies.
This formal and informal amalgamation of political and business power
implies that strong incumbent SOEs have the means to challenge and inﬂuence
the top authorities in cases where their interests conﬂict (Bergsager andKorppoo
2013). Today, the large power generation companies and two grid companies are
major players in conventional and renewable energy power generation
(Dai 2015). The government’s ability to make SOEs responsible for RET growth
has been one of themain enabling factors for the impressive development. Yet, the
power of SOEs has also blocked ‘potentially system-disruptive’ developments:
the grid companies have successfully resisted the State Council’s mandates to
make the transmission system more favourable for RETs (Moe 2015). Although
President Xi Jinping has directly targeted andweakened the vested interest groups
that oppose energy reforms by launching anti-corruption campaigns in the
power sector (Hornby 2014), we argue that the vested interest of certain SOEs
and political elites, as well as their associated fear of losing power remain an
important political barrier for RET transition in China.
12.3.2.3 Administrative Hierarchy
The institutional reforms brought about many new central level agencies with
purview and interest over energy questions. These bodies—including within
the NDRC—are often competing for authorship (Zhang et al. 2013). At the
local level, in turn, implementation has become more decentralized as of 2014
(Zhao 2014). As a result, responsibilities during RET implementation are not
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always clearly allocated, increasing the risk of both interest bargaining and
issues in accountability (Kostka 2014). Local SOEs have a reputation of getting
away with violating environmental standards as local governments have
limited capacities to enforce compliance, and international oversight is not
permitted (Curtin 2015). This is particularly difﬁcult in areas where the
companies are major contributors to the local economic development.
Nonetheless, as the top ofﬁcials of local SOEs are evaluated in the cadre
system, provincial leaders have more control over them than over managers
of private sector ﬁrms (Harrison and Kostka 2014). This is important when
considering that the largely private-owned small and medium enterprise
sector is concentrated in very energy-intensive economic sectors.
12.3.2.4 Central vs Local Level
Local authorities are responsible for policy implementation, and they also have
considerable autonomy regarding the economic development of their areas
and rights over land use (Qi and Wu 2013). This autonomy and preference
over economic development risks outweighing central RET policy within
local jurisdictions (Dai 2015). In 2015, state agencies granted more power to
local authorities through the power sector reform initiatives: all new coal
power plants and RET projects can now ofﬁcially be approved by provincial
governments. Contrary to the objective of this state measure, there is evidence
that local ofﬁcials have taken advantage of their new powers to boost economic
development. In the Shanxi and Inner Mongolia provinces, for example, many
coal-ﬁred power plants that were previously discarded by top authorities
because of their environmental impact have now been re-opened by local
leaders (Lingyu 2016). Furthermore, the CPC has sought to give environmental
issues more weight in the local cadre evaluation as a result of increasing societal
pressures. Yet, these efforts have met with resistance from local level leaders
(Kostka 2014). Given that the average term length is between three to four years,
local leaders tend to adopt short-term policy solutions that contradict central
level initiatives and may not be sustainably viable in the long term (Kostka
2014). Hence, to achieve stronger RET policy enforcement, central authorities
have to more effectively address imbalances within its institutional structures.
12 .4 INDIA
12.4.1 Drivers
In India, numerous mechanisms are in place to support RET development
and deployment, such as grants to develop technologies, tax incentives, and
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generation-based incentives (Hogg and O’Regan 2010). Wind has been receiv-
ing support since the early 1980s, and support for solar took off since 2008. As of
November 2015, India had a total installed capacity of grid-interconnected
power of 38.3 GW from renewable energy sources, with wind and solar
accounting for 24.8 GW and 4.7 GW respectively (MNRE 2016).
12.4.1.1 Ambition
The Indian government wants to command a total renewable energy gener-
ation capacity of 175 GW by 2022: 100 GW from solar power, 60 GW from
wind power, 10 GW from SHP, and 5 GW from biomass-based power projects
(GoI 2015). The costs are immense, with only the solar goal expected to cost
between US$100–113 billion (Ghosh 2015). Although India is one of the
largest investors in renewable energy, with US$7.4 billion in 2014 (FS-UNEP
2015), this is far from what is needed. At RE-invest, the investors’ conference
for renewable energy held in February 2015, the Modi-led government secured
pledges from national and international companies to deploy 266 GW of
renewable energy in the next ﬁve years, and ﬁnancial institutions committed
to ﬁnance RE projects amounting to 78 GW (Bhaskar 2015; Ghosh 2015).
At COP21, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the International Solar
Alliance where 120 states committed to promote solar energy and mobilize
>US$1 trillion of investments by 2030 to install 1 TW of solar power
(Ananthakrishnan 2015). With India expected to be the second largest solar
market by 2030 (IEA 2015b), this alliance is a crucial step towards this goal.
Importantly, India’s ambitions with regard to RET promotion have reached
a new level with the election of Modi as prime minister in 2014. Although the
former prime pinister, Manmohan Singh, had launched the solar mission with
a goal of installing 20 GW by 2020, Modi has increased this target ﬁvefold.
He is also encouraging foreign investment especially in the solar sector, and
wants to attract US$100 billion to the sector until 2022 (Parkes 2015). He has
already secured a US$1 billion deal with the US Export–Import Bank to facilitate
shipping equipment from the United States (ibid.), and a US$2.25 billion deal
with the German government for solar and other RETs (Reuters 2015).
12.4.1.2 Pollution, Energy Access, and Regional Variation
Unlike in China, protests against air pollution are rare in India. Although 13 of
the 20 most polluted cities worldwide are located in India (Chauhan 2015),
environmental standards seem to be perceived as barriers to economic growth
and job creation. For example, despite living in one of the world’s most
polluted cities, the population of Vapi (Gujarat) protested against higher
environmental standards (Barry and Bagri 2014). This is mainly explained
by the city’s dependence on its large and highly-polluting pharmaceutical and
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chemical industries. Although extreme, the example of Vapi appears repre-
sentative of the priorities of large parts of the Indian population. Thus, in
contrast to China, health issues related to environmental degradation (although
existing) do not seem to be a central concern for the majority of society, or, at
least, clearly less important than economic needs.
Providing broad and stable access to electricity to its fast-growing popula-
tion is, however, a key priority to both India and China (Ghosh and Ganesan
2015). Understanding regional variation of political and geographical cir-
cumstances in India is crucial to explain the growth in RETs in the last years.
Installed solar power capacity is largely concentrated in the north-west of the
Indian sub-continent, particularly in the three states of Gujarat, Rajasthan,
and Madhya Pradesh, being home to 60 per cent of the country’s solar
capacity (Figure 12.1). Part of the reason is geographical. While the north-
west of India has particularly high solar radiation, eastern states are less rich
Gujarat (BJP)
Rajasthan (BJP)
Jammu and Kashmir (other)
Himachal Pradesh (INC)
Punjab (NDA)
Haryana (BJP)
Madhya Pradesh (BJP)
Dadra and Nagar Haveli (other)
Maharashtra (BJP)
Chhattisgarh (BJP)
Goa (BJP)
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Installed solar capacity in 2016
Karnataka (INC)
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Odisha (other)
0–50 MW
50–200 MW
200–400 MW
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No data
Telangana (other)
Jharkhand (BJP)
NCT of Delhi (other)
Uttar Pradesh (other)
Sikkim (other)
Arunachal Pradesh (INC)
Nagaland (NDA)
Manipur (INC)
Mizoram (INC)
Assam (INC)
Meghalaya (INC)
Tripura (other)
West Bengal (other)
Bihar (other)
Uttarakhand (INC)
Figure 12.1 Installed solar power capacity and state governing parties in India.
Source: Authors’ depictions, based on data from MNRE (2016b). Names of state governing parties are in
parentheses.
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in this regard, yet have considerable coal deposits. Thus, while energy de-
mand can be met more easily with solar energy in the north-west, coal still
tends to have the upper-hand in most remaining states in regards to eco-
nomic feasibility.
This ‘geographical feasibility’ is often accompanied by a ‘political feasibility’.
To clarify this, it is important to understand India’s federal division of
responsibilities with regard to energy policy. Whereas the federal level is partly
responsible for policy-making, the state level is responsible for both policy-
making and implementation. Together with the general independence of
Indian states, this implies that politics at the state level are particularly
important with regard to policy implementation. Figure 12.1 shows that the
states with large installed solar capacities are dominated by the Hindu nation-
alist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its coalition governments, the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA). As we argued in Section 12.2, the cohesiveness
and power of a governing coalition are key determinants of its capacity to
implement policy. While we certainly do not claim that the BJP is a cohesive
and powerful party in all of the states it governs (similarly to the INC—Indian
National Congress), there is strong evidence that this was the case for the
north-western states, and particularly in Gujarat, where the current Indian
prime minister, Narendra Modi, was chief minister for 12 years. Roy (2013)
describes how Modi managed to create a strong support base cutting across
class and caste—usually the political cleavages in India. The characteristics of
Modi’s government are similar to authoritarian regimes of East Asia: cohe-
sive, basically without alternative and strong opposition, fostering strong
state–business relationships, and high governance and policy implementa-
tion capacities (Roy 2013). Basically, Modi transformed Gujarat into an
economic and solar powerhouse, where national, international, and specif-
ically solar businesses invested heavily. In 2014, Gujarat was home to 40 per
cent of India’s solar capacity (Pearson and Chakraborty 2014) and addition-
ally became the nation’s third largest wind energy producer in 2015 (Parkes
2015). To a large part, this massive expansion of RETs was the reason that
the Modi government successfully provided stable energy access for all its
citizens. Thus, the case of Gujarat underpins the interplay of conducive
geographic and political factors. The combination of high solar and political
capacity made RETs a feasible tool to address the key social demand of
energy access.
This regional success is closely related to India’s recent massive push for solar
power on a national level.WhenModi became primeminister in 2014, Gujarat’s
success story strengthened his and voters’ conﬁdence that this is replicable on a
national level. Additionally,Modi can use the international ﬁnance and national
RET programmes to support RET expansion in BJP-ruled states with high solar
potential, thereby consolidating his party’s power, and simultaneously contrib-
uting positively to international climate negotiations.
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Finally, decreasing costs of implementation are another factor inﬂuencing
Modi’s renewable energy ambition. Prices for solar and wind have been falling
drastically over recent years. The costs for onshore wind are nearly at grid-
parity and solar is catching up rapidly in India (Liebreich 2015). Moreover,
ambitious policy announcements increase the conﬁdence of global players in
the sector, which leads to further a price decrease.
12.4.2 Barriers
While future energy scenarios for India predict that renewable and nuclear
energy will play a more important role, fossil fuels are expected to remain the
main energy sources with an estimate of 56 per cent in power generation
capacity for 2030 (CAT 2015b). In the current Indian power mix, renewable
energies represent only 13 per cent, whereas fossil fuels still have a share of
70 per cent (MoP 2015). Coal has a particular importance. It is the most used
and cheapest energy source in the country and accordingly accounts for over 60
per cent of the power mix. Importantly, former and current governments have
pushed the expansion of coal. The annual production shall be increased from a
current level of 600 million metric tonnes to 1.5 billion metric tonnes in 2020
(EIA 2015), which translates into opening a newmine every month (Rose 2015).
Different projections for India suggest that coal use is set to increase between two
and a half and three times compared with current levels (Dubash et al. 2015).
Vested interests in coal have arguably played a crucial role in this. An
illustrative example of the crony capitalism surrounding coal in India is the
so-called ‘Coalgate’ scandal. The former Singh government is accused of having
allocated coal blocks inefﬁciently and under market value and having used
a subjective and opaque system instead of competitive bidding (The Hindu
2015). According to estimations, this scandal has cost the country US$31 billion
(Mathiesen 2014). Moreover, coal-related interest groups are particularly
powerful politically in the coal-rich regions in India’s eastern states.
However, India introduced a coal tax for imported and national coal in
2010, which was doubled in March 2015 to US$3.2. The revenues from the tax
are going into the National Clean Energy Fund, which had generated an
estimated US$2.7 billion by the end of the 2014/15 ﬁscal year. Whether the
money, however, is spent towards its actual goal—RET research and
innovation—is questioned (Ghosh 2015). Critics argue that the fund is used
to balance the books of several ministries (Krithika and Mahajan 2014). This
contributes to the already difﬁcult RET ﬁnance environment in India
(Chaudhary et al. 2014), which makes RET projects more expensive than in
other countries. Subsequently, we look at further factors explaining this
adherence to coal and other barriers to RET expansion in India.
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12.4.2.1 Discoms
One of the greatest barriers to energy transition in India are state-
government-owned electricity distribution companies, the so-called discoms.
Of 29, 21 are deeply indebted, with over US$2.5 billion of debt in 2014
(Pearson and Chakraborty 2014). This has great implications for renewable
energies. First, discoms are unable to meet their renewable purchase obliga-
tions (Krithika and Mahajan 2014). They prefer to feed in coal-generated
power to the grid, as this has been considerably cheaper in the past. Feeding
in RETs, they fear, will further increase their debt. Second, RET investors
avoid investing in states with highly indebted discoms, as they fear that their
generated electricity will not be bought and that discoms might default on
them. Third, the discoms are too indebted to invest in major grid improve-
ments, which not only lead to more losses and more debt, but also make the
RET-generated power less viable. All this creates a highly adverse environ-
ment for RET promotion.
Theft, a badly implemented subsidy scheme for the rural and poor, and
technical losses are main reasons for this immense indebtedness. In India,
20 per cent of electricity is ‘lost’ during transmission and distribution, double
the world average (Aniti 2015). Electricity theft, that is ‘non-technical’ losses
amounts to US$16.2 billion per year (Northeast Group 2015). Well-off farm-
ers who do not fear prosecution apparently account for most of the thievery.4
Interestingly, theft seems to increase before elections (Golden and Min 2012).
Thus, in many Indian states, governing coalitions appear so vulnerable, they
need to allow thievery of electricity, especially during elections. Mismanaged
subsidies are a related reason for indebted discoms. Originally, these subsidies
were introduced exclusively for farmers (Antholis 2014). However, many
non-farmers, businessmen, and wealthier citizens free-ride on this subsidized
power, as in many states the government appears to allow this practice or to be
incapable of stopping it. The only way discoms seem to be able to reduce the
speed of increasing debt is to cut power regularly.
Modi-governed Gujarat is one of the rare exceptions in this regard.
It provides its citizens with 24-hour access to electricity (Pearson and
Chakraborty 2014). Electricity for agriculture was split from the rest, and
farmers received subsidized tariffs only for a few hours per day. Other paying
customers received uninterrupted supply at normal rates. Ofﬁcials checked
who merits subsidized power. Similar strategies in other states were met with
extreme and violent responses (Katakey and Singh 2014). Consequently, only
Gujarat’s (and Punjab’s) discoms received A+ ratings from the Ministry of
Power for their performance in 2013–14 (The Economic Times 2015).
4 Personal communication with Detlef Sprinz (25 January 2016).
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In contrast to other state governments, Modi’s governing coalition was strong
enough to execute such undertakings, which were extremely unpopular in the
short term but very effective in the long term.
12.4.2.2 Land Rights
Another enormous barrier for the fast deployment of RETs is land acquisi-
tion (Ghosh 2015). Land in India is very scarce but essential for large-scale
solar projects and wind farms. The process of land acquisition for private
companies, however, is expensive (four times the market price in rural areas)
and extremely complicated (70–80 per cent of the affected families have to
agree and social impact assessments have to be conducted). Thus, a normal
process would last 58 months (Kazmin 2015). This is largely the legacy of a
law introduced in 2013 by the Congress party, in order to strengthen the
rights of land owners. Before 2013, land owners felt mistreated by the state,
because it could expropriate them and sell it to businesses, if they would use
the land for ‘public good’. As part of his drive to attract more investment,
Modi tried to change this law and enable authorities to take land without
social impact assessments and without farmers’ consent, although buyers
would have had to pay above the market price as before. His proposal met
strong resistance from the Congress and other parties with big agrarian
constituencies. As these parties still hold the majority in the Indian upper
house, the Rajya Sabha, they were able to repel Modi’s land reform. This not
only is perceived by many as the biggest failure of the current Modi
government but also illustrates how difﬁcult it is to pass laws in the Indian
polity (Kazmin 2015).
12 .5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A successful transition to RET-based energy systems requires radical changes
in the current energy regimes. Although governments play a key role in pushing
such change, their ability and willingness to do so depends particularly on a
range of political economy factors, which also interplay with geographical and
technological ones. Our goal was to analyse how these factors drive and impede
clean energy transition with RETs in China and India.
In China, societal pressures due to increasing air pollution has been one key
factor pushing the CPC to close coal plants and turn to environment-friendly
power production in order to secure its political survival. This has been
accompanied by an increasing institutional and political capacity for clean
energy policy-making at the central level. Nevertheless, the state appears to be
constrained by powerful political vested interest in the power sector on the one
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hand and imbalances within institutional structures on the other. Importantly,
there are arrangements where provincial level actors or incumbent SOEs have
the capacity to override top-level incentives when interests conﬂict, which has
often been problematic for RET development.
In contrast to China, environment-related societal pressures have not
been the key driver for RET promotion in India. Rather, a number of
Indian states—above all Modi-governed Gujarat—proﬁted from a combin-
ation of beneﬁcial geographic and political circumstances, which allowed
them to address their populations’ growing demand for electricity through
the promotion of RETs. The recent upswing in support of RETs at the
national level is closely associated with the fact that leaders of the RET-
feasible states are also leading the national government. Yet, severe barriers
for a clean energy transition pertain. India plans to increase coal production
massively, which can be seen as a symptom of the vested interests in the
sector. Moreover, Indian discoms are in very bad shape ﬁnancially because
they are often used as a political tool to strengthen the governing coalition’s
political survival. Finally, the problems of land acquisition in India present a
major barrier for renewable energy projects, which often need large tracts
of land.
Our analysis generates three broad implications. First, it helps unveil how
politics and the balance of power between contending interest groups drives or
hinders system change. We saw that vested interests in incumbent electric
power systems can inhibit the promotion and deployment of RETs in electricity.
Second, the comparison shows that the drivers of change can be signiﬁcantly
different in distinct contexts. In both countries, changes in the overarching
macro-structures were key to driving RET promotion. These dynamics,
however, were very different. In China, unrest from increasing levels of pollu-
tion has effectively coerced the governing coalition to promote a cleaner electric
power system. In India, however, we found that it has been much less a change
in attitudes or beliefs but rather in ﬁnancial and political feasibility that has
allowed or incentivized certain state governing coalitions to promote RETs as
engines for energy access. Third, in China principal–agent problems between
the central and provincial levels are a key barrier to change, whereas in India
the causal drivers and barriers to RET promotion can be found largely at the
sub-national state level. It is thus key to observe how politics depends on and
interplays with regional contexts.
Concluding, this study highlights two key areas for further research. First,
we see the need for more in-depth analyses of the dynamics surrounding
energy transition in sub-national entities. Second, it would be interesting to
further investigate why massive pollution in India has not created the same
societal pressures (in the form of protests) as in China. Speciﬁcally, whether
this is mainly a reﬂection of lower economic development levels or rather of
more complex political economy factors.
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Towards a Political Economy Framework
for Wind Power
Does China Break the Mould?
Michael R. Davidson, Fredrich Kahrl,
and Valerie J. Karplus
13.1 INTRODUCTION
Wind power is considered one of the most cost-effective options for reducing
carbon emissions from the global electricity system. However, achieving
higher penetrations of wind energy presents a number of unique development
and integration challenges. Most of the existing literature has focused on
general solutions to technical engineering and economic problems, as well as
the design of dedicated policy support. There has been far less focus on the
political economy of wind development, which involves the features of coun-
tries, regions, and systems that shape incentives for developing and integrating
wind power. Given that this broader context mediates the effectiveness of
dedicated technical and policy approaches to promote wind, this is an
important gap.
Drawing on global experience, this chapter develops an analytical frame-
work for understanding the spectrum of political economy conﬂicts that arise
when introducing and scaling wind power within an electricity system. We
apply this framework to China, a country that has very different electricity
sector institutions from those found in most other countries. We argue that
China’s wind development and integration challenges can be understood
through a general political economy framework, and show how high levels
of wind energy curtailment in China are an expected result of clashes among
actors and interests.
13.2 BACKGROUND: WHY DEVELOP A POLITICAL
ECONOMY FRAMEWORK FOR WIND
The physical properties of wind energy—its variability, forecast uncertainty,
and location relative to demand centres—create technical challenges for
existing systems. Electricity systems have historically been designed to accom-
modate generation over which operators had greater certainty and more
control. Accommodating wind requires revisiting established planning and
operational procedures, challenging prevailing political and economic author-
ities under institutional arrangements.
Similar to other large-scale technological changes, efforts to increase the
share of wind energy on electric grids must confront existing political and
economic institutions. In the case of wind, such political economic conﬂicts
are numerous. Although they have been examined in a handful of contexts
(Fischlein et al. 2010; Kahrl and Wang 2014; Krishna et al. 2015; Lehmann
et al. 2012), analysis of the political impediments to wind development and
integration tends to focus more on public acceptance than on institutional
design (Haggett 2008). The redistribution of economic rents that ensues can
lead to a reshaping of political inﬂuence (Jacobsson and Johnson 2000),
motivate incumbents to minimize adverse impacts through political channels
(Stigler 1971), and at its outset prompt resistance that slows the pace of
institutional and technological change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Technic-
ally efﬁcient wind integration strategies, such as new market designs or
enlarging balancing authority areas, may be slowed, altered, or dropped
altogether when they challenge established practices, norms, and interests.
Wind power development interacts with ongoing transformation efforts in
electricity sectors worldwide. Since the 1980s, a number of countries have
restructured their electricity industries, transitioning from regulated, vertically
integrated natural monopolies to unbundled ownership structures with com-
petition in the generation and, in some cases, retail segments of the industry.
Each jurisdiction has its own unique pathway deﬁned by prior institutional
context and proximate justiﬁcations for reform, which affects the degree to
which market competition can be facilitated. Costs, economic transfers, and
economic behaviour associated with wind development and integration occur,
and must be understood, within these unique institutional contexts.
Developing countries share some similarities in approaches to restructur-
ing. Typically, countries with a rapidly expanding ‘green-ﬁeld’ electricity
system and expected high demand growth will emphasize attracting capital
over efﬁciency gains that result from competition. Public ownership is more
prevalent and may be retained even following unbundling. Providing electri-
city services at prices affordable to low-income populations complicates lib-
eralizing retail tariffs and may hide inefﬁcient cross-subsidization. Weak or
resource-limited government institutions for administration, information
Towards a Political Economy Framework for Wind Power 251
collection, and veriﬁcation can hinder cost-effective regulatory design and
implementation (Jamasb et al. 2005; Williams and Ghanadan 2006).
One might expect China to be different from other emerging economies
because of its unique institutional history, which before market-oriented
reforms in 1978 consisted of a planned economy layered on top of a largely
federalized system of governance established over centuries of dynastic rule.
But is China really different? The extent to which China’s experience with
wind energy in its electricity system reﬂects a more universal set of political
economy challenges is ultimately an empirical question.
13 .3 POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK FOR WIND
POWER DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
We develop a framework to probe institutional bottlenecks affecting the
development of wind electricity. We distinguish between political institutions
(the degree of centralization and regulatory philosophy) and economic insti-
tutions (industry structures and approaches to price formation). Our analysis
sheds light on how alternative conﬁgurations of political and economic insti-
tutions, through their inﬂuences on actors and interests, lead to different
decisions—and thus outcomes—for wind investment and integration (see
Figure 13.1).
Our framework is rooted in a broader literature that evaluates the impact of
political and economic institutions on the rate and direction of transition
within large-scale ﬁxed infrastructure systems with long lifetimes (Markard
2011). We adopt the Northian deﬁnition of institutions as ‘humanly devised
constraints’ that shape interaction and can be both formal and informal
(North 1991: 97). We develop our framework with examples from a wide
Capacity
planning
Generation
price formation
Dispatch and
balancing area
coordination
Renewable
energy
promotion
Actors
Functions
Local Local Local Local
Grid
Genco Genco
National
Figure 13.1. Economic and political actors in key wind sector functions in China.
Note: National, national government agencies; Local, local government agencies; Grid, grid companies;
Genco, generation companies. Within government, dark shading indicates primary role, light indicates an
oversight role.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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range of contexts, mainly in the US and Europe. We then ask whether this
framework holds in the case of China, drawing on rich experience in wind
development witnessed in recent years.
13.3.1 Political Institutions
Political institutions comprise the ﬁrst dimension of the framework. Here, we
deﬁne political institutions as governmental roles housed within political
bodies, and the vertical and horizontal relationships that connect them.
Broadly, these roles can be divided into policy and regulatory roles. Policy
roles include treatment of state and non-state entities, long-term plans for
electricity reforms, environmental and energy policy design, and in some cases
pricing, which has implications for the design of renewable energy incentives.
Regulatory roles typically involve implementing the policy regime in a fair and
efﬁcient manner, for instance by policing abuses of market power, determin-
ing costs, and overseeing pricing, planning, dispatch, and other electricity
sector functions.
Countries vary in size, network structures, and resource endowments,
which affect the viability of creating markets and inﬂuencing government
priorities (Jamasb 2006). In general, countries with well-developed electricity
systems have different goals from those still in early stages of development: the
former may be aiming to optimize efﬁciency and provide greater choice to
market participants, whereas the latter are typically trying to attract private
capital to an over-burdened publicly funded system. The institutions and
ideological basis for creating complex markets are also more developed in
the former, whereas the latter may not share the basic regulatory premise of
valuing reduced government intervention (Williams and Ghanadan 2006).
13.3.1.1 Governance of Power Systems: Dimensions of Diversity
We consider four distinct dimensions in the governance of power systems,
with systems lying on a spectrum between extremes within each dimension
(Table 13.1).
First, countries and supranational bodies differ in the extent to which policy
and regulatory functions are distinct and separate. We refer to this as ‘hori-
zontal separation’. Canonical power system designs emphasize the importance
of separation to ensure system operation is free from interference by the
regulated economic actors and the political actors that set the rules (Joskow
2008). The argument for separation extends to ensuring that regulatory bodies
have sufﬁcient authority to compel changes in the sector. In the US, this
separation is pronounced, with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) at the federal level and public utility commissions at the state level
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responsible for coordinating regulation, and Congress, state legislatures, and
executive agencies charged with formulation of policy.
Second, countries and supranational bodies differ in the extent to which
policy and regulatory functions of the power sector are concentrated at the
central level, or vested with subordinate levels of government, as in a federal
system. We refer to this as ‘vertical separation’. In many cases, functions are
spread across different levels of government, and may come into conﬂict. For
instance, in the US regional wholesale markets are overseen by the FERC, but
infrastructure siting decisions and retail electricity prices within those markets
are overseen by state regulatory commissions.
Third, countries differ in the extent to which the government directly controls
power generation, transmission, and distribution assets through direct owner-
ship or majority or minority controlling stakes. Developing countries, in gen-
eral, tend to maintain higher government ownership of assets, particularly if
direct ownership is deemed central to ‘developmental state’ priorities (Johnson
1995). Developed countries vary in government ownership of assets. In France,
the dominant electricity provider, EDF, is a government majority-owned utility.
In the US, most electricity is provided by investor-owned utilities, although the
federal government continues to own a signiﬁcant amount of generation cap-
acity and publicly-ownedmunicipal utilities continue to be important providers.
Fourth, countries differ in their historical and current relationship between
the government and the economy more broadly. Some countries still rely on
elements of central planning, whereas other countries have a long history of
regulated markets. The relative reliance of governments on markets versus
planning—either in the present, or historically—is often reﬂected in govern-
ance of the power sector. For example, economies such as China, India, and
the former Soviet Union used to be planned economies, and despite adopting
capitalist structures, elements of central planning still persist in their power
sectors to this day.
Table 13.1. Four dimensions of governance that affect power system outcomes
Governance
dimension
Description
Horizontal
separation
To what extent are policy and regulatory functions distinct and separate?
Vertical
separation
To what extent are policy and regulatory functions concentrated at the
central government level or decentralized to local governments?
Ownership To what extent is ownership public or private?
Economic
planning
To what extent are economic planning and investment planning
centralized in government agencies or decentralized to market
participants?
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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13.3.2 Economic Institutions
The second key dimension of this framework is economic institutions,
which encompasses the structure of power markets, the relationship between
producers and consumers, and the institutions that allocate costs and shape
economic behaviour. These institutions vary signiﬁcantly across electricity
sectors, as competition has been introduced to different extents in different
parts of the electricity industry in different locations.
13.3.2.1 Industry Structure: Traditional and ‘Standard’
Restructuring Models
Delivering electricity requires the coordination of ﬁve main activities: gener-
ation, transmission, system operation, distribution, and retail. In most coun-
tries, the ﬁrst large-scale electricity companies were vertically integrated
utilities (VIUs) that owned and controlled all ﬁve aspects under a single
roof. Governments typically opted for public ownership and operation of
VIUs, or created private franchises that obligated utilities to serve all custom-
ers at cost-based prices in exchange for a guaranteed rate of return on invested
capital, a model known as ‘cost-of-service’.
As in other network industries with cost-based tariffs, electricity regulators
face signiﬁcant information asymmetries with respect to which costs the utility
should be allowed to pass on to customers. In response to this and a wide array
of other factors, in the 1990s a number of countries began to introduce
competition in parts of the sector. Based on three decades of reforms, there
now exists a ‘standard liberalization prescription’ that speciﬁes which and in
what order certain activities should be made competitive, the appropriate
methods for regulating activities that remain monopolistic, and the necessary
institutions to ensure well-functioning markets (Joskow 2008: 11–13). In
practice, owing to differing motivations for restructuring as well as varieties
of institutions, countries have rarely implemented the textbook liberalization
approach.
These arrangements differ in their requirements on regulatory institutions.
The ‘standard’ restructured model has the largest diversity and complexity of
actors, whereas more vertical arrangements have fewer regulated entities.
Across all industry structures, regulators must develop sufﬁcient expertise to
evaluate the prudency of investments by network companies. The creation of
markets brings additional regulatory complications, as the need for specialized
knowledge to validate some costs gives way to the need to recognize and
quantify the exercise of market power. In countries with a large public
sector and less experience with competition regulation—the case for many
developing and former centrally planned economies—this may be even
more challenging.
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Different generation price formation regimes are typically, but not always,
associated with different industry structures. Generation price formation falls
into three generic categories:
• Cost-of-service: prudent costs approved by regulator and included in rates.
• Benchmark: price based on the (usually average) cost of a benchmark
technology, possibly determined through ‘yardstick’ competition.
• Organized markets: e.g., energy-only market, energy prices determined
through bilateral contracts and short-term wholesale market.
Higher penetrations of wind generation generally increase system-wide
costs of accommodating wind variability and uncertainty, often referred to
as ‘integration’ costs. These costs are compensated to different extents and in
different ways under different pricing mechanisms.
Even in regions with competitive wholesale markets, investment in renewable
energy is typically driven by incentives that exist outside of the market. The two
most common forms of incentive are: (i) feed-in tariffs (FITs) or generation-
based tax credits, where renewable generators are paid a ﬁxed price per unit
generation (kilowatt-hour) delivered to load-serving entities (LSEs); and
(ii) renewable energy quotas, such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS),
which require LSEs to procure a certain share of their sales from renewable
energy. Hybrids or combinations of these price and quantity mechanisms
are common.
13.3.3 Actors and Interests and Wind Energy
The political and economic institutions discussed in Section 13.3.2 engage a
set of actors and their interests, which shape power sector decisions related to
wind energy. In the end, all actors—which include generators, transmission
operators, and distribution companies, dispatch authorities, regulators, and
policy makers—play distinct roles in setting the agenda and determining rules
that govern the power sector, and are impacted to varying degrees by the
system-level outcomes of these decisions.
13.3.3.1 Political Institutions
Depending on their arrangements, political institutions may simultaneously
enable and constrain wind: for instance, if policy sets targets for expanding the
share of renewable electricity, but also constrains dispatch decisions to time
scales not amenable to efﬁciently integrate wind, conﬂicts can (and do)
emerge. A beneﬁcial political arrangement in one setting may lead to poor
wind integration outcomes in another due to reorientation of interests.
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First, the horizontal integration of policy and regulatory functions can
have clear beneﬁts for wind in countries that have achieved political con-
sensus on the beneﬁts of renewable energies. In this case, regulatory and
market institutions may be more easily revisited or altered through admin-
istrative measures to reﬂect how policy incentives play out in the actual
operation of the power system and the settlement of its costs. However, if
closely entwined policy and regulatory functions are vulnerable to capture by
powerful incumbent interests (including pre-existing fossil generators), the
incentives for wind integration will be weaker. Even if interest politics plays
a smaller role, more frequent interference with the regulatory system may
lead to economically suboptimal outcomes and harm long-term develop-
ment potential of the sector.
Second, vertical integration (centralization) of decision-making authority
can ensure that new capacity is optimally located to reﬂect resource quality
and generation needs, whereas greater autonomy for decision makers at
subordinate levels could (though not necessarily) lead to suboptimal alloca-
tions based on local political conditions. Likewise, increasing geographic
scope of transmission and system operation decisions can be favourable
to wind integration. By contrast, in the US, transmission siting authority
is vested at the state level, even within larger multi-state balancing author-
ities (MIT 2011).
Third, a high degree of state ownership in the power system can enable or
constrain wind generation, hinging on the extent to which state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) act as agents subordinate to the state, or conversely, the extent
to which SOEs effectively capture regulatory and policy functions. If policy
priorities at the top shift in favour of wind, state-owned wind developers are
direct beneﬁciaries.
Characteristics of a nation affect the ability of its economy to generate or
adapt to new technologies and practices (Porter and Stern 2001). Instead of
claiming that one institutional form is universally superior for wind energy
integration and therefore should be grafted onto another with an expectation
of similar performance impact, we submit that the more important task
involves understanding how institutions shape outcomes and how potential
interventions interact with legacy structures in ways that create momentum
towards desirable outcomes. For example, as will be discussed later in this
chapter, there are aspects of how legacies of planned economic systems result
in rigid quota setting (on generation within and trade across provinces in
China, for example) that are not compatible with the short-term ﬂexibility
required to efﬁciently integrate wind power.
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13.3.3.2 Economic Institutions
Traditional VIUs and restructured markets create different incentives for wind
energy expansion. For VIUs, the proﬁt objective for deploying wind will
include network expansion and operation costs, and coordinated network
and generation expansion has the potential to reduce overall social costs
(GE Energy 2010). However, VIUs may not have sufﬁcient incentives to
control costs, leading to inefﬁcient investments.
First, how to achieve coordination across functions in support of wind can
be a major challenge, depending on market structure. For competitive gener-
ation markets, not only are network and generation expansion separated, so
are many other economic activities essential to integrate wind, such as price
formation at different timescales and ancillary services. Wind may have
reduced revenue streams because of an inability to participate in forward
energy and balancing markets, and because many markets were not designed
to accommodate particularities of wind, there may not be a sufﬁcient variety of
market products to incentivize integration.
Second, who determines the terms of access of wind generators to the
network? VIUs, which integrate transmission and generation functions,
should have an incentive to connect wind quickly. However, in restructured
markets, connection is a critical step in wind farm development, and associ-
ated costs (including network enhancements) are particularly contentious.
Calculating appropriate costs and the degree of socialization will depend on
whose calculation it is, whether an ISO, a transmission company, or an
integrated network utility. Connection delays can also result in disproportion-
ate hardship on farm owners as a result of cash ﬂow issues, as almost all costs
are concentrated in upfront capital.
Third, once connected, wind integration depends on dispatch rules of the
system operator. ISOs and VIUs alike will generally try to minimize short-
run operational costs, beneﬁtting wind with near-zero marginal cost.
Owners of transmission networks that also do system operation may have
incentives to dispatch generators connected to transmission lines with
favourable tariffs. These incentives in operation also depend on policy and
regulations for curtailment, including circumstances in which it is allowed
and compensation, if any.
13 .4 CHINA CASE STUDY
We apply this framework of interactions of political and economic institutions
to help shed light on wind integration outcomes in China, the world’s largest
energy consumer. China has the world’s highest installed capacity of wind
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energy, but also faces the most severe wind integration situation: curtailment
rates—forced spillage of available wind electricity by the grid operator typic-
ally for economic or grid stability reasons—have been in the double-digits for
at least ﬁve years, reaching 40 per cent in some regions during 2015 (NEA
2016). Delay in grid connection to wind farms is another important barrier to
smooth expansion of wind energy, with wind installations lacking appropriate
connection surpassing 16 GW in 2015 (GWEC 2016). By applying our
framework, we can begin to gain a qualitative sense of whether, and how,
political economy challenges explain wind development and integration
outcomes—or conversely, whether technocratic ﬁxes in the form of capacity
targets, price support, transmission build-out, and wind dispatch require-
ments will be sufﬁcient or sufﬁciently accepted by the affected parties—to
catalyse a low-carbon electricity transition in China.
Many of China’s market-based electricity sector liberalization efforts during
the early 2000s have been abandoned or signiﬁcantly altered from their ideal
prescription owing to historical legacies and institutional priorities, neither of
which are independent. These echo challenges in other country and regional
settings, and hence provide a valuable case of the varied political economy
impacts of wind energy transitions across the developing world. Figure 13.1
shows the actors in China that participate in decisions related to electricity
system functions (capacity planning, generation price formation, dispatch and
balancing area coordination, and renewable energy promotion policies) most
relevant for the development and grid integration of wind, as a function of
industry structures (national, local).
13.4.1 Planning and Project Approval of Wind Farms
Planning—deciding on future generation capacity and transmission needs—
and project approval are critical determinants of wind development and grid
integration outcomes. Systems vary in the degree to which planning functions
are carried out by technical or political bodies. Project approval, also generally
by a government or afﬁliated ofﬁce, is required before initiating construction
of new capacity and transmission projects.
China is perhaps most distinct in the extent of its government involvement
in the planning and project approval processes as well as in industry decision-
making through state control of ﬁrms engaged in all stages of wind farm
construction and operation. This reﬂects, in part, the institutional legacy of
China’s planned economy, which has persisted longer in electric power than in
many other sectors. In practice, it means that generation capacity and trans-
mission planning is largely driven by the supply side, in a top-down manner,
targeting a speciﬁc installed base without explicit incentives to optimize
around system operation.
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Planning for wind capacity expansion largely occurs at the central level but
siting and integration have been complicated by conﬂicts with local institu-
tions. The NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) (together
with the NEA (National Energy Administration), after it was created in 2008)
sets the national wind capacity target through medium- and long-term indus-
try development plans (Ling and Cai 2012). The national target is then
allocated to provinces. Provinces can also volunteer to host large wind bases,
as happened in Gansu in 2006–7, and which later obtained NDRC approval,
beneﬁtting from central support for long-distance transmission (Davidson
et al. 2017). Provincial as well as national ofﬁcials have incentives to target
capacity expansion as it adds to investment, boosting gross domestic product.
Capacity expansion also creates local jobs and demand for the output of one of
China’s strategic renewable energy industries, which was just emerging in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. In China, minimizing cost is only one consider-
ation in planning decisions, which reﬂect many other factors including local
economic goals, industrial policy, technological feasibility, and proﬁt-sharing
arrangements among local stakeholders.
Historically, wind projects have included government contract projects and
concession projects. Before 2003, government contract projects dominated, in
which the government directly awarded project development rights to one
consortium. After 2003, the concession model was introduced, in which the
NDRC selected favourable resource locations for projects and allowed poten-
tial developers to bid through a tender process (Han et al. 2009).
Although the concession system enabled rapid development of wind cap-
acity, several features undermined its effectiveness. First, projects were initially
selected on a least-cost basis, prompting bidders to offer unrealistically low
prices that later undermined quality (Han et al. 2009). Second, pressure to bid
at low cost was exacerbated by targets on the largest generation companies to
expand renewables to 5 per cent of their total capacity (not generation) (Liu
and Kokko 2010). In 2009, bidding with an electricity price was replaced with
region-speciﬁc benchmark pricing for wind projects based on resources. By
this time, there was already evidence that some capacity was of exceptionally
poor quality, with turbines producing far less than rated output, requiring
more downtime for maintenance, or even collapsing (Han et al. 2009).
Capacity thresholds that determine the level of government at which
authorization could be granted also created conﬂicts between stakeholder
interests and wind integration, leading to a situation in which generation
expansion rapidly outpaced transmission buildout and exacerbated curtail-
ment. In the early years of wind development in China, all new wind projects
required central approval (Han et al. 2009). Development accelerated signiﬁ-
cantly when approval authority for wind farms sized <50 MW was granted to
provincial authorities; indeed, a large number of wind farms built during this
period have a capacity of 49.5 MW, as provincial government approval was
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often the preferred, often faster option to launch wind farm construction.1
Many wind farm developers at this time were SOEs with access to low cost
ﬁnancing and were rewarded principally according to capacity constructed.2
However, at this size, the grid company was even more reluctant to connect
capacity, especially capacity in remote areas that required signiﬁcant additional
transmission (Yang et al. 2012).
The conﬂicts related to the planning and project approval process in China
are not entirely unique. In other markets, such as the US, it is easier to build
new capacity than to site new transmission. In terms of this mismatch, a high
degree of federalism plays a similar role in both the US and China. Crossing
state (provincial) lines with new transmission requires additional co-
ordination and approvals in both countries; however, in China grid expansion
arguably faces less resistance from citizens and groups concerned about
aesthetic or environmental impacts. Instead, in China resistance arises because
the interests and constraints of grid authorities are fundamentally different
from those of wind farm developers and their local government champions.
13.4.2 Generator Cost Recovery
The transition to higher wind penetrations often creates economic conﬂicts
between wind and thermal generators, tied to cost recovery. The extent of
these conﬂicts depends on a number of factors, described in Sections 13.4.2.1–
13.4.2.4, that are common to both China and other country contexts.
13.4.2.1 Support Mechanisms and Dispatch
In China, wind energy development is incentivized through FITs. FITs ﬁx the
price, but not the quantity, of wind power. If the FIT price is sufﬁciently high,
renewable energy developers may rapidly expand installed wind capacity,
reducing operating hours, market prices, and revenues for thermal generators.
In countries with economic dispatch, this physical and economic displace-
ment of thermal generation occurs primarily through the dispatch merit order,
as wind has very low marginal costs.
In China, dispatch order is determined administratively rather than accord-
ing to marginal cost, and the operating hour impact of higher wind penetra-
tions on thermal generators is, to some extent, negotiated. In most provinces,
operating hours for each generating unit are determined through an annual
1 Cities also competed by offering favourable arrangements for obtaining land for siting wind
farms (Liu and Kokko 2010).
2 At the end of 2008, 90 per cent of China’s wind developers were SOEs (Liu and Kokko
2010).
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planning process, and system operators (grid companies) dispatch units to
meet targets set through this process.3 In a small number of provinces,
dispatch is based on a preset order, with non-dispatchable renewable energy
receiving dispatch priority.4
Nationwide, China has had a ‘mandatory procurement’ (quan’e shougou)
policy for renewable energy since 2005. Wind curtailment rates, however, have
beenmuch higher than those seen in other countries with similar levels of wind
penetration (Kahrl andWang 2014). In April 2015, the NDRC issued new rules
requiring local planning departments to prioritize renewable generation in
annual plans, as part of a broader reform package (NDRC and NEA 2015).
The ongoing nature of dispatch reforms to promote higher utilization of
renewable energy in China reﬂects a conﬂict between: (i) renewable energy
generators and the political establishment, which are keen to promote renew-
able energy and reduce renewable energy curtailment, and (ii) thermal, and
particularly coal, generators, which are keen to limit reductions in their
operating hours.
13.4.2.2 Fixed-Cost Recovery
Lower operating hours have a signiﬁcant impact on coal generators’ ability to
recover their ﬁxed costs in China, because of the energy-only benchmark
approach to setting their wholesale tariffs. Under this approach, all coal
generators receive the same price for each megawatt-hour of output, with
the price benchmarked against the levellized cost of a supercritical coal unit.
This benchmark tariff requires an estimated number of fully loaded operating
hours, which for coal units in China is typically around 5000 hours, to convert
ﬁxed costs (in yuan per megawatt-year) to a variable price (yuan per
megawatt-hour).5 As the number of operating hours falls, the wholesale
price that generators require to recover their ﬁxed costs increases nonlinearly
(Figure 13.2).
13.4.2.3 Operating Cost Recovery
At higher wind penetrations, thermal generators are generally required to
change their operating practices. This includes (i) maintaining higher reserve
3 For more detail on this planning process and how it intersects with system operations, see
Kahrl and Wang (2014).
4 This policy is known as ‘energy efﬁcient dispatch’ (jieneng diaodu). For political economic
reasons, energy efﬁcient dispatch has proved difﬁcult to extend to other provinces (see Kahrl
et al. 2013).
5 More speciﬁcally, the levellized ﬁxed cost (LFC, in yuan per megawatt-hour) is calculated as
LFC = AFC/AOH, where AFC is the annual ﬁxed cost (in yuan per kilowatt-year) and AOH is the
annual operating hours (in hours per year).
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levels, or operating further below rated capacity, to account for the higher
uncertainty in wind availability; (ii) more frequent, faster, and deeper changes
in output (‘ramps’) to respond to changes in wind availability; and (iii) more
frequent start-ups and shutdowns to respond to the uncertainty and variability
in wind output. These kinds of changes in operating practices increase oper-
ating costs for coal and other dispatchable generators. Collectively, these
additional costs tend to be very small as a portion of system costs, but more
palpable as a share of generator proﬁts. In many countries, they are recovered
either on a regulated cost basis or through energy and ancillary services
markets. In China, however, thermal generators are still not directly compen-
sated for a signiﬁcant portion of their additional cost of accommodating wind
generation.
13.4.2.4 Cost Premium Recovery
China’s 2005 Renewable Energy Law created a national surcharge to pay for
the higher cost of renewable energy. This surcharge, initially set at 0.001 yuan/
kWh, is collected in each province through a ‘renewable price surcharge’
(kezaisheng nengyuan fujia). Grid companies collect these funds separately
and use them to pay premiums to renewable energy generators within their
own province. Where revenue collection exceeds payment obligations, the
funds are collected centrally and redistributed to provinces where payment
obligations exceed revenues.
The drawback to this approach is that, if renewable generation grows faster
than total demand and/or if coal prices fall, the pool of revenues to pay
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
B
re
ak
-e
ve
n
 p
ri
ce
 (
yu
an
/M
W
h
)
Operating hours
Figure 13.2. Break-even price for a supercritical coal unit in China as a function of
operating hours.
Note: This example assumes a capacity cost of 530 yuan/kW-year and an energy cost of 0.36 yuan/kWh.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on E3 (2015).
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premiums to renewable generators will be insufﬁcient. In response to rapid
growth in renewable energy, government agencies have increased the sur-
charge twice, to 0.008 yuan/kWh in 2011 and to 0.015 yuan/kWh in 2013.
However, the lag between surcharge increases has led to signiﬁcant gaps—10.7
billion yuan by the end of 2011 (Yu and Xiao 2014)—between what renewable
generators are owed under the FIT, and what they are actually paid. Increasing
the renewable energy surcharge is politically difﬁcult because: (i) increasing
the surcharge raises electricity prices that are already perceived to be high, and
(ii) the surcharge is collected nationally and involves signiﬁcant transfers
among provinces.
13.4.3 Balancing Area Coordination
A properly functioning electricity system needs to instantaneously balance
supply and demand within a small tolerance. Meeting uncertainties in demand
and supply while respecting various system security constraints traditionally
requires centralized system operation of dispatching plants (i.e., specifying
production quantity). The geographic purview of a system operator is known
as a ‘balancing area’.
Coordinating neighbouring balancing areas has important beneﬁts
for integrating high penetrations of wind and solar energy: aggregating geo-
graphically distant resources tends to reduce resource variability; aggregating
conventional energy sources increases total system ﬂexibility; and access to
more balancing options reduces integration costs such as reserves (GE Energy
2010). As a result of the grid operation institutions in China—including
signiﬁcant vertical separation of operations and planning, and complex hori-
zontal overlapping authorities—the beneﬁts of the large transmission network
are not fully realized for wind integration.
13.4.3.1 Structure of China’s Grid Operations
Electricity in China, following 2002 reforms, is served primarily by two large
central state-owned grid companies, State Grid Corporation of China and
China Southern Power Grid Company, and one local grid company, the Inner
Mongolia Grid Company. State Grid is further organized into ﬁve grid regions,
each consisting of roughly ﬁve provinces. Within State Grid and Southern
Power Grid, direct subsidiary relationships of provincial grid companies
within regional grids create nominal lines of authority.
Electric power operations in China involve a range of vertical and horizon-
tal linkages among grid and government institutions. Power plants are for
the most part dispatched by the provincial grid company enhancing vertical
separation, although there is large heterogeneity across regions. Larger facilities
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and those serving grid-balancing functions may be directly dispatched by
the regional or national grids. Quota-setting and heuristic dispatch ordering
take place mostly at the provincial level. Regional grids help coordinate
inter-provincial connections whereas the national grid helps coordinate
inter-regional connections. These two coordination processes are key to the
functioning of the system, and increasingly important for integrating large
quantities of variable wind energy.6 Central policies aim to increase inter-
regional exchanges of electricity to exploit remote resources of wind, solar,
coal, and hydropower (NEA 2014).
The annual generation planning process ensures that provinces can meet
demand with supply and that generators will receive sufﬁcient quotas to
maintain proﬁtability. Wind and other renewable energy may be incorporated
at this stage by removing a portion of its expected generation from the total
available quota. Transmission contracts for exchanges between balancing areas
are negotiated in tandem with this process. The institutions involved in annual
generation planning and their respective goals are varied (see Table 13.2).
After the heavily negotiated annual plans are ﬁnalized, the grid company’s
goal is to ensure these targets are met by allocating to shorter time periods and
adjusting for intra-annual changes in supply or demand. They may be
censured by government regulators if they deviate too much (SERC 2011).
At the same time, they are faced with the possibly conﬂicting policy for
mandatory procurement of wind. Short-term balancing operations within
balancing areas are thus heavily constrained. Short-term adjustments between
balancing areas are even more difﬁcult because quotas are not easily convert-
ible between regions, and the rigid transmission contracting process is difﬁcult
to renegotiate (Davidson et al. 2017).
These inﬂexibilities have led to increasingly high rates of wind curtailment
across all major wind regions of China. In the northeast, where a large fraction
of coal generators are must-run combined heat and power, Jilin and neigh-
bouring Liaoning experienced 32 per cent and 10 per cent curtailment, respect-
ively, in 2015 (NEA 2016). In the northwest, where a signiﬁcant fraction of coal
plants are directly dispatched by the regional operatorwind curtailment in
Gansu reached the country’s largest of 39 per cent in 2015 (NEA 2016). In
this case, without reforming generation planning—addressing horizontal over-
lapping authorities—vertical integration has had limited beneﬁts.
Within this rigid planning framework, policy makers in China have piloted
various mechanisms—both market and administrative—to increase renewable
energy dispatch, primarily focusing on the provincial grid. Energy-efﬁcient
dispatch, established in 2009, reorients renewable energy and high-efﬁciency
coal to the top of annual plans, but does not compare plants in different
6 For a more detailed treatment of institutional coordination issues, see Kahrl and Wang
(2014).
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provinces and does not completely do awaywith the basic quota system to ensure
proﬁtability (Davidson et al. 2017). Reforms announced in early 2015 highlight
reducing the total amount in the plan (hence available for quota) as well as
prioritizing renewable energy in cross-region transfers (NDRC and NEA 2015).
Vertical integration through regional power exchanges has been piloted and
disbanded multiple times as many institutions sought to stall reform. Accord-
ing to one account, provincial governments and generation companies were
united in opposition: provincial governments did not want to give up auton-
omy over planning decisions through a regional market, and risk-averse
generation companies had already grown accustomed to the guaranteed
revenue streams under the quota system (Wen 2014).
13 .5 CONCLUSION
Energy system transitions, by introducing or replacing one technology or
practice with another, inevitably create winners and losers. To better assess
the landscape of political economy obstacles to energy system transition, in
this chapter we developed an analytical framework to understand the political
economy of wind energy—a high potential source of zero-carbon dioxide
electricity.
At the generator level, the political economy impacts of wind power are in
part driven by wind’s physical characteristics. Wind displaces conventional
dispatchable resources (e.g., coal, natural gas generation) because of its low
marginal costs, but requires dispatchable resources for balancing because of
its limited predictability and variability. This may reduce capacity utilization
of conventional dispatchable generators and force them to operate in new
Table 13.2. Actors and interests in annual generation planning in China
Actors Interests
Grid companies Increase efﬁciency of delivery (i.e., reduce losses)
Utilize transmission lines with energy-based compensation (typically,
ultra-high voltage)
Coal-ﬁred power
companies
Lobby for higher quotas
Wind companies Lobby to reduce planned quantities of conventional generation
Provincial
governments
Lower local electricity price
Promote local generation over imports
National
government
Minimize frictions among provinces
Conserve resources nationally for energy security and environmental goals
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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conditions, creating costs that may or may not be remunerated under existing
market or regulatory rules.
Yet, as we showed, the political economy impacts of wind extend beyond
transfers among generators. Greater investment certainty for wind generators
is underwritten by electricity customers, and governments may transfer more
of that risk onto speciﬁc classes of customers (e.g., residential or industrial
customers). Regional dispatch can reduce the operating challenges of wind
power, but integrating local electricity systems into more regionally coordinated
dispatch creates economic transfers between higher- and lower-cost regions.
The losers in these political economy conﬂicts will often resist policies that
support wind, renewable energy, and energy transition.
By applying our framework to China, a country with electricity sector
institutions that are very different from those in most other countries, we
demonstrated how wind development and integration challenges in China can
also be understood within a more general political economy framework. On
the basis of our analysis, we surmise that vertical separation (i.e., degree of
federalism) plays a very important role in explaining wind integration out-
comes in China, perhaps as important as in the US and Europe. We also ﬁnd
evidence that underneath the veneer of stronger horizontal integration in
China the disparate interests of actors can lead to poor coordination across
functions such as generation and transmission planning, or generation
planning and dispatch, with consequences for wind development. Fleshing
out on-the-ground implications of vertical and horizontal separation for wind
integration is an important topic for future empirical work.
China is, in many ways, an extreme case because of the severity of its
wind energy curtailment problem. As such, China presents a cautionary tale
of the perils of not proactively identifying and addressing potential political
economy conﬂicts. We argue that, although the technical challenges of
renewable integration may have reasonably straightforward solutions, ad-
dressing political economy challenges by their nature must be built into
longer-term political and economic strategy. In developing policies to
facilitate low-carbon energy transitions, governments should ensure that
they simultaneously acknowledge and address potential political economy
conﬂicts.
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The Social Shaping of Nuclear Energy
Technology in South Africa
Britta Rennkamp and Radhika Bhuyan
14.1 INTRODUCTION
Why is the South African government pursuing a nuclear energy programme,
despite abundant and accessible fossil and renewable energy resources? The
South African electricity sector has historically been mainly coal-fuelled. One
nuclear power plant has contributed ﬁve per cent of electricity since the 1980s.
Renewable energy contributes another ﬁve per cent.
We argue that the government has chosen to procure an additional 9.6
GW of nuclear capacity, because of a signiﬁcant coalition of nuclear energy
supporters. The role of coalitions in shaping policy outcomes has long been
established. The constructivist literature on science and technology policy
explains why decision-makers sometimes choose less practical and less cost-
efﬁcient technologies over others. The concept of social shaping of technol-
ogy suggests that the interplay of social, political, economic, and cultural
factors in a society shape the design and implementation of a technology.
The literature identiﬁes political factors leading to the prioritizing of nuclear
technologies over other alternatives. We apply this theoretical perspective to
the recent nuclear programme in South Africa. A discourse network analysis
helps to establish the political arena of nuclear energy and to identify the
coalitions supporting and opposing the nuclear energy programme, as
well as the arguments that motivate their positioning (Leifeld 2012). The
analysis uses data from 350 media articles, relevant policy documents, and
background interviews.
14.2 SOCIAL SHAPING OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ROLE OF
DISCOURSE COALITIONS
Existing research from the sociology, political science, and nuclear scholarship
identiﬁes various motivations for governments to pursue nuclear pro-
grammes, despite other options. Sociologists framed theories of social shaping
of technology (SST), social construction of technology (SCOT), and actor
network theory (ANT) in the 1980s and 1990s. These approaches dismiss
the idea of ‘technological determinism’, which assumes technological choices
are purely economically or technically determined. Constructivist theories
suggest that organizational, political, economic, and cultural factors ‘pattern
the design and implementation of technology’ (Williams and Edge 1996). The
reasons for acceptance or rejection of a technology emerge from the societies
themselves (Bijker 1995; MacKenzie 1998). ‘Relevant social groups’ shape
technological trajectories according to their interests and interpretations
(Bijker 1995: 269).
Constructivists argue that choices are inherent to a technology trajectory.
The logic of choice between technological trajectories makes technology a
negotiable matter. Choices may be irreversible and lead towards long-term
‘lock-in’ situations (Bijker 1995; Williams and Edge 1996). The concept of
choice relates directly to the politics that emerge from prioritizing one technol-
ogy over another. Technologies are never neutral. Choices trigger controversy
among their supporters and opponents (Williams and Edge 1996; Latour 2005).
Complex social, political, and cultural dynamics are inherent to technological
knowledge production and technology choices (Bijker 1995; Williams and Edge
1996; Latour 2005).
Scholars have identiﬁed factors that explain the choice of energy technolo-
gies, which may not be economically or technically advantageous. The analysis
of the social construction of large technological systems demonstrates how
technology choices correspond to the political and economic structure of a
nation. The analysis of the United Kingdom’s (UK) and German electricity
sectors suggests that the political system shapes the governance structure of
the power sector. Centralized governments produce large centralized electri-
city systems. Decentralized systems favour smaller distribution and generation
infrastructure (Hughes 2011).
Autocratic elements within a political regime were critical in the adoption of
large and centralized nuclear energy technologies (Winner 1986, 2000;
Temples 1980). Countries that adopted nuclear technology show strong con-
nections between nuclear power and nationhood (Jasanoff and Kim 2009).
Nationhood is an idea built through public discourses and debates about
national identity and a nation’s path of future development. National public
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discourses often emerge from energy technology and its politics, as energy
counts as a basic building block of industrialization, technological progress,
socio-economic development, and consequential economic power. Govern-
ments often procure energy technologies because of prestige, rather than
economic necessity (Hughes 2011).
A comparative analysis of six nuclear nations identiﬁes six drivers that
sustain commercial nuclear power programmes (Sovacool and Valentine
2012: 250):
(1) national security and secrecy
(2) technocratic ideology
(3) economic interventionism
(4) centrally coordinated energy stakeholder network
(5) subordination of opposition to political authority and
(6) social peripheralization.
The characteristics of countries that are following a nuclear path include
closed political systems that minimize opposition, transparency, and account-
ability; economies with a history of central planning and government inter-
vention; as well as strong national commitment to technological progress
(Sovacool and Valentine 2012).
Public discourse reﬂects the debates about national identity, a nation’s path
of future development, and its signiﬁcance in the global arena. The way a
nation exploits its energy resources is an essential component of this process
(Bouzarovski and Bassin 2011). Nuclear technology programmes are state
interventions that create winners and losers, as any other public policy.
Distributional conﬂicts motivate actors to shape coalitions in support or
opposition of these policies that represent their beliefs, ideas, and interests
(Sabatier 1988; Hajer 1995).
Discourse coalitions differ from traditional political coalitions or alliances,
because there is a linguistic basis for political coordination between various
parties. ‘Story-lines, not interests, form the basis of the coalition, whereby
story-lines potentially change the previous understanding of what the
actors’ interests are’ (Hajer 1995: 66). This chapter presents an analysis of
the discourse coalitions that emerge in support and opposition to the nuclear
programme in South Africa.
14 .3 NUCLEAR POWER POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa may soon count as both old and new nuclear power. Nuclear
power was a substantial commitment of the apartheid government, which
ruled the country on behalf of the white minority between 1948 and 1994.
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Under apartheid rule, engineers built nuclear capacity in nuclear fuel produc-
tion, a weapons programme, uranium enrichment, and research since the
1950s. The programme came with a high cost, as large parts of the electricity
produced from the reactor went into fuel and uranium production (Marquard
2006). The remainders of this programme are Africa’s only commercial
nuclear plant in Koeberg outside Cape Town, a research reactor in Pelindaba
near Pretoria, a state-owned nuclear cooperation, a regulator, and a coalition
of nuclear engineers.
The African National Congress (ANC) actively opposed nuclear power in
its role of a liberation movement and during its early days as a ruling party
(ANC 1994). This position changed gradually, as the scientist and technicians
involved in the pro-nuclear coalition continued pushing for a continuation of
nuclear energy.
The pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) was used in the ANC’s ﬁrst
nuclear programme. The programme aimed to commercialize a German
licensed small reactor design, which did not succeed in a research and
development (R&D) programme in Germany and lost public funding in
1998 (BMU 2006). The main problem with the pebble bed reactor was that
it created very high temperatures at its core, which could not safely transform
into process heat. The temperatures inside the reactor could only be estimated,
as the movement of the pebbles inside the reactor destroyed all measuring
devices (Moormann 2008). South African and German scientists convinced
the ANC government to fund the technology from 1993 until 2010. The
PBMR received more than ZAR10 billion of public funding, accounting for
one-third of the Department of Trade and Industry’s R&D budget (Creamer
2010; Hogan 2010).
The PMBR programme originally envisioned producing electricity in smaller
reactors than pricy pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants like Koeberg. Yet, it
became part of a wider ‘nuclear policy’ published in 2008, which aimed to revive
the manufacturing processes including uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel
production. The policy framework aimed to build new PWR plants by 2015 and
create more than 10,000 new jobs in the industry (DME 2008).
The release of the nuclear policy coincided with the world’s ﬁnancial crisis
and severe shortages in electricity supply. International rating companies
evaluated South Africa’s utility Eskom’s ﬁnancial prospects negatively, which
did not correspond with the government’s ambition to acquire new nuclear
power plants, ‘owned and operated’ through Eskom (DME 2008).
In 2011, the ANC restated its plans for the nuclear build programme three
days after the accidents in Fukushima. The nuclear build programme suggests
building six nuclear plants to add 9.6 GW of capacity to the current national
capacity of about 40 GW. The programme refers to the country’s electricity
plan, the integrated resource plan (IRP), that outlines South Africa’s electricity
mix 2030. The IRP was the ﬁrst integrated, participative plan for the future of
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the electricity sector, which grounds in the energy white paper (DME 1998).1
The plan proposed two scenarios with 9.6 GW of nuclear power (DoE 2011).
Initially, the plan was set out as a ﬂexible planning instrument, subject to
updates every two years as economic and technical parameters may change.
The original IRP was grounded in higher assumptions of economic growth
than in reality, which translated into a higher demand (RSA 2010; DoE 2011).
The original IRP stated clearly that growth assumptions have to be revised in
the future (DoE 2011). The IRP update report (DoE 2013) revised the lower
electricity demand and lower growth assumptions. The report established
several scenarios taking alternative electricity generating technologies and
prices into account. It recommended delaying or abandoning the nuclear built
programme if the electricity demand does not unfold accordingly; solar, hydro,
and gas options become available; or the cost of procuring nuclear energy
exceeds a certain cost.2 The IRP update report did not undergo a public
consultation process and was not presented for parliamentary approval. The
original IRP remains the main policy basis for the government’s plans to expand
nuclear power generation capacity.
14.3.1 Discourse Coalitions in Support and Opposition
of the Nuclear Build Programme
The government’s plans to expand nuclear energy triggered a polarizing public
debate between two coalitions in support and opposition of the programme.
Fifty-ﬁve organizations are publicly involved in the debate on the nuclear
programme—Figure 14.1 shows these actors as circles. The organizations
range from business (including industry, consulting ﬁrms, trade unions, and
business associations) to governmental departments, state agencies, state-owned
enterprises, and civil society organizations, which include non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and academic institutions.
Actors share a connection if they put forth the same argument to support
or oppose the nuclear programme. These arguments appear as squares.
The coalition in support of nuclear power shares connections in light lines.
The actors in the opposing coalition connect through dark lines. Arguments
1 The Energy White Paper (DME 1998: 58) ruled out that new nuclear capacity should be
added before 2007. The paper qualiﬁes that ‘whether new nuclear capacity will be an option at
that point or beyond will depend largely on the environmental and economic merits of other
energy sources relative to nuclear and its potential and public acceptability, construction lead-
times and load characteristics’.
2 The IRP update report (DoE 2013) suggests delaying the decision to procure nuclear energy
‘if the demand is lower than 270 TWh, if hydropower, [ . . . ] rooftop photovoltaic or shale gas
options succeed. The programme should be cancelled if the procurement price exceeds US$6,500
per kWh.’
Social Shaping of Nuclear Energy Technology: South Africa 275
Institute for security studies
Rosatom Cadiz Mining and Minerals
Universal electricity access
NIASA
Cape Peninisula University of Technology
Baseload generation
Trade and Industrial Policy strategies
COPE
Presidency
Stratek
Business Leadership SA
Co-ordinating Committee
Frost & Sullivan Africa
Green Connection
National Nuclear Regulator
Environmental Montitoring Group
Congress of the people
World Wildlife for Nature
Democracy Works
UNISA
Corruption
Corruption Watch
Environmental Geopolitical influences
Dependence on fossil fuels
Transparency
Outdated energy policy
Energy Research Centre
University of the Witwatersrand
Fossil Free South Africa
Project 90x2030
NERSA
Transnational Institute
University of Greenwich
National Union of Mineworkers
KPMG Investec Bank
BUSA
Outdated technology
National Treasury
North West University
Independent Analyst
International nuclear market
NUMSA
EFF
Lead times
SAFCEI
Nuclear AfricaCoalition against Nuclear Energy
Earthlife Africa
COSATU
Koeberg Alert Alliance
Manufacturing circle
Areva NECSA
Department of Energy
Job creation
Bantamsklip Anti Nuclear Group
Local skills development
Energy security
EskomEconomic growth
Safety
Emissions reduction
Skills
groundwork
Maintenance
Local uranium resources
Greenpeace Africa
Cost
DA
Renewable energy prospects
Industrial development
Institutional capacity National Nuclear Executive
Unplug Nuclear campaign in Cape Town
National Union of Mineworkers
Techology maturity
National Planning Commision
Figure 14.1. Discourse coalitions in South Africa’s nuclear power programme.
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that share both lines are the most contested arguments. Actors and arguments
that share many connections are more relevant to the discourse. The discourse
network emerges from a dataset of 350 articles, which made 64 statements in
favour or against the nuclear programme. Arguments and actors were coded
and their discursive relationships appear in the network.
The actors put 24 arguments forth in support or opposition of the nuclear
energy programme. Cost and safety emerge as the main contested issues in the
current nuclear debate. Impacts on emissions reductions, economic growth,
job creation, and skills development are also contested in the public debate.
The four most frequent arguments, calculated in Eigenvector centrality, are
cost, safety, renewable energy prospects, and job creation.
14.3.1.1 The Coalition of Supporters
The coalition of supporters consists mainly of government departments,
agencies, and state-owned enterprises, private business, as well as a few
outspoken individuals in universities and consulting companies. The Depart-
ment of Energy (DoE) is the central actor in this coalition, followed by the
Nuclear Energy Cooperation South Africa (NECSA). Further state actors in
support of the programme are the utility Eskom, the Presidency, the Nuclear
Regulator, and the Nuclear Energy Committee (NNEECC). The DoE has
become very active in advancing the nuclear programme. The Department’s
main arguments for nuclear power include cost, baseload generation, energy
security, emissions reductions, job creation, industrial, and skills development.
South Africa’s state-owned nuclear cooperation, NECSA, supports the
programme arguing for beneﬁts in job creation, industrial development,
energy security, and skills development. The organization employs about
100 of the country’s nuclear engineers and scientists. NECSA has high stakes
in the nuclear debate, as the organization is supposed to play a signiﬁcant
role in the future programme. The ownership of the new ﬂeet is not yet clearly
deﬁned. Eskom owns and operates Koeberg, but there is uncertainty whether
the utility will be in the position to manage the new plants as well or if NECSA
will step in. NECSA denied media reporting that the organization is under
ﬁnancial constraints and unable to pay salaries (Joubert 2015). The annual
report disclosing ﬁnances for 2015 is still outstanding.
The NNEECC was ﬁrst established in 2008 and headed by the former
President Kgalema (Creamer 2012). The committee consisted of a group of
ministers supplemented with a committee of technical experts, which were
exchanged to political appointments. Motlanthe did major preparations
and networking efforts with international vendors to identify ﬁnancing for
the nuclear programme. In 2013, Jacob Zuma took over the committee’s
leadership (City Press 2013; Donelly and Faull 2013). This move reﬂects the
president’s growing interest in the nuclear programme. His main arguments
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for nuclear power are economic growth and its contribution to energy security
of the country in the long term. Cost has been its only publicly stated
constraint to the programme (Zuma 2016). In 2014, the committee changed
its purpose to overview the entire electricity sector. The committee continues
supporting the nuclear programme arguing that nuclear energy will contribute
to energy security and that the technology is safe. The National Nuclear
Regulator echoes safety afﬁrmations.
Business representation falls into three categories. International vendors,
namely Rosatom of Russia and Areva of France are in the ﬁrst category.
Rosatom argues that the main beneﬁt will be industrial development, as the
company plans to involve the South African nuclear industry in a ‘global value
chain’ through high rates of locally produced components of nuclear technol-
ogy. Areva argues for job creation, contributions to economic growth, and
skills development. The second category is domestic business representation.
The Nuclear Atomic Industry Association (NIASA) and Business Leadership
SA share the arguments for local skills development, economic development,
and baseload generation. The third category consists of consulting companies
and academic institutions. The consulting ﬁrms, Stratek and Nuclear Africa, as
well as the universities of the North West and the Cape Peninsula are
institutional homes to a handful of individuals who are very actively engaged
in supporting nuclear energy in the public debate. Their arguments concen-
trate mainly on the cost of the nuclear programme and its contributions to
emissions reductions, job creation, baseload, and economic growth.
14.3.1.2 The Coalition of Opponents
The coalition of opponents to the nuclear programme connects some govern-
ment departments and agencies, business associations and trade unions,
political parties, academic institutions, and many NGOs. The opposing coali-
tion is larger in terms of numbers of actors and arguments. This coalition does
not show a central actor pushing against the programme. It is a wide range of
40 actors with a majority of civil society organizations. The main arguments
against the nuclear programme are the cost, safety of nuclear technology, and
alternative solutions that include an expansion of the renewable energy pro-
gramme. Numerous local and international NGOs share these views, motivated
through environmental conservation concerns or place-based concerns about
the prospects of having nuclear power plants built in their proximity.
The main business actors in this coalition are business associations and
trade unions. The main mine worker unions (NUM, NUMSA, and COSATU)
argue against the programme. The unions express concern about harmful
impacts of an expensive nuclear programme on economic growth and job
creation (COSATU 2015). The trade unions historically protect labour rights
in the mining sectors. COSATU argues that the baseload generation argument
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for nuclear energy does not hold, as coal-ﬁred plants can provide sufﬁcient
baseload to supplement renewable energy. COSATU also expresses its con-
cerns about the possibility of human error and natural disasters, which led to
the accidents in Ukraine, the United States (US), and Japan. They highlight the
lack of safe waste storage and a policy framework to store waste in a secure
manner. Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), South Africa’s largest business
association, shares the unions’ concern about the cost of the programme. The
association supports the recommendations of the national planning commis-
sion to delay the decision on an ‘extremely expensive technology option’, as
electricity demand has declined (Paton 2014). A few governmental actors form
part of the opposing coalition to the nuclear programme. The National
Treasury has kept its eye on the cost of the nuclear programme, which is its
principal argument that may lead to halting the programme.
When President Jacob Zuma ﬁrst took ofﬁce, he assembled a planning
commission to develop a vision for the country’s development path until
2030. The ﬁrst draft did not touch on the nuclear programme, but the ﬁnal
draft recommended to delay the decision and to conduct environmental and
economic analyses to understand the feasibility of the programme ﬁrst (NPC
2011). The Energy Commissioner argued against the nuclear programme
stating that it would not contribute to solving the current electricity crisis
and that it is more expensive than other options. He argued that Eskom does
not have the institutional capacity to operate a ﬂeet of six power plants, which
would leave the operation to foreign companies. The National Energy Regu-
lator (NERSA) argued against the nuclear programme, because of its high cost
and opportunity cost of an investment in nuclear power, which would be
better placed in renewable energy, which allows for power generation from
independent power producers.
The opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), argued against nuclear
power using similar arguments. Long lead times of building nuclear power
plants will not solve the current supply shortages. The ANC should rather look
into affordable renewable energy options than invest in an expensive nuclear
programme. The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) argued that the cost for
the programme is too high, the technology is not safe, and emissions reduc-
tions can be achieved through expanding the renewable energy programme
(Ndlozi 2015).
14.3.2 Political Discourse Shaping South Africa’s Nuclear
Technology Decision
Sections 14.3.2.1–14.3.2.8 contextualize the main arguments and actors in the
discourse networks within the framework of analysis of political factors that
favour nuclear programmes, according to Sovacool and Valentine (2012).
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14.3.2.1 Cost
Cost is the most controversial issue in the current debate on the nuclear build
programme. Both coalitions refer to the cost argument. Thirty-nine state-
ments from the opposition question the affordability of the programme, while
the supporters afﬁrm the affordability of the programme. The polarizing
debate on costs emerges from the variety of cost estimates available publicly
and the lack of cost assessment for the South African programme.
The costs per kilowatt of new build nuclear power vary from different
sources and high or low cost scenarios between US$1,500 and US$8,000
(Caetano and Rennkamp 2014; Thomas 2010). Taking the lowest and the
highest price estimates for the nuclear build programme of 9.6 GW, prices
range between US$14.4 billion and US$76.6 billion. The National Treasury
collects annual revenue of roughly ZAR780 billion/US$46 billion.
Delayed scenarios that increase the initial cost estimates are likely in nuclear
power plant building, because every plant is innovative. Any changes that
engineers need to make in the construction require approval from the national
regulator to ensure the safety of the plant. These additional bureaucratic
processes often cause delays. Recent nuclear plants built in Flamanville,
France, and Olkiluoto, Finland, cost more than twice the originally estimated
budget and delayed construction times were over ten years (WNN 2015).
Large public infrastructure works bear additional risk factors. Strikes of
highly unionized workers may cause delays. Scarce civil engineering and road
infrastructure may cause unforeseen logistical challenges. Both risk factors
have caused delays during the construction of the coal-ﬁred plants in Medupi
and Kusile (SAPA 2015; Steyn 2015a).
14.3.2.2 Opposition to Political Authority
The contested price tag of the nuclear build programme caused major debates
within the government and the energy stakeholder network. Several ANC
internal battles emerged from this issue. The controversial dismissal of former
ﬁnance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, had its roots in his critical eye on the build
programme, among other issues (Brummer 2015; Paton 2015). Old and new
ﬁnance minister, Pravin Gordhan, committed to funding only projects that fall
within the budget (England 2015). Jacob Zuma stated in his state of the nation
speech in February 2016, ‘we will only procure nuclear on a scale and pace that
our country can afford’ (Zuma 2016). The energy minister stated repeatedly
that nuclear energy ‘will be affordable’ and that it had calculated the cost of the
build programme, but cannot release any of the cost estimates (Gqirana 2015).
The National Planning Commission commissioned a study on the cost
implication of a nuclear programme, which revised the assumption of IRP
(ERC 2013). The update of the IRP reported similar dynamics and suggested
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that the nuclear decision ‘can possibly be delayed’ (DoE 2013: 8). The update
process of the IRP suggests that there are controversies within the department,
as department internal analysts suggested delaying the nuclear decision. These
controversies have not been reﬂected in the public discourse.
The debates on the cost of the programme closely relate to the power battles
internal to the ANC and the opposition to political authority, as Sovacool and
Valentine (2012) put it. In a single party system with nearly two-thirds
majority of the vote, internal opposition creates substantial checks and balances.
Traditional opposition work from alternative political parties is compromised,
as they are unlikely to win a national election and threaten the power position
of the ruling elite.
14.3.2.3 Economic Interventionism
The debate on cost also relates to the concept of ‘economic interventionism’.
The nuclear programme would be South Africa’s largest public expenditure
in the history of the country. The public procurement process will have to
correspond to the constitutional rules. These require that public expenditure
corresponds to ﬁve principles: 1) value for money; 2) open and effective
competition; 3) ethics and fair dealing; 4) accountability and reporting; and
5) equity. Public procurement procedures in principle need to correspond to
each of these pillars (RSA 1996, n.d.). The rules correspond to the govern-
ment’s attempts for Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), which targets
(previously) disadvantaged groups of individuals, small businesses, and local
producers to beneﬁt from economic development. Inequalities in ownership
of South Africa’s asset base continue to be a major structural problem, which
these rules aim to correct. The procurement rules specify more details on the
relationship between price and social development criteria (localization, com-
munity development) in speciﬁc programmes. A ‘public protector’ oversees
these processes (RSA 2014). A government gazette supports the procurement
of the nuclear programme (DoE 2015a).
Another typical characteristic of economic interventionism is the attempt to
advance job creation and industrial development through large publicly pro-
cured infrastructure projects. The analysis of discourse coalitions showed that
the supporting coalition argues for industrial development and job creation as
positive outcomes of the nuclear programme. ‘Localization’ is a very speciﬁc
objective in South African economic policy-making. The idea of introducing
local content requirements into public procurement rules is common in
developing countries. The aim is to minimize the amount of imported tech-
nology and to produce as many components as possible locally. South Africa’s
Department of Science and Technology developed a ‘localization strategy’
that aims to mainstream the approach of localizing technological components
across the economy (DST 2008). Localization always comes with the trade-off
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between potential job creation locally, a higher technology price, and delays
caused through technological learning.
Nuclear energy technology also falls under the localization strategy (DST
2008). The DoE aims to achieve the following objectives through localization,
based on its nuclear energy policy: 1) lead the supply of nuclear products and
services; 2) create jobs; 3) become self-sufﬁcient in all aspects of the nuclear
fuel cycle; and 4) contribute to energy security and economic growth (DoE
2013). Uranium enrichment can be mined as a by-product of gold and copper
mining. A small industry of three companies contributes to 1 per cent of the
world’s uranium supply. This is a relatively small share, given that South
Africa’s accessible uranium reserves add up to 4.8 per cent of the world’s
known resources (Van Wyk 2013).
The representatives of the Russian nuclear industry nurtured the South
African government’s aspiration to revive nuclear manufacturing processes
locally and to create jobs in the sector. Rosatom spokesperson, Segey Novikos,
sees potential for 60 per cent localization of the nuclear plants in South Africa
through Rosatom (SABC 2013). Former energy minister, Ben Martins,
pointed out that localization, job creation, and skills development were the
main ‘tenets’ to ‘create a better life for our people’ (Campbell 2013). The
dreams of reactivating the nuclear value chain with a local enrichment and
nuclear fuel programme are ‘unrealistic’ with outdated technologies and no
access to an enrichment plant, according to a representative of the Nuclear
Energy Industry Association. Localization of the construction increases the
cost of the programme, but the actual numbers are unknown.3 Areva criticized
the South African localization plans as being unrealistic, as only 10 per cent of
local companies were qualiﬁed to contribute local content, which makes 50–80
per cent targets difﬁcult to implement (Steyn 2015b).
14.3.2.4 Job Creation and Skills
Job creation is the third contested impact of the nuclear build programme. The
coalition of supporters uses this argument frequently in support of the pro-
gramme. In light of a national unemployment crisis with unemployment as
high as 25 per cent and youth unemployment at 50 per cent, the national
government’s discourse centres on prioritizing job creation (RSA 2010). The
programme can create similar employment to Koeberg in each new power
plants, which adds up to roughly 10,000 permanent jobs in the operation. Job
creation in construction, design, and manufacturing are uncertain.
The debate on job creation questions who the beneﬁciaries would actually
be. Former energy minister, Dipuo Peters, saw job creation potential along the
3 Interview, South African Nuclear Industry Association (2013).
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value chain including the uranium-mining sector. The controversial Gupta
family acquired a uranium mine, but required additional funding to operate it
(Shamase 2011; Gosam 2016). Greenpeace argues that job creation in the
nuclear programme is unlikely to make a difference, as the technology is
highly specialized and import-driven. COSATU argues along similar lines,
nuclear programme will have minimal effects on South Africa’s unemployment
crisis. Most likely, this will beneﬁt specialists in the nuclear establishment and
foreigners. The estimates for job creation vary from 27,000 (Eskom) to 70,000
(DoE) on up to 400,000 (Areva) (Biyase 2010; Felix 2013).
The debate on skills and their development intertwines with the debate on
job creation. NECSA appears in the opposing coalition once, because of the
statement that there are not enough skills in the nuclear sector, despite their
training efforts. Others doubt whether the skills development in the past still
sufﬁces to manage a large scale build programme in the future (Wild 2013).
NGOs argue that the country lacks the nuclear engineers to operate the ﬂeet
safely (Abbas 2015). Eskom denies any skills shortages (Wild 2013).
14.3.2.5 Safety
Safety concerns are the second main contested argument in the discourse
network. The coalition of opponents mainly uses this argument along three
lines. The ﬁrst argument refers to the risks of nuclear accidents. Greenpeace
argues that there is a lack of regulatory capacity to deal with nuclear accidents
at the scale of Fukushima (Macleod 2011; Donelly 2015). The bulk of the
NGOs, political opposition parties, and trade unions share this general con-
cern. The second argument refers to the risk from radiation under normal
operation. The third argument refers to waste and its storage. Nuclear waste
can never be stored safely and can jeopardize the health of the generations to
come according to Earthlife and the Coalition against Nuclear Energy in South
Africa (Bega 2011).
The main argument of the nuclear supporters is that Koeberg has been
operated safely for 30 years. Eskom, Nuclear Africa, Kgalema Motlanthe, the
DoE, and the National Nuclear Regulator share this point (Bega 2011). Safety
and environmental concerns of the nuclear programme motivated numerous
local and international NGOs to engage publicly in the discourse on nuclear
energy. Earthlife and Greenpeace produced studies to inform the debate
(Earthlife 2007; Adam et al. 2011). Almost half of the actors in the opposing
coalition are NGOs.
There are a number of local organizations that tackle the immediate
consequences of nuclear power plants near major urban spaces. Yet, civil
society engagement remains largely at the small scale of individual research,
publications, and media interviews.
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The factor of ‘social peripheralization’ implies that NGOs are only margin-
ally inﬂuential in the political discourse (Sovacool and Valentine 2012). NGOs
are a substantial component of the coalition of opponents. Overall, 16 active
NGOs represent a population of 55 million people and their focus is mainly on
knowledge production, media outreach, and local initiatives. There are no
visible nationwide campaigns.
14.3.2.6 Energy Security, Renewable Energy, and ‘Baseload’
A third debate centres on energy security and the feasibility of nuclear
technologies over other alternatives. The third most frequent argument in
the opposing coalition relates to the feasibility of nuclear versus renewable and
other technologies. Actors argue that the prospects of renewable energy tech-
nologies make the nuclear programme unnecessary. Their short construction
lead times can help solving the current supply shortages. Further arguments
relate to higher cost-effectiveness and safety, as well as the fact that South
Africa’s abundant solar and wind resources that have not been fully
exploited yet.
The coalition of supporters counters arguments for renewable energy with
the need for ‘baseload generation’ (Pressly 2013). This argument refers to
baseload power needed to address the intermittency of solar and wind tech-
nologies during the night and in case of no wind. The actors supporting
nuclear energy argue mainly that nuclear power provides basepower, which
renewable energy does not. NIASA, NECSA, CPUT, and the DoE continue
this line of argument that the country needs to reduce emissions. Minister
Joemat-Pettersson summed up this view asking the question, ‘How are we
going to reduce our carbon footprint and increase our baseload if we are
not going to do nuclear energy?’ (Gqirana 2015).
The main debates on the technical issues on energy security, as well as
baseload and alternative supply technologies reﬂect the structure of the power
sector and the energy network. Increasing the inﬂux of renewable energy
would favour independent power producer and change the current structure
of the power sector towards decentralization. A power sector reform towards
decentralization would create power losses in the current beneﬁciaries of the
sector, which are mainly the state-owned companies operating coal and
nuclear plants, Eskom, and to some extent NECSA. Attempts to restructure
Eskom have failed as the process of the Independent SystemMarkets Operator
(ISMO) illustrate. The bill was dropped after ﬁve years of consultation.
In sum, the debate on baseload versus renewable energy technology reﬂects
the polarizing positions on the current and future structure of the power
system and its stakeholder network.
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14.3.2.7 Secrecy, Transparency, and Corruption
The political opposition parties, as well as NGOs, argue against the nuclear
programme, because of the lack of transparency in the policy process and risk
for corruption. Secrecy surrounding the relationship with Russia, the cost of
the programme and controversial appointments as Minister of Energy fuelled
these arguments. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) argues that the nuclear
programme can be compared to the arms deal in the way the cabinet runs the
process secretly ignoring the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA)
(Fakir and Pienaar 2016). The NNEECC’s ‘proceedings and documents are
classiﬁed under the Minimum Information Security Standard Act (MISS Act)
as TOP SECRET’. The Committee reports to the cabinet. No agenda or
minutes can be shared with the public (Zuma 2015).
The DoE has denied any allegations of secrecy arguing that the documents
need to be kept classiﬁed in order not to compromise the integrity of the
process or confuse the public (DoE 2015b; Gqirana 2015; Zulu 2015; Le
Cordeur 2016). The arguments about corruption and lack of transparency
from the opposition to the nuclear programme emerge from the unknown cost
of the programme, the lack of transparency in the procurement process, and
the relations with Russia.
14.3.2.8 International Prestige and Geopolitical Dimensions
The veil of secrecy on cost and procurement reaches into the geopolitical
dimensions of the nuclear energy programme. The nuclear technologies will
require technology transfer from international vendor companies. These
companies are typically closely linked to their national governments and
make presidential diplomacy an essential component of international nuclear
procurement. The South African government entertains close relationships to
the world’s major nuclear powers. Most of the world’s installed nuclear
capacity sits in the US, France, Japan, and Russia (IAEA 2015). An invitation
to join the BRICS economics club catalysed the government’s attempts to
expand relations with other emerging economies. The BRICS are one of the
few clubs that mostly favour nuclear power. In this group, Russia has been the
country that the South African government has least established relations
with. The nuclear programme offered an opportunity to ﬁll the gap. Russia
has been revitalizing its nuclear programmes under Putin’s rule. Zuma had
made the nuclear programme his presidential priority. He used the engage-
ment with the BRICS nations to explore partnerships for implementation.
According to media reports, Putin and Zuma negotiated the terms of the
nuclear cooperation during the BRICS summits and several bilateral visits
between 2010 and 2015 (Hunter and Faull 2014; Gosam 2016).
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The DoE worked towards signing Memorandi of Understanding (MoU)
with several countries, which are eligible to supply nuclear technology to
South Africa. These MoU were very different in nature, length, and detail
with the MoU with Russia the most lengthy and detailed (DoE 2015b). The
opposition to nuclear power suspected that Russian suppliers had already been
chosen as preferred partners without following public procurement rules. The
DoE kept the MoU with Russia secret and did not reveal the details until the
Mail and Guardian published a translation from the Russian version of
the same MoU. Russia’s nuclear provider, Rosatom, had published it on its
website (RSA/RF 2014).
14 .4 CONCLUSION
The analysis has shown the main controversies and coalitions in favour of and
in opposition to the South African nuclear build programme. The structure of
the coalitions and the main arguments in the debate can explain why the South
African government chose to procure nuclear power over other alternative
options. The nuclear build programme shapes two polarized coalitions. The
opposing coalition is larger and consists mainly of civil society organizations
concerned with environmental issues and good governance. The most power-
ful actor is the National Treasury, which is the main political counterweight to
supporters in the DoE, NECSA, and the Presidency. The coalition of sup-
porters is much smaller and consists mainly of government actors, business,
and a few experts in academia and consulting ﬁrms. The supporting coalition
may be smaller, but has higher stakes in the programme, as well as immediate
ﬁnancial and employment beneﬁts in case of success.
The arguments in the discourse network relate to the six political conditions
that help to explain why they should favour nuclear programmes. First, the
debate on the cost of the nuclear programme reveals the main political battles
within the ANC. The subordination of opposition to political authority is
particularly striking in the single party system. Most checks and balances
occur within the ruling party, while the formal opposition poses no immediate
electoral threat. The National Treasury is therefore the main political coun-
terweight to the nuclear programme. Second, the debate on cost also relates to
the favouring factor of economic interventionism, as the state plays a strong
role in picking winners through public procurement and setting rules for
localization and job creation for relatively specialized nuclear workers who
have very different proﬁles from the millions of unemployed in South Africa.
Third, the debate on safety reﬂects an active civil society engagement in
knowledge production, but without major political awareness campaigns
and public outreach to ANC voters. Civil society engagement is not peripheral,
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but it has not mobilized those who can make a difference with their votes.
Fourth, the debate on energy security, baseload, renewables, and emissions
reductions reﬂects the clashes in the energy stakeholder network in a centrally
organized political system between those who want to preserve the status quo
and those who argue for reform. The defenders of the status quo aim to
preserve existing privileges, while supporters argue for decentralization and
uptake of new technology options. Fifth, security concerns are secondary in
today’s nuclear debate. International prestige mattered more in the past
than today. Secrecy is a major characteristic of the current nuclear govern-
ance style and the ANC has preserved the culture of secrecy of the past in
managing the nuclear build programme. The lack of transparency in the
procurement, classiﬁcation of documentation on any environmental and cost
assessments, and hidden details on the nature of international relations fuel
doubts on the legitimacy of the programme. Sixth, geopolitical inﬂuences play
a signiﬁcant role in the implementation of the programme. Secrecy conferred
on the agreements with Russian agencies and institutional counterparts has
fuelled suspicions of corruption. The ANC’s political culture of secrecy
reﬂects elements of an autocratic rather than a democratic, open, and trans-
parent regime.
The analysis revealed how the political conditions that favour nuclear
programme play out in South Africa. Economic factors such as cost, job
creation, the health of the ﬁnancial sector, and state-owned entities turned
out to be signiﬁcant, which the original framework did not account for.
Security concerns become insigniﬁcant, as the economic factors turn out to
be the main determinant of success or failure of the programme. Beneﬁts of
job creation, ﬁnancial prospects for constrained public entities, and uranium
mining prospects for government-related businesses are tangible gains for the
coalition of supporters, which suggests that South Africa’s nuclear programme
is not primarily about generating electricity.
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European Energy Security
Challenges and Green Opportunities
Almas Heshmati and Shahrouz Abolhosseini
15.1 INTRODUCTION
Energy security can be considered as both an international and a national
security issue that may lead to cross-national tensions. Europe is facing some
challenges and also has possible opportunities to avoid or to overcome these
challenges. The crisis in Ukraine, with its importance as an energy corridor for
Europe, is a threat to energy security at a time when political tensions have
increased between Ukraine and Russia. Iran could be considered as an alter-
native source of energy for the European market, but there is a longstanding
dispute between Iran and the West involving economic sanctions. Iran is not
only the holder of the largest natural gas reserves and the fourth largest crude
oil reserves in the world (BP 2014), but it is also located in a geopolitical area.
The European Union (EU) is determined to diversify its energy supply in
order to reduce its dependency on Russian supplies. In this regard, renewable
energy technologies are an alternative for power generation and subsequent
dependency reduction. A sizable investment has been made in the EU for
developing renewable energies. The advanced technologies of Europe enable
these countries to produce renewable energy more cost-effectively and the
power generated by these sources continues to increase. However, proﬁtability
of renewable energies depends on the prices in the depletable energies market.
Thus, developing the renewable energy market is very sensitive to price
ﬂuctuations in primary energy sources. In this regard, integrating distributed
renewable energy sources and smart grids within local marketplaces for
trading renewable energy in small units can be a promising combination for
enhancing renewable energy deployment. Considering Europe’s intention to
organize a single harmonized system, the member countries are required to
apply suitable mechanisms to support renewable energy enhancement.
In this research, we review the relevant literature on the current state and
effectiveness of developing renewable energy on energy security. The review
uses primary energy import sources, possible alternatives, and considers how
energy security in Europe is affected by the sources. For this purpose, the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated to measure the level of
energy security for selected countries. We also examine EU energy policy,
try to analyse the reasons why Europe should adopt a new energy policy
direction, and we suggest alternative solutions for enhanced energy supply
security. The aim is to suggest suitable solutions for energy security in Europe
through energy supply diversiﬁcation, including alternative energy corridors,
to reduce dependency on Russian supplies and enhance the power generated
by renewable energy sources in order to meet energy targets based on the EU
2020 strategy including greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction,1 renew-
able energy deployment, and energy efﬁciency enhancement. The information
used for the chapter is derived mainly from ofﬁcial reports and is based on
secondary data sources.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 15.2 discusses the
effects of renewable energy development on energy security. Section 15.3 deals
with the challenges in the Middle East and the balance of energy demand and
supply in Europe. This is followed by a discussion of import sources and
possible alternatives for Europe in Section 15.4. Section 15.5 presents a policy
framework aimed at enhancing energy security in Europe. Section 15.6 provides
a conclusion.
15 .2 THE EFFECTS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON ENERGY SECURITY
Ongoing concerns about energy security have been raised since the Arab oil
embargo in 1973 when oil importing countries in Europe and elsewhere were
faced with the effects of high oil prices and limited energy supplies. Although
concerns about energy security started waning with low oil prices in the 1980s,
oil prices increased again over the next decades. Considering the importance
of energy for economic development and growth, industrialized countries
focused on alternative policies to enhance alternative energy sources such as
nuclear power and renewable energy. Over recent years, climate change and
environmental protection have been at the core of energy policies together
with energy security. Nuclear power and renewable energy sources have been
1 Europe 2020 is a ten-year strategy proposed by the European Commission in March 2010
for advancement of the economy of the EU. It aims for smart, sustainable, inclusive growth with
greater coordination of national and European policy (European Commission 2010).
European Energy Security 293
suggested as alternative sources since the 1970s. However, since the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, energy policies in relation to nuclear
power plants have been reshaped around the world.
Deese (1979) discusses the economic, political, and security aspects of
energy. Energy security is achieved when stable sources of energy are available
at affordable prices. It is possible to attain high energy security through
internal (domestic) or external (imported) energy supplies. Russia has been
the main source, providing 41 per cent of total European imports of energy in
2014 (BP 2015a). Germany has been importing 45 per cent of its natural gas
demand from Russia. Considering the disputes that have occurred between
Russia, Ukraine, and Western powers over recent years regarding gas trans-
mission and political interventions, European countries are looking for sus-
tainable sources of energy to diversify their energy supply sources. Policy
makers have therefore been trying to enhance the deployment of renewable
energy sources through different incentive policies such as feed-in-tariffs and
renewable portfolio standard carbon tax.
15.2.1 Natural Gas and the Interplay with
Renewables and the Environment
The literature about natural gas and the interplay with renewables, particularly
related to temporal transitions, energy/environmental policies, and energy
security, has been developing rapidly. Creutzig et al. (2014) view the energy
transition in Europe as catching two European birds (mitigating climate
change and energy security crisis) with one renewable stone. The governance
of natural gas transit in Europe is investigated by Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, and
Wochnik (2015). They develop a theoretical framework to explore the regu-
latory practices and spatial features of this unexplored infrastructural realm.
This chapter reveals emerging new socio-technical assemblage and institu-
tional orders other than the traditional organizational arrangements.
The interaction of risks associated with natural gas and renewable resources
for electricity is analysed by Esposito, Krupp, and Carley (2015). They identify
risks relating to development, construction of power plants and transmission
systems, planning, costs, and policies decisions, and show how the risks can
potentially be offset. Lee et al. (2012), in the case of the United States (US), ﬁnd
natural gas and renewable energy technologies enjoy many complementarities
arising from their similarities, but ﬁnd that their dissimilarities provide the
biggest opportunities for mutually beneﬁcial collaboration. Mediavilla et al.
(2013) refer to the physical limits and temporal conditions in the transition
from an oil economy towards renewable energies. The temporal dynamics of
energy transitions is studied by Sovacool (2016). The focus is on the speed at
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which transition can take place and causal complexity underlying the concep-
tions and deﬁnitions of energy transitions.
Fischhendler and Nathan (2014), in their study of energy security in
Israel, ﬁnd the concept of energy security open to manipulation and various
interpretations by inter-ministerial committees. The security concept differs
from environmental acceptability and interdependency, supply reliability,
and geopolitical beneﬁts. Verdeil et al. (2015) also discuss the challenge of the
transition to development of urban natural gas in the Mediterranean Metrop-
olis. The issue of accurately forecasting the availability of natural gas to ensure
sustainable energy policy is emphasized by Darda, Guseo, and Mortarino
(2015). The use of alternative reserve estimates for South Asian natural gas
shows where in the region the reserves allow for building a sustainable power
reserve system for natural gas tomeet increasing energy demand in themedium
term. Ghezelbash et al. (2015) emphasize the use of high net present values of
selected systems in the assessment of performance of natural gas expansion.
Kahrl et al. (2013) analyse the changes necessary to increase the share of natural
gas in China’s electricity mix.
15.2.2 Renewable Energy Development
As mentioned in Section 15.2.1, renewable energy sources have been devel-
oped to enhance energy security and emission reduction. European countries
are at the forefront when it comes to improving efﬁciencies and using renew-
able energy. Also, tax policies have been applied by these countries in order to
reduce liquid fossil fuel consumption. It is expected that liquid fuel consump-
tion in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries will be 14.0 million b/d (barrels per day) in 2040 which is
0.8 million b/d lower than the 2010 level (EIA 2014). The importance of
developing renewable energy has been highlighted by climate change and
energy security issues through the excessive consumption of fossil fuels,
political instabilities in the Middle East, and uncertainty around supply
disruptions due to political disputes in Ukraine. Germany is considered to
be the forerunner when it comes to generating renewable energy, because it
was able to raise the share of renewable energy sources in its fuel-mix to more
than 10 per cent in 2014.
Renewable energy has been developing rapidly in recent years. Reductions
in costs due to economies of scale and use of advanced technologies have made
it possible for countries to generate renewable energy more efﬁciently and
cost-effectively. Table 15.1 compares power generation costs and cost outlooks
based on different sources of energy over the period 2000–15 and 2015–50,
respectively.
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As can be seen in Table 15.1, Solar PV accounted for the largest reductions
in costs during the last decade. Renewable technologies may not be compatible
with conventional fuels due to unit costs, but they could be feasible if we were
to consider associated externalities such as carbon emissions and social effect.
Table 15.1. Power generation costs (2000–15) and cost outlook (2015–50) based on
sources of energy, US$ per megawatt hour
2000 2010 2014 2015 2000–15 (%)
Power generation costs: 62 58 52 47 −24
Gas (CCGT) US
Hydro 52 70 67 66 25
Geothermal 48 84 77 72 50
Gas (CCGT) Europe 47 80 80 76 62
Coal US 57 81 80 80 40
Wind onshore 76 116 82 86 14
Gas (OCGT) US 117 110 96 91 −23
Coal (Europe) 77 109 92 92 19
Nuclear 74 96 100 102 37
Gas (OCGT) Europe 94 142 139 134 42
Solar PV 509 333 145 135 −74
Biomass 109 144 140 139 28
Coal w/CCS US 84 135 146 156 86
Coal w/CCS Europe 107 152 154 164 53
Wind offshore NA 205 180 184 NA
Solar CSP 207 238 226 200 −4
Wave-tidal NA 280 296 302 NA
2015 2020 2030 2050 2015–50 (%)
Power generation cost outlook: 135 117 89 51 −62
Solar PV
Geothermal 72 71 69 66 −8
Hydro 66 66 66 66 1
Wind onshore 86 83 79 70 −18
Solar CSP 200 178 141 88 −56
Gas (CCGT) US 47 61 70 92 94
Nuclear 102 101 98 92 −9
Gas (CCGT) Europe 76 85 92 102 34
Coal US 80 92 101 114 43
Wind offshore 184 172 151 116 −37
Coal Europe 92 112 122 130 42
Biomass 139 138 137 133 −5
Coal w/CCS US 156 157 150 137 −13
Coal w/CCS Europe 164 175 167 149 −9
Wave-tidal 302 274 226 154 −49
Gas (OCGT) US 91 111 124 159 76
Gas (OCGT) Europe 134 147 157 174 31
Notes: CCGT=combined cycle gas turbine; OCGT=open-cycle gas turbine; CCS=carbon capture and storage;
CSP=concentrated solar power; PV=photovoltaic; NA=not available; US=United States.
Source: Adapted from EI (2015).
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Also, economies of scale are crucial for reducing unit costs. Bohi and Toman
(1993) studied energy security by looking at externalities and policies.
Table 15.1 shows that Solar PV is expected to be the least expensive power-
generation technology by 2050. The unit cost for this technology reduced by
74 per cent during 2000–15 and it is forecast that this will reduce further by
another 62 per cent over 2015–50. Therefore, Solar PV could be considered
as an alternative source of energy in decent sunlight conditions, for example,
in Central Europe.
Currently, nuclear power is being considered as an alternative to fossil fuels
in European countries, but these countries are also coming under pressure to
stop the operation of existing nuclear power plants. There has been a de facto
moratorium on the construction of new nuclear power plants, with phase-outs
announced by Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, and the
Netherlands (Asif and Muneer 2007). Additionally, high primary energy
prices combined with energy support policies have been the main driver in
enhancing renewable energy sources. Many OECD countries have enacted
national policies to support sustainable development through clean technolo-
gies. These policies deal with a wide range of objectives such as energy security,
market competition, and environmental protection. Economic feasibility is at
the core of renewable energy development. Without this essential parameter,
renewable energy technologies will not be able to compete with conventional
fossil fuels. Table 15.2 shows the growth rates of wind and solar energy
consumption as the main renewable energy sources, based on region, over
the period 2010–14.
Based on the ﬁgures presented in Table 15.2, we see a rapidly increasing
trend (as high as a 3–4 digit growth rate) during 2010–14 for wind and solar
energy consumption. In parallel with non-oil and gas producing countries,
even countries located in the Middle East are determined to develop solar
energy for environmental reasons. Among individual countries, the US had
Table 15.2. Wind and solar energy consumption in 2010–14, in terawatt hour (TWh)
Wind power Solar power
2010 2014 Change, % 2010 2014 Change, %
North America 105.5 202.1 91.6 1.3 19.3 1384.6
South and Central America 3.5 17.7 405.7 a 1.1 >2000.0
Europe & Eurasia 152.6 261.6 71.4 23.2 99.7 329.7
Middle East 0.2 0.3 50.0 0.1 1.1 1000.0
Africa 2.2 6.1 177.3 0.3 2.1 600.0
Asia-Paciﬁc 79.4 218.3 174.9 6.4 62.6 878.1
World 343.4 706.2 105.6 31.4 185.9 492.0
Note: ‘a’ indicates less than 0.05 level of signiﬁcance.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 2015a).
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the highest consumption of wind energy (183.6 TWh), which was more than
the total consumption in the top ﬁve consumer countries in Europe (171.1
TWh); the US also accounted for 26 per cent of the total global consumption of
wind power (BP 2015a). Europe had a lower growth rate than North America,
but it ranked ﬁrst in relation to total wind and solar energy consumption.
In other words, developing renewable energy sources has already reached a
high level in Europe.
15 .3 MIDDLE EAST CHALLENGES AND
ENERGY BALANCE IN EUROPE
The Middle East is considered to be the main source of crude oil supply in the
world. Almost 35 per cent of the total crude oil traded on the world market is
supplied by Middle Eastern exporters. Russia and the Middle East are major
exporters of natural gas and crude oil to Europe. Considering the potential
for terrorist attacks and political instability in these regions, Europe requires
alternative sources of energy supply. Other factors such as climate change
and crude oil prices make it even more important to switch from fossil fuels
to renewable energy sources. The Yom Kippur War (1973), the Iranian
Revolution (1979), the Iran–Iraq War (1980), the First Persian Gulf War
(1991), the Second Persian Gulf War (2003), the Arab Spring in Egypt, the
Libyan and Syrian Civil Wars (2011), and the Yemen Civil War (2014),
together with the Saudi Arabian invasion of Yemen (2015) have all contrib-
uted to continued political instability in the Middle East. Owen (2004)
discusses oil supply insecurity: control versus damage costs. Sen and Babali
(2006) focus on problems of and solutions to security concerns for oil supply
in the Middle East.
In the future, natural gas will play a critical role in the global energy market
due to its advantages relating to prices, availability, cleanness, and security.
Currently, European countries greatly depend on Russia as a supplier of
natural gas. After the Fukushima disaster, nuclear power has lost its priority
in the energy portfolio of EU-28 countries and alternative clean energy
resources are being seriously considered. However, the generation capacity
of renewable energy sources is not enough to cover the gap created by shutting
down nuclear power plants completely. If this trend aggregates with climbing
demand in the natural gas sector, Europe will depend more on foreign energy
resources and major producers.
In the past, the EU built an integrated single energy market to be used as an
asset in relations with neighbouring supplying countries. Therefore, when we
talk about supply diversiﬁcation, not only different sources of energy but also
different exporters and transit routes should be taken into account for the
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EU. Europe therefore needs to design an energy policy based on regional
integration in order to use it as leverage for making long-term and stable
partnerships with major suppliers. This new policy should create an ability to
develop concrete mechanisms to deal with emergency situations arising from
changing attitudes on the supply side. Vivoda (2009) asks whether diversiﬁ-
cation of oil import sources and energy security is a key strategy or an elusive
objective. Nuttall and Manz (2008) discuss a new energy security paradigm for
the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Considering this perspective, Europe needs to try and have a close relation-
ship with the Caucasus region to improve supply security and to establish an
international partnership. The Caucasus has started an ongoing trend of
capturing larger shares of the EU energy market, while export capacity is
affected by increasing domestic demand. Furthermore, there are some con-
straints on exports because of limited investments, lack of transport infra-
structure, lack of technology, and only a few available transit routes. Europe
depends on Russian energy sources, and Qatar’s exports cannot decrease
Europe’s energy vulnerability. Russia’s position as a dominant supplier in
the European energy market along with the EU’s limited internal resources
is forcing the EU to consider other suppliers in the Persian Gulf region. In this
regard, Iran could serve as a candidate for changing the EU’s energy portfolio.
15.3.1 Energy Policy in Europe
The location of existing oil reserves does not align with population concentra-
tion and energy use structures around the world. As an example, consumption
in Asia-Paciﬁc, Europe, and North America accounts for almost 77 per cent of
the total world consumption, while they control only 19 per cent of the global oil
reserves (BP 2015a). At the same time, the former Soviet Union, Middle East,
South America, and Africa consume 26 per cent while they control 81 per cent
of the world’s oil reserves.
A majority of energy suppliers are located in politically unstable regions,
such as the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, which poses high potential
risks due to political instability (in Iraq, Syria, Venezuela, and Nigeria). There
was a longstanding dispute between Iran as a key supplier in the Middle East
and Western powers, but this has been resolved recently. The changed rela-
tions could offer great potential for an alternative solution for the EU’s supply
diversiﬁcation plans. Therefore, EU countries need to use a speciﬁc energy
policy framework or energy diplomacy in order to take advantage of compe-
tition among suppliers including Iran.
Energy security can also be improved by replacing more vulnerable supplies
with stable sources of supplies. More than 40 per cent of Europe’s imported
natural gas through pipelines comes from Russia (BP 2015a). The gas supply
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dependency of Ukraine and Belarus on Russia is 74 per cent and 100 per cent
respectively. Considering that Ukraine is the main transit route for Russia to
export natural gas to Europe, the EU, as a third party, could suffer because of
any supply disruptions caused by a Ukraine–Russia dispute (gas pricing,
transit fee, or other political issues affecting the two countries’ relations).
‘Optimal policy can be achieved by pricing both energy security and
greenhouse gas abatement and pursuing each technology to the point
where its additional cost is equal to the marginal beneﬁts achieved in both
dimensions’ (Brown and Huntington 2008). There are three key targets
under the EU 2020 growth strategy that are supposed to be met by the
year 2020. First, a 20 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions from the
1990 level. Second, 20 per cent of energy to come from renewable energy
sources. Third, a 20 per cent improvement in energy efﬁciency. The effects of
renewable energy technologies, energy efﬁciencies, and market regulation on
carbon emission reduction are very important for this purpose. Different
energy policies may interact with each other. These interactive effects should
be accounted for in policy-making.
Indicators that are considered for supply diversiﬁcation and energy security
include import dependency, fuel-mix, and stocks of critical fuels
(Bhattacharyya 2011). The percentage of dependency on fuel imports shows
the potential of the risk. This dependency may not be the same for all fuel
types. Some countries are self-sufﬁcient in producing one fuel type but they
have to import another one. A ratio of the fuel-mix can be used by countries in
order to diversify sources of energy supply. The EU has developed renewable
energy sources in recent years and the region has also changed the major
source of motor fuels from gasoline to diesel.
15.3.2 The Monopolized Energy Market and the Necessity
of Including New Suppliers
Undoubtedly, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas for EU countries.
Russia has the second largest natural gas proven reserves in the world and
enjoys a monopoly in the European energy market, but we cannot ignore the
other players in the market. Some countries such as Azerbaijan, Algeria,
Nigeria, and Qatar have speciﬁc shares in gas supply to Europe. But in the
future we must observe some variations in these supplies which may cause
certain problems for EU countries. A similar situation may apply in the case of
crude oil. Natural gas reserves have not been concentrated as much as crude
oil, but Russia together with the Caspian Sea and the Middle Eastern regions is
the owner of about half of the total natural gas reserves in the world.
Major consumers, including the EU, will be more dependent on the same
regions for importing oil and gas. We should keep in mind that there is rapid
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growth in energy consumption in developing countries such as China and
India; they are looking for sources of energy in these regions too. So ﬁnding a
new source of energy and a sustainable supplier is very important not only for
Europe, but also for major emerging economies like China and India. In other
words, the Middle East is a kind of battleﬁeld between Western and Eastern
powers to win a greater share of oil and gas resources to obtain long-term
inﬂuence over the sector. Therefore, the security of oil and gas supply to the
EU in the long term depends on having access to producing areas.
15 .4 IMPORT SOURCES AND POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES FOR EUROPE
Comprising more than 40 per cent of the world’s crude oil and natural gas
proven reserves, the Middle East is the key region for energy supply. The free
ﬂow of oil to world markets from the Persian Gulf region forms a vital part of
major security issues. Cooperation between Iran–Europe, Iran–US, and Iran–
Persian Gulf states could show the Middle East to be a stable region that could
be important for both Europe and the US. DeRosa and Hufbauer (2008)
investigate the consequences of the normalization of economic relations for
Iran’s economy and the US. Katzman (2012) discusses US concerns about and
policy responses in relation to Iran. Europe would have access to an alternative
source of energy and the US would save a large amount of military expenses if
this happened. Political stability in the Middle East would allow for the US’s
estimated military expenses in the Persian Gulf to be reduced (Delucchi and
Murphy 2008).
Table 15.3 presents a security index for some countries over 1980–2012 in
the EU, including Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the UK. Net energy imports have been used as an energy security index in
this table. Net energy imports are calculated as a percentage of energy use
(production is excluded).
The HHI can be used to measure the level of energy security. However, this
index has a disadvantage as it does not take political risks into consideration.
The UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain had HHI above 2000, indicating that these
countries were highly concentrated for power generation (Bhattacharyya 2011).
We calculated the HHI of fuel-mix concentration for the selected countries
for the period 2000–14. Figure 15.1 shows the index values. Consistent with
Bhattacharyya’s study, our calculations show clearly that these countries rely
heavily on fossil fuels for power generation.
With the exception of France, we see a declining trend in the fuel-mix
concentration since 2009. This shows the effect of the 2008–9 crisis on energy
consumption. Policy makers tried to support alternative energy sources and
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enhance energy efﬁciency which led to decreasing levels of concentration.
We ﬁnd that Germany’s energy policy was more stable than that of other
sample countries. Also, Germany had the lowest HHI among the ﬁve selected
countries, while Italy and Spain showed signiﬁcant improvements in HHI
measurements after 2009. However, the level of concentration in the countries
chosen indicates that supportive policies should be the focus of policy makers
for diversifying energy sources. The diversity in the fuel-mix of primary
energy consumption in some European countries is shown in Table 15.4,
which gives the level of fuel-mix concentration of energy consumption in
seven European countries for 2010 and 2014.
Unlike Scandinavian countries, which rely mainly on hydropower, EU-28
will be relying on natural gas resources rather than on clean energy in the
Table 15.3. Energy security index for some countries in the European Union
1980 1990 2000 2010 2012
Germany 48.03 46.98 59.79 59.78 59.88
Denmark 95.02 41.03 −48.84 −20.68 −16.94
Spain 76.70 61.60 74.10 73.15 74.19
France 72.57 50.06 48.12 48.17 47.11
Italy 84.79 82.73 83.58 82.52 79.40
The Netherlands −11.58 7.83 21.38 16.31 17.26
Sweden 60.16 37.11 35.82 34.72 28.53
Europe Union 44.88 42.21 43.90 51.25
Source : World Bank (2015).
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Figure 15.1. Fuel-mix concentration level using HHI (2000–14).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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future. This implies that these countries need to develop relations with the
main suppliers and transit countries. Although part of Europe’s energy
demand could be covered by domestic suppliers in the east and north of the
continent, the EU imported around 78 per cent of crude oil consumption for
2014 (BP 2015a). Despite Europe being at the forefront of renewable energy
deployment in recent years, the table shows that fossil fuels still remain the
main source of primary energy consumption in the region.
15.4.1 Import Sources for Europe
Currently, Russia is considered to be the main source of energy for Europe.
Pipelines are not only a means of transportation for natural gas and crude oil
transmission, they also play a critical role related to geopolitics and energy
security. The Russia–Ukraine dispute in 2009 over pricing, when Russia cut off
gas supply to Ukraine and allowed increased ﬂows to South Eastern Europe
and to some parts of Central and Western Europe, is the best example of
pipeline politics leading to an energy crisis in Europe. The importance of
pipeline transmissions is also relevant in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Europe is looking for supplies for reducing its dependency on Russia.
In 2014, more than 30 per cent of energy trade movement through pipelines
in Europe was supplied by Russia. Europe imported 365.70 bcm (billion cubic
metres) of natural gas (320.8 pipeline, 44.9 Liqueﬁed Natural Gas, LNG) in
2014 (BP 2015a). A major part of the LNG import demand in Belgium, France,
Table 15.4. Fuel-mix of primary energy consumption in seven European countries (%)
Year Oil Natural gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Renewable
France 2010 33.04 16.72 4.79 38.39 5.67 1.35
2014 32.38 13.60 3.79 41.52 5.98 2.74
Germany 2010 36.03 22.91 23.94 9.95 1.35 5.82
2014 35.85 20.51 24.89 7.07 1.48 10.19
Italy 2010 42.50 39.71 7.97 – 6.51 3.26
2014 38.01 34.32 9.07 – 8.66 9.94
The Netherlands 2010 49.75 39.16 7.89 0.09 – 2.20
2014 48.83 35.64 11.10 1.11 – 3.21
Poland 2010 27.45 13.47 56.37 – 0.84 1.98
2014 24.87 15.36 55.28 – 0.52 4.08
Spain 2010 49.77 20.71 5.54 9.29 6.41 8.28
2014 44.74 17.82 9.02 9.77 6.69 12.03
UK 2010 35.25 40.41 14.92 6.74 0.38 2.34
2014 36.88 31.93 15.70 7.66 0.69 7.03
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 2015a).
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Italy, Spain, and UK is supplied by Qatar and Algeria. The other suppliers
(outside Europe) are Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago. About 3 per cent of
European LNG consumption is covered by other European suppliers.
Given current tensions between Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, there is
increasing concern about potential disruptions to the security of energy supply
to EU consumers in the long term; pipeline connections running from the East
to the West should be given special priority in order to mitigate these (Lise,
Hobbs, and Van Oostvoorn 2008). Iran could be considered as a potential
source in this regard. Security and the diversiﬁcation required for EU energy
supply highlight the signiﬁcance of an energy corridor bridging the large
natural gas reserves of the Caspian region, including those in Iran, with the
EU market (Mavrakis, Thomaidis, and Ntroukas 2006). The EU has failed to
create coherent energy security and energy foreign policy since the Russian–
Ukrainian gas conﬂict in January 2006. Supply diversiﬁcation through the
aforementioned countries and implementing an energy policy of decreasing
their overall gas demand will enable EU countries to reduce Russia’s gas
exports (Umbach 2010).
15.4.2 Renewable Energy Technologies as Alternative Sources
At individual country level, Germany has the highest rate of economic growth
together with the highest level of installed capacity of renewable energy
sources (Moutinho, Moreira, and Silva 2015). Natural gas is able to bridge
the transition period required for renewable energy technologies to facilitate
larger energy deployment in order to make it feasible from an economic point
of view. It is forecast that natural gas consumption in Europe will be 650
billion cubic metres of natural gas (bcma) in 2020 and 780 bcma in 2030, while
conventional gas production will decline to 230 bcma in 2020 and 140 bcma in
2030 (Weijermars et al. 2011).
Some scholars believe that transition progress for renewable energy sources
such as wind and solar will happen after 2020; even the growth rate of
consumption will increase rapidly during the next decade. Also, renewable
energy markets are not formed easily due to cost disadvantages and subsidized
fossil fuels (Jacobsson and Bergek 2004). Some countries such as Indonesia
took advantage of falling oil prices during 2014–15 to reduce subsidies paid for
fossil fuels, but still a large amount of subsidies are paid by oil-rich countries.
Because of the negative and irreversible externalities associated with conven-
tional energy production, what is required is enhancing renewable energy
supply technologies.
Economic policies can be used as incentives for enhancing production and
use of renewable energy sources. Also, charging taxes on emission generation
or fossil fuel consumption can be used as a supportive policy to promote
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the deployment of renewable energy. There are three types of supportive
mechanisms that are widely used by states to promote renewable energy
technologies: feed-in-tariffs (FIT), tax incentives, and renewable portfolio
standard (RPS). Both FIT and RPS mechanisms have been applied by the
EU to develop renewable energy technologies and it therefore has experience
with both of these mechanisms. FIT policy has led to the rapid expansion of
power generated by renewable energy sources and it has been employed more
than the RPS mechanism (Rickerson and Grace 2007).
A comparison of these policies indicates that FIT is an appropriate policy
for developing renewable energy sources when a low level of risk for investors
is required. However, the RPS mechanism works well when the government
wants to use a market view policy. Europe intends to organize a single
harmonized FIT system though this is impossible because of different policies
across the countries in the EU. The RPS system has not been implemented in
Europe because the FIT system has been used by most EU countries. Hence,
FIT policies are suitable for encouraging development of renewable energy
sources, while the RPS mechanism should be applied to renewable energy
sources promoted to a certain level (Abolhosseini and Heshmati 2014).
Considering the outlook for the renewable energy market, what is required is
a marketplace where small volumes of power generated can be traded. If such a
marketplace does not exist then enhancing renewable energy will be limited
to individual households to cover their own demands. Power generation by
renewable energy sources can also beneﬁt from integration of technologies.
Integrating distributing and renewable energy sources and smart grids within
local marketplaces for trading renewable energy in small units can be a prom-
ising combination for developing renewable energy sources across the EU
(Heshmati and Abolhosseini 2014).
The 2020 strategy sets three critical targets for renewable energy enhance-
ment to meet by 2020. This includes GHGs reduction, renewable energy
deployment, and energy efﬁciency improvement. These targets could be
achieved by developing renewable energy sources, technological change, and
market regulation on carbon emissions. An estimated model (Heshmati,
Abolhosseini, and Altmann 2015) shows that the role of governmental
policy-making is more important than economic growth.
15 .5 A NEW EUROPEAN POLICY FRAMEWORK
Energy security has moved up the EU’s priority list. A high import depend-
ency is not considered a problem in itself but it becomes an issue when supply
is interrupted. In spite of Europe’s struggle for energy saving and improving
the share of renewable energy in its energy basket, the region remains highly
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dependent on imports, especially of natural gas. The EU’s collaboration has to
extend to the Persian Gulf, East Mediterranean, and the Caucasus area because
Europe plays a critical role in the supply side of energy markets. Limited
natural gas resources in North Africa may lead to an increased focus on
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Qatar, and Iran as substitute sources. Due
to existing infrastructure problems, limited investments in gas ﬁelds, and
underdeveloped transit routes in these countries, Europe has to share the
costs and beneﬁts with the owners of energy resources.
A common energy policy applied by EU member countries enables them to
have a well-interconnected market in order to avoid possible supply disrup-
tions. These countries can create a competitive market for suppliers through
international collaborations with all market players. There are also economies
of scale in building necessary infrastructures. Considering certain targets for
reducing carbon emissions which have been deﬁned by different scenarios, it is
crucial for the EU to choose an optimal and proper direction for enhancing
energy efﬁciency. The share prices of major manufacturers of solar panels in
China and wind turbines in Denmark have decreased due to a sharp decrease
in crude oil prices. This suggests that clean energy policies are inﬂuenced more
by economic conditions than by environmental concerns.
In this research we aimed to deﬁne a policy framework for the EU’s energy
security. Considering the small share of power currently generated by renew-
able energy sources, it is necessary for EU countries to design an applicable
green pathway in order to achieve energy supply security (Heshmati 2014).
In order to improve energy efﬁciency and power generation by renewable
energy sources, high-level commitment, investment resources, and efﬁcient
management are required for the development and implementation of policies
and programmes (Gellings 2009). There are some barriers that should be
removed in order to facilitate the market creation process.
The Middle East and the Caucasus are two main strategic regions for the
supply of natural gas to Europe. For renewable energy to be enhanced, a
marketplace for green energy needs to be designed in order to promote
market liquidity. Developing renewable energy has relied on public support
and economic incentive programmes, but this has been affected by the
economic crisis. A proper marketplace for trading the power generated by
distributing renewable energy sources installed by households, combined
with support policies for enhancing energy efﬁciency will lead to promoting
market liquidity (see Heshmati and Abolhosseini 2014; Heshmati, Abolhosseini,
and Altmann 2015).
A multidimensional policy approach is required for achieving sustainable
energy security in Europe. Important dimensions of this policy include
improved security, lowered dependency, increased share of clean and renew-
able energy, diversiﬁed energy sources, and common energy policies. As such,
it is necessary to create a balanced security situation incorporating all potential
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market partners through international cooperation. For this to happen, a
proper policy design, effective policy-making for internal efﬁciency, and
diplomacy in external energy are required so as to be able to take advantage
of international cooperation.
15 .6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The free ﬂow of oil to world markets from the primary energy sources is a vital
part of energy safety issues. Energy security can be considered as both inter-
national and national security issues that may lead to cross-national tensions.
Europe is faced with some challenges and also has possible opportunities to
overcome these challenges. The Ukrainian crisis and its importance as an energy
corridor for Europe is a threat to energy security when political tensions increase
between Ukraine and Russia. Iran could have been considered as an alternative
source of energy supply for Europe, but there has been a longstanding disagree-
ment between Iran and the West involving economic sanctions.
The nuclear deal between Iran and Western powers in July 2015 (effective
on 16 January 2016) may facilitate possible changes that could build a bridge
between Iran’s natural gas sources and major consumers in Europe. Iran is not
only the holder of the largest natural gas reserves and the fourth largest crude
oil reserves in the world, but it is also located in a geopolitical area. The EU is
diversifying its energy supply in order to reduce its dependency on Russia.
In this regard, renewable energy technologies are an alternative means of power
generation. The EU has made sizable investments and the use of advanced
technologies enables the countries to produce renewable energy more cost-
effectively. The power generated by these sources also continues to increase.
This is consistent with sustainable development goals.
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Part V
Incumbency
Clean energy transitions entail sustained periods of collision between incum-
bents and new entrants. The tensions between new entrants and incumbents
are not purely economic, but range across political, regulatory, and cultural
landscapes as well. In this part, authors explore these dynamics through case
studies from three different perspectives.
Looking at recent regulatory disputes in Wisconsin, USA, Astoria explores
how a seemingly straightforward conﬂict over solar electricity rates in fact
reveals how deeply the regulatory framework has been shaped by the biophys-
ical characteristics of fossil fuels. The case illuminates the crucial role of legal
and institutional reform in achieving clean energy transitions. Shifting focus to
the wires that constitute electricity grids, Eid, Hakvoort, and de Jong examine
how the seemingly neutral term ‘smart grid’manifests itself in deeply different
ways in China, the EU, and USA. Drawing out the widely varied industrial
organization of each setting, the authors discuss how real-world implementa-
tion of smart grids encodes deeper signals of social priorities, economic
interests, and political economic constraints. Finally, shifting to one of the
largest remaining redoubts of incumbency, Asmelash explores the challenges
of—and pathways towards—a binding multilateral agreement to phase out
fossil fuel subsidies. Building upon a wide-ranging discussion of institutional
architecture and international legal precedent, the chapter focuses attention
on what role should be played by key multilateral institutions such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO).

16
Incumbency and the Legal Conﬁguration
of Hydrocarbon Infrastructure
Ross Astoria
16.1 INTRODUCTION
Through its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), the United
States (US) has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by between
26 and 28 per cent in 2025 relative to a 2005 baseline. The US commitment is
founded solely on regulations promulgated by administrative agencies under
existing statutory authority, including the Clean Air Act, the Energy Policy Act,
and the Energy Independence and Security Act (UNFCCC 2016). These regu-
lations include fuel-economy standards for various classes of vehicles, energy
conservation standards for appliances and some commercial buildings, and,
most prominently, carbon dioxide emission standards for new and existing
electrical generating units (EGUs). The regulations for new EGUs are known as
New Source Performance Standards (EPA 2015b) and those for existing EGUs,
as the Clean Power Plan (EPA 2015a). The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) promulgated both under the authority of the Clean Air Act.
In accordance with the Clean Air Act’s ‘cooperative federalism’, the Clean
Power Plan decentralizes the US’s mitigation effort by setting emission targets
for the individual states. The individual states are then to design a state
implementation plan (SIP) which meets those emission targets. At present,
then, whether the US successfully eliminates greenhouse gas emissions from
its electrical power sector and transitions to clean energy or whether it
backslides on its mitigation commitment is heavily dependent upon state
policy and politics.
Greenhouse gas abatement touches almost every aspect of policy, and in this
chapter, I use a recent utility rate case from the state of Wisconsin to illustrate
some of the political and policy difﬁculties states will confront during the
transition to renewables. In this rate case, the state’s largest capital owned
utility, WE Energies, sought tariff rates which severely undermined the value
of distributed photovoltaic (PV) energy production to the homeowner and
thus the viability of the distributed photovoltaic industry in Wisconsin. The
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) approved the rates and
advocates of the renewable energy industry sued, winning a lower court
decision reversing a portion of the tariff. The case docket and ensuing litiga-
tion strongly suggest that the incumbent utility used its economic power to
undermine the formation of solar industry in Wisconsin. That is, the rate case
is an instance of monopolistic rent-seeking, the typical response to which is
to propose disciplining the badly behaving monopoly through either more
regulation or more competition (forced by regulation).
This economic view of the conﬂict between the incumbent utility and
the solar industry, however, is insufﬁcient to identifying the contradictions
between hydrocarbon infrastructure and renewable energy infrastructure.
First, the economic view falls short in describing how the law organizes the
relevant markets and other institutions of exchange. Second, the economic
view fails to take into consideration the biophysical aspects of hydrocarbon
generation and renewable energy generation. Hence, in the ﬁrst half of this
chapter, I sketch the salient aspects of the WE Energies rate case which make it
appear an instance of monopolistic rent-seeking. In the second half of the
chapter, I analyse how the biophysical aspects of hydrocarbon generation have
been scribed into the law of electrical power utilities. The biophysical point of
view, inter alia, incorporates the ﬁrst and second laws of thermodynamics into
its analysis of socioeconomics. The concept of energy returned on investment
(EROI) is a corollary of the second law of thermodynamics, and allows us to
identify three contradictions between hydrocarbon infrastructure and renew-
able infrastructure. Using examples from the WE Energies rate case, we can
see how the law, legal institutions, and the legally organized markets for
electricity are conﬁgured around and support hydrocarbon infrastructure.
As a general matter, then, for the US to transition to renewables and
eliminate greenhouse gas emissions, law, legal institutions, and the markets
which they organize must be reconﬁgured to support renewable energy
infrastructure.
16 .2 STRATEGIC RENT-SEEKING IN WISCONSIN
Wisconsin is situated on the west coast of Lake Michigan and the port city of
Milwaukee is its largest. The early economy of Wisconsin revolved around
agriculture and the extraction of its northern pine forests, the timber from
which was transported either to Milwaukee or, more likely, to Chicago, from
where it was exchanged for the grains from the fertile Midwestern plains. The
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area between Chicago and Milwaukee became a leading developer of tractor
equipment. Along with timber, the farm equipment was shipped west to the
farmers who used it to build up their homesteads and crop yields. This
foundation, along with a railroad system and access to navigation over the
Great Lakes, led eastern Wisconsin to develop into a classic Keynesian-Fordist
economy—centralized manufacturing of raw materials with unionized labour
and a fairly robust welfare state (Cronon 1992; Hurst 1964). The west of the
state was and is agricultural. In line with the general trend in the US, during
the 1980s, the Keynesian-Fordist economy in eastern Wisconsin began to
deteriorate. A few silos of Keynesian-Fordist manufacturing remain in the
vicinity of Milwaukee, and a remnant of both the timber industry and the
Keynesian-Fordist economy is found in the paper and pulp mills of northern
Wisconsin.
The law has organized the electrical power utilities in Wisconsin under
three different forms: capital-owned utilities, municipally owned utilities, and
rural electrical cooperatives. WE Energies is a capital-owned electrical power
utility (ofﬁcially, ‘The Wisconsin Electrical Power Corporation’ or WEPCO
doing business as WE Energies). In July 2015, WE Energies’ holding company,
formerly called Wisconsin Energy, completed the US$9.1 billion purchase of
Integry Energy Group, at which point it became the ‘WEC Energy Group’
(WEC) (Content 2015).
According to Energy Information Agency ﬁgures from 2012, WEC Energy
Group’s electrical utilities held load territory covering 35 million megawatt
hours (MWh) of loads per year, about 25 million of which are WE Energies’
(EIA 2012). For comparison, the next largest investor-owned electrical utility,
Wisconsin Power & Light, held load territory encompassing 10 million MWh
of annual loads (EIA 2012).
On 31 January 2014, WE Energies ﬁled a request with the PSCW to open a
rate docket for the 2015 test year. The request revised rates extensively and
included new tariffs for distributed generation (PSCW Case No. 5-UR-107).
The new WE Energies tariff decrease the value of distributed PV to its owner
in ﬁve ways. First, like all residential customers, distributed generation owners
would pay an increased customer-related facilities charge of US$0.5202/day
rather than the previous US$0.30/day (PSCW 2014a: 35). WE Energies con-
currently reduced the volumetric charge from 13.9 cents to 13.4 cents (PSCW
2014h: appendix B). Second, distributed generation owners would pay a
facilities charge for the installation of a second meter (required to meter
imports and exports separately) (PSCW 2014a: 56). The PSCW partially
approved this facility charge (PSCW 2014h: 70–1). Third, the crediting of
exports was altered from annual to seasonal, reducing the ability of solar
generation to spread its surplus generation over a longer period of time.
Fourth, owners of distributed generation will receive the wholesale price
(rather than the retail price) for their exports, a difference of about 8 cents/
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KWh (PSCW 2014b). Fifth, owners of distributed generation would pay a new
customer-related demand charge, which, according to WE Energies ‘will
recover distribution costs that are not recovered by the facilities charge of
the underlying rate’ (PSCW 2014a: 56–7). WE Energies also stated that the
demand charge is supposed to ‘recover the costs of stand-by generation’
(2014a: 57). The demand charge for solar would have been US$3.794/kW/
month (PSCW 2014c).
RENEW Wisconsin is a non-proﬁt organization which advocates for the
renewable energy industry in Wisconsin. They intervened before the PSCW
and along with the Alliance for Solar Choice eventually ﬁled suit against the
demand charge (but not the other features of the tariff). RENEW’s policy
director, Michael Vickerman, offered testimony on the economic impacts of
the new tariffs to owners of PV. Excluding the generally applicable increase in
the facilities charge, Vickerman calculated that for a 5 kW PV system installed
in 2013 whose total annual output is equivalent to half of the resident’s annual
loads, the new tariff reduces the value to the owner by 35 per cent, from US
$834 per year to US$542 per year. If the PV system is sized to cover 95 per cent
of loads, it becomes more likely that production will exceed loads and that
the new annual netting procedure and new export price would be applicable
more frequently. Under this scenario, Vickerman calculated that the value of
the PV to the owner drops 47 per cent, from US$834 per year to US$389 per
year (PSCW 2014d: 20–2).
In other states, such as Minnesota, Maine, New York, and California,
stakeholders are having a robust discussion on how to value distributed energy
resources in a manner which facilitates the transition to clean energy and
expands economic opportunity, while also preserving capital’s ﬁscal position.
Because the utility made no effort to engage the renewable energy stake-
holders, because the PSCW voted against the recommendation of staff, and
because the one (dated) study on the value of solar concluded it to be beneﬁcial
to WE Energies, this rate case seems a classic example of the sort of strategic
rent-seeking which canonical economic thought instructs us to expect from
monopolies (Kaiser 2014; PSCW2014e: 27–32). In any case, the judge presiding
over the legal challenge to the demand charge thought so. During the oral
hearing, he commented on the evidence WE Energies presented on behalf of
the demand charge:
[t]he strong impression that this Court has when we look at the evidence that
was presented is…these are stories, but they’re not empirical, and they happen
to be stories spun by a company that is facing competition from the people who
are now going to be paying these higher rates. So if these were our standards
in most cases, let’s hear the competitor tell us what his competitor is doing
but without evidence, but without empirical evidence, we would expect it to
be skewed
(Alliance for Solar Choice v. Public Service Comm. of Wisconsin 2015: 60).
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The judge seems to be indicating that he believes the monopoly utility to being
using the economic power of its incumbency to hinder the emergence of
economic competition. Incumbents protecting their economic position by
raising obstacles to competition from renewable energy will no doubt hinder
the transition to renewable generation. However, focusing on economic
incumbency conceals the degree to which presently existing infrastructure
and the laws which conﬁgure that infrastructure presuppose and entrench
hydrocarbon generation. The incumbent, then, is not so much any particular
ﬁrm, but hydrocarbons per se, a subject to which we now turn.
16 .3 THE BIOPHYSICAL APPROACH AND
HYDROCARBON ’S LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The biophysical approach incorporates the ﬁrst and second law of thermo-
dynamics into the analysis of socioeconomics. Here, we are interested in the
second law of thermodynamics and its relationship to the legal regime which
has arisen around and supports hydrocarbon infrastructure. The second law of
thermodynamics states, roughly put, that without exogenous inputs of energy,
a closed system become less organized, more random. One way to measure the
exogenous inputs of energy into the socioeconomic system is energy returned
on investment, or EROI. EROI is ‘the ratio of energy returned from an energy-
gathering activity compared to the energy invested in that process’ (Hall and
Klitgaard 2012: 310). It is derived from the ecologist’s practice of analysing the
transportation of energy through trophic food webs.
EROI for all fossil fuels declines over the history of the industry. In 1930,
petroleum and gas had EROIs as high as 100:1, and perhaps higher. In 1970,
the EROI of petroleum and gas was down to 30:1, and the EROI from
contemporary tar sands extraction is as low as 2–4:1. At best, corn-base
ethanol has an EROI of 3:1. In 1930, coal had an EROI of 80:1, which had
declined to 30:1 by 1970. Hydropower retains a high EROI of about 100:1,
while wind turbines have an EROI of about 18:1. Solar PV presently has an
EROI of about 7:1, and some analyses show as high as 15:1. The EROIs for
wind and solar, however, do not include the embodied energy of whatever
devices, such as storage, might be needed for a renewable grid (Hall, Lambert,
and Balogh 2014).
Prieto and Hall estimate that an EROI of 3:1 is required at the well-head
merely to extract, reﬁne, and transport the petroleum to the place of use.
EROIs at the well-head must be of the order of 8:1 if one wishes the workers
at the well to be able to support a family and as high as 12:1 if one wishes
that family to have access to health care (Prieto and Hall 2013). In general,
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energy-gathering activities which have high EROI ratios allow for the satis-
faction of a greater number of life activities above mere necessity. Declining
EROI ratios make societal activities which are high on the hierarchy of ‘energy
needs’ (such as art or ﬂying to Las Vegas) increasing difﬁcult to achieve while
also satisfying the needs of other members of society.
Scholars still dispute the appropriate boundaries for determining EROI for
particular energy-gathering activities and in many cases the necessary data is
unavailable or incomplete. However, neither the orders of magnitude nor the
general trend in EROI values are contentious. The fossil fuels extracted during
the twentieth century represented extraordinary high EROIs and show a
continual decline. The best ﬁrst principle from ecology suggests that hydro-
carbon EROIs can be expected to decline further, and can be intuitively
observed in quests for ‘extreme energy’ such as Arctic petroleum drilling
endeavours.
On the other hand, since renewable generation is in its infancy, their EROIs
are expected to increase, although this is by no means guaranteed. The EROIs
on both wind and solar PV, for instance, already exceed that of tar sands.
Whether renewables will be able to obtain ratios high enough to support their
own expansion remains open, especially at the rate required to avoid disastrous
global warming. Less likely still is that renewable generation will obtain EROIs
high enough to satisfy the consumption norm which organized the US’s
productive capacities during the previous century of high EROI hydrocarbons.
From EROI we may introduce the notion of hydrocarbon infrastructure,
which is infrastructure which is possible and useful only when high EROI
hydrocarbons are available. The electrical power utility in the US is a para-
digmatic example of hydrocarbon infrastructure. The electrical power indus-
try, however, is not only an organization of technology and human capacity. It
is also a legal apparatus, which responds to and is conﬁgured by the biophysical
aspects of hydrocarbons. As such, the electrical power utility has two critical
relationships to the depletable reservoir of high EROI hydrocarbons. First, it is
the apparatus through which that depletable store is converted from a use-value
to an exchange-value. Second, it is parasitic upon that same depletable store.
First, the primary use-value of hydrocarbons is found in their chemical
bonds. The bonds represent both a store of energy (heat) and an arrangement
of atoms from which a substance may be made. For the hydrocarbons’ use-
value to be realized as an exchange-value, the use-value must be made social
by bringing it to the market, as the metaphor goes. At the market, other
members of society may access the hydrocarbon’s use-value by exchanging it
for some other use-value. The exchange is not, of course, completed by
bartering use-values, but through the exchange of the money commodity,
that is, currency. In the case of the electrical power utility, the use-value of
the hydrocarbon (heat) is converted to a commodity (the kWh) by processing
it through an extensive number of technological devices. With a monthly bill,
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the ‘customer’ then exchanges that kWh for currency. The currency is thereby
brought under the legal control of the utility, which then dispenses that
currency to different social interests, that is, to capital in the form of dividends
and coupon payments, to labour in the form of wages, to politicians in the
form of campaign contributions, and so forth.
To further illustrate the utility’s power over the dispensation of the use-
value of high EROI hydrocarbons, consider the cost-of-service study (COSS)
which WE Energies used in the recent rate case. Electrical power utilities serve
a variety of customer types, typically residential, commercial, and industrial.
The utility incurs costs in delivering electrical power to these different classes,
but because all customer classes are reliant upon the same grid, a method is
needed to assign those costs to the different customer classes. Once the costs
are assigned, the rate paid by the different customer types can be calculated.
A COSS assigns costs across customer types and a great number of method-
ologies are available.
The Citizens’ Utility Board (CUB) submitted testimony opposed to WE
Energies’ requested rates. One objection was that in previous rate cases WE
Energies had used several COSS methodologies and then assigned costs and
rates by comparing and weighting the different outcomes of the different
methodologies. In this case, however, the CUB noted that WE Energies used
only a single COSS methodology known to assign costs disproportionately to
residential rate payers as compared to commercial and industrial rate payers
(PSCW 2014f: 11). In disproportionately assigning costs of service to residen-
tial customers, the CUB argued that WE Energies was concurrently assigning
to the residential rate class a disproportionate responsibility for paying those
costs as compared to the commercial and industrial rate classes. Although
concealed as a technical accounting procedure, the COSS is a political instru-
ment for assigning the beneﬁts and costs of hydrocarbon’s use-value among
different social interests.
Second, the electrical power utility could not exist or perpetuate itself in
the absence of the reservoir of high EROI hydrocarbons and is, therefore,
parasitic upon it. The various devices which transform the chemical bonds of
the hydrocarbon into heat, steam, mechanical motion, and then an electrical
current represent very large magnitudes of embodied energy. Those physical
devices include not only the steam turbines, electromagnets, transformers,
and conductors but also the steel rails over which the coal is transported to
the plant. Without access to the high EROI reserve of fossil fuel, the devices
which convert it into a current could not themselves have been brought
into being.
In sum, the electrical power utility is a legal apparatus which is both
parasitic upon a depletable reserve of high EROI hydrocarbons and realizes
the use-value of those hydrocarbons, channelling their beneﬁts and costs to
various segments of society.
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16.4 THREE CONTRADICTIONS AND THE
CONFIGURING LEGAL APPARATUS
Renewable energy infrastructure and hydrocarbon infrastructures both in-
volve a myriad of technological devices. Here, however, I focus on the bio-
physical characteristics of coal-ﬁred and distributed PV generation. These two
types of generation were central to the rate case and also show distinctly the
contradiction between the legal regime which has arisen around hydrocarbon
infrastructure and that which must be constructed around renewable infra-
structure. The incumbent, then, is not simply any particular utility which
exercises its entrenched economic power to exclude competition. Rather, the
law entrenches hydrocarbon infrastructure itself and high EROI coal is itself
the incumbent. Other types of generation, such as wind and nuclear, will have
a mix of biophysical characteristics which overlap those of solar and coal. This
overlap means they will play an important part of the transition away from
hydrocarbon generation and to renewable generation, but that role is not
discussed here.
16.4.1 Efﬁciency Logics and Territory
The efﬁciency logics of coal-ﬁred and distributed PV generation are different,
which manifests in different legal relationships with territory.
Coal’s (formerly) high EROI means that it can be combusted at a perpetual
high heat, and thus produce a perpetual high voltage. To match this perpetual
high voltage as required by Ohm’s law, hydrocarbon generation needs loads
that are temporally disbursed. In this way, the turbine can be turning as near
to capacity as possible. Hence, utilities developed loads by, for instance, giving
away appliances and through construction projects. The amusement park, for
instance, was a creature of the utilities meant to provide the turbine with an
off-peak load (Nye 1992: 122–32). These temporally dispersed loads are also
physically separate from each other, so to bring them under their dominion,
the utility must acquire and retain control of the territory in which those loads
are located. In the US this was accomplished through the law and, during the
formative years of the industry, the utilities convinced states to transfer to
them certain powers of sovereignty, including exclusive franchises over terri-
tory, eminent domain, limited negligence liability, and access to premises
(Hempling 2013: 15–34 (territory), 57–8 (eminent domain), 61–3 (liability);
Wisc. Statutes 1983).
This impulse to control the development of a territory is so strong that the
law has made some attempt to restrain it. Utility law in Wisconsin prohibits
public utilities and nonutility afﬁliates from engaging in real estate practices,
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residential real estate development, property management, or residential or
commercial construction (Wisc. Statutes 1999a). However, this constrain is
almost immediately undermined in the next section of law, which permits
public utilities or nonutility afﬁliates to consult or make ﬁnancial arraign-
ments with third parties engaged in residential or commercial construction
(Wisc. Statutes 1999b). Hence, WE Energies’ holding company, WEC, owns
Wispark, a ‘full-service real estate development company’ which develops ‘real
estate projects that support and complement key programs of Wisconsin
Energy Corporation (WEC)’ (Wispark Webpage 2016).
In contrast, distributed PV is intermittent and produces low voltages. The
perception of intermittency is conditioned by a century’s access to hydrocar-
bon infrastructure, but nevertheless counsels conﬁning loads to the time and
wattage of generation. Since voltage deteriorates linearly over a conductor, low
voltages do not travel far. Hence, the efﬁciency logic of distributed PV is to
bring loads both physically and temporarily proximate to the generation and
to minimize or eliminate all other loads. This is almost the exact opposite of
the efﬁciency logic of hydrocarbon generation. Hence, distributed PV does not
require the control of territory or the gifting of toasters.
However, distributed PV does require legal protection against shading as
well as the authority to enter so as to remove that shading, or, at the least,
the upper hand in negotiating over the prevention and removal of shading.
In 1982 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered whether a homeowner
had a cause of action against a neighbour whose trees shaded the homeowner’s
solar thermal water heater. Building off of the common law’s Doctrine of
Ancient Lights, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the homeowner
could bring a nuisance suit over the shading and the Wisconsin legislature
then codiﬁed the ruling (Prah v. Maretti 1982). Likewise, to receive a payment
from the state’s solar incentive programme, a homeowner must show the
installed PV system will have ‘10 percent or less obstacle shading’ (Focus on
Energy 2016).
16.4.2 Decommodiﬁcation and Jurisdiction
Under hydrocarbon infrastructure, the utility is the ‘producer’ of a commod-
ity, the kWh, and the homeowner is the ‘consumer’ of that commodity.
The utility produces the kWh to maximize its exchange-value and not for its
use-value, which is incidental to the utility.
In contrast, for distributed PV, the ‘consumer’ and the ‘producer’ are the
same. The distinction, then, no longer provides a felicitous description of
socioeconomic relations. For distributed PV, the kWh is not brought to the
market as a means of realizing its exchange-value by swapping it for the
money commodity. The electric current is generated for its use-value, and
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its exchange-value is incidental to the homeowner. Distributed PV, then,
represents the decommodiﬁcation of a critical aspect of human well-being
(power, heat, and light) which the utilities had formerly commodiﬁed (Nye
1992: 234).
However, the legally organized electrical power ‘markets’ are conﬁgured
around electrical power as a commodity which utilities generate for its
exchange-value. The law of jurisdiction, as scribed in the US Constitution
itself, conﬁgures both the retail markets and the wholesale markets which have
commodiﬁed electrical power. Early in the development of the electrical power
industry in the US, a detente was reached between municipal ownership and
capital ownership of utilities. The law acknowledged capital-owned utilities as
monopolies (supposedly ‘natural’) in exchange for having a state public utility
commission regulate rates so as to be ‘just and reasonable’. Wisconsin was one
of the ﬁrst states to legislate this arrangement in 1907 (Nord 1975).
The power industry’s construction of transmission across state lines dis-
rupted the detente. In the early 1920s, Narragansett Electric Light Company,
located in Rhode Island, entered into a contract with the Attleboro Electric
Steam Company, located in Massachusetts, to supply electrical current. As
required by law, the Narragansett Company then ﬁled the rate schedule
contained in the contract with the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission
(PUC), which accepted it. Several years later, the Narragansett attempted to
revise the contract through a proceeding before the Rhode Island PUC,
claiming that because of increased generating costs, it was suffering an oper-
ating loss. The Rhode Island PUC agreed and revised the rates accordingly.
The Attleboro Electric Steam Company ﬁled suit against the Rhode Island
PUC for its approval of the new rates, and the parties appealed the case to the
Supreme Court of the US. The Supreme Court found that the current crossing
the state boundary separating Rhode Island fromMassachusetts was interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court then ruled that the commerce clause of Article
I, Section 8, prohibited the Rhode Island PUC from exercising jurisdiction
over the transaction between Narragansett and Attleboro. It further concluded
that jurisdiction over interstate transactions of electrical power was reserved to
the federal government (Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island et al. v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. 1927). In response, the Congress passed the
Federal Power Act which assigned to the Federal Power Commission juris-
diction over ‘the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to
the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce’ (Federal Power
Act 1935).
Hence, out of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the commerce clause,
there emerged a regulatory framework in which the federal government,
through the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC)) regulates the interstate wholesale electrical power
industry while states regulate the intra-state retail side of that industry.
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Accordingly, during the restructuring period of the mid-1990s, the FERC
used a sequence of orders to coax the regional wholesale markets into being and
now supervises them to ensure that rates are ‘just and reasonable’ (see FERC
Orders 888, 889, 890 (FERC 1996a, 1996b, 2007)). Those wholesale markets
entrenched existing hydrocarbon infrastructure, including both generating
assets and the high-voltage transmission which that generation requires.
Recent litigation over FERC orders requiring the organized wholesale
markets to allow the participation of demand response in the wholesale
markets illustrates the entrenchment. Voltage and loads must be perpetually
and instantaneously matched. As initially conﬁgured, the wholesale markets
achieved that matching by increasing generation rather than by reducing load.
In those markets, load-serving entities (LSEs, i.e., distribution utilities) submit
their projected daily demand to the market, usually a day ahead and for
durations of an hour, although each regional wholesale market conﬁgures its
own market and there is variation among them. Generators then submit their
generation bid for those same time increments. All trading takes places in
dollars per MWh. Generator bids are stacked in order of price, and the next
least cost bid required to meet the demand is assigned the clearing price. The
clearing price is adjusted for reliability, congestion, and line losses at particular
nodes in the grid, producing the localized marginal price, or LMP. The LMP is
then paid by all LSEs and received by all dispatched generators.
Into this conﬁguration of the wholesale markets, FERC Order 719 (FERC
2008) required market organizers to allow demand-side management (DSM)
to participate in the bidding. FERCOrder 745 (FERC 2011) further established
the mechanism for compensating DSM. According to a 2009 FERC study
(FERC 2009: x), DSM could reduce peak load by up to 150 GW nationally,
something many generators were not interested in, and the Electrical Power
Supply Association (EPSA) brought a suit. EPSA claimed that Orders 719 and
745 exceeded FERC’s jurisdictional authority because DSM fell on the retail
side of the jurisdictional divide. The appellate court agreed: ‘[d]emand
response—simply put—is part of the retail market. It involves retail customers,
their decision whether to purchase at retail, and the levels of retail electricity
consumption’ (EPSA v. FERC 2014, emphasis in the original).
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the grounds that DSM
‘directly affects wholesale rates’ and that FERC has not ‘regulated retail sales’
(FERC v. EPSA 2016). Nonetheless, esoteric matters of legal jurisdiction
continue to conﬁgure the organized markets around pre-existing hydrocarbon
infrastructure. As legally organized, generation of MWh transmitted over
high-voltage conductors is the reference position for the organized wholesale
markets. Other techniques for managing electrical power management have
no jurisdictional home. Consider, for instance, that under the appellate court’s
rationale in EPSA v. FERC, the exported generation from distributed PV
would likely be considered a retail commodity just like DSM, but that under
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WE Energies’ distributed generation tariff the exports from distributed PV are
compensated at the wholesale rate. The Supreme Court’s ruling in FERC v.
EPSA disturbs the jurisdiction conﬁguration of hydrocarbon infrastructure,
but does not alter it. Especially given the mechanism by which DSM providers
are to be compensated (from the LSEs in which the DSM is located), FERC v.
EPSA likely marks an important aspect of the US’s transition to renewables.
It does not by itself, however, reconﬁgure those markets around renewables
generally or distributed PV speciﬁcally. The commodity exchanged in the
wholesale markets, the MWh, remains for distributed PV the wrong order of
magnitude.
16.4.3 Guaranteeing and Disciplining Capital
The devices which compose the electrical power utility, such as the turbine,
represent large magnitudes of embodied energy. The initial ﬁnancial capital
required to construct those devices is therefore also large and requires long
payback periods over which it is subject to many risks. To assuage these risks
and facilitate capital formation, states guarantee capital’s return on investment
(ROI). Indeed, in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission 1923) the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Taking Clause to require state public service commissions to approve
rates large enough to preserve ﬁnancial capital’s ROI and thereby the utility’s
ﬁscal position. This guarantee of capital is illustrated by WE Energies’ rate
case. In its ﬁnal ruling, the PSCW began its decision by settling on the
appropriate return on equity (ROE) to be received by the shareholders.
In this instance, PSCW staff facilitated negotiations between WE Energies,
the CUB, the Wisconsin Industrial Energy Group, and the Wisconsin Paper
Council. They agreed to reduce WE Energies’ proposed ROE from 10.4 per
cent to 10.2 per cent. From this prioritization of ROE, WE Energies’ revenue
requirements were then calculated, and from that how much the utility was to
collect from ratepayers (PSCW 2014g: 3, 2014h: 17–20). The presently existing
legal conﬁguration disciplines the formation of capital towards hydrocarbon
infrastructure.
In contrast, each individual distributed PV requires a small ﬁscal outlay and
the payback period is comparatively short. As compared to hydrocarbon
generation, then, risks to capital are greatly reduced. Nonetheless, relative to
the pocketbook of the PV owner, the capital outlay for distributed PV might
yet be substantial. Further, transitioning to a renewable energy infrastructure
will require capital outlays of at least the same order of magnitude as a
business-as-usual scenario over the coming decades. Some state-recognized
ﬁnancing mechanism, then, is needed to facilitate and discipline capital
formation towards investments in renewables.
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A third-party installer arrangement is one such mechanism. Under such an
arrangement, the installer ﬁnances and installs the distributed PV system, and
the installer and the homeowner then share the economic beneﬁt of the
homeowner’s reduced power costs. However, under this arrangement the
installer appears to be selling kWh to the homeowner and ambiguity exists
as to whether, as a matter of law, the third-party installer should be classiﬁed
as a utility subject to regulation by the public service commission. This legal
ambiguity exists in Wisconsin, and appears to be preventing the formation
of a third-party installer industry. In its rate case, WE Energies solicited a
prohibition on third-party installers by seeking a requirement that distrib-
uted generators own their own equipment (PSCW 2014a: 60). The PSCW
rejected WE Energies’ proposal, but without resolving the ambiguity about
the legal status of third-party installers (PSCW 2014h: 89).
16 .5 CONCLUSION: RENTS, LAW, AND MAKING
MARKETS FOR RENEWABLES
From the merely economic point of view, WE Energies’ rate case is an
instance of incumbent rent-seeking. However, when we view the electrical
power utility as a paradigmatic instance of hydrocarbon infrastructure com-
posed of technological devices, human capacities, and a supporting legal
apparatus, we discover more substantive contradictions between distributed
PV and coal-ﬁred generation.
The utility’s legal apparatus is conﬁgured around the biophysical character-
istics of high EROI hydrocarbons, coal in particular. Hydrocarbon generation
tends towards a centralized legal conﬁguration which exercises sovereign func-
tions over an exclusive territory, which is the ‘producer’ selling a commodity to a
‘consumer’, and which has the state secure capital’s ﬁscal position over long
periods of time. Distributed PV generation, in contrast, implies a tendency
towards physically and temporally conﬁning loads to the proximity of gener-
ation, represents the decommodiﬁcation of an important part of life (heat, light,
and power), negates the distinction between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’, and
requires the state to support a different type of capital formation and discipline.
These biophysical differences, of course, are both tendencies and extreme
limits. They are not ‘natural’ and their existence and perpetuation requires
constant effort. The utility’s monopoly over territory, the commodiﬁcation
of the kWh, and the state’s preservation of capital’s ﬁscal position were all
earned by shrewd manoeuvring during the industry’s formative years. The
utilities, for instance, used differential rates between residential and industrial
customers to undercut industries’ self-generation, and installed snake lines to
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strategically service otherwise unproﬁtable communities so as to undercut
the political impetus for municipal ownership in these communities (Nye
1992: 316). During the initial years, it was unclear as to what, exactly, the
utility was selling and whether electrical power ought to be classiﬁed as labour,
capital, a raw material, or a service (Nye 1992: 234). Hence, the legal apparatus
now aggregated around hydrocarbon infrastructure is not merely a formal
recognition of facts on the ground, but participated and continues to partici-
pate in bringing those facts into existence. In this regard, as in so many others,
the law is performative, calling into being institutions and modes of living. To
complete the transition to renewables, the law and legal institutions must
similarly be conﬁgured around and bring into existence renewable generation
and infrastructure.
The task of transitioning to renewables in the US is not merely one of pricing
carbon or ﬁnding the right level of subsidization of renewables. While these
beneﬁt the transition, they continue to operate under the conceit that green-
house gas emissions are a ‘market failure’ which needs ‘correcting’. Markets and
the law which constitutes them are always and everywhere conﬁgured around
certain assets and to the beneﬁt of particular interests. To transition to renew-
ables, then, law and the markets the law structures do not so much need to be
‘corrected’ as conﬁgured around renewables generation in the ﬁrst place.
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Global Trends in the Political Economy
of Smart Grids
Cherrelle Eid, Rudi Hakvoort, and Martin de Jong
17.1 INTRODUCTION
The global transition towards sustainable, secure, and affordable electricity
supply is driving changes in the consumption, production, and transportation of
electricity. In the past decade there has been a dash for ‘smart’ in power systems,
resulting in a consensus that a ‘smart grid’ will pave the way to decarbonization,
reliability, and efﬁciency in the electricity sector. On the basis of the terminology
alone, smart grids have received a lot of support in government policy for the
theoretical beneﬁts implementation might bring.
Smart grids can be deﬁned as electricity networks that enable two-way
communication and power exchange between electricity consumers and
producers, utilizing information and communication technology (ICT) to
manage demand, and ensure safe and secure electricity distribution (DOE
2006; Hall and Foxon 2014). A smart grid can support the reliability of the
grid with the penetration of distributed generation and electric vehicles
(EVs), and can deliver possibilities for real-time management of electricity
demand, production, and storage.
However, the smart grid concept is both broad and vague, allowing actors to
adopt a strategic position, but not to systematically favour the emergence of a
shared vision for a smart grid (Tricoire 2015). Within the subjectivity of the
term (nobody would support a ‘dumb grid’), the assumption exists that trade-
offs between sustainability, affordability, and security of supply would be
reduced with the transition towards a smart grid. It can be observed that the
political economic context inﬂuences the motives for investing in smart grids.
Nonetheless, not each investment necessarily contributes to the sustainability
and affordability objectives from a greater social perspective. The conﬂicts
between different policy objectives and the interests of the actors involved
present an interesting point for research. In this chapter, the authors clarify
which (set of) goal(s) are emphasized by smart grids in the United States (US),
Europe, and China according to industry structure, regulatory context, and the
power of energy policy.
17 .2 THE HISTORY OF ‘SMART GRID ’ TERMINOLOGY
The functionalities of the smart grid are not recently discovered concepts.
Schweppe, Richard, and Kirtley described these functions in a report called
‘Homeostatic Control: The Utility/Customer Marketplace for Electric Power’
(Schweppe, Richard, and Kirtley 1981). In this report, Schweppe, Richard, and
Kirtley referred to homeostatic control as a way of maintaining internal
equilibrium between electricity supply and demand with the use of economic
signalling and information and communication technology.
However, the term ‘smart grid’ itself was not used until 2005. In that year a
report from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) was
published, named ‘Toward a Smart Grid: Power Delivery for the 21st Century’
(Amin and Wollenberg 2005). In this report the electric grid was likened to a
F15 aircraft with ‘self-healing’ possibilities in case of emergency, similar to the
homeostatic description by Schweppe. In this colourful metaphor, the F15
aircraft is able to continue ﬂying even after losing one wing due to fault
detection and automation. The use of detection and automation was suggested
to improve transmission grid operations.
17.2.1 Deﬁning Smart Grids
Technically speaking, it is not straightforward to deﬁne whether a grid is
‘smart’ or not ‘smart’. Most systems, at least at the high voltage levels, have
technologies in place in order to sustain reliability of supply with supervisory
control and data acquisition systems (SCADA). However, distribution grids
have traditionally been managed in a passive manner and therefore smart
grids generally refer to new developments on the distribution side. Aspects
of smart grids that can represent such developments are: (i) the installation of
physical ‘smart devices’, and (ii) the (real-time) operational management of
those devices.
The smart meter is frequently seen as a prerequisite for smart grids. This
digital meter measure consumption data in short time intervals of typically
15 minutes. This consumption data can be communicated to different actors
like consumers themselves who can then adjust their consumption levels.
Furthermore, this data can be of interest to the utility, the distribution service
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operator (DSO), retailer, and/or aggregator for billing purposes and evaluation
of provided demand response. Usage data along with price signals are the key
components of the ‘homeostatic feedback’ Schweppe envisioned and are
central to any smart grid.
In addition to the smart meter, there are other devices that enable insight for
the consumer and provide automated feedback on signals through, for example,
in-home displays and in-home automation.Distributed energy resources (DER)
are different types of units that enable local production, alternative consump-
tion, and/or storage. Examples of distributed generation (DG) units are solar
photovoltaics (PV) and combined heat and power (CHP). Battery storage can
provide important value with the increase of self-consumption from electricity
generation, reduction of peak consumption, reduction of system-wide gener-
ation costs, losses, and network congestions. Electric vehicles (EVs) can also be
part of a smart grid. EVs, for example, can act as a storage unit for generated
electricity.
17.2.2 Real-Time Management and Control
The distributed energy resources do not automatically operate efﬁciently after
installation. The installation of such devices becomes proﬁtable when com-
bined with contracts for variable pricing, direct control, and automation
(Faruqui et al. 2010; Aghaei and Alizadeh 2013; Geelen et al. 2013). The
interactions of such devices can be called demand side ﬂexibility or demand
response. Demand response refers to ability of the demand to ‘respond’ to
triggers like prices or direct control. There are multiple purposes for which the
operation of smart devices can be optimized: economic, environmental, and
network purposes (Conchado et al. 2011). The demand response provision is
seen as one of the major added values of the smart grid (Faruqui, Harris, and
Hledik 2010).
17 .3 ACTOR PERSPECTIVES ON SMART GRIDS
In addition to technical changes, smart grid innovations can require institu-
tional changes in market design, actor roles, and responsibilities. Different
actors involved in the electricity sector might have diverse interests in smart
grid developments. Those different actors are, for example, the (public) service
utilities, DSO, retailers, aggregators, and electricity customers. Smart grid
assets relate to different technical functionalities, which can provide beneﬁts
and costs for (some of the) actors involved. Investment in smart grid assets
simultaneously inﬂuences targets related to affordability, sustainability, and
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reliability (JRC and DOE 2012). For example, distribution automation has
many beneﬁts for reliability due to the automated/self-healing ability of the
network, but can also reduce expenses for network expansion (affordability).
At the same time, with large DG penetration, distribution automation can help
reach sustainability targets. Alternatively, depending on the way in which the
dynamic tariff takes account of policy goals, smart metering and smart
appliances can reduce costs for electricity usage, and help support reliability
and sustainability objectives. Therefore, due to its multiple functionality, a
smart grid can present a different ‘toolset’ for each of the actors involved.
The actors themselves operate within the context of the industry structure.
Depending on the structure applied, more or less room is given for competi-
tion between actors. Figure 17.1 presents examples of the most common
industry structures. In the US the integrated utility structure prevails
(Brooks 2015). In Europe, retail competition is applied due to the European
Commission’s laws regarding functional and legal unbundling of network
operators (Newbery 2002; CEER 2013). Unbundling refers to splitting net-
work operation from supply or production activities in order to allow non-
discriminatory grid access to all market parties. Switzerland, however, is not
part of the European Union (EU) and currently has a wholesale competition
model. In China, a single buyer model is applied, where there are two state-
owned utilities that deliver electricity in their service area. Due to this diver-
sity, the actors involved are motivated by different interests on smart grid
investments. This issue will be further described in Section 17.4.1.
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Figure 17.1. Possible industry structures due to sector liberalization.
Source: Authors’ illustration adapted from Batlle and Ocaña (2013).
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17.3.1 The Integrated Utility
A strictly vertically integrated utility owns and manages the entire chain of
electricity production, transport, and retail. When the production units are
not owned by the public utility (which is more common) the utility is either a
single buyer of electricity (with one-sided competition), or there is a wholesale
competition model in place where different buyers and sellers compete for the
lowest price at any moment in time. In this chapter we refer to an integrated
utility when there is a single retailer present in the area of service, but there is
still competition possible in the wholesale market. The integrated utility can be
seen in options A–C in Figure 17.1.
The aptitude of smart grid investments depends on the regulatory scheme
applied in the sector. For example, under cost of service regulation, capital
expenses (CAPEX) in smart grids could be more easily approved if the
regulator deems such investment as prudent, especially if investments would
help to solve imminent grid congestion or supply constraints. Furthermore,
the integration of IT and smart grid devices might reduce the need for grid
reinforcements or production investments by optimizing the integration of
distributed generation. However, many smart grid investments not only
involve CAPEX, but also increase operational expenses (OPEX), for example
for the procurement of ﬂexibility in real-time operations.
On the other hand, under incentive regulation, as applied elsewhere for
integrated distribution companies, incentives might exist to reduce OPEX, for
which smart grids might or might not help. Policy makers could support smart
grid investments (CAPEX and OPEX) by allowing them to remain outside the
regulatory benchmark.
Another issue with smart grid developments and the position of integrated
utilities is that due to the monopoly position of the utility, the value, and
hence, the price of demand response (of ﬂexible consumption) is not com-
petitively set. Consequently, investments may be hampered by a lack of proper
economic incentives discouraging cost-efﬁcient innovation.
17.3.2 The Distribution Service Operators
In order to give electricity consumers retail choice, it is necessary to unbundle
the distribution activity from electricity retail and supply as has taken place in
Europe. Generally, the DSO’s main task is to keep electricity reliability levels
above thresholds by installing enough network capacity and maintaining the
grid. Furthermore, the DSO is responsible for providing free third-party access
to consumers and producers. Through the established regulatory scheme for
the DSO, for example cost of service or incentive regulation, the DSO can
recover its incurred costs.
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Certain investments in smart grid control devices and metering improve the
DSO’s ability to get insight into developments and can therefore decrease
operational and investment expenses. A DSO can beneﬁt with smart metering
from a reduction in metering costs. Furthermore, the procurement of ﬂexibil-
ity can delay the need for investments in the network.
In Europe, most DSOs are subject to incentive regulation, which means that
their expenses should reduce with an efﬁciency factor each year. However, the
procurement of ﬂexibility through smart grid solutions can increase the
operational expenses in time. This can counteract the tendency of the DSO
to embark on this route. In several European countries, there is therefore a
debate about whether smart grid investments should be left outside the
regulatory benchmark.
With respect to unbundling of generation and supply versus transmission
and distribution, there is an important difference between the level of
unbundling. When the DSO is administratively or legally unbundled (i.e.,
separated from production and supply while remaining under the same
holding company), the holding could maintain (ﬁnancial) links between the
network and generation company. In this case, the smart grid investments by
the network company might implicitly beneﬁt other companies in the same
holding. On the other hand, with ownership unbundling, the DSO and the
generation company are different ﬁrms which are strictly separated with
respect to the ownership of the assets. In this case, the allocation of smart
grid beneﬁts would provide clear beneﬁts that could be transparently allocated
to the actors providing the added value.
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) emphasized that the
DSOs should provide a level playing ﬁeld for other actors in the electricity
supply chain (CEER 2014). In a response by the association of European
Distribution System Operators (EDSO), the DSOs accentuated that all actions
that inﬂuence grid operations should be carefully assessed (for example instal-
lation of new EV charging stations and DG units). Furthermore, they empha-
sized that if the required regulation for a new activity is of such size that it
becomes closely monitored by the regulator, then it should probably be directly
done by the DSO itself as an already regulated entity (CEER 2014; EDSO 2015).
17.3.3 Retailers
Unlike the vertical integrated utility, in a retail competition model retailers are
competing for their share of electricity consumers. For retailers, smart meter-
ing with insight into real-time consumption could provide more insight into
consumption load curves and price elasticity and consequently could result in
efﬁcient trading for the supply of electricity. Smart metering and real-time
data transfer could enable the possibility of tailored contracts for direct control
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of devices and real-time pricing, and furthermore could support the provision
of incentives for new ﬂexibility services (Hakvoort and Koliou 2014).
Besides supply of traditional electricity retail services, the smart grid could
open up new business opportunities for retailers, for example with real-time
trading of electric ﬂexibility services on balancing markets, ancillary services,
or congestion markets (Eid et al. 2016). This role could also be fulﬁlled by the
aggregator, which speciﬁcally focuses on enabling, management, and trading
of aggregated ﬂexibility as presented in Section 17.3.4.
17.3.4 New Entities: Aggregators and Energy Service Companies
Due to integration of real-time data management and control, business models
could arise for new actors in the electricity supply value chain. First of all, the
service of electricity supply could be offered by traditional retailers (as presented
in Section 17.3.3). However, this could also be provided by aggregators or energy
service companies (ESCOs). ESCOs exist, for example, in the UK and might
combine offers for a range of supplied services like electricity, heating, cooling,
and gas supply for a certain urban district (Hannon and Bolton 2015). In addition
to the provision of multiple services to the customers, the customer could also
trade services to the system with contracts for ﬂexibility through an aggregator
(Eid et al. 2016). This aggregator is different to the traditional retailer due to the
fact that it speciﬁcally focuses on the trading of ﬂexibility services on markets.
17.3.5 Consumers
Different to the traditional passive role that residential electricity consumers
normally have within the electricity supply chain, the smart grid could open
up possibilities for active engagement through real-time insight in consump-
tion data, price changes, local production, and self-consumption of electricity.
Both in the design phase of smart grid projects and in the operational phase,
this customer engagement is possible. For example, smart grid projects in
the Netherlands and Germany show the active engagement of consumers
in the design phase of the smart grid with involvement regarding the installed
technologies and the way in which ﬂexibility is managed. From previous
experience, it can be seen that privacy should be addressed carefully already
in the design stage of the smart grid project to support consumer engagement
(McDaniel and Smith 2009; Cuijpers and Koops 2012).
With the application of dynamic pricing and the installation of in-home
displays and energy management systems, consumers can have more control
of their consumption and might actively participate in reducing their energy
costs and their impact on emissions.
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17.4 POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON SMART GRIDS
Often, policy makers promise very positive prospects with smart grids through
enabling real-time interactions that enhance sustainability, affordability, and
reliability for the electricity sector. Section 17.4.1 presents the main sources for
political and economic tensions with the investments for smart grids. Later,
from Section 17.4.2, different developments of smart grids in the US, Europe,
and China are presented.
17.4.1 Sources for Socio-Political Tensions
Depending on industry structure, regulatory context, and push from energy
policy, a certain (set of) goal(s) could be emphasized with the smart grid. The
following subsections highlight those factors, after which developments with the
application of smart grids are described in the US, Europe, and China. Table 17.1
provides an overview of the most important aspects of the diverse policy perspec-
tives on smart grids described in Sections 17.4.2, 17.4.3, and 17.4.4.
17.4.1.1 The Impact of Industry Structures
As discussed in Section 17.3, the industry structure provides important insight
with regard to the type of actors involved in the electricity supply value chain.
Table 17.1. Summary of policy perspectives on smart grids
United States Europe China
Industry
structure
Mostly vertically
integrated or wholesale
competition
Retail competition Vertically integrated
Regulatory
model
Cost of service/rate of
return regulation
Incentive regulation for
DSO
Rate of return
regulation
Energy policy Bottom-up Hybrid Top-down
Initial smart
grid interests
Reliability and recovery
of investments for
utilities
Affordability and
sustainability
Supply surge of
electricity demand in
reliable and sustainable
manner
Smart grid
developments
Smart metering applied
in many places, but no
greater smart grid
vision. End user left
passive in many cases
Smart metering roll-out
only fully completed in
Sweden and Italy.
Remaining problems
are the role of the DSO
Large-scale projects,
including smart
metering, micro grids,
and EV pilot projects
are deployed on larger
scale, where direct
control is applied by
state grid company
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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In the US the integrated utility model prevails, with around 70 per cent of
electricity sold coming from integrated utilities. Almost half of these are public
utilities (municipality, cooperatives, and others) and the rest are private
(Brooks 2015). The customers in those places are bound by the local (public)
service utility for the electricity services.
The integrated utility could directly utilize the insight into consumer data
for both network and (local) supply optimization. For integrated utilities,
however, the possibility exists that due to their monopoly position, the price
of demand response (of ﬂexible demand) is not competitively set. Therefore,
such investments might lead to too high beneﬁts for the utility. This raises
questions about the strategic behaviour of utilities in preventing society from
adopting cost-efﬁcient innovation. This is also of importance for China, due to
the fact that all electricity for residential consumers comes from one of two
state-owned companies.
Alternatively in Europe, the retail competition model prevails with the
unbundled DSO. Depending on the type of unbundling, legal or ownership
unbundling has effects on the possible beneﬁts that the DSO could transfer to
the retailer associated company. When the DSO is only administratively or
legally unbundled (i.e., separated from production and supply while remain-
ing under the same holding company), the holding could maintain (ﬁnancial)
links between the network and generation company. In this case the smart grid
investments by the network company might implicitly beneﬁt other compan-
ies in the same holding, creating a competitive advantage towards other
retailers. On the other hand, under full ownership unbundling, the DSO and
the generation company are separate ﬁrms that are strictly separated with
respect to the ownership of the assets. The allocation of smart grid beneﬁts
would provide clear beneﬁts which could be transparently allocated to the
actors providing added value.
17.4.1.2 The Impact of the Regulatory Model
As discussed in Section 17.3, the industry structure inﬂuences which (type of)
actors are involved in the electricity supply chain. However, the business
model for the network operators and other monopolistic entities depends
heavily on the applicable regulation. Due to the fact that the electricity
network is monopolistic by nature, electricity transport remains a regulated
utility.
There are different ways in which regulators can settle the remuneration for
regulated companies. Incentive-based regulations motivate utilities to reduce
OPEX and/or CAPEX in line with an efﬁciency factor. Alternatively, with rate
of return or cost of service regulation, CAPEX can be more easily recovered if
the regulator deems such investment as prudent. If such smart grid invest-
ments require CAPEX (for example, the installation of smart meters), this can
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be recovered if the regulator agrees. However, many smart grid investments
not only involve CAPEX but also OPEX, for example with the procurement of
ﬂexibility in real-time operations of the network to delay network expansions.
A strict cost of service regulation on CAPEX could hamper a holistic smart
grid vision, due to the fact that smart grid assets do not operate ‘smartly’
without additional long-term operational expenses for procurement, manage-
ment, and remuneration of electric ﬂexibility that is activated from end-users.
On the other hand, under incentive regulation as applied elsewhere for
integrated distribution companies, incentives might exist to reduce OPEX, for
which smart grids might or might not help. Policy makers could support smart
grid investments by allowing them (CAPEX and OPEX) to remain outside the
regulatory benchmark.
17.4.1.3 The Impact of Energy Policy
In order to motivate the sector to contribute to sustainability objectives, policy
makers could provide in appropriate ﬁnancial instruments to motivate invest-
ments in smart grids. Policy could be deﬁned strictly top-down, bottom-up, or
in a hybrid model (both top-down and bottom-up) and could indicate
whether lower policy levels have less or more freedom and power in deﬁning
their own strategies.
In some places, certain aspects of the smart grid, for example the smart
meter, could be legally enforced by law (top-down), or this could be left to the
interests of the utilities involved and the consumers. In some places in Europe
(Italy and Sweden), the DSO has been obliged to install smart meters for all
consumers. In the EU in general a hybrid approach can be observed due to the
settlement of (top-down) binding targets (for example the 2020 objectives for
sustainability). The principle of subsidiarity, however, implies that member
states are free to develop their own energy strategies and implement them in
the most appropriate way (bottom-up).
In the US, where federal funding is available for smart metering (the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009), utilities still have the
freedom to decide whether to use this possibility or not, presenting a bottom-
up approach for actual implementation. By contrast, in China, a top-down
approach is applied, with the state grid company depending entirely on the
policy directions given for the roll-out of smart grids.
17.4.2 The United States’ ‘Smart’: Reliability of Supply
In the US, policy interest in the smart grid arose due to frequent electricity
interruptions in 2005, acting as a driver for innovation in the electricity sector
(Lin, Yang, and Shyua 2013). Later, in December 2007, the concept of the
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smart grid was established in US legislation, where in the Energy Independ-
ence and Security Act of 2007, the smart grid was named as a main pillar for
reform (Kaplan et al. 2009). As described in this policy report, this modernized
grid would have a range of features. It would be able to ‘self-heal’, to motivate
the participation of the electricity consumer, to provide power of a quality
suitable for twenty-ﬁrst century needs, to resists attacks, to accommodate all
generation and storage options, to enable markets, to optimize assets, and to
operate economically efﬁciently. TheAmerican Recovery andReinvestmentAct
of 2009 (ARRA), commonly referred to as the Stimulus or the Recovery Act,
provided US$4.5 billion of funding to modernize the electricity power grid.
Thirty of the largest utilities in the US have fully deployed smart meters to
their customers. The states of California and Texas are leading with the
penetration of smart meters. Some utilities have included the possibility of
alternative pricing programmes or even including a larger smart grid vision
with in-home energy management systems and displays in New York and
Wisconsin (Edison Foundation 2014). Unlike in Europe, the US electricity
sector is mostly structured by the integrated utility model and most resi-
dential consumers are contracted with their municipality utility. Apart from
in Texas (DEFG 2015), retail choice is not common in the USA. Therefore
the penetration of smart metering is carried out in most states through
centralized roll-outs, probably due to the high rate of integrated utilities
which have a monopoly position to do so. ‘However, several states allow
customers to opt-out of smart meters. For those customers typically an initial
fee and a monthly opt-out fee are required. The number of customers who have
requested to opt-out of their smart meter is relatively low’ (Edison Foundation
2014: 1).
Alongside the emphasis on reliability in many smart meter roll-outs, a large
range of projects involve experimentation with different smart grid technolo-
gies. For example, the University of Delaware’s Vehicle to Grid (V2G) project
presents an interesting business case for trading ﬂexibility services to PJM, the
local Transmission Service Operator (Kempton et al. 2009). Furthermore, the
US presents a range of micro grid projects, in which electricity, heat, and gas
supply can be locally managed (DOE 2014). Micro grids are grids that
incorporate IT to coordinate local production with consumption and eventu-
ally enable operations in both disconnected and connected mode. The main
motives for those projects are reliability and energy independence especially in
cases of severe weather events (Bower et al. 2014).
Most utilities, however, continue with smartmetering investments, due to the
CAPEX nature of those investments and the possibility of receiving a return on
investment, but leave out the further smart grid vision with a participative end-
user. There is no interest in this due to the reduced income for utilities given the
nature of current regulation in many places (cost of service or rate of return
regulation).
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However, recent energy policy topics are not related to smart meter
deployment, but rather to how to deal with the penetration of distributed
energy resources. Net metering results in overall reduction of energy sales and
recovering the costs of ﬁxed assets by utilities is being jeopardized (Eid et al.
2014). Therefore, utilities are currently focusing on the addition of or increase
in ﬁxed charges to make up for such costs.
17.4.3 Europe’s ‘Smart’: Affordability and Sustainability
in the Liberalized Sector
The smart grid concept has been ﬁxed in European policy since publication of
the European Commission’s report ‘European Smart Girds Technology Plat-
form: Visions and Strategy for Europe’s Electricity Networks of the Future’
(European Commission 2006). In contrast to the US, the European system has
not faced signiﬁcant reliability problems. The main drivers for transition were
described as the need for new directions to cope with secure and sustainable
electricity supplies in the future. Europe’s ambitious sustainability objectives
do favour a need for new solutions to meet the 2020 objectives of: reducing
electricity demand by 20 per cent, increasing renewable share to 20 per cent,
and decreasing CO2 emissions by 20 per cent compared to 1990. The Euro-
pean Commission set a target for 80 per cent of European households to be
equipped with a smart meter by 2020, if the roll-out of smart meters is assessed
positively (European Union 2009).
Regarding the regulatory context, in Europe the DSO is regulated by
incentive-based regulation, meaning that costs for OPEX and/or CAPEX
should be reduced in time. Since, in many places in Europe, parts of the
network soon need replacement, DSOs are interested in options to delay the
need for network investments. However, the economic rationale is totally
dependent on the regulatory scheme that is in place for recovering costs for
both CAPEX and OPEX related expenses for smart grids. Research shows that
‘unless the DSO controls electric vehicle charging within an active system
management approach, the DSO would have to heavily invest into low- and
medium-voltage lines to compensate for local peak demand resulting from
EVs. This example from EVs clearly demonstrates the trade-off between
CAPEX and OPEX and resulting potentials to avoid unnecessary costs for
DSOs’ (Ruester et al. 2014: 232).
However, OPEX expenses will rise for DSO with smart grid investments
and procurement of ﬂexibility for the DSO to replace network expansions.
This is not the investment rationale of the DSO and therefore is not supported
by European regulation. A different situation for the UK exists due to the fact
that the regulatory Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) adjusted
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regulation for the DSO to take into account other objectives like smart
metering (Ruester et al. 2014).
As the DSO is a meant to be a market facilitator in a retail competition
model, providing non-discriminatory third-party access to the grid, current
legislation limits the DSO to procuring ﬂexibility rather than investing in
grid reinforcements. However, as stated by Lunde, Røpke, and Heiskanen,
‘dynamic tariffs that vary in both time and place might discriminate customers
by increasing price in a geographic area speciﬁcally with capacity problems,
and not in neighbouring areas without capacity problems’ (Lunde, Røpke, and
Heiskanen 2015).
In Europe, so far, only Italy and Sweden have completed a full smart meter
roll-out and in both cases the ‘degree of smartness’ has tended mostly to focus
on remote meter reading (KEMA 2012a). The motive for installing smart
meters in Sweden was the legal requirement to provide monthly invoices based
on actual meter readings from 2009 onwards (Bartusch et al. 2011). The roll-
out of smart meters would reduce electricity metering costs for the DSOs
(Capgemini 2008; KEMA 2012a). However, currently the Swedish DSOs
provide time-of-use tariff options in order to shift consumption from peak
hours to off-peak hours (Bartusch et al. 2011).
In Italy, the electricity producer Enel initiated smart-meter roll-out in 2000,
initially to reduce non-technical losses (KEMA 2012b). More recently, ENEL
has also set out a path to move from the roll-out of smart meters to a demand
response market platform. Furthermore, the Netherlands has been presenting
different interesting cases of smart grid pilot projects since 2012.1 The projects
were subsidized by the Dutch government and in order to expand their
experimental scope, these projects have been allowed to function outside the
Dutch regulatory context. From those projects it is visible that the unbundling
of the DSO from the traditional supply chain might lead to different hurdles
for coordination between network capacity limitations and demand response
programmes. Therefore, the European DSOs are possibly moving towards
new roles in order to attain policy objectives that are of common interest
(EvolvDSO 2014).
17.4.4 China’s ‘Smart’: Dealing with a Surge
in Electricity Demand
Chinese energy policy has focused on growth of the electricity sector in order
to keep up with the surge in electricity demand. At the same time, policy
efforts have focused on sustainability to reduce emissions and the negative
1 See an overview of those pilot projects online at: <http://www.netbeheernederland.nl/
smartgrids/> (accessed 17 October 2016).
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health effects from the high share of fossil-fuel-powered production in China
(RAP 2013; Brunekreeft et al. 2015). In this context, the Chinese government
has acknowledged the importance of smart grids in its twelfth Five-Year Plan
for National Economic and Social Development. The report explicitly sets up
the goal of accelerating smart grid developments. In line with this policy focus
power companies in China, especially the grid operators and academic insti-
tutions, are actively promoting their views on smart grids and developing,
testing, and deploying smart grid technologies (Brunekreeft et al. 2015).
Chinese transmission and distribution are under the monopoly of one of
the two state-owned enterprises. The National Development Reform Com-
mission sets the price by which the monopolies can sell their electricity by
means of rate of return regulation. By the end of 2015, more than 30 million
smart meters had been installed in China. This was completed through uniﬁed
bidding processes set up by the two state grid enterprises.2 Furthermore, 342
of the 352 planned smart grid projects had been completed; including char-
ging and battery swap stations for EVs, smart substations, 20 smart grid
demonstration project and smart distribution networks in 68 cities.
Furthermore, the ambitious renewable targets in China have stimulated
investments in wind and solar power. The grid is required to be upgraded
rapidly in order to handle electricity ﬂows coming from such intermittent
production units. China is currently the number one installer of wind power
capacity, and number two, after the US, in wind power production. Reduced
capacity factors have been attributed to high amounts of forced curtailment,
which reached as high as 50 per cent in some regions in 2012 (Davidson 2013).
The inﬂexible planning processes that gave preference to incumbent generators,
combined with the volatile nature of production from renewable sources, had
disadvantaged wind production (Davidson 2013; Paulson Institute 2015).
Furthermore, most wind, solar, and coal electricity generation is located in
the north and far west of China and most electricity consumption is located in
the east. Due to this distance between supply and demand, large transmission
lines are planned and under construction to connect generation units with
consumption locations. Recently, high levels of investment have been made in
the transmission network for ultra-high voltage (UHV) lines.With China being
the only country to deploy UHV technology on a large scale, its investment
efforts support the international position of Chinese UHV technologies in
gaining global market share (Paulson Institute 2015).
In Chinese terms, the smart grid involves a broad portfolio of information
and communication technologies. This also includes modern grid technolo-
gies such as UHV transmission grids or heat-resistant wires. Consequently,
2 For more information on the smart meter installation and smart grid projects, see: <http://www.
reportlinker.com/p03837879-summary/China-Smart-Electric-Meter-Industry-Report.html> and
<http://www.geidco.org/html/qqnycoen/col2015100801/column_2015100801_1.html>.
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smart grids in China focus on all sections of the power system, with a speciﬁc
focus on the integration of RES (Yu, Yang, and Chen 2012; Brunekreeft et al.
2015). The two state-owned Chinese network companies have invested very
highly in transmission network upgrades. Due to their monopolistic nature
and their close connection with policy, objectives and directives can be directly
implemented in a top-down manner.
In addition to the high-voltage transmission perspective of smart systems in
China, there are different policy objectives for ‘smart grids’ at the distribution
level. Currently, different pilot projects in distribution networks are operational,
with one of the most important projects being EV pilot projects. China’s four
ministries jointly launched the nationwide pilot programme in 2009 which
aimed to roll out ten new pilot cities each year.
Out of all these cities, Shenzhen had the most ambitious plan, that is to
deploy 9,000 EVs, followed by Beijing and Shanghai with 5,000 and 4,157 EVs
respectively. Shenzhen, known as the pilot project city of China, has one of the
largest EV ﬂeets in the world. Shenzhen will be the ﬁrst city to successfully
complete attempts to liberalize sectors (Li et al. 2015). Due to the overcrowded
nature of some cities, the government has set maximum quotas on car
ownership, but there are no restrictions for EV owners, making EVs an
attractive option for potential car owners. However, there remains a problem
with regard to sufﬁcient access to charging stations. Furthermore, the National
Energy Administration is planning 30 micro grid demonstrations as outlined
in the renewable energy development plan.
17 .5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
The authors of this chapter have provided an overview of developments of
smart grids within different policy contexts. We deﬁned three main causes of
political–economic tensions with smart grid developments in the US, Europe,
and China, namely industry structure, regulatory models, and the impact of
energy policy.
Firstly, the industry structure deﬁnes what actors are involved in the
electricity supply chain, ranging from a single (state-owned) utility to a
regulated network operator with multiple retailers whom compete for their
share of customers. Secondly, the regulatory model impacts how the utility
is motivated to invest in smart grid assets, or not, depending on the way its
costs are being recovered. Thirdly, the impact of energy policy can differ
depending on how energy policy is set in legislation and at what level this
is done.
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In the US, due to the industry structure and the type of regulation, which is
cost of service or rate of return based, the utility invests in smart grid assets if
the regulator approves those as prudent. In the past, reliability issues have
been the major factor for the development of the initial smart grid. However,
after the installation of smart meters, in most places utilities are not interested
in investments for a holistic smart grid vision, simply because the regulation
does not incentivize them to do so. With their focus on cost recovery, the
current emphasis is on how to handle the reduction in energy sales due to the
high penetration of Solar PV with net-metering practices, and the connection
of other distributed energy resources.
The situation is different in Europe where the industry structure is retail
competition-based with incentive regulation. Incentive regulation motivates
network operators to reduce operational and/or capital expenses over time
with an efﬁciency factor. It is not clear if investments in smart grids are being
recovered where they are being restricted by the regulatory framework.
In Europe, the policy interest in smart grids began in order to help reach
the highly ambitious sustainability objectives. The European Energy directive
sets a binding target regarding smart metering if it is assessed that the roll-
out would be positive, but member states are still allowed to set up their
own roadmaps to reach an overall 80 per cent target of smart metering in
2020 (European Union 2009). Consequently, in both Europe and the US
a holistic view of smart grids could be hampered due to the fact that gen-
erally operational expenses with smart grids will increase, but the regulatory
scheme does normally not cover those expenses. Especially in Europe, due
to the unbundling of the DSO, the new role of the DSO in smart grids
remains unclear.
In China, the surge of the national electricity demand has been the driving
force for smart grid policies. The two electricity state-owned enterprises in
China have direct links with policy and depending on the stated policy
directions by the National Energy Administration, smart grid projects can
be approved and implemented in a relatively rapid manner. Most smart grid
projects involve electric vehicle pilots and micro grids which are directly
managed by the utility. The quick approach that China has taken results in a
large-scale smart grids development, including smart metering, smart distri-
bution networks, numerous micro grids, and EV pilot projects.
The EU and the US have formulated policies related to the roll-out of smart
metering. However, smart grid investments do not (yet) primarily focus on
sustainability targets. A holistic smart grid vision would open up possibilities
for increased bottom-up participation and better integration of DER at low
voltage levels and local energy management. However, due to the traditional
regulatory funding schemes for utilities and DSOs involved in those places,
the operational expenses for the activation of local ﬂexibility are currently
not equally supported. Furthermore, the cooperation models between actors
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involved in smart grids still remain unclear in many places in Europe, par-
ticularly in relation to the role of the DSO.
It is therefore recommended that regulators allow smart grid investments to
remain outside of the regulatory framework. This should not only be the case for
smart grid capital expenses, but also for smart grid operational expenses in order
to support smart grid developments beyond the installation of smart meters. At
the same time, the regulatory institution should be aware of the possibility for
excessive beneﬁts that can result from smart grid developments and should
specify new indicators for utility regulation within the smart grid context.
A further important dilemma might be related to incumbent power produ-
cers and integrated utilities which are dependent on their energy sales from
large gas, coal, or nuclear production units. The aspect of stranded costs might
reduce the interest for alternative ‘smart’ investments and developments.
Therefore, the role of policy makers should be to reduce regulatory uncer-
tainty and support developments that have a long-term sustainable effect for
the energy sector as a whole.
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Falling Oil Prices and Sustainable
Energy Transition
Towards a Multilateral Agreement on
Fossil-Fuel Subsidies
Henok Birhanu Asmelash
18.1 INTRODUCTION
Governments worldwide subsidize the consumption and production of fossil
fuels to the tune of USD$0.5–USD$5.3 trillion, depending on how subsidies
are deﬁned and measured (IEA 2015a; Coady et al. 2015). The adverse eco-
nomic and environmental effects of these subsidies have long been recognized,
but countries have been reluctant to remove them mainly for political econ-
omy reasons (Burniaux and Chateau 2014; Granado et al. 2010; OECD 1998;
Parry et al. 2014; Pitt 1985). While momentum for fossil-fuel subsidy (FFS)
reform has been building over the last few years, the sharp drop in inter-
national oil prices since the second half of 2014 has intensiﬁed calls for—and
efforts to bring about—the phasing out of FFSs by making the withdrawal
of these subsidies less politically controversial (IEA 2015a). It is, however,
uncertain how long the decline in oil prices will persist and, if past experiences
are anything to go by, the prices are likely to rise again (IEA 2015a). When oil
prices start rising again, the momentum for subsidy reform could dissipate
and governments may ﬁnd themselves under mounting pressure to (re)intro-
duce subsidies (Coady and Shang 2015; Kojima 2009). This means that, in
addition to seizing the opportunity offered by falling oil prices to reform
FFSs,1 the key challenge is to ensure the durability of the initiated reforms
1 A number of countries including, Angola, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, and Malaysia have
already initiated or accelerated their subsidy reform seizing the opportunity offered by the low oil
prices (IEA 2015a).
(Coady and Shang 2015; IEA 2015a). This entails the need for ways to lock in
FFS reforms, and it is primarily in this context that an international agreement
on FFSs merits consideration. Such an agreement would tie the hands of
governments and thereby enhances the credibility of FFS reforms. It would
also help governments resist pressure from interest groups to bring back
subsidies in the wake of oil price hikes. Currently, there is no binding
international agreement to phase out FFSs. The Kyoto Protocol’s call for
progressive reduction or phasing out of subsidies in all greenhouse gas emit-
ting sectors, and the G20’s pledge to phase out or rationalize inefﬁcient FFSs,
go some way in this direction, but they fall far short of a legally binding
commitment to end FFSs.
Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to explore the challenges of and
prospects and possible avenues for negotiating a binding multilateral agree-
ment to phase out FFSs. Fossil-fuel combustion is the largest source of
greenhouse gas emission, the increasing atmospheric concentration of which
leads to global warming and climate change (IPCC 2014a). In recognition of
the critical role that sustainable energy transition will play in combating
climate change, more than 160 countries have set renewable energy targets
and policies to promote the development and deployment of renewable energy
sources (IRENA 2015). The subsidization of fossil fuels runs counter to these
policies. By artiﬁcially lowering fossil fuel prices, FFSs encourage the wasteful
consumption of carbon-intensive fuels and undermine the competitiveness of
renewables (Bridle and Kitson 2014). Their elimination would not of itself
bring about the transition, but it will clear one of the major obstacles in
achieving sustainable energy transition. While FFS reforms take place at the
national level, an international agreement will provide legal certainty and the
necessary context and basis for undertaking such reforms at the national level.
This chapter is intended to provide a basic framework for the necessary
discussions on strengthening the current international legal framework for
phasing out FFSs. Section 18.2 will introduce the basic notion of FFSs.
Section 18.3 makes the case for FFS reform mainly from a sustainable energy
transition perspective. Section 18.4 examines the main barriers to FFS reform
and how the collapse in oil prices can help in overcoming them. Section 18.5
reviews existing intergovernmental initiatives to phase out FFSs. Section 18.6
begins by outlining how a binding multilateral agreement helps the global
effort to phase out FFSs, before assessing the key issues and challenges in
reaching such an agreement. Section 18.7 sums up the discussion.
18 .2 UNDERSTANDING FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES
Despite its frequent use, the term ‘subsidy’ is ‘notoriously difﬁcult’ to deﬁne.
Existing deﬁnitions range from as narrow as a direct budgetary payment by a
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government to a producer or consumer to as broad as any government
interventions that affect prices or costs (UNEP 2008). Since an enumeration
of these deﬁnitions serves little purpose, this chapter will focus on the only
legally binding international deﬁnition of subsidies, which is contained in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures (SCM Agreement).
For the purpose of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is deemed to exist if:
(i) ‘there is a ﬁnancial contribution by a government or any public body within
the territory of a Member or any form of income or price support in the sense
of Article XVI of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]’, and
(ii) ‘a beneﬁt is thereby conferred’ (WTO 1995: Art. 1.1). A ﬁnancial contri-
bution, as spelt out in Article 1.1(a) (1) of the SCM Agreement, may take the
form of: (a) a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infusion)
or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees);
(b) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected
(e.g., tax credits and other ﬁscal incentives); (c) provision of goods or services
other than general infrastructure or government purchase of goods; or
(d) government payments to a funding mechanism or government entrustment
or direction to a private body to carry out one of the type of functions illustrated
in (a)–(c) and which would normally be vested in the government and the
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by govern-
ments. These four broad categories of ﬁnancial contributions capturemore than
what is normally perceived as a subsidy, but, as noted by the Appellate Body in
US-Softwood Lumber, the inclusion of an exhaustive list of ﬁnancial contribu-
tions is in itself an indication that not all government measures capable of
conferring beneﬁts would necessarily constitute a subsidy within the meaning
of the SCM Agreement (WTO 2004). Some of the most notable exclusions are
of particular importance in the context of energy subsidies. For example,
regulatory measures, including border measures such as tariffs and export
restraints, are excluded from the subsidy deﬁnition of the SCM Agreement,
although they may eventually confer the same beneﬁt as the above-mentioned
ﬁnancial contributions.2 Also excluded are implicit subsidies that arise from
government inaction (or inadequate action), such as the non-internalization of
negative externalities or the adoption of lax environmental regulations
(Bigdeli 2008). A failure to internalize negative externalities through taxes
or other mechanisms is likely to confer the same beneﬁt as any other ﬁnancial
contribution on those who create the externalities. Indeed, it is precisely for
this reason that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) incorporates negative
externalities associated with the use of fossil fuels into its global FFS estimates.
2 For example, a restriction on coal exports, either in the form of quotas or a total ban, may
increase the quantity of coal in the domestic market and hence provide an advantage for
consumers in terms of lower prices in the same way a government provision of coal (below
market price) does. For more details, see Rubini (2009).
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18.3 FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES AND ENERGY
TRANSITION: THE CASE FOR REFORM
Despite the emergence of alternative energy sources, the world remains
dependent on fossil fuels for more than 80 per cent of its energy (IEA
2015a). This heavy dependence on hydrocarbons, however, has become a
serious cause for climate change and energy security concerns. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that the warming
of the climate system is unequivocal (IPCC 2014a). The global average tem-
perature has increased by about 0.85ºC during the period 1880–2012 (IPCC
2014b). This is in large part due to the unprecedented increase in the atmos-
pheric concentration of greenhouse gas. Continued greenhouse gas emissions
will cause further warming and increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive,
and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems (IPCC 2014b). Mitigating
these risks requires substantial and sustained reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions. This is, however, unlikely to be achieved unless the world halts its
unabated use of fossil fuels. Carbon dioxide emission from fossil-fuel com-
bustion is the single largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions (IEA
2015b). Meeting the internationally agreed goal of limiting global average
temperature increase to no more than 2ºC requires the vast majority of proven
fossil-fuel reserves to remain buried underground (IEA 2012). The only way
this could be achieved is through a massive improvement in energy efﬁciency
and a rapid transition of the global energy system from one that relies heavily
on fossil fuels to a system that depends mainly on renewable energy sources
such as solar and wind (Barnosky 2015). This much-needed energy transition
is already under way, but not at a pace fast enough to avoid catastrophic and
irreversible consequences of climate change (IEA 2015a).
FFSs are one of the major obstacles holding back the necessary transition.
There are at least three, to some extent overlapping, ways in which FFSs
hamper the development of renewable energy sources (Bridle and Kitson
2014; Bridle et al. 2014). First, FFSs undermine the competitiveness of renew-
ables by artiﬁcially lowering the cost of fossil fuels. Second, FFSs tend to divert
investment away from renewables by enhancing the relative attractiveness of
the fossil-fuel industry. Third, given the inherently long-term nature of energy
projects, subsidy-induced fossil-fuel investments could ‘lock in’ unsustainable
energy infrastructure for decades to come (Unruh 2000). The literature is
replete with studies showing the economic and environmental gains from the
removal of FFSs. One of the earliest studies on the subject found that removing
FFSs would reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by 9 per cent and lead to a
global welfare gain of US$33 billion (Larsen and Shah 1992). Subsequent
studies have yielded largely similar results. Merrill et al. (2015) recently
found that removing fossil-fuel consumption subsidies alone would result in
global greenhouse gas emission reduction of up to 13 per cent by 2050.
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Why, then, are countries reluctant to harvest this ‘low-hanging fruit’? The
answer to this question usually takes two forms. The ﬁrst response is related to
the concern that since FFSs are commonly justiﬁed under the guise of pro-
tecting poor households against high energy prices, their removal could
restrict such households’ access to energy. Studies, however, have shown
that untargeted FFSs are costly and inefﬁcient means of making energy
affordable to the poor. Rather than helping the poor, such subsidies dispro-
portionately beneﬁt high income households (IEA 2011; del Granado, Coady,
and Gillingham 2010). The second explanation is more compelling and
popular; eliminating FFSs is complex and politically difﬁcult. Experience
from previous subsidy reform efforts suggests that reforming FFSs can face
stiff resistance from the public and vested interests (Koplow 2014).
Section 18.4 will discuss the nature of these political barriers and whether—
and if so how—low oil prices can help in overcoming them.
18.4 FALLING OIL PRICES AND FOSSIL-FUEL
SUBSIDIES: FUEL FOR REFORM
The price of crude oil went from a peak of about US$115 a barrel in June
2014 to below US$50 in January 2015. The decline has continued ever since
and crude oil now costs less than US$30 a barrel, falling more than 70 per
cent since the second half of 2014. The environmental implications of this
sharp drop in oil prices are far from straightforward. On the one hand, low
oil prices encourage the overconsumption of carbon-intensive fuels and
reduce the incentives for energy conservation. Low oil prices could also
make renewables relatively even more expensive and hence scare off
much-needed investment in the renewable energy sector (Cheon and
Urpelainen 2012). On the other hand, falling oil prices presents an invalu-
able opportunity to phase out FFSs (Coady et al. 2015; IEA 2015a; World
Bank 2015). The major challenge is how to maximize the opportunities and
mitigate the challenges.
There is a broad consensus in the literature that the main barriers to FFS
reform are political. Subsidy reforms face strong opposition both from vested
interests and from the public at large. The primary opposition to subsidy
reform comes from speciﬁc interest groups that beneﬁt from the status quo
(Overland 2010). Subsidy reforms create ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, like most
other policy reforms. The political economy of reforms suggests that reforms
become extremely difﬁcult to implement when the ‘losers’ are more powerful
or better able to organize themselves than the ‘winners’ (Haggard and Webb
1994). This is particularly the case for FFSs. Different studies show that
subsidy beneﬁts tend to be highly concentrated in the hands of speciﬁc groups
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(with higher levels of energy consumption), while the costs are widely spread
across the general population. Those who beneﬁt from the status quo obvi-
ously stand to lose from the removal of subsidies. And hence they have strong
incentives to lobby for the retention of subsidies. In contrast, members of the
general public have much less incentive,3 as well as less information, to lobby
for subsidy reform. This lack of countervailing lobbying for subsidy reform
strengthens the vested interests’ chance of successfully blocking subsidy
reforms. The drop in oil prices, however, reduces the incentives for such
lobbying. Under the current low oil prices, the change in fuel prices after the
removal of subsidies would not be as dramatic as it would have been under
high oil prices. By limiting the price increase from subsidy removal, low oil
prices mitigate the cost of subsidy reforms for those groups that beneﬁt from
subsidies (Benes et al. 2015).
Another source of resistance to subsidy reform comes from the general
public. In theory, one may expect the poor, in whose name FFSs are usually
justiﬁed but who beneﬁts very little from subsidies, to support rather than
protest against subsidy reforms. In practice, however, public resistance is often
the cause of FFS reform reversal in many countries (Cheon 2015; Victor 2009).
Perhaps this is down to the lack of information about the costs of FFSs (and
the beneﬁts of their reform) among the general public and the fact that unlike
their long-term economic and environmental beneﬁts, the short-term impacts
of FFS reforms (e.g., increase in fuel prices and general inﬂation) are more
visible and easier to detect for the general public. Some countries have
implemented compensatory measures such as direct cash transfers to poor
households to offset the increase in fuel prices from subsidy reforms. Such
targeted subsidies are, however, complex and difﬁcult to implement, especially
for countries with limited institutional capacity (Fattouh and El-Katiri 2012).
Here, again, low oil prices reduce the risk of public resistance to subsidy
reforms and the need for compensatory measures. Low oil prices means that
the removal of subsidies is unlikely to cause a signiﬁcant increase in fuel prices.
18 .5 INTERGOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES TO PHASE
OUT FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES
There is a growing recognition that FFSs are not only economically inefﬁcient
but also harmful for the environment. The most visible aspect of this recog-
nition is the proliferation of calls for the phasing out FFSs and efforts to do so
3 This is because the cost of subsidies is likely to be much smaller in per capita terms than the
beneﬁt to vested interests (Morgan 2007).
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over recent years. This section will highlight and brieﬂy discuss the efforts that
have been made thus far at the intergovernmental level. Although these efforts
are yet to yield the desired results, they represent a major step forward in the
quest to end FFSs, and offer valuable lessons for future multilateral efforts to
eliminate FFSs.
One of the ﬁrst intergovernmental responses to calls for FFS reform came in
the form of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change). FFS reform was included, albeit implicitly, in the Proto-
col’s non-exhaustive list of policies and measures to tackle climate change.
Article 2.1(a) (c) of the Protocol states that:
Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, ﬁscal incentives,
tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse-gas emitting sectors that
run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market
instruments. (UN 1998, emphasis added)
Most FFS schemes fall under this provision, but the requirement to phase
out FFSs is neither comprehensive nor mandatory. First, it applies only to the
so-called Annex I countries and excludes some of the leading fossil-fuel
subsidizing countries. Second, none of the policies and measures set out in
Article 2 are mandatory, even for the Annex I countries (Feaver, McGoldrick,
and Boyd-Wells 2010). The protocol gives the signatories absolute discretion
to implement any particular policy or measure, as long as they meet their
emission reduction commitments.
Perhaps the most concerted effort yet to phase out FFSs at the intergovernmen-
tal level has been that of the G20. At their Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009,
G20 leaders agreed:
To phase out and rationalize over the medium term inefﬁcient fossil-fuel subsidies
while providing targeted support for the poorest. . . . (G20 Leaders 2009, Leaders’
Statement, emphasis added)4
A similar commitment was also made by the member states of the Asia-Paciﬁc
Economic Cooperation (APEC) shortly after (APEC 2009). Together, the G20
and APEC membership, which comprises a wide range of countries with the
highest FFSs, accounts for about 83 per cent of global oil consumption,
making the commitment even more remarkable (Aldy 2015). However, trans-
lating this commitment into action proved to be a slow and difﬁcult process
for several reasons. The ﬁrst of these concerns the scope of the commitment.
In the absence of a universally agreed upon deﬁnition and given the diverse
range of interests involved, deﬁning FFSs was one of the most contentious
issues during the negotiations (Lang 2011). Since they were not able to agree
4 Available at:< https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/
pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf> (accessed 16 October 2016).
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on a common deﬁnition, the resultant compromise was a commitment to
phase out ‘inefﬁcient FFSs’, whereby each country determines for itself what
constitutes an ‘inefﬁcient’ FFS. The explicit reference to ‘inefﬁcient’ subsidies
was meant to permit some exceptions, but it is already hard enough to deﬁne
FFSs, let alone to identify the inefﬁcient ones. This provides a way for G20
countries to deﬁne FFSs as narrowly as they wish, and thereby claim not to
have any FFSs. As noted by Koplow (2012), it was by deﬁning FFS narrowly
that eight out of the twenty G20 members claimed to have no inefﬁcient FFSs,
while those that reported having inefﬁcient FFSs reported considerably lower
ﬁgures than estimates had suggested. However, given that members are
entitled to adopt their own deﬁnition of ‘inefﬁcient FFSS’, there is no legal
grounds for holding them accountable for the discrepancy.
Other noteworthy intergovernmental forums that have joined the ﬁght
against FFSs include the G7, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development
(UNCSD), and the Friends of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFFSR). The G7,
which is composed of seven G20 members, regularly reafﬁrms its commitment
to phase out FFSs, but has never moved beyond such rhetorical commitments.
The UNCSD has the potential to expand the geographical scope of the com-
mitment to phase out FFSs due in part to its almost universal membership.
However, this potential has yet to be fully realized. The issue of FFS reform was
discussed during the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, but the outcome document—
General Assembly Resolution 66/288—was conﬁned to reafﬁrming theG20 and
APEC non-binding commitments (with additional qualifying language) to
phase out harmful and inefﬁcient FFSs that encourage wasteful consumption
and undermine sustainable development (UN 2012). Finally, FFFSR is an infor-
mal grouping of eight non-G20 countries—Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia,
Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland—formed in June
2010 to advocate for FFS reforms. Since then, the group has evolved to become
a vital player in the international efforts to phase out FFSs. It has recently
launched a communiqué calling for the elimination of FFSs in the context of
the Paris climate change conference (FFFSR 2015). The communiqué has been
endorsed by a number of countries and encourages the international commu-
nity to advance FFS reform through three interrelated principles: (i) increased
transparency, (ii) greater ambition in the scope of reform, and (iii) the provision
of targeted support for the poorest.
18 .6 TOWARDS A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES
Despite the series of non-binding intergovernmental agreements discussed
in Section 18.5, FFSs remain prevalent around the world (Bast et al. 2015).
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Against this backdrop, this section examines the prospects for, and challenges
of moving towards a binding multilateral agreement on FFSs. Negotiating
such an agreement is obviously highly complex and time consuming. It is also
politically challenging. However, the growing recognition of the need to
eliminate inefﬁcient and environmentally harmful FFSs, together with the
fall in global oil prices, has created a unique opportunity not only to reform
FFSs but also to lock in those reforms.
18.6.1 The Need for a Multilateral Legal Regime
It is widely agreed that climate change is a global problem that requires global
policy response. The issue of FFSs is no exception. Insofar as the environmen-
tal and economic impacts of FFSs are not limited to the subsidizing country
only, it is in the interest of all countries to cooperate in phasing out FFSs. It was
the recognition of this fact that led to the intergovernmental efforts discussed in
the Section 18.5. However, those efforts contain only voluntary commitments
with no incentives (or punishments) to encourage or force the countries
concerned to undertake or sustain FFS reforms. Past precedent suggests that
such commitments may not translate into actual subsidy reforms, and, even
when they do, the reforms tend to be vulnerable to oil price shocks, public
protest, and changes of political regime. Without any mechanism that ties their
hands, reluctant governments often ﬁnd it easier to renege on their voluntary
commitments in times of high and rising oil prices, in the face of popular
opposition, or in the run-up to elections (Vagliasindi 2013). It is thus necessary
to transform these fragile political commitments into legally binding obligations
to ensure that countries undertake and stick to subsidy reforms.
18.6.2 Key Issues and Challenges Ahead
In this section we discuss some of the key issues and challenges in the pursuit
of a multilateral framework for FFS reforms. The likelihood and success of a
multilateral agreement on FFSs largely rests on the international community’s
ability to: (i) deﬁne what constitutes a ‘fossil-fuel subsidy’, (ii) create an effective
mechanism for enhancing transparency, (iii) address the concerns of develop-
ing countries and oil-exporting countries, and (iv) establish enforceable com-
mitments with implementation timelines. At the heart of all these challenges lies
the issue of political will to reach a multilateral agreement on phasing out FFSs.
Despite the growing consensus on the need to eliminate FFSs, countries are still
reluctant to undertake legally binding commitments. The recent history of
international negotiations suggests that building the necessary political will
for a binding multilateral agreement on phasing out FFSs will require, among
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other things, a core group of ‘like-minded’ countries that push for action. Until
the creation of the FFFSR in 2010, the global effort to phase out FFSs had no
such support. The FFFSR’s active participation in the ﬁght against FFSs indi-
cates that the group is well positioned to lead international efforts to phase
out FFSs.
18.6.2.1 Deﬁning Fossil-Fuel Subsidies
It is not possible to forge a successful multilateral legal regime for FFS reform
without a clear and reasonable deﬁnition of FFSs. Past efforts to deﬁne subsidies
are characterized by disagreement on how broadly subsidies should be deﬁned,
prompting the inclusion of vague language such as ‘inefﬁcient’ and ‘harmful’ in
FFS reform commitments. Deﬁning what is and what is not a subsidy is
problematic. Deﬁning subsidies too broadly runs the risk of including virtually
all public sector activity and undermining the policy space of governments.
Such a deﬁnition is more likely to be contested by governments that are
reluctant to undertake comprehensive subsidy reforms. Deﬁning subsidies too
narrowly runs the risk of excluding a range of government support measures to
the fossil-fuel industry. It would also allow countries to circumvent their
commitment by simply replacing one form of subsidy with another. Thus, the
ﬁrst challenge will be ﬁnding a reasonable deﬁnition of FFSs. In this regard, the
WTO’s subsidy deﬁnition offers a sound starting point as it ‘has been tried and
tested through a rigorous negotiating process and is supported by extensive legal
analysis and jurisprudence’ (GSI 2010). It is, however, worth noting that this
deﬁnition was designed with the speciﬁc purpose of disciplining trade-
distorting subsidies and has never been tested in a dispute involving FFSs.
18.6.2.2 Enhancing Transparency
Transparency is another necessary prerequisite for a successful subsidy reform
both at the national and international level. It provides a clear and compre-
hensive picture of FFSs, which is essential to assess their costs and beneﬁts. It
also helps to garner the necessary public support for subsidy reforms by
exposing the vested interests involved (Laan 2010). Moreover, accurate infor-
mation about the extent and nature of subsides is crucial to get negotiations off
the ground (Laan 2010; Steenblik 2010). Such information is not yet forth-
coming, however, either because ‘governments themselves do not have full
records on the range of support measures in place in their jurisdictions’, or
because they ‘often do not see it in their best interests to disclose subsidies’
(GSI 2012).5 The problem is exacerbated at the international level by the
5 Shaffer, Wolfe, and Le (2015) further note that countries ‘might worry about providing
adverse information for a potential legal dispute’.
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‘absence of an international system or protocol to comprehensively assess and
monitor [FFSs]’ (GSI 2012). The voluntary self-reporting and peer-review
mechanisms of the G20 and APEC have shown that such mechanisms are
unlikely to be sufﬁcient to improve transparency (Casier et al. 2014). It is
therefore imperative to devise a mandatory notiﬁcation or reporting mechanism,
which facilitates the collection of data across countries through a commonly
agreed reporting format and methodology.
18.6.2.3 Clear and Enforceable Commitments
One of the shortcomings of previous intergovernmental agreements to elimin-
ate FFSs was the lack of clear-cut commitments to phase out FFSs. Apart from
their non-binding nature, the commitments were vague and indeﬁnite. It is
desirable to clearly and explicitly set out each and every country’s commitment
to phase out FFSs. Perhaps the most effective way to do so is to ban certain FFSs
and/or impose a quantitative limit on the overall level of subsidies a country
may provide.6 Given how deeply entrenched FFSs are in many countries, it is
unrealistic to expect countries to eliminate their FFSs overnight (Beaton et al.
2013). A commitment to progressively eliminate FFSs is more realistic than an
outright ban. But, in order to be effective, such a commitment needs to be
complemented by clear and explicit country-speciﬁc benchmarks and timelines
for implementation. Moreover, a strong and effective enforcement mechanism
is central to the successful implementation of such commitments.
18.6.2.4 Ensuring Wide Participation
The ultimate purpose of negotiating a multilateral agreement to phase out
FFSs is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and accelerate the transition away
from fossil fuels. Such a purpose is best achieved when all countries participate
in the process. However, it is clear that not all countries are yet ready to get rid
of their FFSs. This has to do with the level of subsidies, the policy rationales
behind them, the technical and institutional capacity to undertake reform,
and the political economy of each country. These factors magnify the
long-standing divergence between developed and developing countries, and
between energy-producing and energy-consuming countries. Energy-producing
countries use subsidies to achieve a much wider objective than that of protecting
poor households from high and rising fuel prices. For them, subsidies are also a
means of sharing national natural resource wealth andmaintaining their natural
comparative advantage (Krane 2014). Although studies have shown that sub-
sidies are inefﬁcient in achieving such objectives, it will take time and effort to
6 Here examples can be drawn from the SCM Agreement’s outright ban on export contingent
and import substitution subsidies, and the Agreement on Agriculture’s (AOA) de minimis limit.
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bring these countries on board. During the 2012 Rio+20 Conference, for
example, oil-producing countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela
successfully blocked the proposal to phase out FFSs.
Developing countries present another major hurdle in reaching a multilat-
eral agreement on FFSs. This is partly because subsidies lie at the heart of their
poverty alleviation strategies and they lack the necessary technical and insti-
tutional capacity to undertake subsidy reforms (Commander 2012). Further
fuelling the problem is the fact that consumption subsidies, which are rela-
tively easy to identify and hence have become the focus of international
subsidy reform efforts, are more prevalent in developing countries than in
developed countries. This makes any agreement to phase out FFSs much more
burdensome for developing countries, thereby reducing their willingness to
undertake binding commitments. One possible means of overcoming this
problem is the provision of capacity-building and technical assistance support
for developing countries that join the agreement. Another way is to incorp-
orate ﬂexible rules for developing countries whereby they will be given longer
transition periods to eliminate their FFSs.
18.6.3 The Quest for an Institutional Home:
In Whose Court Is the Ball?
The issue of FFS reform has been raised in international forums ranging from
the UNFCCC to the WTO. This conﬁrms the cross-cutting nature of the issue.
But, it also shows that the quest to phase out FFSs has no single institutional
home at the international level. This is not necessarily a problem per se, but
the process of reaching and implementing any major international agreement
requires such an institutional framework (Alvarez 2005). A single internation-
al organization is needed to coordinate the fragmented international efforts, to
provide a forum for negotiations towards an international agreement, and
oversee the implementation of the agreement. Since all the organizations
involved in the ﬁght against FFSs are not equally suitable, it is pertinent to
ask: which international organization is best suited to take on this role?
It is relatively easy to exclude some of the organizations from the outset
because they lack a secretariat, which can carry out a ‘leadership role’ in an
international treaty-making process (e.g., G20, FFFSR, UNCSD), because they
have a limited membership size (e.g., APEC, IEA, and OECD), or because the
issue of FFS reform does not fall within their direct mandate (e.g., Energy
Charter Treaty). The same goes for organizations that are not forums for
negotiations as such (e.g., UNEP, the IMF, and the World Bank). This leaves
us with the UNFCCC and the WTO, and we next examine each of them in
turn to see which one is better equipped to ﬁll the institutional vacuum and
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provide an institutional home for negotiating and overseeing the implemen-
tation of an international agreement on FFSs.
18.6.3.1 The UNFCCC
Since environmental concerns are at the forefront of the quest to end FFSs, the
international environmental regime is the most logical starting point in the
search for an institutional home for global FFS governance. The UNFCCC
stands out in this respect as the only legitimate and comprehensive forum for
international climate negotiations. It entered into force in 1994 and has been
ratiﬁed by more than 196 countries as of 2015. This almost universal mem-
bership makes it an ideal forum for multilateral FFS governance. The elimin-
ation of FFSs ﬁts well with its ultimate objective of reducing and stabilizing
atmospheric greenhouse gas emission levels so as to prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic climate change (UN 1992: Article 2). As discussed in Section 18.5,
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC recognizes the phasing out of subsidies in
greenhouse gas emitting sectors as one of the policy measures countries should
take to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. What remains to be done now is to
make this recognition more speciﬁc, convert it into a binding commitment,
and extend its scope of application to the entire UNFCCC membership.
The draft negotiating text of the Paris Agreement had two provisions
related to FFSs: the ﬁrst urging ‘parties to reduce international support for
high-carbon investments, including international [FFSs]’, and the second
listing ‘the phasing down of high-carbon investments and [FFSs]’ as one of
the climate ﬁnance options. The inclusion of such provisions in a legally
binding international agreement would have been a great step forward, but
neither of these provisions made it into the ﬁnal text of the agreement. What is
left in the ﬁnal text of the Paris Agreement is Article 2(c), which obliges
member state to ‘[make] ﬁnance ﬂows consistent with a pathway towards low
greenhouse-gas emissions and climate resilient development’ (UNFCCC
2015). Like its predecessor (i.e., Tokyo Protocol), the Paris Agreement leaves
the choice of speciﬁc emission reduction policies and measures to the discre-
tion of each country.
This is due in part to the high regard with which the principle of national
sovereignty is held within the international environmental regime (Lang,
Wooders, and Kulovesi 2010). The main focus of international climate nego-
tiations that have taken place under the auspices of the UNFCCC has largely
been on determining countries’ emission reduction commitments, but not on
the speciﬁc policies and measures countries should take to meet their com-
mitments. It is therefore too optimistic to expect the UNFCCC to mandate
speciﬁc policies and measures in the ﬁrst place and, second, to create a
multilateral legal regime for FFS reform. This has been conﬁrmed by the
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Paris Agreement, which refrained from prescribing speciﬁc emission reduction
policies and measures.
18.6.3.2 Is the Ball in the WTO’s Court?
TheWTO is not an environmental organization per se, but this does not mean
that it has no role to play in the protection of the environment or that it cannot
serve as a forum for global FFS governance. Sustainable development that
protects and preserves the environment is acknowledged as one of the over-
arching objectives of the WTO in the ﬁrst paragraph to the preamble to the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. FFSs have also been the subject
of discussion in the WTO ever since concerns over the dual pricing practices
of energy-exporting countries were raised in the early 1980s (Lang, Wooders,
and Kulovesi 2010). The relevant question is therefore not whether the FFS
issue falls under the domain of the WTO, but rather whether the WTO is best
suited to address them. In the remainder of this sub-section we argue in favour
of a positive answer to this question.
It is easier to work around an existing agreement than trying to negotiate a
whole new one. And it goes without saying that this could be achieved best in
an organization that already possess the necessary experience and expertise in
dealing with the issues at stake. As noted, the WTO has the only binding
multilateral agreement applicable to FFSs. The SCM Agreement was, however,
drafted with a view to discipline trade distorting subsidies. Whether and to
what extent it could also discipline environmentally harmful subsidies is a
matter of debate. While it is not necessary to recount the entirety of the debate
here, it is important to note that the potential role of the SCM Agreement in
disciplining FFSs is limited to the extent that FFSs are also trade distorting.
There are two types of trade-distorting subsidies under the SCM Agreement:
prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies. In order to qualify as prohibited
subsidies, FFSs must be contingent upon export performance or upon the use
of domestic over imported goods (SCM Agreement: Article 3). Since countries
do not subsidize fossil-fuel exports or provide import substitution subsidies to
fossil-fuels, FFSs hardly qualify as prohibited subsidies under the SCM Agree-
ment. Whereas to qualify as ‘actionable subsidies’, FFSs must meet the speci-
ﬁcity and adverse effects requirements set out in Articles 2 and 5 of the SCM
Agreement, respectively. The only circumstance in which FFSs may qualify as
actionable subsidies is when they beneﬁt fossil-fuel producers or energy-
intensive industries (Asmelash 2015). The speciﬁcity requirement entails
that the subsidy has to be provided to an industry/enterprise or group of
industries/enterprises (SCM Agreement: Arts 1(2) and 2). Fossil-fuel produc-
tion subsidies could meet this requirement as they tend to be industry speciﬁc,
but most fossil-fuel consumption subsidies are provided to all enterprises
throughout the economy, and hence are de jure non-speciﬁc. They may be
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deemed de facto speciﬁc within the meaning of Article 2(1)(c) insofar as they
only or disproportionately beneﬁt energy-intensive industries (Howse 2010).
However, establishing de facto speciﬁcity is complex and requires subsidy-
speciﬁc factual analysis. Even then, there is the adverse effects requirement.
Energy is a key input for energy-intensive industries, but it is not the only
input. This makes the task of establishing the causal link between the subsid-
ized imports and the adverse effect thereof problematic. As such, existing rules
of the SCM Agreement appear to be inadequate to discipline FFSs. This is
partly reﬂected in the absence of WTO challenges to FFSs. The rules need to be
strengthened if they are to discipline not only trade-distorting, but also
inefﬁcient and environmentally harmful FFSs.
The WTO has already shown interest in tackling environmentally harmful
subsidies in the ﬁsheries sector. The Doha Round negotiation on ﬁsheries
subsidies was elicited by concerns about the contribution of ﬁsheries subsidies
to overﬁshing and overcapacity (Bigdeli 2008). Given the similarity of pur-
pose, it is more logical to address both issues under the auspices of the same
organization. The WTO also has well-established institutional machinery
capable of providing technical assistance for developing countries, estimating
and analysing the economic and environmental impacts of FFSs, enhancing
transparency, and facilitating multilateral negotiations. Despite its limited
success, the SCM Agreement has already created a notiﬁcation and surveil-
lance mechanism, which could serve as a useful basis for developing a more
effective monitoring and notiﬁcation mechanism for FFSs.
Another reason that makes the WTO an appropriate forum for FFS gov-
ernance is the binding nature of its dispute settlement mechanism. The Kyoto
Protocol has also created a unique compliance mechanism, but it is not
comparable to that of the WTO, which is strengthened by the threat of
withdrawal of concessions or the imposition of trade barriers.
18 .7 CONCLUSION
FFSs are one of the major obstacles in achieving sustainable energy transition.
Aside from imposing a heavy burden on government budgets, they encourage
wasteful energy consumption and impede investment in renewable energy
sources. However, despite growing reform efforts, they remain prevalent
around the world. The current political commitments need to be transformed
into legally binding commitments in order to accelerate FFS reforms and
ensure the durability of the initiated reforms. While this will require strong
political will and leadership, the combination of the recent fall in oil prices, the
growing consensus on the need to reform FFSs and the formation of inter-
governmental coalitions for FFS reforms (e.g., FFFSR) has created enough
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momentum to at least initiate the process. The main challenges will be to
deﬁne what constitutes FFSs, to bridge the developed–developing country gap,
and to set out enforceable obligations with implementation timelines. More-
over, the crosscutting nature of the issue meant that the global effort to phase
out FFSs is fragmented across multiple organizations. The global effort to
phase out FFSs lacks a single institutional home at the international level.
However, as the only international organization with a proven track record of
serving as a forum for negotiating and implementing binding multilateral
subsidy rules, the WTO seems to be the most appropriate forum to coordinate
international efforts and serve as a forum for negotiating a binding multilat-
eral agreement on FFSs. It is up to the FFFSR to emulate what the ‘Friends of
Fish’ did for ﬁsheries subsidies and put FFSs on the WTO’s negotiating
agenda. Norway and New Zealand (on behalf of the FFFSR) have already
taken the ﬁrst step by raising the issue of FFS reform in the WTO’s Committee
on Trade and Environment, but this needs to be followed up by a formal
proposal for negotiations. Although reaching a multilateral agreement has
become increasingly difﬁcult in the WTO, the agreement reached at the 2015
WTO Ministerial Conference to abolish agricultural subsidies proves that if
there is a will, there is always a way.
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Part VI
Sector Reform
This part of the book provides four unique analyses of case studies of
sectoral reform and provides timely insights related to the nature of energy
reform within broader political economic dynamics. National and regional
structures vary considerably and the dynamics behind energy transitions
necessarily reﬂect the complex structures, power of incumbents and political
dynamics of change. This part offers insights on four distinct situations and
decision dynamics. Understanding the trade-offs of development, climate
and clean energy, habitat protection, and political/economic dynamics from
these case studies offers insights for approaching today’s and tomorrow’s
complex decisions.
In particular, Baker examines the contested negotiation of key policies
which have been fundamental to the introduction of a renewable energy sector
in South Africa and considers how the new renewable energy sector has
evolved thus far, raising key challenges and concerns for its future develop-
ment. Ogunley provides insights on power reform based on Nigeria’s complex
energy economy. This enquiry provides a comprehensive assessment of the
reform by isolating the major challenges facing it, focusing on political
economy developments surrounding regulatory, institutional, legislative, and
ﬁscal issues with mainstreaming clean renewable energy being the main theme
tying together the analysis. Valenzuela and Studer examine Mexico’s energy
transitions via a comparison of two recent energy reforms, corresponding to
two administrations, and offer insights related to coherence of policy and key
policy drivers of energy security and climate mitigation. Their contribution
underscores the political economy trade-offs between the need for a strong
climate commitment that provides a stable long-term energy transition path-
way and the political and economic short-term beneﬁts derived from low
electricity tariffs. Bucaram, Fernandez, and Grijalva offer a set of intriguing
insights from analysing the situation in Amazon basin in Ecuador and the
complex trades offs of protecting precious habitat, development, and the access
and provision of energy resources.
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Post-Apartheid Electricity Policy and
the Emergence of South Africa’s
Renewable Energy Sector
Lucy Baker
19.1 INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in coal-dependent, carbon-intensive South Africa’s elec-
tricity sector present something of a paradox. On the one hand, the country is
now a leading destination for investment in renewable energy. Since the
country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ Programme (RE
IPPPP) was launched in 2011, nearly 6,327 MW of capacity and 92 projects
have been approved, of which almost one-third were connected to the grid by
October 2015, constituting approximately 2 per cent of overall capacity (CSIR
2015). RE IPPPP is held up as an international model for the procurement
of utility-scale renewable energy (Eberhard, Kolker, and Leigland 2014). In
reﬂection of global trends, since mid-2015 solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind
technologies have become cost-competitive with South Africa’s new build
coal-ﬁred power plants.1
On the other hand, large-scale renewable electricity generated by independ-
ent power producers (IPPs) is feeding into a grid otherwise controlled by the
state-owned monopoly utility, Eskom, which has depended almost entirely on
abundant sources of historically low-cost coal. This carbon-intensive electri-
city sector, a key feature of the country’s ‘minerals-energy complex’ (Fine and
Rustomjee 1996) accounts for 45 per cent of national carbon emissions (237
Mt CO2-equivalent in 2010). While Eskom continues to build more coal-ﬁred
power plants, it is also experiencing a ﬁnancial and supply-side crisis, the
culmination of events over decades. The most recent symptoms of this crisis
1 See also Baker (2016).
have included load shedding in late 2014 and throughout 2015. Described as a
‘monster of apartheid’,2 Eskom is now subject to growing indebtedness and
received a negative outlook for its credit rating in November 2015. Meanwhile,
a highly controversial 9.6 GW nuclear ﬂeet is being pushed by the Presidency
and explorations are under way for the extraction of shale gas.
In light of these competing parallel narratives, this chapter asks how, why,
and when South Africa’s renewable electricity sector has emerged. Focusing on
shifts that have taken place in the country’s electricity governance and policy-
making, from a period of generation surplus in 1980s to the supply-side
constraints of the present,3 the chapter builds on earlier studies of South Africa’s
electricity policy (Pegels 2010; Baker, Newell, and Phillips 2014) and provides
an analysis of complex and constantly evolving developments. This analysis
includes an examination of two key developments, the Renewable Energy
Independent Power Producers’ Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) and the
Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for electricity, both launched in 2011. In
addition to enabling the emergence of a renewable electricity sector, these two
mechanisms were carried out under relatively transparent and participatory
planning and procurement processes when compared to the secretive nature of
decision making in electricity and other sectors during the apartheid era.
The chapter is based on extensive ﬁeld research on the political economy
of South Africa’s electricity sector. This includes primary data gathered in
approximately 50 semi-structured interviews in 2010 and 2015 conducted
with: members of the energy industry (electricity, coal, and renewables);
energy-intensive users; government departments; the National Energy Regu-
lator of South Africa (NERSA); the utility Eskom; banks and ﬁnancial insti-
tutions; research institutes; and civil society. The research is also informed by
an in-depth content analysis of grey literature, such as national policies and
publications by government and industry, and a long-term and systematic
consultation of media sources on energy in South Africa and globally, includ-
ing: Engineering News, Mining Weekly, and ESI Africa.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 19.2 explores the key
features of South Africa’s minerals-energy complex (MEC) and recent shifts
within it, particularly in the electricity sector and the current crisis.
Section 19.3 provides a longer-term perspective on the governance and struc-
ture of Eskom. Section 19.4 explores the nature of post-apartheid policy-
making and signiﬁcant changes that have taken place since 1980s, particularly
as regards the role of the Department of Energy (DoE) and other entities that
undertake activities in its name. Section 19.5 examines the negotiation of the
IRP for electricity, the country’s ﬁrst process for electricity planning and how
2 By government member, in interview, May 2010 (anonymous).
3 Note that ‘surplus capacity’ is a technical term that fails to account for the social reality that
until 1993, only one-third of the population was connected to the grid.
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its latest revision has since stalled over the controversial issue of nuclear
power. Section 19.6 explores the emergence of the renewable energy inde-
pendent power producers’ procurement programme (RE IPPPP), which is
followed in Section 19.7 with an examination of key challenges for the new
renewable energy industry. Section 19.8 concludes.
19 .2 THE MINERALS-ENERGY COMPLEX AND
ELECTRICITY CRISIS
The political economy of South Africa’s electricity policy has been character-
ized by the country’s minerals-energy complex (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee
1996), a system that is both electricity- and carbon-intensive. In descriptive
terms this refers to an evolving system of production and consumption based
on the country’s historical dependence on cheap and abundant coal supplies
and cheap labour, to produce cheap electricity for an export-oriented industry
based on raw and semi-processed mineral products such as coal, platinum,
iron ore, steel, and aluminium. Analytically, the MEC offers a framework that
can be used to address the economic legacy of apartheid and the nature of
power relations, politics and policy-making in contemporary South Africa
(Padayachee 2010: 2).
South Africa’s natural resource wealth, however, has not been evenly distrib-
uted (Harvey 2015). As one of the most unequal countries in the world, the
country faces huge socioeconomic development challenges. These include a
history of racial oppression and inequality, high levels of violence, an unemploy-
ment rate of 40 per cent, and poor access to economic and social services such as
health and education. Approximately 25 per cent of the population (12.3million
people) lack access to electricity (IEA 2011) despite a signiﬁcant electriﬁcation
programme after apartheid (Bekker et al. 2008).
As a vertically integrated electricity monopoly, Eskom has been a key player
in and beneﬁciary of the MEC. To date Eskom has controlled the country’s
high-voltage transmission grid, 90 per cent of coal-ﬁred generation plants, and
60 per cent of distribution, which is consumed by one-third of South Africa’s
customers.4 As an illustration of the MEC’s carbon and electricity intensity,
the country’s 31 energy-intensive users consume 44 per cent of the country’s
electricity. This group includes ﬁve major mining companies who also supply
80 per cent of the coal used by Eskom (Eberhard 2011). A number of these
energy-intensive users were granted preferential tariffs, or ‘special purchasing
4 Municipal distributors purchase electricity from Eskom Distribution and in turn supply
about two-thirds of the country’s customers, accounting for 40 per cent of total electricity sales.
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agreements’ by Eskom during the early 1990s when the utility had substantial
overcapacity.
However, in recent decades a number of the MEC’s core features have been
subject to change. Firstly, this can be identiﬁed in the evolving set of relation-
ships and linkages between the country’s state-owned companies, corporate
capital, and a growing ﬁnancial sector. As McDonald (2009: 20) surmises, the
former MECmodel of ‘big state negotiating with big capital’ has been replaced
by a ‘fragmented and rescaled state negotiating with more globally dispersed
capital, in many different sectors with new technical demands’. Secondly, the
contribution that mining makes to the national and international economy
has declined dramatically. Until 25 years ago South Africa accounted for
40 per cent of the world’s mining industry but now only accounts for 4 per
cent (Seccombe 2015). Further shifts in the MEC include an increased con-
tribution by ﬁnancial and business services to the economy, which now
constitute 24 per cent of GDP (Bhorat, Cassim, and Hirsch 2014) and the
creation of a black industrial and ﬁnancial elite in the post-apartheid era
(Cargill 2010). Meanwhile, the country’s national credit rating is now under
threat from long-term weak economic growth rate and large budget deﬁcit.
The country’s ongoing electricity crisis represents a further shift in the
MEC. Since mid-1980s, South Africa has gone from a period of electricity
surplus with some of the lowest electricity prices in the world as a result of
over-planning and the construction of excess generation capacity (Dubash
2002), to capacity restraints, a supply side crisis, and imminent deﬁcit. Elec-
tricity prices have tripled in real terms since 2005 (IEA 2014: 147). By October
2015, Eskom was facing a funding gap of R280 billion (Creamer 2015a).
The crisis has contributed to lowering growth rates, discouraged private
investment, exacerbated the country’s large current account deﬁcit, and
pushed the cost of electricity beyond the reach of the poorest households
which are connected to the grid. Since 2005 Eskom has failed to meet its target
for an additional 17000 MW of generation capacity by 2018. To make up the
shortfall, during 2014 and 2015 Eskom relied heavily on expensive diesel
peaking plants and having exhausted its budget to do this, then sought further
tariff increases (Creamer 2016). In addition to a commitment of R23 billion
from National Treasury in 2015, the utility also discussed the sale of its assets
in order to raise the capital to ﬁll an estimated funding gap of R200 billion
(US$17 billion) by 2018 (Reuters 2015).
Reasons for the crisis in South Africa’s electricity sector are deep-seated and
long-term (Eberhard 2007; Trollip and Marquard 2014; Baker et al. 2015).
They include a legacy of mismanagement; a failure by Eskom to enforce
contracts with its coal suppliers (Olsen 2007); inadequate maintenance of
the utility’s older power stations; climate change mitigation commitments
pledged in 2009; and a failure by government to approve the construction of
new generation capacity in the early 1990s as the following sections discuss.
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South Africa’s industries have been further affected by rising national electri-
city prices. The country’s coal supply chain has also changed: Eskom is no
longer able to rely on ready supplies of cheap national coal resources, due to
growing export demands, and the end of long-term coal contracts between
tied coal mines and Eskom (Burton and Winkler 2014).
The crisis arguably presents a challenge to the dominance of Eskom as a
monopoly utility, which may be further challenged by embryonic processes for
the procurement of independently produced power from renewable energy
under RE IPPPP, in addition to gas, coal and cogeneration, and small-scale
rooftop solar PV (Baker et al. 2015). With this in mind, Section 19.3 now
provides a longer-term perspective on Eskom’s governance.
19 .3 GOVERNING ESKOM
Eskom retained its monopoly status and side-stepped global trends of power
sector liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. This was due ﬁrstly to South
Africa’s political and economic isolation under apartheid, which meant that
the country was not beholden to the loan conditionalities of structural adjust-
ment; and secondly to the country’s cheap and abundant supplies of indigenous
coal and a well-developed transmission network. The ‘standardmodel’ of power
sector liberalization, as endorsed by the World Bank (Gratwick and Eberhard
2008) was based on the notion that public ownership was hampered by poor
technical and ﬁnancial performance and high investment requirements. The
standard model thus advocated a move away from a publicly-owned utility to
one based on privatization, competition, and the unbundling of the utility into
separate transmission, generation, and distribution companies (Dubash 2002).
However, in light of repeated failings, themodel is now in demise (Williams and
Ghanadan 2006; Yi-chong 2006).
Nonetheless, in the mid-1990s attempts were initiated to unbundle South
Africa’s electricity sector when the Department for Public Enterprises (DPE)
of the new democratic government announced plans to restructure Eskom
alongside the country’s four largest state-owned enterprises (Eberhard 2005).
As a member of the energy-intensive users’ group explained (in interview,
October 2010), this development ‘was informed and motivated by the global
privatisation drive of the time and the strong belief that privatisation was
better than government’, despite ﬁerce resistance to this within the utility.
Subsequently the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (DME 1998) set out a
gradual liberalization of the power sector in line with the standard model,
which would see the corporatization and outsourcing of various functions of
Eskom. Notably, the White Paper anticipated the creation of a separate
transmission utility and system operator, which would be owned by the state
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in the ﬁrst instance but with a view to a possible future sale. The White Paper
was followed by a cabinet memo in 2001 announcing that 30 per cent of
electricity generation, including renewable energy, would come from IPPs, in
turn followed by a cabinet ruling that Eskom no longer be allowed to build
new electricity generation. Such a move was described by Eberhard (2007: 231)
as South Africa’s ‘self-imposed’ structural adjustment programme as part of
broader attempts to improve efﬁciencies in government-owned entities.
The subsequent Eskom Conversion Act of 2001 required a corporate
governance structure for the utility, which converted it from a statutory
body to a public company and required that it pay tax and dividends for the
ﬁrst time. This would mean the formation of separate transmission and
distribution bodies and the creation of different generating companies to
create internal competition (Gaunt 2008).
However, key aspects of the 1998 White Paper were not implemented and
some are still outstanding. For instance, a separate transmission utility has
never been established and the Independent Systems and Market Operator bill
that would do this has been continually postponed. Signiﬁcantly, between
1998 and 2003, no new generation was built. The various reasons attributed to
this include: union resistance; resistance from within Eskom (Eberhard 2007);
tensions within the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME); the loss of
construction and management expertise as white staff members left the
country after apartheid; and surplus generation capacity from 1980s, which
reduced incentives for any new construction in the post-apartheid era. One
energy-intensive user stated (in interview, November 2010), ‘the then DME
did not put in an appropriate policy, the regulator was not sufﬁciently
empowered to make things happen, the ministry did not fully understand
and the DPE failed to step up. There were also drivers within Eskom not to
cooperate with the introduction of private generators.’
Furthermore, despite approval for the entry of IPPs under the White Paper,
there was no adequate institutional framework, including a lack of clarity over
who the buyer of power would be. In addition, no IPP would be able to
compete with Eskom tariffs, which at the time were well below cost. Conse-
quently, by 2003 government had begun to rethink its strategy. Faced with
falling reserve margins and an imminent electricity crisis, a cabinet memo-
randum approved that Eskom should be re-allowed to construct more power
plants but that 30 per cent of new generation should be built by IPPs.
However, in the absence of a regulatory framework, it was not until the
introduction of RE IPPPP that this actually took place as discussed in the
next paragraph.
According to (Marais 2011: 348), such a move reﬂects a slowing down in
the privatization drive in all sectors in the 2000s due to ‘the demise of the
Washington consensus globally in the late 1990s’. This, in addition to trade
union resistance at the national level. Eberhard (2005: 5309) has described this
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sequence of events as a move ‘from state to market and back again’, relating to
the constant national tension between the interests of public and private
capital, and the broad and diverse political spectrum that falls under the
umbrella of the ruling ANC, from the developmental state at one end to
market liberalization at the other (Gumede 2007).
Section 19.4 discusses the contested nature of electricity policy and planning
in South Africa, including the shifting roles of various different departments
and institutions involved, and the relative weakness of the DoE, despite its
formal mandate.
19 .4 ELECTRICITY POLICY
The excessively secretive nature of apartheid era policy-making ‘made rational
and public debate on energy policy nigh impossible’ (DME 1998: 24). In the
post-apartheid era, however, electricity policy-making has been inﬂuenced by
weak institutional capacity (Newbery and Eberhard 2008) and ‘a systemic lack
of clarity concerning roles and responsibilities in the electricity sector’ (IDASA
et al. 2010: 4).
Under apartheid there was no department dedicated solely to energy
planning and policy-making and no formal public process for it either.
Eskom was responsible for all planning and new build decisions in electricity.
Since then responsibility for policy-making on electricity has moved across
various different departments. In March 1980 the energy function of the then
Department of Environmental Planning and Energy was moved into the
newly formed Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) (Fine
and Rustomjee 1996: 97). It was not until 2009, following President Jacob
Zuma’s inauguration that the functions of what had by then become the
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) were separated into two depart-
ments: the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and the Department of
Energy (DoE). Meanwhile, it was not until the Electricity Regulation Act of
2006 that responsibility was formally allocated to the energy minister to
approve the construction of new generation capacity and what the source of
that capacity should be (see Figure 19.1).
Various different departments are involved in South Africa’s electricity
governance. The Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) is Eskom’s principle
shareholder and is responsible for the operability of the entity in accordance
with the 2001 Eskom Conversion Act. National Treasury is responsible for
Eskom’s ﬁnancial exposure. The National Energy Regulator of South Africa
(NERSA), established in 2004, has a mandate to determine electricity tariffs;
approve generation, distribution, and transmission licences; and oversee the
import, export, and trading of electricity within the Southern Africa Power
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Pool. Both the DoE and NERSA report to the energy minister. Other institu-
tions of national governance that are involved in energy policy include the
Department of Environmental Affairs, and metropolitan and municipal
governments.
Seven years after it was established, the DoE is still developing capacity and
expertise. Its ability to govern electricity has been challenged by lack of
knowledge and understanding of new technologies, particularly renewable
energy. One of the reasons attributed to this lack of capacity was because
energy policy, in addition to many other policy imperatives, such as safety
conditions in mining and the growth of mining employment, was marginal-
ized when under the remit of the DME, which was heavily focussed on the
distribution of mining rents to the country’s recently established group of
black capitalists (Baker 2012; Harvey 2015). Therefore, informal and formal
inﬂuence over many decisions and activities made in the DoE’s name is
carried out by various departments and institutions under varying degrees of
secrecy as the following examples illustrate.
Firstly, and as discussed in Section 19.5, Eskom still carries out electricity
planning in name of the DoE. Secondly, the policy capacity for the procure-
ment of privately generated power from renewable energy under RE IPPPP
and future IPP programmes is housed within the IPP unit. While the IPP unit
acts on behalf of the DoE, the unit was set up by National Treasury’s Public–
Private Partnership unit together with foreign technical consultants for the
speciﬁc purpose of managing RE IPPPP. The IPP unit therefore functions
outside of formal departmental governmental structures. However, since it
was set up in 2011, it has maintained credibility as a high quality, transparent,
and secure professional body. Perhaps because it ‘did not start out with the
level of mistrust of private business that sometimes characterises other gov-
ernment agencies in South Africa’ (Eberhard, Kolker, and Leigland 2014: 9).
Thirdly, a ‘War Room’ was set up in late 2014 by the Presidency in response
to the electricity crisis, and in order to ensure greater coordination between all
departments that hold a stake in the sector and between which there are
evident tensions (Baker et al. 2015). Despite its potential inﬂuence, limited
information is available with regard to the activities of the War Room and how
it makes decisions.
Fourthly, the highly controversial, highly secretive nuclear procurement
programme being pushed by the Presidency and a minority within the DoE,
was granted cabinet approval at the end of 2015. Should the programme go
ahead it is possible that it will be managed by the Energy Security Cabinet
Subcommittee (ESCS). While the ESCS reports to cabinet, ‘its proceedings and
documents are classiﬁed under the Minimum Informational Security Standard
Act as TOP SECRET [sic]’ (Baker et al. 2015: 42). The issue of nuclear power is
a key sticking point for the latest revision of the Integrated Resource Plan, now
discussed in Section 19.5.
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19.5 THE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN FOR
ELECTRICITY
South Africa’s IRP for electricity is a master plan covering total generation
requirements for electricity from 2010 to 2030. The plan anticipates a doub-
ling of national capacity from approximately 41,000 MW–89,532 MW by
2030. Signiﬁcantly, IRP represents the ﬁrst time that electricity planning has
taken place in South Africa in accordance with the 2006 Electricity Regulation
Act, which established the necessary powers for the DoE to conduct an open
planning process for electricity. While the IRP’s negotiation process was
heavily contested, it is still considered a breakthrough in terms of electricity
planning. However, as this section explores, this breakthrough is now threat-
ened by the scrapping of the revised IRP released in late 2013, which ques-
tioned the need for a national nuclear programme. The scrapping of this
revision is seen as a deliberate attempt by government attempt to push
through nuclear power (Baker et al. 2015).
Before an electricity generation project can be approved, it must align with
the technological allocations set by the IRP in order for NERSA to be able to
grant the project a licence (Pienaar and Nakhooda 2010). However, accord-
ing to the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity updated in
2011, the minister holds the discretion to approve additional generation
capacity of a certain technology if s/he considers it appropriate. The IRP
allows for approximately 20 per cent (17.8 GW) of installed generation
capacity to come from renewable energy (including projects approved
under RE IPPPP) which will deliver 9 per cent of supply. The plan claimed
to be consistent with a carbon emissions constraint of 275 million tonnes of
carbon dioxide annually after 2024 (DoE 2011: 6). Despite this constraint
and the positive gains for renewable energy, almost half of the overall
generation mix will still be dominated by coal, thereby enabling a low carbon
transition to take place in parallel to an already existing high carbon trajec-
tory (Baker 2014).
The IRP ‘stakeholder engagement process’, which took place throughout
2010 and early 2011 was protracted and controversial. In light of the afore-
mentioned lack of capacity of the DoE, the IRP was put together by Eskom’s
Systems Operator with inputs from a technical task team that consisted largely
of members from government, Eskom, coal companies, and energy-intensive
users. This team was heavily criticized for consisting largely of vested interests
from the mining and energy spheres and related government institutions,
and for excluding the renewable energy industry and civil society. IRP was
subject to numerous other criticisms, including over its methodology; a lack of
transparency over critical assumptions; technology costs; and the plan’s
potential impacts on the poor. Notably, the IRP’s assumption that national
electricity demand would double by 2030, led to one member of the City of
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Cape Town to refer to it as ‘business as usual on steroids’. Despite this, and
while the IRP process was dominated by relatively specialized stakeholders
able to engage with the inevitable technical complexity of electricity planning,
opening it up to public participation still set an important national precedent.
Therefore it was still considered a signiﬁcant advance on previous electricity
planning processes, or lack thereof (Hughes 2010; Mainstream Renewable
Power 2010; Nakhooda 2011).
In 2013, a revised IRP was put out for public comment following the
requirement that the plan be updated on a biennial basis. Given the decline in
South Africa’s economic growth since the release of the ﬁrst IRP in 2010 and
declining electricity consumption by themining andminerals sector, the revised
draft made a downward adjustment to the demand forecast by 6,600 MW.
The draft also proposed to reduce allocations for new coal (from 6,250 MW
to 2,450 MW) and wind (from 9,200 MW to 4,360 MW) while increasing
contributions from solar PV (from 8,400 MW to 9,770 MW) and CSP (from
1,200 to 3,000 MW). The wind industry was particularly critical of the assump-
tions contained within the revised draft, arguing that the technology costs did
not reﬂect the price decreases that had taken place since the start of RE IPPPP
(Baker et al. 2015: 24).
However, the draft has yet to be approved by cabinet. The main reason for
this is that it challenges the necessity of a 9.6 GW nuclear ﬂeet currently being
pushed by the Presidency and members of the DoE (Baker et al. 2015).
Signiﬁcantly, the draft questions the high associated costs of nuclear technol-
ogy, stating that ‘the revised demand projections suggest that no new nuclear
baseload capacity is required until after 2025 (and for lower demand not until
at earliest 2035)’ (DoE 2013: 8). In light of the high costs and implications for
technological lock in of a large nuclear ﬂeet, the draft asserts that ‘commit-
ments to long range large-scale investment decisions should be avoided’ (DoE
2013: 9). Details regarding how much the nuclear programme will cost, how it
will be paid for, and who might build own and operate it have been entirely
lacking in transparency (Paton 2015c). Current but as yet unconﬁrmed capital
cost estimates are at R1 trillion. National Treasury, which has largely been
excluded from the process, has questioned the programme’s affordability
(Mantshantsha and Marrian 2015).5 A new draft is anticipated for 2016 that
will contain a higher allocation for nuclear energy than the 9.6 GW currently
included (Paton 2015b).
The IRP represents a poignant example of the inherently political nature
of policy-making in electricity. Despite the 2006 Electricity Regulation Act,
discretionary powers held by the DoE may still undermine the plan’s apparent
5 Serious questions over the affordability of any potential programme have been linked to the
ﬁring of the ﬁnance minister Nene in December, who stated that nuclear power would not be
procured if the country could not afford it (Paton 2015a).
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neutrality. Furthermore, control over the plan and its implications seem to be
as much about a contest over which technologies get prioritized, as a contest
over which models should be used to procure and manage them. As one South
African project developer clariﬁed [personal communication, November
2014] ‘the competitive bid model around RE IPPPP is through private gener-
ation, while nuclear is a bi-lateral negotiation led by the head of state’. With
this in mind, RE IPPPP as the introduction of the ﬁrst successful framework
to procure renewable energy and privately generated power is now discussed
in Section 19.6.
19 .6 RENEWABLE ENERGY PROCUREMENT
RE IPPPP is a competitive tender system under which IPPs bid to construct
and connect their renewable electricity projects to Eskom’s monopoly con-
trolled transmission grid. The programme’s initial allocation in August 2011
was for 3,725 MW to be allocated under fewer than ﬁve bidding rounds. This
was augmented by an additional 3,200 MW of capacity declared by the energy
minister in December 2012, a further 6,300 MW in August 2015, and an
‘expedited’ round to absorb 1,800 MW of projects that failed marginally in
previous rounds in November 2015. It is anticipated that a new tender
framework for round ﬁve and beyond will be introduced in 2016.
Internationally RE IPPPP is held up as example for its high quality regu-
latory framework, tough qualiﬁcation criteria, and strong economic develop-
ment and community ownership requirements, all of which provided a long-
awaited positive policy signal to investors and developers. The programme
has further been celebrated for the savings it has created for the South African
economy. According to the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
(CSIR 2015), solar PV and wind projects collectively generated a R8.3 billion
beneﬁt in the ﬁrst six months of 2015. This is ﬁrstly through savings in diesel
and coal fuel costs, to a total of R3.6 billion and secondly through savings
to the economy by avoiding load shedding or ‘unserved energy’ (Creamer
2015b).
The initial concept for RE IPPPP began in the form of a renewable energy
feed-in tariff (REFIT), for which the idea was put forward in 2006/2007 by
individuals within NERSA’s Electricity Regulatory Division. This move was
supported by the German and Danish bilateral agencies and some individuals
within Treasury, the DPE, and the Department of Environmental Affairs. The
main aim of REFIT was to create a market mechanism that would ‘kick start
and stimulate the renewable energy industry in South Africa’ in order to meet
the target of 10,000 GWh of renewable energy by 2013 as set out in the 2003
Renewable Energy White Paper (NERSA 2008: 4) (see Box 1).
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Initially there was opposition to the notion of a feed-in tariff and renewable
energy from within the regulator, the DoE and Eskom. However, in pushing
for REFIT, NERSA’s director succeeded in galvanizing the global renewable
energy industry, whose market opportunities in Europe and the US had been
undermined by the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. From the outset, REFIT was
subject to intense interest from South African renewable energy IPPs, in turn
backed by international renewable energy developers and private ﬁnance, who
were awaiting the policy certainty that would allow them to build their
projects and connect to the grid (Baker 2012). During the negotiation process
for what is now RE IPPPP there were protracted disagreements over:
• how the tariff levels should be set
• who the buyer of power would be
• mistrust of renewable energy from various factions of government and
business
• how political and ﬁnancial risks should be allocated between government
and the private sector.
There was also signiﬁcant conﬂict over whether a tender system, which was
eventually selected, or a feed-in tariff system should be implemented. Notably,
the DME proposed a tender system as the preferred model, while private
sector representatives, NERSA, and the Danish Embassy argued in favour of a
feed-in tariff system (Renewable Energy Summit 2009). While a feed-in tariff
Box 1. Renewable Energy White Paper
The 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper was the ﬁrst national document that
referred to the procurement of renewable energy from IPPs. Described by one
Eskom employee as ‘a visionary blip on the horizon’, it was published by the then
DME in 2003 with support from the Danish foreign aid agency DANIDA, just
missing the World Summit on Sustainable Development hosted by South Africa in
2002. The paper set a minimal target of four per cent of the estimated electricity
demand by 2013 (DME 2003), to be achieved through a mixture of biomass, landﬁll
gas, hydro-electricity, and solar water heaters with only one per cent for wind
(Edkins et al. 2010). Funded under the World Bank’s Renewable Energy Market
Transformation Project (REMT) and managed by the Development Bank of South
Africa, the paper should have been revised in 2008. Still unpublished by May 2012
it had no inﬂuence on the content of the IRP. Reasons for the delay are attributed
by one energy analyst to a resistance within the DoE: ‘the World Bank paid for the
research to be carried out on the renewable energy white paper as part of
REMT. This was resisted by the DoE. The irony is that the DoE should be making
this policy. Instead it ended up being an activist process funded by theWorld Bank’
(in interview September 2010).
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pays generators a ﬁxed price for each unit of renewable energy sold to the grid,
which is set at a higher rate than the retail price of electricity generated from
conventional resources, under a competitive bidding system potential project
developers bid for a renewable energy contract below a certain cap. The latter
system is therefore more competitive and is currently the preferred global
model (EY 2014).
When REFIT had become so high proﬁle as to be irreversible, in late 2010 the
DoE backed byNational Treasury’s Public Private Partnership Unit and various
international technical advisors made changes to the Electricity Regulations on
New Generation Capacity, which effectively transferred powers over the pro-
curement process away from NERSA to the DoE and National Treasury. This
move also facilitated the shift from a feed-in tariff to a competitive bidding
system, which saw the proposed REFIT replaced by RE IPPPP in August 2011
(Baker 2012: 109–13). National Treasury justiﬁed the move by stating that the
proposed REFIT was illegal given that ‘the predetermined tariff would fall foul
of South Africa’s procurement rules’ (Creamer 2011).
Signiﬁcantly RE IPPPP’s negotiation demonstrates a turf battle between
NERSA as the initiator of the process and theDoE backed byNational Treasury,
who altered legislation in order to take control of the programme. While
NERSA was undoubtedly ‘acting beyond its mandate’ (Baker 2012: 105) given
that under the 2006 Electricity RegulationAct, it is theDoE’s role tomake policy
and NERSA’s to implement it through licensing and regulation, NERSA’s lead
in pushing for the system was clearly instrumental in its emergence.
19 .7 CHALLENGES FOR A NEW INDUSTRY
South Africa’s renewable energy sector that has emerged out of RE IPPPP
potentially offers a window of opportunity to achieve a clean energy transition.
However, as I now discuss, despite RE IPPPP’s apparent and rapid success,
there are concerns over the way in which it is evolving, particularly as to
whether it will be able to bring about social, economic, and environmental
beneﬁts beyond the generation of renewable electricity.
The majority of capacity allocated under RE IPPPP is for wind, solar PV
and concentrated solar power (CSP). Under RE IPPPP, projects are assessed
70 per cent on price below a tariff certain cap, which decreases with each round
and 30 per cent on socioeconomic development requirements. RE IPPPP’s
economic development requirements are potentially very progressive, and
include factors such as participation of historically disadvantaged individuals,
job creation, local content, rural development, community ownership, and skills
development. A project must meet the economic development requirements
before the price submission can be considered. Successful projects sell their
384 Sector Reform
power to Eskom under a 20-year power purchase agreement (PPA) which is
government-backed and local-currency-denominated. However, partly due to
the risk-adverse nature of project ﬁnance, many national ﬁrms have been
prohibited from participating in the market, while ownership of the industry
is dominated by large international companies (Baker 2015). Such a scenario
raises questions as to who the winners and losers might be in the creation of a
new renewable energy sector in a process that has to date favoured international
actors over local companies.
The dramatic decrease in the tariffs bid by project developers under RE
IPPPP means that many renewable energy projects are now cost-competitive
with Eskom’s new build coal projects. However, these low tariffs have also
been identiﬁed as a risk to project ‘bankability’. Not least, given that projects
are now operating on very tight ﬁnancial contingencies. While this risk is
carried by the private sector rather than Eskom, these costs will inevitably be
structured into any successful project and therefore passed on to the country’s
electricity consumers.
The capacity of Eskom’s transmission grid to integrate renewable energy, as
an intermittent generation source is a further challenge. While IPPs pay for
the connection of their projects, Eskom is required to strengthen the trans-
mission network and upgrade substations in order to do so. However, Eskom
has stated that due to funding constraints, it is likely to struggle to connect IPP
projects outside of areas of grid strength. It is therefore anticipated by industry
that in some locations solar PV and wind will start to compete for access to the
same line.
19 .8 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, factors that have shaped the nature of policy-making in post-
apartheid South Africa’s electricity sector include: surplus power capacity
from mid-1980s until the early 2000s; the country’s economic and political
isolation under apartheid; a spectrum of political and economic ideological
conﬂicts within government, Eskom, and the unions with regards to the
privatization of the electricity sector; and the loss of skills in the utility.
Signiﬁcantly, in light of the recent introduction of a regulatory framework
for electricity planning and in the absence of expertise and capacity within
the recently established DoE, activities carried out in the department’s name
have been undertaken by various other institutions. Electricity policy is
therefore embedded within long-standing political and economic forces,
which demonstrates the diverse and often conﬂicting nature of interests
within the ruling party.
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The contested nature of electricity policy in South Africa relates as much to
a struggle over which technology is selected as the model that should procure
and manage it. Decision-making over the ideal electricity mix reﬂects deeper
struggles over what gets supported by the state, who gets to build it, and who
gets to beneﬁt. While privately generated renewable electricity presents a clear
challenge to Eskom’s crisis-ridden monopoly utility, coal-ﬁred power is likely
to remain the primary energy source for the time being, despite the end of
historically cheap prices. Meanwhile, the potential construction of a highly
contested 9.6 GW nuclear generation programme appears to represent an
attempt by the state to reinforce its power through Eskom, at the same time as
precipitating a potential return to an era of secretive decision making charac-
teristic of the apartheid era.
This chapter also contributes to the broader debate over the ideal model
of power sector governance. Signiﬁcantly, my argument does not subscribe
to the notion of ‘private goods and public bads’, which would assume that a
liberalized sector is inevitably efﬁcient, competitive, and innovative while a
state-owned utility is inherently over-subsidized, corrupt, and resistant to
new technologies. Or alternatively that a state-controlled utility always
works in the interests of the majority public, while a privatized electricity
sector in the interest of a private rentier class. Regardless of the ownership
structure, the harder question is whether the sector is transparent, ﬁnan-
cially accountable, subject to public scrutiny and technically and manageri-
ally competent.
On a related point, this chapter raises poignant questions over the signiﬁ-
cance of transparent and democratic decision making for a clean energy
transition. Following a breakthrough as the ﬁrst public negotiation process
for electricity planning, the IRP as a process now appears to have been
undermined. This is due to the DoE’s stalling of the revised draft in light of
the draft’s questioning of a potentially unviable nuclear ﬂeet whose costs are
unknown. Arguments aside as to whether nuclear power should contribute to
a clean energy transition, of greater concern is that it represents a backward
step in terms of a transparent process for electricity planning (Baker et al.
2015). This has huge implications for how any other technology, clean or
otherwise, and its related procurement model may then be pushed through in
future, beyond the view of public scrutiny.
Finally, while this chapter focusses on South Africa’s emerging utility scale
renewable energy sector, it acknowledges the other processes now emerging
for the procurement and development of independent power from other
sources, including embedded generation roof top solar PV, coal, co-generation,
and gas. This, in addition to a small IPP programme of projects less than 5MW
of which ten winning bidders were announced in early October 2015. The
way in which RE IPPPP may continue to develop therefore has signiﬁcant
implications.
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Political Economy of Nigerian
Power Sector Reform
Eric Kehinde Ogunleye
20.1 THE CONTEXT
The Nigerian power sector is currently undergoing one of the most ambitious,
comprehensive, and bold reforms in the history of Africa. The ultimate aim is
to privatize all power assets with a view to ending the country’s chronic power
shortages and long-standing monopoly of the sector by the state-owned power
entity. The reform is based on the 2005 Electric Power Sector Reform Act,
2010 Roadmap for Power Sector Reform, and subsequently the 2013 Roadmap
for Power Sector Reform Revision 1, among several other policy documents.
While the Act provides a legal backing for the reform, the roadmaps serve as
instruments for fast-tracking the proposed fundamental changes to the own-
ership, control, and regulation of the sector as envisaged in the Act and ensure
these are achieved and realized, especially for the ultimate beneﬁt of electricity
users. For additional policy initiatives, pronouncements, and documents that
have been initiated by the government to guide the power sector reform
process, see Ogunleye (2016).
The Act focuses on creating a regulatory agency that would serve as the
umpire for ensuring effective enforcement and compliance with the rules of
the game in the electricity sector. It emphasizes privatization of a hitherto
government-owned electricity company that has monopolized electricity gen-
eration, distribution, and transmission for decades. Through this action, the
reform seeks to remove obstacles to private sector investment in this critical
sector. It also attempts to improve energy independence and diversify energy
sources towards cleaner energy such as solar, geothermal, and wind. The
objectives of the reform include highly ambitious targets for the power sector.
It was projected that power generation would reach over 13,000 megawatts
(MW) by 2015 and 40,000 MW by 2020. While the 2015 target has been
missed and 2020 is unrealizable, efforts are still being made to scale up and
maintain a steady pace and timely implementation of the reform.
The reform was conceived out of obvious challenges facing the country’s
energy sector with serious negative effects on business. Power outage is a
common and daily experience; Nigeria is one of the countries with the lowest
electricity consumption per capita in the world at around 100 kilowatt-hour
(kWh) per annum. Installed capacity remains low at around 8,000 MW, out of
which only 4,000 MW is operable and less than 2,000 MW available to generate
energy. The gross inadequacy of energy generation becomes glaring when com-
pared with SouthAfrica’s almost 5,000 kWh per capita. Indeed, 60 per cent of the
time, there is no access to electricity in Nigeria (Aliyu, Ramli, and Saleh 2013).
The goals of the reform can be broadly categorized into: (1) deﬁning a new
national power policy that positions the private sector as driver of the sector
on funding, innovation, and leadership; (2) designing an enabling regulatory,
policy, and commercial framework for engagements of all stakeholders in the
sector; and (3) commercialization of the sector. In more speciﬁc terms, the
Roadmap for Power Sector Reform outlines speciﬁc tasks to include: estab-
lishment of a bulk purchaser/trader; strengthening the Nigerian Electricity
Regulatory Commission (NERC); provision of Federal Government Credit
Enhancement; operationalizing the Nigerian Electricity Liability Management
Company (NELMCO); strengthening the training institute, NAPTIN (National
Power Training Institute of Nigeria); strengthening technical and managerial
capacity of the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN); and sale of Nigeria’s
generating companies and distribution companies to the private sector.
The reform was planned in three phases. Five activities were scheduled
for the ﬁrst phase. These are unbundling and privatization of the long-lasting
government-owned monopoly power company, National Electric Power
Authority (NEPA) subsequently known as Power Holding Company of Nigeria
(PHCN), creation of an independent power sector regulator (NERC) to ensure
sanity in the market and carry out other standard regulatory functions, incorp-
oration of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) successor generation
and distribution companies, creation of a multi-purpose entity that would have
the function of procuring electricity from the independent power producers and
newly created generation companies for subsequent sale to the distribution
companies, and establishment of the training institute, National Power Training
Institute of Nigeria (NAPTIN). The second phase, which has a medium-term
horizon, involves developing a cost-reﬂective electricity tariff to ensure competi-
tive pricing that would attract private sector participation in the sector. The third
phase, which is the ﬁnal long-term phase, focuses on achieving a completely
competitive power sector.
It is noteworthy that modest progress has been recorded in the course of
implementing the reform. First, the ﬁrst phase of the privatization process has
been successfully concluded with the unbundling of the hitherto state-owned
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monopoly in the electricity sector—NEPA and later PHCN—giving way to
the emergence of 11 distribution companies, six generation companies and
a transmission company. Second, the regulatory and institutional framework
for the power sector reform has been established and fully functional (see
Ogunleye (2016) for a complete list of these institutions). Third, a cost-
reﬂective tariff (multi-year tariff order or MYTO) that would make the sector
attractive to both local and foreign investors has reached a very advanced stage
of implementation, albeit fraught with some challenges that are discussed later
in this chapter. Fourth, there is emergence of several independent power
plants with combined capacity to generate additional 2,500 MW of electricity.
Fifth, regulatory institutions responsible for implementing the proposed
reforms have been established. Sixth, signiﬁcant efforts are ongoing to im-
prove the gas-to-power infrastructure which is the greatest binding constraint
on electricity supply, resulting from pipeline vandalism and gas pricing policy.
Lastly, several policies and market rules are being developed to guide the
emerging privatized power sector at different stages of the reform.
Despite the progress, challenges remain. The most prominent of these is the
political environment surrounding the reform, mainly regulatory and institu-
tional issues. First, it can be argued that the long-lasting monopoly of the
sector by government exacerbated by over-regulation was the dominant factor
behind the deterioration in the country’s energy sector over the years, cul-
minating in its current deplorable state. Second, the reform is generating
emerging challenges that require development of an effective post-reform
strategy on regulatory, institutional, and human capacity issues. Third, the
state of insecurity in the country, especially in the Niger Delta region, induces
incessant gas pipeline vandalism with serious implications for the progress of
the reform as gas supply to the power stations is being constrained. Fourth, a
cost recovery challenge has emerged recently, an outcome of the alleged over-
priced power plants and distribution companies during the bidding process by
the eventual buyers.1 Fifth, the MYTOs have also been a thorny issue, with
incessant complaints by industrialists while residential consumers engage in
sporadic demonstrations and protests over energy bills that they claim do not
match supply availability and quality of service. Sixth, weak political will to
invest in the sector now further exacerbated by the country’s current challeng-
ing ﬁscal revenue position. This is a major concern because transmission
remains under government ownership, though managed by an independent
private ﬁrm. Lastly, there is challenge with energy security due to limited
1 Some generation and distribution companies have claimed that the power assets purchased
during the privatization process were overvalued because the data and information provided to
them by the government was wrong and inﬂated. Examples of such alleged wrong data include
the customer base and aggregate technical, commercial, and collection loss level.
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investment in clean energy, especially hydro and solar, that would help achieve
optimal mix of energy sources.
A few studies have attempted to assess the energy sector reform in Nigeria
(see Adenikinju 2003; Oke 2008; Okoro and Chikuni 2007; Sanyaolu 2008;
Tallapragada and Adebusuyi 2008; Idris et al. 2013; and Joseph 2014). Some
have focused on the investment opportunities and pitfalls associated with the
reform (David-West 2014; Onochie, Egware, and Eyakwanor 2015). Others
have assessed the impact of the reform (Adoghe, Odighe, and Igbinovia 2009).
Yet others have looked at it from consumer perspective (Ochugudu and
Onodugo 2013). Generally, most of these studies have focused mainly on the
challenges and opportunities offered by the reform without paying particular
attention to the political economy of the reform process. Indeed, none
provided a detailed, comprehensive, and historical assessment of the reform
in within institutional, regulatory, and legislative contexts. This study ﬁlls
these gaps.
Following this introduction, Section 20.2 outlines the key challenges threat-
ening the reform. An assessment of the reform is the focus of Section 20.3,
while Section 20.4 concludes with a way forward.
20 .2 KEY CHALLENGES FACING THE POWER
SECTOR REFORM
20.2.1 Poor Transmission Network
The transmission segment of the power sector is the weakest link in the
Nigerian electricity value chain. Transmission lines are notorious for being
very old and weak. Some of the cables are compromised and can no longer
withstand the pressures of carrying power lines. Worse still is the fact that the
transmission lines are limited in scope and coverage of the country. Currently,
the transmission lines are unable to successfully evacuate all the power gener-
ated to the point of need as total system collapse is a regular reoccurrence during
peak generation period, thus increasing the level of trapped power generated.
What this means is that, even when there is additional capacity to increase
power generation, this is constrained by limited transmission capacity that
makes evacuating additional power load impossible. One reason for the weak
transmission lines is their limited capacity, being originally designed to carry
between 3,000 and 3,500 MW. Another factor is lack of regular maintenance
of the transmission lines. Security challenges in some parts of the country, and
issues associated with obtaining right of way for construction of new trans-
mission lines, constrain expansion.
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20.2.2 Inadequate Funding
Funding is one of themost acute challenges facing theNigerian power sector. Yet,
substantial investments are required in the entire electricity supply chain.
A rationale for the power sector reform is the need to reduce government funding
of the sector throughprivatization thatwould leave ﬁnancing of the sectormainly
in the hands of the private sector. While up to 70 per cent of the loans and equity
funds that paid for the assets came from the local ﬁnancial market, the debt
obligation on the ﬁrms and the banking system is huge. Worsening the situation
are the large collection losses being declared by these ﬁrms, amounting to a
substantial ﬁnancial haemorrhage. To a great extent, the generation companies
are responsible for the loss because they have not done sufﬁciently well to invest
in strengthening the metering system that would discourage power theft and
improve the collection rate. Alleged excessive estimated bills that do not reﬂect
power availability and consumption have also discouraged payments by con-
sumers. The poor balance sheets of the banking system resulting from exposure
to power sector loans appear to have weakened them and discouraged further
extending additional funding required for the reform.
To tackle the ﬁnancing challenge, the government has taken the lead in
proffering solutions through convening investor conferences, investment
roadshows, and provision of special funding to stakeholders in the electricity
value chain. For instance, on 2 August 2014, the government made available
approximately US$1 billion through the Nigerian Electricity Market Stabiliza-
tion Fund. The purpose of this facility was to make funds available to power
generation companies to settle legacy gas debts, address revenue shortfall
during the Interim Rule period, and clear debts incurred through infrastruc-
ture upgrade, notably metering. As of October 2015, about 30 per cent of this
facility has been approved and disbursed. However, this support tilts in favour
of the distribution companies to the disadvantage of the generation compan-
ies. Earlier, NGN300 billion was made available through the Power and
Airline Intervention Fund. These interventions are temporary stopgap meas-
ures for addressing the funding challenge, necessitating need for a more
permanent solution that assures sustainable private sector-led ﬁnancing.
20.2.3 Policy Challenge
The guiding policy for the power sector reform are very numerous and appear
uncoordinated, as many of them are not in sync nor do they ‘talk’ to each other
(see Ogunleye 2016). They are also characterized by obvious overlaps and
conﬂicts. This is discernible, for example, in the operations of NAPTIN,
Standards Organization of Nigeria and National Environmental Standards
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and Regulations Enforcement Agency in the monitoring of and enforcing
compliance with the technical and operating standards in the power sector.
Ambiguity is also rampant in some of the policy documents, with generic,
broad, and unclear objectives lacking speciﬁcity.
20.2.4 Inadequate Gas Supply
Gas as a feedstock for power generation accounts for about 50 per cent of the
total cost of producing power in Nigeria. This is signiﬁcant considering that 80
per cent of total electricity generation in Nigeria comes from gas (Figure 20.1).
Around 4.9 billion standard cubic feet (scf) of gas per annum is covered by the
agreements between gas suppliers and electric companies, with just about a
third of this being delivered. Yet, the country’s installed power generation
capacity would require gas supply of up to 7 billion scf per annum to
adequately power them. Adequate gas supply to power generation is central
to achieving the country’s objective of electricity availability, affordability, and
accessibility. Indeed, distribution companies have named insufﬁcient gas
supply as a major challenge constraining their ﬁnances because it limits the
power supplied to them by the generation companies.
Nigeria ranks among the top ten countries with highest proven gas reserves
in the world (Figure 20.2), but rather than put this important resource to good
use, a great percentage is wasted through ﬂaring, leading to very low utilization
rate (Figure 20.3). Incoherent gas-to-power policy, low proﬁtability of domes-
tic gas supply vis-à-vis exports, and poor gas-to-power infrastructure are all
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challenges affecting its effective utilization to generate power. The problem of
gas to power can be broadly classiﬁed as gas pipelines vandalism and poor gas
project facilities management (Amadi 2015). This boils down to availability,
affordability, deliverability, and commerciality of gas supply.
There is a signiﬁcant gas supply mismatch with some completed power
generation plants lacking gas supply while uncompleted projects have gas
supply infrastructure available to them. For example, at the time of writing,
Geregu and Omotosho plants do not have gas supply infrastructure. Some of
the key challenges constraining effective gas supply are political considerations
around locating power stations, gas pipeline vandalism, long distances be-
tween sources of gas supply and power stations, and weak gas-to-power policy
resulting in a misalignment between gas and power policies. The strategic
importance of gas to the success of the power sector reform is demonstrated by
the relative success of Transcorp Ughelli Power, a generation company in the
Niger Delta area that was able to increase its generation capacity from 160
MW to 453 MW within six months of operation owing to its power station’s
proximity to gas supply locations.
Some political and economic solutions have been proposed, and others are
still being sought, to tackle the gas challenge. One is the development of the
Gas Master Plan in 2008 to provide a guide for mainstreaming commercial
exploitation and management of gas in the country through three key strat-
egies: stimulating the multiplier effect of gas in the domestic economy; posi-
tioning Nigeria competitively in high-value export markets; and guaranteeing
the country’s long-term energy security. Second, efforts have been made by
the government to allocate between 10–15 per cent of the gas spot market
supplied by Nigeria Liqueﬁed Natural Gas to power generation companies.
Third is establishment of the Gas Aggregation Company with the aim of
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providing a strategic framework for implementing the gas master plan with a
view to achieving a wholly competitive and market-driven domestic gas sector.
Fourth is removal of an earlier government price cap on domestic gas supply.
In August 2014, the government revised the gas-to-power price upward to US
$2.50 from US$2/mcf (per thousand cubic feet) and added US$0.80/mcf to
cover transportation costs for new capacity. This and future guided policy on
pricing are expected to bring the domestic price of gas closer to its inter-
national market price, thus encouraging domestic supply instead of exports.
Fifth is setting up a special purpose ﬁnancing facility to settle legacy gas supply
debts. Lastly, the power sector regulator, NERC, has made access to gas a
compulsory condition for licensing independent power projects.
20 .3 ASSESSMENT OF THE POWER SECTOR REFORM
Assessment of the reform is undertaken by analysing the policy documents
relevant to the reform vis-à-vis the projected and actual outcomes of the reform.
Some of the documents analysed are: the Electric Power Sector Reform Act
2005; the Roadmap for Power Sector Reform; and progress reports by special-
ized agencies that include NERC, the Presidential Task Force on Power, the
Ministry of Power, the National Rural Electriﬁcation Agency, Independent
Power Plants, the Energy Commission of Nigeria, and so on. Since the study
focuses on a contemporary issue, a large number of the information is sourced
from real-life observations, speeches made by stakeholders involved in the
reform, and presentations in different forums.
20.3.1 Process Infractions in the Management
of the Privatization Process
From the outset, several allegations of infractions have surfaced in the power
sector reform process. At the point of awarding the management contract of
the Transmission Company of Nigeria to Manitoba Hydro International, both
the then serving Minister of Power and the Director-General of the agency
responsible for the privatization process—the Bureau of Public Enterprises
(BPE)—were relieved of their duties as a result of alleged infractions in the
bidding process. The minister was found to have a conﬂict of interest as he had
stakes in some of the ﬁrms bidding for some of the PHCN successor com-
panies. Geometric Power, in which the minister had a stake, had joined
Eastern Electric Nigeria Ltd and O & M Solutions of Pakistan in bidding for
the Enugu Distribution Company and Afam Generation Company, respect-
ively. Yet the minister maintained that he had no conﬂict of interest because
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he had informed the National Council on Privatization chaired by the Vice-
President. He asserted that he had transferred his shares to a blind trust and
did not participate in the day-to-day operations of the company.
Also, the Director-General of the BPE at the time was believed to have been
an accomplice in the non-disclosure of the conﬂict of interest of the Minister
in bidding for the privatized power entities since the BPE was the clearing-
house for the bids. In addition, the Senate ad hoc committee on privatization
and commercialization had called for removal of the Director-General on the
grounds of alleged gross incompetence in the management of the privatization
process, and alleged illegal and fraudulent sale of the federal government’s
5 per cent residual shares in the Eleme Petrochemicals Company Ltd. In
probing the privatization of government enterprises between 1999 and 2011,
the committee said that the Director-General of BPE was also implicated in
fraudulent disposal of the Aluminium Smelter Company to a Russian ﬁrm,
Rusal, culminating in the Supreme Court invalidating the sale.
Granted, efforts were made to ensure a transparent and accountable reform
process by sticking to the privatization guidelines throughout the privatization
process. However, allegations abound of obvious obscurity, opaqueness, and
favouritism in the selling process. One key instance of such was the sale of the
Kaduna Distribution Company. The preferred bidder, Northwest Power Ltd
(NPL), was unilaterally granted deadline extension for the completion of the
Share Purchase Agreement rather than reverting to the reserved bidder as
provided for in the privatization guidelines. This was an obvious act of
favouritism because Section 15 (138) of the Request for Proposals for the
Privatization of PHCN Successor Companies stipulated that failure of the
preferred bidder to meet its payment obligation before the stipulated deadline
would require that the 25 per cent down payment be forfeited while the right
of purchase would be given to the reserve bidder. Speciﬁcally, Section 15 (140)
stated that ‘failure to complete the transaction within a mutually agreed
timeframe will result in the forfeiture of the down payment as per the terms
of the Share Sale Agreement’.
The position was that NPL paid 24 per cent of the total bid on 23 December
2013 and had until 23 June 2014 to settle the 75 per cent balance. When it
became obvious thatNPLwas unable tomeet the deadline, the BPE acted against
the privatization rules by extending the payment date to 6 August 2014.NPLwas
unable to meet the 6 August deadline and therefore had to request a further
extension to 6 October 2014. Again, this deadline was missed and further
extended to 4 December 2014. Yet the BPE ﬁnally sold the entity to NPL, despite
a court order secured by the reserve bidder to stop the sale. The claim by the BPE
was that the National Council on Privatization (NCP) alone had the ﬁnal say in
the sale and had decided to use its discretion in the matter. In fact, in a letter
to the Vice-President, who is the chairman of NCP, the BPE warned against
handing over the asset to the reserve bidder, claiming that there was no
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guarantee that the reserve bidder would fare any better than the preferred bidder,
and that doing so would set the process back by about 12 months.
20.3.2 Political Interference
This is the most visible and challenging political economy issue facing the
power sector reform. In contracting the management of TCN to MHI for US
$23 million for three years starting July 2012, one of the key reasons proffered
was the need to reduce the bureaucracy associated with public management of
the enterprise with a view to improving efﬁciency of operations devoid of
government interference. The ﬁrm was mandated to run the entire TCN
system and turn it into a technically and ﬁnancially efﬁcient, sustainable,
and stable company within the period of the contract. In addition, MHI was
expected to ensure evolution of a TCN that would eventually become a private
commercial company by reorganizing the institution so that the Transmission
System Provider became a separate entity from the Market Operator and
System Operator. In contrast to this thinking, however, management of the
TCN appears to be fraught with serious political interference that tends to
limit effective performance of the institution and dampen its ability to achieve
the stated mandate.
At its inception, the process for awarding MHI the management of TCN
wasmired in controversies, leading to internal wrangling that bred operational
lapses. For example, the chairman of the supervisory board of the institution
has changed many times due to dissatisfaction and protests over political
interference and alleged ‘over-hyped’ powers accorded the MHI. Some of
the alleged powers include the handover of the day-to-day running of the
TCN and operations of its bank account to MHI, as well as allowing it to
appoint a Chief Executive Ofﬁcer) without recourse to the supervisory board.
One easy way of interference was in the expectation that MHI would contrib-
ute to developing local capacity that would eventually take over management
of TCN through local counterparts that are expected to understudy the MHI
expatriates. Incessant change in the leadership of the MHI itself that is
attributed to the internal wrangling has also been obvious within the short
period of the contract.
There were also allegations that the provision for Nigerian counterparts to
understudy the MHI expatriates was exploited by the political class to com-
pensate loyalists and political jobbers. One obvious outcome of political
interference in TCN activities is that it has made the institution the weakest
link in the electricity reform value chain, with its non-performance rubbing off
negatively on existing independent power producers, generation companies,
distribution companies, and ultimately on attracting much needed investment
to the power sector.
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Towards the end of the MHI ﬁrst contract in 2015, the transmission
segment of the Nigerian power sector was enmeshed in uncertainty over
who was in charge. At the twilight of President Jonathan’s administration,
the Minister of Power issued several last-minute directives that sometimes
appeared contradictory. For example, there was an earlier directive that all
actions with respect to the proposed unbundling of TCN be held in abeyance
pending the decision of the incoming administration of President Buhari.
However, ten days later there was another directive appointing a full manage-
ment team to a supposedly unbundled TCN (now a System Operator and
a Transmission System Provider). Meanwhile, these new entities were yet to
be incorporated as legal entities because their operating licences were yet to be
issued by NERC and TCN had not been wound up.
Also, proposing a change while the management contract of MHI still
subsists and might possibly be extended—it was ultimately extended by one
year to July 2016—would only result in confusion and crises in the manage-
ment of the entity, impinging on its overall performance. It is imperative to
ask, however, what the basis was for the contract renewal. There are indica-
tions that there was neither careful nor clear assessment and evaluation of the
contract terms of MHI vis-à-vis its performance on the agreed milestones that
would inform the need to extend the contract or to act otherwise. It appears
that the need to avoid a void in this segment of the power sector was the sole
factor behind the renewal. About two months to the end of the contract
extension, it remains doubtful whether there is any serious plan in place to
strengthen the TCNmanagement and it is difﬁcult to ascertain what the future
holds for this segment of the power sector. What appears obvious, though, is
that a concessioning process has not been activated. Yet, the government
would have to decide what to do with TCN. In September 2015, the Federal
Government consulted the development partners on what the future of TCN
should be. The consensus was that it should be concessioned. But the question
remains whether it should be consessioned as an entity or in an unbundled
form. The fact that the process of the concession has not commenced is a
pointer to government’s dilemma on what to do with the TCN.
20.3.3 Corruption
Corruption is one of the key reasons for the collapse of the Nigerian electricity
sector and was, therefore, the main rationale adduced for its reform. Yet the
reform has been embroiled in corruption allegations from the beginning. First,
there were claims that the US$16 billion invested in the National Integrated
Power Project (NIPP) under the President Obasanjo administration was
largely mismanaged. In fact, the two-year gap in funding NIPP projects
under President Yar’adua was due to the intensive legal, political, and ﬁnancial
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scrutiny these projects were subjected to with a view to correcting the alleged
corruption. Several senior ofﬁcials of the Rural Electriﬁcation Agency and
key members of the House of Representatives Committee on Power were
arraigned by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for alleged
embezzlement of NGN6 billion funds belonging to the Rural Electriﬁcation
Agency. For a long time during the privatization process that involved reaching
a settlement with the erstwhile staff of PHCN, there were allegations that the
workers’ pension fund of around NGN88 billion, accruing from the 7.5 per cent
deductions from their salaries, was misappropriated.
The current eighth National Assembly has set up a 13-man Senate
Committee to probe the power sector reform, based on alleged corruption
especially involving unbundling the PHCN. Also being probed is MHI’s
management of the TCN. It is estimated that approximately US$29.635 billion
has been spent on the power sector in the past 16 years with very limited
results.2 While the outcome of this probe is expected, one hopes it does not
end up like previous attempted probes of the same issue in 2007 by the House
of Representatives and Senate that degenerated into claims and counter-claims
of witch-hunting. In the end, in 2010, the chairmen of both committees were
accused by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of involvement
in a NGN5.2 billion contract scam related to the Rural Electriﬁcation Project.
20.3.4 Weak Regulatory, Institutional, and Legal Framework
There was an inherent structural weakness in the institutional framework for
the power sector reform. These institutional weaknesses emanate from obvious
gaps, overlaps, confusion, and conﬂicts in the mandates and interactive rela-
tionships among these institutions as provided for in their enabling laws. In
many cases, the issue of what institution is responsible for playing coordination
and leadership role in the power sector is obscure. For example, NAPTIN—a
power sector capacity-building institution—is also mandated to oversee effect-
ive monitoring of and compliance with the technical and operating standards.
Yet, this mandate is also given to the Standards Organization of Nigeria and the
National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency, thus
revealing a conﬂict of mandate among these institutions.
The most recent development with respect to possible conﬂicts in the power
sector involves establishment of the Nigerian Electricity Management Services
Authority at the twilight of President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration.
The agency is mandated to carry out inspections of electrical materials
throughout the entire electricity supply industry, and to enforce all statutory
2 It is estimated that Presidents Obasanjo, Yar’adua, and Jonathan spent US$16 billion,
US$5.375 billion, and US$8.26 billion, respectively.
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technical electrical standards, testing and certiﬁcation, and regulation of all
electrical installations and instruments. In addition, the agency is given the
power to ensure that all major electrical materials and equipment used in
Nigeria are of the right quality and standards, as well as to specify technical
standards for electrical plants, electric lines, and connectivity.
This mandate obviously conﬂicts with that of the Standards Organisation of
Nigeria (SON) that already has the same mandate. Moreover, it also distorts
the hitherto regulatory structure and framework of the power sector where
NERC was solely responsible for both the economic and technical regulation
of the sector. The mandate of the new agency—to promote measures for
advancing the skills of those working in the power sector and to issue
competency certiﬁcates and licences to qualiﬁed electrical personnel and
contractors—also conﬂicts with that of NAPTIN. Creating additional regula-
tory agencies is inconsistent with the philosophy of privatization and negates
the provision in section 32 of the EPSRA.
20.3.5 Policy Inconsistencies and Regulatory Uncertainty
The regulatory authorities have manifested policy inconsistencies in the
implementation of the power sector reform. One way this has become clear is
in the realization of the cost-reﬂective tariff. For instance, NERC had worked to
achieve a viable, stable, and rules-based electricity market where cost-reﬂective
tariff would be a key pillar. This would herald the movement from the Pre-
Transition Stage Market to the Transition Stage Market. However, rather than
proceed to implement the various contracts, rules, regulations, systems, and
procedures involving a move towards a cost-reﬂective tariff with the advent of
the Transition Stage Market on 1 February 2015, NERC rather weakened this
pillar by reducing tariffs across board by 24 March 2015—just 11 weeks after
introducing those same tariffs. The loss of credibility and reputational damage
caused by this policy inconsistency sent a wrong signal to investors andwas a big
blow to the reform.
20.3.6 Electricity Tariff
Electricity tariff is of concern because pricing should achieve delicate balance
between the interests of investors and of consumers. Indeed, for this type of
reform to be politically and socially acceptable, there is a need to ensure that
the poorer members of society are not made worse off. However, this has been
a major issue in recent times. For a long time, the absence of a cost-reﬂective
electricity tariff has been cited as one of the main deterrents to local and
foreign investor participation. To correct this anomaly, the power sector reform
404 Sector Reform
target is to introduce a cost-reﬂective tariff through the MYTO. In this frame-
work, consumers are categorized into residential, commercial, industrial,
special, and street lighting. The tariff structure is designed to achieve four
simultaneous objectives: to ensure fairness to consumers; to allow licensees to
recover all reasonable costs within a reasonable period of time; to provide
sufﬁcient funding to ﬁnance activities of investors; and to allow for reasonable
earnings to achieve efﬁcient operations. The review aims to reﬂect the current
market conditions, with cost of supplying electricity to the wide range of
consumers, inﬂation rates, exchange rates, gas supply price, generation capacity,
capital expenditure, operations expenditure, and cost recovery and reasonable
return on investment for investors as guiding posts.
However, challenges exist with implementation of the cost-reﬂective tariff.
For instance, just one year after the initial roll-out, NERC found two major
deﬁciencies in the new price structure. First, it was realized in 2009 that there
had been a substantial shift in the two key variables used to determine the
tariff, namely, gas prices and exchange rates. What this implies was that with
these changes, the supposedly cost-reﬂective tariff remained still unattractive
to draw investors. Second, the tariff only made provisions for gas as a source
of power generation, leaving out other sources such as wind, coal, and solar
power. Yet some investors were willing to explore these other sources in their
power generation investment bid. This necessitated a review of the tariff by
NERC earlier than scheduled. The newest review took effect on 1 February
2016, leading to around 45 per cent hike in tariff. Questions and protests
continue to trail this increase that is believed by many to be unfair and unjust,
especially since it has not been accompanied by commensurate improved
service. One interesting feature in the tariff review is the consideration of
fairness and public interest as key factors. The ﬁxed charge that was an
intrinsic part of the earlier tariff system has now been removed for vulnerable
customers and those engaged in informal activities.
20 .4 WAY FORWARD
Gas is the cheapest way to generate electricity per kilowatt unit of power and
Nigeria has this resource in abundance. Formulating an effective gas policy
that allows gas to play a pivotal role in the power sector reform is imperative to
making meaningful progress. One way this could be done is by encouraging
public–private partnership and completely private sector-driven gas develop-
ment initiatives through sufﬁciently robust incentives. This will further reduce
the pressure on government, given its limited ﬁnancial resources, to undertake
this task alone. Another important area would be to encourage private sector
investment in gas infrastructure that would help evacuate gas and deliver it
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to the power stations. Stepping up surveillance on the pipeline infrastructure
with a view to increasing the probability of apprehending vandals and ensur-
ing timely punishment that would serve as deterrent to vandalism would
contribute to ensuring the security of gas-to-power infrastructure.
Capable, relevant, and sufﬁcient manpower development for the entire
power sector value chain is absolutely necessary to push forward the reform
agenda and manage post-privatization challenges. In addition to the required
system, electrical, hydro, and mechanical engineers and other technical pro-
fessionals are required to drive the reform and post-reform process. Unlocking
the sector through the reform has opened up the sector to a spectrum of power
sector value chain activities that necessitate increased human and technical
capacity. The reform has created opportunities in the production and main-
tenance of transformers, transmission lines, meters, cables of acceptable qual-
ity, and other facilities in the entire value chain of generation, transmission,
and distribution. The government should ensure that NAPTIN plays its role in
this respect by providing it with the needed resource support. Private sector
players should complement the government’s efforts through NAPTIN by
undertaking training and capacity development initiatives.
There is a need to push for production, distribution, and dynamic efﬁciency
in the power sector. This can be achieved through a well researched, highly
insightful, and incisive evaluation, assessment, and appraisal of the status quo.
Probing the power sector reform through politically motivated committees
may not achieve this objective. Rather, a holistic technical and economic
assessment that looks at the entire value chain is what is required. For
instance, it is not clear if any study has examined the equilibrium structure
of the entire spectrum of the Nigerian electricity industry with a view to
determining the demand, supply, and the existing demand–supply gap in
the market. More efforts by both public and private stakeholders should be
directed towards research and development in alternative sources of renew-
able and clean energy. Most studies and investigations have focused on
supply-side issues, paying little attention to demand-side solutions. There is
need to balance the current focus on supply solutions with demand manage-
ment interventions that will reduce the pressure on electricity demand.
Political will and policy consistency are necessary to improve on the reform
and attract more local and foreign investors. One key area such political will
can be demonstrated is in providing leadership by example in the manage-
ment of the transmission segment of the power sector value chain. This
segment is under the control of the government and yet remains the weakest
link in the electricity value chain. Rather than engaging in wanton interference
and using it for political gain, the focus should be on providing the needed
oversight of the management consultant while at the same time giving it the
freedom to carry out its assigned responsibilities as contained in the contract
signed. The government should ensure sustained investments in the sector.
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Concessioning TCN to private operators should be undertaken as a matter of
urgency by commissioning a reputable Transaction Adviser to work with the
Infrastructure Concessioning and Regulatory Commission to deliver on this.
This will address the parallel management of the TCN. Proactive and deter-
mined efforts must be geared towards investing in network expansion and
completing ongoing transmission projects.
The government should focus on continuously evolving an effective insti-
tutional framework that guarantees sustainability of the reform efforts. High
priority needs to be given to the regulatory, institutional, and human capacity
framework for managing post-privatization challenges. The plethora of policy
pronouncements, documents, committees, commissions, and other frame-
works for the power sector reform should be reviewed and properly aligned
to suit and reﬂect current realities. Continued development of the power
sector through laws and regulations, and enforcement of compliance with
these is also necessary. There is also a need for increased investment in clean
and renewable power generation to help the country achieve an optimal mix of
energy sources, with the emphasis on hydro and solar power sources and
ultimately improve the country’s green growth.
Evolving a cost-reﬂective tariff would result in a win-win situation that
would help attract the necessary ﬁnance from existing and prospective invest-
ors while simultaneously making consumers fell contented that they are
getting value for money. Unnecessary political interference in energy pricing
can at best be counterproductive, as demonstrated by the tariff reduction of
2015 shortly before the presidential elections. NERC’s action in reviewing the
assumptions for calculating the MYTO 2.1 is in order and should be pursued
to a logical end. Consideration for fairness and the public interest in reviewing
the tariff is commendable. However, possible loopholes and slippery slopes
should be avoided in relation to the issue of aggregate technical, commercial,
and collection losses. Distribution Companies (DISCOs) should be compelled
to respect their metering obligations to the consumers.
It is necessary to develop special-purpose ﬁnancial products and vehicles
that would help channel funds from surplus sectors to the power sector. The
Nigerian pension fund and insurance fund are currently estimated to stand
at around US$30 billion and US$2 billion, respectively. These funds are
currently under-utilized and will be of limited beneﬁt to the economy if they
are not deployed to sectors of real need such as the power sector. Much
needs to be done to amend investment rules so that a large part of these
resources could be channelled to power generation, especially clean energy
and long-term infrastructure projects. Putting the fund into government
bonds that are considered to be safe havens would yield limited beneﬁts.
The Sovereign Wealth Fund, especially the Infrastructure Fund component,
should be effectively utilized in deploying innovative power generation,
especially clean and renewable energy.
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Tackling the current spate of insecurity would also be of obvious help in
moving forward on the power sector reform. The north-eastern part of the
country is riddled with insecurity occasioned by an insurgency that makes
investment in power generation, transmission, and distribution in the region
problematic. Moreover, Niger Delta, the source of the gas needed to ﬁre the
power plants, also has its fair share of instability. More recently, there have
been sporadic nationwide attacks by Fulani herdsmen. These pose a threat to
sustained success of the reform.
Global goodwill and commitment to improve the power sector should be
leveraged. In 2013, the US government announced the private sector-focused
Power Africa initiative with a commitment to add over 30,000 MW of more
efﬁcient electricity generation capacity in six African countries, including
Nigeria. The support offered by this initiative is gaining momentum though
it has not yet signiﬁcantly affected choice of power generation technology. In
2014, for example, Power Africa, through USAID’s Development Credit
Authority, made available US$90 million for on-lending to the newly privat-
ized distribution and generation companies. It also made available US$50
million for a portfolio of solar-battery hybrid power systems distribution in
Nigeria. Power Africa is supporting NBET to negotiate and ﬁnalize a model
Power Purchasing Agreement that ensures effective connection of some wind
and solar power projects that are capable of delivering 600 MW to the
national grid.
More global and continental development ﬁnance, foundations, and
concessional private sector ﬁnancing institutions and South–South partners
have indicated interest and even made commitments to help improve the
power situation in Nigeria. For instance, during the 2014 US–Africa Lead-
ers Summit, the World Bank announced a US$5 billion commitment in
support of the Power Africa initiative. Recently, the African Development
Bank has made ‘Light and Power Africa’ one of its ‘High 5s’, with a
commitment to invest US$12 billion in energy projects between 2015 and
2020. From 2015 until 2020, the European Union (EU) is budgeting for
around €2.5 billion in grants and €20 billion investment in sustainable
energy provision in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, individual EU mem-
ber countries are expected to provide ﬁnancial support that will more than
double this amount, with France committing US$6.4 billion over the next
four years to electriﬁcation in Africa. The US and EU have already com-
mitted to providing support through synergy by signing a memorandum of
understanding in this respect. South–South partners, notably China, are
also making inroads into pepping up activities in the power sector. This
enthusiasm for investment, and technical support and assistance, should
be effectively leveraged to achieve the desired goals of the power sector
reform.
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Climate Change Policy and Power Sector
Reform in Mexico under the Golden
Age of Gas
José María Valenzuela and Isabel Studer
21.1 INTRODUCTION: CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY
TRANSITION, AND ENERGY REFORM
In the last quarter century, Mexico has undergone a series of major institu-
tional and technological changes in the power sector. Since the early 1990s,
and as in other restructured markets, Mexico’s power sector has gradually
evolved into an open-market regime where natural gas has gained a dominant
market share (Carreón-Rodríguez, Jiménez, and Rosellón 2006; Fuentes and
Bowler 2014). During the same period, climate change emerged as a global
priority. However, it was not until the late 2000s that Mexico developed
economy-wide mitigation programmes and policies.
Although not having mitigation obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and
being responsible for <2 per cent of global carbon emissions, Mexico had
assumed voluntary commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
for 2020 and 2050 even before the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21—UNFCCC)
in Paris. Besides hosting COP16 in Cancún and helping restore the trust in the
multilateral climate negotiations, Mexico was the ﬁrst non-Annex I country to
have established a comprehensive climate change law—a far-reaching institu-
tional framework that includes an array of planning instruments—and submit-
ted ﬁve national communications under the convention (Fekete,Mersmann, and
Vieweg 2013: 78). It was also the ﬁrst developing country to present its Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) (Gobierno de la República 2015)
with conditional and unconditional pledges (CAT 2015).
Despite its leadership on climate issues, Mexico’s ambition to promote
clean energy is less certain. Veysey et al. (2015) concluded that achieving
Mexico’s long-term climate change mitigation goals would require the power
sector to become virtually zero emissions by 2050. Yet, observers have noted
the lack of certainty about the role that renewable energy will play in the
short- and long-term development of the power sector. The 21st Century
Power Partnership, under the Clean Energy Ministerial (2015), depicted
Mexico’s type of process as ‘restructuring’, committing to deep transform-
ation of the power sector structure, but with a limited or average approach
regarding the ambition for clean power transition. Power sector reform is
still centred on a large-scale, centralized, fossil-fuel-based generation model
(Zinaman et al. 2015).
Mexico’s decreasing power sector emission intensity, from 0.608 to 0.499
tCO2e/MWh between 2003 and 2013 (SEMARNAT et al. n.d.), contributed to
a complacency narrative. Emission reductions are still primarily driven by a
hustle to power Mexico with natural gas, and marginally by an expansion of
wind energy based on ad hoc regulatory beneﬁts rather than a clear, long-term
policy for a robust and diversiﬁed portfolio of electricity sources.
The energy reform created a series of mechanisms that could be the basis
for potential long-term growth of low-carbon technologies. They include an
independent system operator, the binding character of clean energy obliga-
tions and certiﬁcates, and long-term auctions for clean energy. The ﬁrst of
these mechanisms is a key component to the wholesale electricity market,
and the other two are fundamental policies to contain the costs associated
with increasing clean energy shares. However, the central policy objective of
the current administration in Mexico is to lower power production costs,
mainly grasping the beneﬁts of low-cost gas in North America. This policy
objective discouraged the administration from embracing ambitious climate
change mitigation commitments that might limit cost reductions in the
short term and thus hurt the main support base of the energy reform
coalition—a broad spectrum of industries and businesses eager to access
competitive tariffs.
This chapter presents a decade-long outlook on the relation between cli-
mate and energy policy in Mexico, putting into perspective the challenges of
energy transition policies when fossil fuel prices remain low. This circum-
stance could be a regular feature in North American energy markets in the
near future, if carbon prices are not adopted (IEA 2011). We conclude that a
climate policy devised on the basis of the economic co-beneﬁts (including
energy security) could be easily undermined if these co-beneﬁts become less
clear under a power market driven by low fuel prices, even for a country
otherwise considered an international leader in the subject.
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21.2 ENERGY TRANSITION AND CLIMATE
CHANGE AGENDA AS A POLITICAL
NECESSITY (2008–12)
21.2.1 Race between Demand and Energy Reforms
In the last 30 years, Mexico’s energy consumption has grown steadily, at a rate
of about 2 per cent annually. Fossil fuels represent >92 per cent of the total
national energy consumption. Between 2000 and 2010, electricity generation
increased by 33 per cent, the population increased by ~66 per cent, and the
total energy consumption more than doubled whereas electricity consumption
almost tripled. Per capita electricity consumption reached 2 MWh per capita,
from 0.9 MWh per capita, as described in detail in Table 21.1. Thirty years ago
production almost doubled consumption, a circumstance contributing to a
narrative on Mexico’s energy abundance position. But by 2013 this position
has entirely faded away.
Although the growth in demand comes as no surprise, the pace of Mexico’s
energy imports merits consideration. Through 2011–13, Mexico faced prob-
lems with the reliability of and access to natural gas because of the Mexican oil
company Petróleos Mexicanos’ (PEMEX) limited ability to increase gas pro-
duction and expand the natural gas pipeline network (Auditoría Superior de la
Federación 2014). At the same time, the fuel mix for power generation shifted
away from heavy fuel oil. The share of natural gas in the total electricity output
increased from 12 per cent in 1990 to over 50 per cent in 2010.
21.2.2 Climate Change in the Context of Energy Politics
In 1992, theMexican Congress approved a sweeping energy reform that deﬁned
new areas for the participation of private investment in power generation in two
Table 21.1. Key indicators of energy production and demand
1983 2003 2013
National energy consumption (petajoules) 4383.8 7216.9 9011.8
Population (millions) 71.8 104.7 118.4
Energy consumption per capita (gigajoules/person) 61.1 68.9 76.1
Electricity consumption (gigawatt-hour) 61,183.3 176,718.5 235,158.6
Electricity consumption per capita (kilowatt-hour/person) 852.2 1687.5 1986.2
Energy production (petajoules) 8260.0 10,289.4 9020.2
Relation between production and demand 1.9 1.4 1.0
Source: Based on SENER (2015c).
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forms: (i) independent power producers (IPP) with Federal Electricity Com-
mission (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE) as a single buyer; and
(ii) generation for self-supply (Hernández 2006). However, from that point
on, the political context inMexico was quite adverse, frustrating efforts to pass a
comprehensive energy reform. In 1999, 2002, and 2008, the presidency submit-
ted three energy reform proposals to the Mexican Congress. The ﬁrst two
failed, while the third, proposed by President Felipe Calderón (2006–12), was
approved, but only because it was a fairly limited.
The 2008 reform is noteworthy because it was accompanied by two dis-
tinctive laws: (i) the Law for Sustainable Use of Energy (Ley para el Apro-
vechamiento Sustentable de la Energía, LASE) and (ii) the Law for the Use of
Renewable Energy and Financing of Energy Transition (Ley para el Aprove-
chamiento de Energías Renovables y el Financiamiento de la Transición
Energética, LAERFTE). The laws shaped a new institution for the promotion
of energy efﬁciency, created a new ﬁnancial vehicle for the deployment of
energy transition initiatives independent from the state-owned enterprises,
and ﬁrmly provided legal support to many regulatory decisions that could
have been contested by future governments from opposing parties, less
favourable to private investment in renewable energy.
In an adverse political context and in the face of rapidly growing energy
demand and limited energy resources, renewable energy and energy efﬁciency
emerged as key elements of the Calderón administration’s strategy to achieve
Mexico’s energy security and economic development goals. Boosting renew-
able energy, particularly in the electricity sector where private investment was
partially allowed, became a priority goal in the Sectorial Energy Programme for
2007–12 (SENER 2007: 6).
It has been argued that the personal beliefs of President Calderón and a
strong sense of global responsibility drove the dynamic climate agenda that
unfolded during his presidency (Torres 2014). Mexico is the second largest
GHG emitter in Latin America and ranks ten among the world’s highest levels
of GHG emissions, excluding land-use change and forestry (World Resources
Institute 2015). It is estimated that 15 per cent of Mexico’s territory, 68 per
cent of the population, and 71 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) ‘are
highly exposed to climate change risk’ (OECD 2013). Embracing the ﬁght
against climate change could help improve Mexico’s world image, which had
been severely affected by the violence linked to Calderón’s war against the
drug cartels, and could potentially generate concrete beneﬁts, such as ﬁnancial
resources to support the energy transition, thus explaining Mexico’s strong
promotion of the Green Climate Fund.1
1 As of 2014, Mexico has pledged US$10 million towards the Green Climate Fund (GCF
2015).
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Although all of these factors could have played a role in understanding
the wide array of new institutions for climate policy-making developed
during the Calderón administration, they do not explain the feature that
became the backbone of his climate policy. Calderón’s power sector transi-
tion policy was a child of necessity and a by-product of the political
constraints that impeded his government from fully opening Mexico’s
energy sector to private investment as a means to achieve the twin goals
of energy security and economic growth. Climate change mitigation was
not a primary goal, but rather, as Fekete, Mersmann, and Vieweg have
argued, ‘a secondary political goal’ that opened up ‘new potentials to achieve
other primary development goals’ (2013: 2). As the former energy minister
Georgina Kessel stated in 2009, diversifying primary sources and reducing
the uncertainty generated by the volatility of fuel prices reinforce energy
security (Kessel 2009).
The new legal mandates of 2008 reform conﬁrmed the Energy Regulatory
Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía, CRE) powers to push for the
rapid development of self-supply contracts, through wheeling fees and energy
banking regulation that allowed wind energy to surpass 2000 MW in 2014
(IRENA 2015: 16). Companies such as Grupo Bimbo, Cemex, FEMSA, and
Walmart in Mexico leveraged their AAA credit ratings to become off-takers
from renewable self-supply generation projects, accruing 5–20 per cent less
than the applicable electricity rate (Yale School of Management 2012).
Private investment was limited not only by the size of the self-supply market
but also by the requirement that surplus production is sold to CFE at a
discounted price, the lack of transparency on the administrative proceedings
for interconnection to the grid, and CFE’s unwillingness to build transmis-
sion infrastructure in remote resource-rich areas (WWF, Climate Works, and
PwC 2013).
The difference in renewable energy investments from the private sector and
the CFE is staggering. By 2014, the CFE installed 597 MW of wind energy,
through IPP contacts, whereas self-supply development accounted for 1439
MW (SENER 2015b). This difference underscores the opportunity that renew-
able energy represented to large consumers willing to invest away from the
taxing tariff. These electricity prices incentivized private investment in renew-
able energy projects for self-consumption, particularly large wind ‘demonstra-
tion’ projects in the southern part of Mexico (Oaxaca), which were co-ﬁnanced
by grants from the Global Environmental Facility, the World Bank, and the
Inter-American Development Bank and promoted by the Mexican government
as an opportunity to reduce their electricity bills. After all, it was possible that
the high tariffs for industrial and commercial users were also based on a form
of cross-subsidy.
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21.2.3 Climate Change: Much Ado about Nothing
The most signiﬁcant legacy of the Calderón government was the enactment of
the General Climate Change Law (Ley General de Cambio Climático, LGCC)
in 2012, which was seen as an avenue to provide continuity to the institutional
framework, the programmes and plans, as well as the mitigation commitments
adopted since 2006. The LGCC created a comprehensive institutional frame-
work and climate change system by consolidating a number of institutions
that had been previously created (e.g., Inter-Ministerial Commission on
Climate Change, Council on Climate Change), as well as planning instruments
(e.g., National Strategy on Climate Change, PECC) and evaluation and fund-
ing instruments, including a climate fund. Beyond actions pertaining to the
federal government, the LGCC made it obligatory for sub-national govern-
ments to develop their climate change mitigation and adaptation plans.
Other policy instruments refer to the requirement for mandatory emissions
reporting and the creation of a public emissions registry for all sectors, as well
as the reform of subsidies by 2020. The most important features of the LGCC
include the conﬁrmation of pre-existing mitigation targets; that is, the reduction
of GHG emissions below a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2020 and by 50
per cent by 2050 from levels in 2000, conditional on international ﬁnancial
support; 35 per cent of electricity from clean energy sources by 2024; as well as
the possibility of establishing an emissions market and entering into emission
trading agreements with other countries.2 Similarly, energy-intensive industrial
sectors strongly opposed the mitigation targets proposed in the original text of
the LGCC. Some industrial associations, especially Mexico’s National Steel
Chamber (CANACERO 2011), were particularly vocal in their opposition
against the strong reductions proposed by the LGCC. They were concerned
that ambitious targets would restrict Mexico’s ability to continue growing and
compromise their competitiveness in the absence of a global agreement that set
similar commitments from other countries (CESPEDES 2013).
Although the LGCC received multi-party support in both houses of the
Mexican Congress (280 versus 10 in the Deputy Chamber, and 78 versus 0 in
the Senate), it took three years to be approved. The legislation underwent
changes that made the mitigation commitments stated in the law aspirational
and subject to the availability of international ﬁnance. The Law also assumed a
gradual approach for the adoption of climate change mitigation actions,
starting with the least-cost ones. The strong stance of industrial sector
would remain a key variable on the limitations of future reforms.
2 For a more extensive discussion see Valenzuela and Studer (2016).
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In spite of the strong climate institutional development, Calderón’s climate
strategy failed to set a de-carbonization pathway for the Mexican economy.
The renewable energy target set at 8 per cent for 2012 was not achieved: non-
hydropower renewables for 2012 were only 2.9 per cent of total power capacity
(IGS-EGADE 2014).
21 .3 ENERGY REFORM AND CLIMATE POLICIES
BY LEGAL FIAT (2012–15)
21.3.1 Low Energy Prices: Political Priority of Energy Reform
Once the political constraints faced by President Calderón for comprehensive
energy reform were removed, based on the results of the 2012 election and the
political manoeuvring that led to a multi-party agreement known as the ‘Pact
for Mexico’ (Pacto por México), a comprehensive energy reform was possible
under the incoming government of President Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–18).
Simultaneously, the government moved away from the previous administra-
tion’s strategy to link climate change policy to energy security. By contrast, the
reduction of energy prices became the top priority of Peña’s energy reform
(Gobierno de la República 2013: 3). Climate policies were designed by legal
ﬁat, resulting from implementing the LGCC.
As Alvarez and Valencia (2015) have argued, little over 60 per cent of the
Mexican industry’s energy consumption consists of gas and electricity, almost
in equal share. Most industrial sectors (steel and chemical industries as well as
glass, pulp, paper, beer, and plastic production) largely depend on gas for their
production processes. The automotive sector, another critical manufacturing
industry in the Mexican economy, is more dependent on electricity than gas.
Since over 50 per cent of electricity is generated with gas, the Mexican industry
has a large stake in maintaining and expanding the availability of low-cost gas.
Seven years before reform, César Hernández, the incumbent UnderMinister
for Electricity, wrote about subsidies serving the purpose of compensating for
the inefﬁciency of the power industry, and not for gains to consumers:
‘The problem is not the subsidy, it is a charade—the problem is the cost of
production’ (Hernández 2006: 32). As Pollitt (2012) has concluded from a
comparative perspective, cost might fall not necessarily because of the market
but rather due to other structural reasons. For Mexico, two relevant structural
adjustments are evident: (i) the displacement of heavy fuel oil by gas and (ii) the
reduction of technical and non-technical losses.3 In any case, by government
3 For an extended discussion see Valenzuela and Studer (2016).
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estimates, the efﬁciencies from the operation of the wholesale market could
represent electricity service cost reductions between 26 and 48 per cent.4
21.3.2 Political Effects of Natural Gas Price Cycles
In 2011, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published optimistic conclu-
sions on the future of gas production in North America. According to IEA
(2011), the characteristics of the gas market and the lack of substantial
liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) infrastructure adequate for exports would allow
for low prices for the foreseeable future. The following years proved the
diagnosis correct overall, with prices rapidly falling by 2012.
The price of natural gas is especially important in restructured markets
because of its role in determining the marginal cost of electricity, which
inﬂuences the prices of bulk energy in the wholesale market. Based on
20 years of comparative data among US states, Borenstein and Bushnell
identiﬁed that the gap between average cost (under regulated markets) and
marginal price (under wholesale markets) generates a speciﬁc economic
expectation: ‘consumer and political sentiment has tilted toward whichever
regime (regulation and markets) offered the lower prices at the time’ (2015: 1).
Hence, they argue that the impetus of reform is stronger when low gas prices
are observed because large consumers, in particular, industrial users, observe
the beneﬁts competitors can have during those periods.
The consumer and political sentiment explained by Borenstein and
Bushnell (2015) could certainly be signiﬁcant in Mexico on the basis of two
considerations: (i) the proximity of competitors across the US border with
access to power prices from wholesale markets; and (ii) the fact that the self-
supply regime in Mexico allowed for large consumers with access to reliable
natural gas supply (mostly in the northeast of Mexico) to access power prices
that resembled those of restructured markets, owing to on-site generation
using the Henry Hub indexed natural gas.
Clean energy auctions with long-term contracts represent an ‘average cost’
approach to energy procurement. This model is politically castigated during
periods of low gas prices and low marginal costs of generation, but is desirable
when natural gas prices increase. Thus, if Borenstein and Bushnell’s (2015)
argument is right, we should expect opposition to the average cost approach
during the period when gas prices are low, at least from large consumers. This
scenario is clearly observed in the Mexican case.
4 The government has been cautious of not releasing the numbers to a wide audience. These
were presented as part of the ofﬁcial consultation process to publish the new market rules that
will apply to the wholesale electricity market (SENER 2015c).
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As seen in Figure 21.1, since 2008, when the previous reform was drafted
and approved, the progression of industrial tariffs and natural gas prices
diverged, with natural gas prices increasing to levels that spur debate on the
need for a diversiﬁed energy matrix. In 2012, the year of the incumbent
presidential election, the gap was so signiﬁcant that gas prices accessible to
CFE diminished by >50 per cent, whereas tariffs for industrial users were up
by >20 per cent in nominal terms.
In recent years, a gap between the index of gas prices (in Mexican pesos) at
the Henry Hub and those accessible to CFE have also grown because of
exchange rate and the use of expensive LNG in the generation mix, thus
adding to the expectation from power consumers and the incumbent govern-
ment to beneﬁt from the abundance of natural gas in the region.
21.3.3 Climate Change by Legal Fiat
The 2012 LGCC dictated a battery of policies and programmes aimed at
achieving the 2020 and 2050 mitigation goals, which are to be implemented
by the government, regardless of political convictions. Most of these policies
and programmes, such as the Special Climate Change Programme and the
Climate Change Strategy, will be reviewed in a comprehensive manner in 2019
for the ﬁrst time.
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Figure 21.1. Gas prices and industrial tariffs.
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Although Mexico has gained the title of being the ﬁrst developing country
to present its INDC (Gobierno de la República 2015), it is not clear if Mexico’s
current energy policies and future economic growth will allow for fulﬁlling
these commitments. Mexico proposed an unconditional commitment to miti-
gate 22 per cent of GHG from a BAU scenario that implies about 45 per cent
increase from 2013 emissions. The characterization of emissions in year 2013,
2030 BAU, and the INDC unconditional and conditional pledges are present-
ed in Table 21.2.
The unconditional commitment entails an actual increase of about 15 per
cent of economy-wide emission from 2013 to 2030. Within the unconditional
pledge, Mexico has published an indicative distribution of emissions and
mitigation by sector as part of the INDC. The power sector would then be
expected to mitigate 31 per cent from a BAU scenario, resulting in a total
emission of 139 MtCO2e in 2030, rather than the BAU scenario of 202
MtCO2e, compared with 127 MtCO2e in 2013.
According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2015), Mexico’s uncondi-
tional 2030 target does not rank highly compared with commitments of other
countries in terms of absolute emissions reductions. There also remains the
question of how different sectors will participate in achieving the conditional
goal of 36 per cent reduction of GHG emissions, which would require an
additional mitigation of 140 MtCO2e, equivalent to the total power sector
emissions in the 2030 INDC. Although the allocation of these additional
emissions reductions has not been deﬁned, it is certain that the power sector
will have to play a relevant role.
The LGCC also included the possibility of developing a carbon market and
linking it to carbon markets in other countries. However, it is unclear that
these markets will develop before the end of the incumbent administration in
2018. In October 2015, President Peña Nieto joined the World Bank’s initia-
tive to put a price of carbon, stating that Mexico is ‘setting a price of carbon
Table 21.2. INDC emissions and pledges (2013–30) (MtCO2e)
2013 2030 BAU INDC
unconditional
INDC
conditional
Oil and gas 87 137 118 Undeﬁned
Power 126 202 139
Industry 141 202 194
Domestic and commercial 26 28 23
Transport 148 229 181
Waste 31 49 35
Agro 80 93 86
Land use, land-use change, and forestry 33 32 −14
Total 672 972 762 622
Source: Based on Gobierno de la República (2015).
Climate Change Policy and Power Sector Reform: Mexico 419
that is just’ and referring to Mexico’s leadership as having already created a
carbon tax on the sale of several fossil fuels (Presidencia de la República 2015).
The tax rates, which are very low by world standards (less than US$3.50), were
set according to the carbon content of propane, gasoline, diesel, and coal
relative to gas. Natural gas was exempted from the tax, conﬁrming the federal
government’s strategy to rely heavily on gas as the ‘transition’ fuel (Gobierno
de la República 2013; Guerra Abud 2014; Pierre-Marc 2014). Also evidencing
the alignment of government policies and industrial interests, the originally
proposed tax rates were signiﬁcantly modiﬁed to pass through the Mexican
Congress, with a 92 per cent reduction for oil coke and 85 per cent for coal
(Kossoy et al. 2015). With a negligible environmental impact, the carbon tax in
Mexico was introduced mainly for revenue purposes and not as a strategy to
invest in clean energy or to affect consumer preferences for fossil fuels.
21.3.4 Walking Half-Way on Clean Energy Deployment
In spite of both Mexico’s abundant renewable energy resources and all gov-
ernment efforts on climate policy during the Calderon administration, the
share of renewables in electricity generation decreased from 25 to 14 per cent
in 1990–2013 (OECD 2015a, b). According to some estimates, it would not be
until 2018 that the proportion of renewable energy will return to 1990 levels.
The Law of Electric Industry (Ley de la Industria Eléctrica, LIE), which was
enacted in the summer of 2014 with a tight schedule to start trading at the
wholesale market in January 2016, introduced a number of mechanisms that
would, in principle, facilitate the development of renewable energy. The LIE
created an independent system operator, dis-incorporated the dispatching
operations unit from CFE, and provided legal and operational capacities to
perform traditional system operation activities, while also acting as the clear-
inghouse for market operations and developing the transmission infrastruc-
ture plan. CFE will be unbundled according to guidelines of the Secretariat of
Energy (Secretaría de Energía, SENER), and plants will be independently
represented in the market to provide for liquidity, with market supervision
from SENER and the Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE).
Two instruments—clean energy mandates with tradable certiﬁcates and
energy auctions—are meant to speciﬁcally foster the expansion of clean energy
technologies andmeet the underlying target of 35 per cent clean energy by 2024.
Auctions will be conducted three years in advance of the time for delivering
energy, so as to provide sufﬁcient time for the development of projects. They
could represent an improvement for large deployment of clean power, as they
will be managed by independent entities such as the National Energy Control
Centre and CRE, rather than through CFE’s IPP bidding processes that were
previously used.
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The ability of the LIE to promote renewable energy may be constrained by
the Peña Nieto administration’s strong preference for natural gas as the fuel
that could help gain both competitive power prices and reduce emissions. One
example of this preference is the ambiguity regarding the deﬁnition of clean
power in the LIE. The LIE deﬁned clean power with a list of low-carbon
technologies that included renewables, large hydropower, nuclear energy, and
carbon capture and storage. However, it also included high-efﬁciency cogen-
eration, which even if less carbon-intensive per net energy output is still a
carbon-emitting technology at a signiﬁcant rate. With high-efﬁciency cogen-
eration expected to grow >7 GW, generation could reach close to 10 per cent
of the total power demand by 2024. This would leave low-carbon technologies
a potential market share of only 25 per cent out of the 35 per cent of clean
energy mandated by law (CESPEDES–PwC 2015: 44). In 2014, large hydro-
power and renewable energy accounted for almost 17.2 per cent and nuclear
energy for 3.2 per cent (SENER 2015b).
The Mexican government’s promotion of natural gas as the ‘cleanest fuel’5
contributed to the confusion generated by the inclusion of efﬁcient cogener-
ation into the deﬁnition of clean energy by the LIE. It also nurtured concerns
that the government would take advantage of an administrative leeway,
included in the LIE, for deﬁning the natural gas combined cycle as clean
energy technology. The CANACERO even proposed a deﬁnition for clean
energy that included technologies with emission levels equivalent to 400 kg of
carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour, which would have certainly made new
natural gas combined cycle plants qualify as clean energy (CANACERO 2015).
However, the right-wing, largest opposition party, Partido Acción Nacional
(National Action Party), presiding over the Special Commission on Renewable
Energy and the Commission on Climate Change, presented a proposal for a
new Law on Energy Transition (Ley de Transición Energética, LTE) that
introduced new obligations for renewable energy and energy efﬁciency pro-
grammes.6 In addition to limiting the range of potential technologies to be
regarded clean by the authority, the LTE also considered intermediate goals
for clean energy (25 per cent by 2018 and 30 per cent by 2021) to achieve the
35 per cent by 2024 goal, already stated by the LGCC.
After over a year of its introduction and as COP21 was taking place
in Paris, the LTE was ﬁnally approved in both chambers of the Mexican
Congress. Although the CANACERO aggressively lobbied against its approval,
5 A common practice by Juan Jose Guerra, environment minister from December 2012 to
August 2015, was to focus on natural gas as clean energy during public presentations; this
occurred even in fora dedicated to renewable energy (SEMARNAT 2014).
6 This law replaced the renewable energy and energy efﬁciency laws (LAERFTE and LASE)
that had been approved in 2008 and which were not consistent with the new energy reform. LTE
would supersede both laws and integrate them into a coherent legal instrument that would be
aligned with the LIE.
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an amendment to the LTE stated that no new technology could be accredited as
clean energy if emissions surpassed the 100 kg of carbon dioxide per megawatt-
hour threshold. At the same time, the Senate approved a ﬂexible mechanism
regarding clean energy certiﬁcates. During the ﬁrst four years, those liable will be
able to transfer up to 50 per cent of the certiﬁcate obligations to the following
year at no cost, if either the cost of certiﬁcates goes over US$20 or if the number
of certiﬁcates issued during the given year is <75 per cent (Decreto por el que se
expide la Ley de Transición Energética, 2015). If the ﬂexibility mechanism kicks
in, the increment of certiﬁcate obligations will be postponed and the clean
energy goals might not be met.
Surprisingly, markets have proven political fears overstated. The results of
the ﬁrst long-term energy auction concluded in late March 2016 allocated
contracts for almost 2000 MW of installed capacity of solar and wind energy.
In total, 227 offers from 69 bidders were evaluated, resulting in total winning
bids representing 5.4 TWh/years of energy and CEL. The most competitive
winning offer on energy and CEL was in the low range of 600 Mexican pesos,
or below US$40 per megawatt-hour plus CEL, which is a threshold only seen
for natural gas combined cycle. Among the winning projects, seven corres-
ponded to solar photovoltaic and four to wind energy (CENACE 2016). The
auction demonstrated a large competitive resource base for renewable energy
expansion, and showcased that policy precaution regarding renewable energy
expansion goals might be counterproductive to the development of a more
competitive power system. The amount of participation in the auction clearly
shows that the use of Clean Energy Mandates might be under-utilized at the
moment, as these results came weeks after SENER published an increase of
CEL obligations by only 0.8 per cent, from 5.0 per cent in 2018 to 5.8 per cent
in 2019 (SENER 2015a, SENER 2016).
21 .4 THE WAY FORWARD AND THE CHALLENGE
FOR POLITICAL COHERENCE
As presented in this chapter, evidence conﬁrms Zinaman et al.’s (2015) conclu-
sion. Mexico’s power reform is ambitious about restructuring but modest about
the commitment to clean power transition, despite the ratcheting of climate
commitments and the favourable trends in renewable energy investment in the
country—see Valenzuela and Studer (2016: ﬁgure A1).
Mexico’s energy reform has indeed created formal means of achieving
transition to a low-carbon power system, mainly through clean energy certiﬁ-
cates, mandates, and auctions. Nonetheless, the Mexican government strong
preference for offering competitive prices risks reducing the pace of the power
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sector transformation in the future and providing a dubious outlook on a low-
carbon transition.
For decades, underinvestment in the oil industry, upstream and down-
stream, as well as in the electricity sector, created a series of bottlenecks that
had direct effects on the availability of natural gas and the price of electricity.
Access to abundant and cost-competitive capital and production efﬁciencies is
expected to address these concerns with markets fully opened to private
investment in all segments of the power sector, except in distribution and
retail. Lower energy costs became the major driver on policy debates—an
outcome that could be attainable independently from the power sector reform
or long-term diversiﬁcation strategies—because of historically low gas prices
in North America.
One of the fundamental challenges for transitioning to clean power in a
liberalized regime is that the cost of ambition will be evident to consumers
(Pollitt 2012). This occurs not only because of transparency in operations
across industry segments, which were previously embedded into the vertical
structure, but also because policy instruments under markets are to be trans-
parent, general, and enduring to provide the right incentives to participants
(e.g., clean energy certiﬁcates and carbon tax). Ultimately, this is precisely the
challenge the current administration faces.
Energy transition under adequate incentives and planning could represent
an opportunity to increase energy security and hedge against cost instability
that might have economy-wide negative impacts. Yet, under very low prices of
gas, the beneﬁts are less clear because of the primacy of delivering on the
political promise of low-cost electricity in the very short term. Energy-
intensive industries, such as the steel industry, whom are not prepared for
the regulatory and economic challenge, have taken this juncture to advocate
for further downscaling of Mexico’s commitments towards power sector
transformation to a low-carbon scenario. These enterprises that beneﬁted
from the previous self-supply regime and who have ready access to natural
gas imported from the US will need to share the burden of clean energy
transition.
In 2008, when a full power sector reform was politically unfeasible and high
gas prices further strengthened the argument for diversiﬁcation through
private investment in renewable energy, the Calderón government effectively
coupled the emerging climate change agenda with renewable energy invest-
ment policies. These included the ﬁrst renewable energy promotion law and
clear long-term non-fossil fuel targets in the power matrix. At the same time, a
robust climate change institutional framework was set in place, plausibly
securing that mitigation commitments and national goals would become a
driving force in the future of energy policy-making and market development.
The incumbent government effectively manoeuvred for full reform and bene-
ﬁted from the political windfall proﬁts of lower gas prices in the region.
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Although it might seem only natural to continue the hustle to power the
country with Texan gas, the government should provide a longer-term vision
for the development of low-carbon technologies.
There are three key issues to be addressed. First, power system planning and
policy should reﬂect a clear separation between high-efﬁciency cogeneration
and low-carbon technologies, as this would facilitate linking instruments such
as clean energy certiﬁcate mandates to mitigation results. Second, risk-
mitigating instruments such as auctions should not be compromised by
decision-making informed only by low gas prices observed in the near past
and future, postponing the expansion of clean energy obligations. Finally, the
country should adopt a comprehensive approach for adequate pricing,
through a more aggressive use of clean energy obligations and reducing
subsidies in the power sector, and for scaling up the carbon taxes economy-
wide. These measures can be effectively addressed only if the government is
able to assume political commitment to scale up climate ambition, and to fully
communicate the economic costs and beneﬁts of rapidly deploying renewable
energy in the power sector, at the expense of decelerating the deployment of
natural gas-based generation.
The coherence of climate and energy policies, or the lack thereof, will
determine the success of Mexico’s climate ambition in the 2020s. As discussed,
Mexico expects its power sector to reduce a large share of emissions by 2030,
whereas specialists expect a zero-emissions power system by the middle of the
century. The enactment of the LTE serves to bridge some of the gaps in the
energy reform regarding the challenges of efﬁciency and low-emission tech-
nology promotion, allowing for a set of energy sector institutions to work
hand-in-hand with climate policy institutions. Developing a solid climate
policy framework can have a signiﬁcant effect in guiding key aspects of
power sector restructuring. In Mexico, taking advantage of the existence of a
capable independent system operator, clean energy certiﬁcates and mandates
and long-term auctions could allow for the expansion of renewable energy in a
very brief period of time.
The Mexican case offers a valuable example to other economies undergoing
or considering power sector restructuring, particularly whenever fossil fuel
resources are still more competitive than large-scale deployment of renewable
energy. It is possible to observe the political economy trade-offs between the
need for a strong climate commitment that provides a stable long-term energy
transition pathway and the political and economic short-term beneﬁts derived
from low electricity tariffs. It is also possible to observe how these trade-offs
are only partially resolved through adequate institutional construction.
Mexico’s political elites, interest groups, and society need to recognize and
assume that transition could entail additional costs in the short term to some
economic actors, but that, in a broader context, these costs could remain below
the economic gains of a structural transformation and liberalization of the
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power sector. More importantly, the lack of coherence between energy policy
and climate change policy is unsustainable and will ultimately have an effect
on increasing the costs in the power sector owing to late action, with a
potential burden to be disproportionately shared by other sectors.
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Sell the Oil Deposits! A Financial Proposal to
Keep the Oil Underground in the Yasuni
National Park, Ecuador
Santiago J. Bucaram, Mario Andrés Fernández,
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22.1 INTRODUCTION
The Yasuni National Park (YNP) is a protected area located in the Amazon
region of Ecuador and is recognized as one of the most biodiverse regions in
the world (Bass et al. 2010). In 1989 it and much of its adjacent area were
designated by UNESCO as a Biosphere Reserve (UNESCO 1989). In recent
years, the YNP has received much attention due to the media exposure of the
Yasuni-ITT Initiative. This Initiative, announced in 2007 by the Ecuadorian
government, proposed a moratorium on oil activities in the Ishpingo-
Timbococha-Tiputini (ITT) blocks within the YNP, in exchange for US$3.6
billion in compensation over a period of ten years. The compensation was
supposedly in recognition of the supply of environmental services generated
by the YNP from which the entire planet beneﬁted. The Initiative was initially
celebrated as an innovative proposal that offered an alternative to global
environmental problems as it would promote the transition from the current
development model, based on oil extraction, to a new strategy based on equality
and sustainability (Acosta, Gudynas, andVogel 2009; Larrea andWarnars 2009;
Rival 2010; Vogel 2010).
The ﬁnancial mechanism of the ITT Initiative involved contributions to the
Yasuni Trust Fund, and may have taken the form of debt-for-conservation
swaps, emission permit auctions or conservation projects, and donations from
governments, multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations,
private companies, and individuals (United Nations Development Group
2010). In exchange for the contributions, the Ecuadorian government would
issue Yasuni Guarantee Certiﬁcates (YGCs), which were documents with a
face value equal to the contribution in US dollars. The YGCs were intended to
represent ‘avoided emissions’ (measured in metric tons of CO2e) from keeping
oil underground. The avoided emissions were calculated as the ratio between
the contribution and the then current price of the European Union Allow-
ances (EUA) from the Leipzig Carbon Market. The maximum total amount of
YGCs to issue would be 407 million tons of CO2e corresponding to the
estimated emissions produced from extracting oil from the ITT ﬁeld. The
YGCs did not earn interest and did not have an expiration or maturity date as
long as the government maintained its commitment to not exploiting the oil
reserves. Any contribution below US$50,000 was considered a donation and
no YGC would be issued. By 2013, only US$336 million had been pledged
(about 9 per cent of the target compensation) and US$13.3 million actually
delivered (0.37 per cent of the target compensation), leading President Correa
to terminate the Initiative, arguing that the international community had
failed to embrace it.
Some authors, however, argue that the original ITT Initiative is still a
coherent and innovative proposal to address climate change (e.g., Vallejo
and Friant 2015), and that the failure of the Initiative was not due to poor
design but to poor implementation by the policy makers in charge (Pellegrini
et al. 2014). Despite the purported advantages of the Initiative, Pellegrini et al.
(2014) indicate that its demise depended to a large extent on the inability of
policy makers to identify and resolve tensions between the proposal and the
institutions that facilitated it; and, the high reliance of the Initiative’s imple-
mentation on exogenous dynamics (e.g., oil prices) that were not explicitly
considered.
Other authors like Haddad (2011) argue that the Initiative took the
form of a compensated moratorium, where the compensation was esti-
mated with respect to foregone oil revenues rather than the environmental
beneﬁt accrued. Likewise, Harstad (2012a) considers that the Initiative and
the oil moratorium could be viewed as the Ecuadorian government hold-
ing a hostage (the YNP) and demanding a ransom (the target compensa-
tion), so that if the ransom was not received, oil extraction would start.
Therefore, the whole Initiative appeared as an arbitrary exercise of power
where the stronger party (the Ecuadorian government) demanded a ran-
som from the rest of the world, who had no alternative but to comply
(Williamson 1983).
The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, we conduct a feasibility
analysis of the ITT Initiative and show that it was severely ﬂawed from its
inception. Subsequently we use the price discounting framework of Bucaram,
Fernández, and Grijalva (2016) to assess the revenues that would have hypo-
thetically occurred from the trade of YGCs. We conclude that the ITT
Initiative was in fact poorly designed and was bound to fail. Second, we
develop a ﬁnancial approach for a ‘New ITT Initiative’. We propose the sale
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or leasing of the rights of extraction of the oil deposits in the YNP as a feasible
strategy to keep the oil underground and, consequently, to protect the YNP’s
ecosystem services. This ﬁnancial approach is much more transparent and
simpliﬁed than the ITT Initiative, and could be easily implemented through
existing market mechanisms. Thus, our proposal does not require the creation
of ﬁnancial instruments such as the YGCs, it disregards inaccurate concepts
such as ‘avoided net emissions’, and demonstrates the redundancy of the
Initiative with respect to the Kyoto Protocol instruments. We ﬁnally emphasize
that the Initiative, as originally designed, should be discarded and further efforts
should be addressed to the adoption of our new, more useable Initiative.
22 .2 FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE ITT INITIATIVE
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of the ﬂaws of the ITT
Initiative as a climate change mitigation instrument and as a ﬁnancial tool
to raise the compensation necessary to motivate the Ecuadorian government
to prioritize conservation over oil extraction.
The modelling assumptions are as follows. First, we assume YGCs are
ﬁnancially and operatively equivalent (i.e., fungible) to the Certiﬁcates of
Emissions Reductions (CERs). The CERs are ﬁnancial instruments associated
with Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) projects, which have a payoff
structure (i.e., cash ﬂows) similar to the YCGs. That is, CERs are the best proxy
or twin security to value the YGCs. This assumption relies on paragraph 26 of
the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund of July 2010
(United Nations Development Group 2010), which states, ‘the YGCs will also
include the metric tons of CO2 avoided according to the price, at that date, of
the European Union Allowances (EUAs) in the Leipzig Carbon Market . . . ’.
Furthermore, paragraph 27 of the same document asserts that ‘if in the future
the world carbon market accepts the YGCs as equivalents of Emission Permits,
the government will issue YGCs for sale to private and/or public entities in
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions . . . ’. These statements show a clear and
explicit expectation by the Ecuadorian government that the YCGs could
become equivalent to the EUAs traded in the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). However, as EUAs are electronic certiﬁcates
distributed by European governments to ﬁrms in the industrial sector, EUAs
are by deﬁnition not equivalent to those of the YGCs. Hence, we use the CERs
for the purposes of our analysis.
Second, we assume donors are rational utility maximizers and, given scarce
ﬁnancial resources, they will choose the best use of their money by evaluating
all the alternatives. Donors then use the carbon market as a means to decide
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the scale of their donations. Third, we assume the Ecuadorian government
commits to keeping the oil underground as long as the compensation is
incentive-compatible, that is, if the compensation is equal to or greater than
US$3.6 billion. Fourth, for the sake of conducting an analysis of the best-case
scenario, we ignore the fact that YGCs represent neither a portion of the oil
reserves nor avoided carbon emissions as purported but are, in practice, the
representation of nothing more than a bona ﬁde promise from Ecuador to
refrain from exploiting the ITT block. This simpliﬁes the analysis and allows
us to approach the problem from a ﬁnancial perspective and to obtain an
upper bound valuation of the YGCs.
22.2.1 Price Discounting
The ITT Initiative did not comply with any of the CDM or REDD+ criteria to
be considered a viable mitigation instrument, namely, the permanence, add-
itionality, certainty, and non-leakage criteria of the greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. The reasons are as follows:
22.2.1.1 Permanence
Oil exports have been Ecuador’s main source of revenue for more than
40 years, and oil exploration activities continued to take place in the YNP
and its buffer zone even after the implementation of the ITT Initiative (Martin
2011; Arsel and Angel 2012). However, exploration was omitted as a source of
potential activities that may affect the YNP. This omission signalled a weak
commitment by the Ecuadorian government to the terms of the ITT Trust
(Singleton 2000). Moreover, there was always the possibility that Ecuador
would need funds to face negative macroeconomic shocks or to boost eco-
nomic development. Then, the goals of the (current or future) government
might switch from seeking international compensation for avoided emissions
to prioritizing oil export revenues undermining the long-term credibility of
the initiative. Though the Initiative made provisions for the reimbursement of
donations if oil extraction occurred, the ﬁnancial and legal mechanisms that
would put this repayment process into operation were not clear. Thus, other
concerns arose because of the institutional instability around the design and
management of the ITT Initiative (Arsel 2012; Arsel and Angel 2012).
22.2.1.2 Additionality
The ITT Initiative did not provide any baseline or offset estimations to identify
truly additional GHG emissions reductions or sequestration. This implied that
the claimed equivalence between the YGCs and CERs or EUAs could not hold
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because credit buyers would pay only for offsets that they could claim as credit
under regulatory schemes. That is, credit buyers would not wish to buy YGCs if
the offsets might be disallowed because they could not be proven to be truly
additional (Kim, McCarl, and Murray 2008; Kim and McCarl 2009). More-
over, the YNP has been a protected area for more than 34 years. Consequently,
no additional environmental services are produced by the YNP and, therefore,
no further international funding needs to be provided to ensure biodiversity
conservation or protection of the indigenous peoples living in voluntary
isolation. Although this all depends on whether the legislation is adequately
enforced, this is not a matter within the environmental and conservation realm.
22.2.1.3 Leakage
The avoidance of emissions from the combustion of the oil that would be
preserved underground was not a sensible aim of the Initiative. Ecuador does
not have any control over oil markets, thus its oil is easily substituted in the
short term by purchases in other countries or extraction from other ﬁelds in
Ecuador itself.
22.2.1.4 Uncertainty
Haddad (2011) argues that the Initiative took the form of a compensated
moratorium where the compensation was estimated with respect to the value
of foregone oil revenue rather than the environmental beneﬁt accrued. In
addition to the unavailability of baseline data and data of impacts on ecosys-
tem services from oil extraction, potential credit buyers, donors, and investors
could not make decisions regarding compliance with regulatory limits for
emissions. Hence, no clear rationale existed of how the compensation request-
ed by the Ecuadorian government was related to offset levels, or whether it was
merely an arbitrary calculation. The ITT Initiative was plagued with contra-
dictions and logical ﬂaws. The most important were:
1) the YGCs were not recognized under the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms
and no formal procedures were speciﬁed to operationalize the equiva-
lence with CERs and EUAs;
2) although the Initiative predicted that the YGCs would be recognized by
the US government as a pilot study for carbon offsets (Larrea and
Warnars 2009), the transaction costs were too large to make this a
reasonable goal.
Bucaram, Fernández, and Grijalva (2016) conduct price discounting simu-
lations assuming that any non-compliance with CDM or REDD+ criteria is
partially resolved through discounts to the price of the YGCs if they had been
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freely traded in the EU-ETS market. They conclude that the longer the time
horizon, the lower the price discounts from permanence and uncertainty; but
long time horizons have a minimal effect on the heavy discounts related to
leakage. In the context of the Initiative, however, it seems fair to emphasize
short-run effects. Considering the often volatile political environment in
Ecuador, it was not clear whether the government following President Correa
would maintain the promise of not extracting oil. Further, the Ecuadorian
Constitution allows Correa to remain in ofﬁce only until 2017 (ten years from
the beginning of the Initiative), so donors/investors would probably have
looked at this time horizon when evaluating the Initiative. Hence, price
discounting is relevant for our evaluation for the following reasons:
1) the unclear and possibly short time horizon of the Initiative, which
makes its permanence questionable;
2) the degree of uncertainty concerning the overall design of the ITT Trust
and its implementation;
3) the signiﬁcant leakage in the short run.
22.2.2 Financial Valuation of the ITT Initiative
In this section we evaluate whether the ITT Initiative was an incentive-
compatible contract for the Ecuadorian government using as a focal date
13 August 2013 (i.e., when the Initiative was terminated). The target compen-
sation expected by the Ecuadorian government was US$3.6 billion, a ﬁgure
that, according to the Initiative’s designers, was equal to half the foregone oil
revenues from the ITT block. Thus, if oil revenues accruing to the government
were estimated to be higher than US$3.6 billion, the Ecuadorian government
would not have had any incentive to keep the oil underground, resulting in a
breach of the ITT commitments. Also, we estimate the revenues that would
have been raised from the YGCs trade in the best-case scenario. For this we
employ Monte Carlo simulations that incorporate the price discounts calcu-
lated by Bucaram, Fernández, and Grijalva (2016).
22.2.2.1 Valuation of Oil Extraction in the ITT Block
The ITT Initiative was drafted under the assumption that the Net Present
Value (NPV) of the oil revenues from the exploitation of the ITT block would
be around US$7.2 billion, from which the Ecuadorian government would
receive 50 per cent. Consequently, if oil revenues exceeded US$3.6 billion,
there would no longer be any incentive to comply with the agreements set in
the Initiative. The Initiative’s designers argued that this compensation value
was incentive-compatible, and that the Ecuadorian government would easily
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be able to comply with it. This conclusion was derived from the following
assumptions (Acosta 2007):
1) an expected production of 900 million barrels in total (on average 36
million barrels per year);
2) an average oil price received by Ecuador of US$32 per barrel;
3) a production period of 25 years;
4) production costs of US$12 per barrel;
5) a discount rate of 9 per cent—the ofﬁcial rate of discount of the Ecuadorian
government (Ministerio Coordinador de Política Económica 2013); and
6) no initial investment.
However, many of these assumptions were wrong or unrealistic. For
instance, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices were in fact around US
$72 per barrel in 2007, and averaged US$80 in 2008 and 2009. Thus, the
assumption of an average oil price received by Ecuador of US$32 per barrel
was pessimistic and, in fact, actual oil price behaviour during this period
changed the government’s incentives. High oil prices can be considered as
one of the main factors for the termination of the Initiative in 2013.
It is then necessary to determine a more accurate valuation of the revenues of
the ITT block through the use of a more realistic and updated set of assump-
tions. We use as a focal date of our analysis 13 August 2013 (i.e., when the
Initiative was terminated). We also apply the ofﬁcial assumptions provided by
Petroamazonas (2010), Larrea (2010), and Ministerio Coordinador de Política
Económica (2013) as follows:
1) an expected oil production of 846 million barrels;
2) operation and transportation costs of the oil drilling operation of US$15
per barrel;
3) a production period of 23 years;
4) an initial investment of US$5.59 billion; and
5) a participation in the proﬁts of 47 per cent for the Ecuadorian government.
For the average oil price that the government of Ecuador receives for each
sold barrel during the life of the project we use three scenarios: US$70 per
barrel (pessimistic), US$80 per barrel (most likely), and US$91.70 per barrel
(optimistic). We use three different discount rates: 9 per cent, used by the
Ecuadorian government (Ministerio Coordinador de Política Económica
2013), 6 per cent, and 12 per cent, used by Larrea (2010). Table 22.1 presents
the NPV of oil revenues under these parameters. The results show that there is
no case where the ITT Initiative is incentive-compatible (NPV less than US
$3.6 billion). In all cases, the compensation would never have been high
enough to enable the government to meet its pledge to keep the oil under-
ground indeﬁnitely.
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For the Monte Carlo simulations of the valuation of oil extraction revenues
we introduce some additional assumptions as follows:
1) the total amount of oil reserves is uncertain, sowe use the range of reserves
from Petroamazonas (2010), namely 412 million barrels of proven, 846
million barrels of probable, and 1,531 million barrels of possible reserves;
2) as the bargaining power and contract conditions for oil exploitation are
not certain, we assume that participation in the proﬁts for the Ecuador-
ian government ranges between 40 per cent and 50 per cent;
3) the production and transportation costs range between US$11 and
US$19 per barrel;
4) the discount rate ranges between 6 per cent and 12 per cent; and
5) annual average oil prices for the period 2007–12 are derived from theWTI
oil price series observed in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)
market, for 2013–17 from the NYMEXWTI oil forecast, and for 2018 and
beyond we assumed that the price of a WTI oil barrel will range between
US$70 and US$98 per barrel, for which we apply a discount of 5 per cent
to obtain the price received by the Ecuadorian Government.
Simulation results (Figure 22.1) show that the probability of the ITT Initia-
tive being incentive-compatible (i.e., oil revenue less than US$3.6 billion) is
less than 0.006 per cent approximately. This conﬁrms our claim that the
designers of the ITT Initiative greatly underestimated the potential oil rev-
enues of the ITT block and, as a result, claimed a low level of compensation
relative to the true opportunity cost of keeping the oil underground.
22.2.2.2 Valuation of the YGCs Revenue
The other component required to examine the ﬁnancial feasibility of the ITT
Initiative is the valuation of the YGCs.We use as a proxy the market conditions
(observed and predicted) for CERs in the EU-ETS market. We explore two
scenarios, the ﬁrst where no price discount occurs and the second where we
Table 22.1. NPV of oil revenues from exploitation of the
ITT block (US$ billions)
Discount rate (%) Average price of oil (US$ per barrel)
70 80 91.7
6 10.93 13.27 16,01
9 8.52 10.38 12.56
12 6.77 8.28 10,04
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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apply the discounts calculated by Bucaram, Fernández, andGrijalva (2016). The
assumptions used in this section are as follows:
1) the period of YGCs emission or fund collection is 13 years;
2) the maximum number of YGCs issued by the government is 407 million;
3) the sales success rate is 100 per cent (i.e., all the YGCs are sold and
traded); and
4) the price of the YGCs is equal to the price of CERs in the EU-ETS
market.
For the last assumption we use the historical prices of the instrument from
2007–13 and for the period 2014–20, the forecast price provided by Thomson-
Reuters.
Under the no price discount scenario (i.e., best case scenario) and for a discount
rate of 6 per cent, the NPV of YGCs revenue is US$616 million. For discount
rates of 9 per cent and 12 per cent, the NPVs are US$544 and US$484 million,
respectively. That is, even without any price discount, the funds that could have
been raised using carbon market mechanisms are much lower than the target
compensation of US$3.6 billion.
To simulate the impact of the price discounts on the YGCs valuation, we
further assume that the sales success rate varies between 70 per cent and 100 per
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Figure 22.1. Density distribution of the NPV of the expected oil revenue from the
ITT block.
Note: The density distribution is the result of one million replications.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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cent, and that the discount rate ranges between 6 per cent and 12 per cent.
Figure 22.2 shows the density distribution of the NPV of the expected YGCs
valuation. The left panel shows results when no price discount is applied to the
YGCs,while the right panel shows results for price discounts between 60 per cent
and 100 per cent. For both cases, the probability of the Ecuadorian government
raising US$3.6 billion through the Initiative is zero, regardless of the YGCs price
discounting (i.e., using either CER as the twin security of the YGCs).
The most likely amount of funds that could have been raised is US$544
million with no discount on YGCs prices, and US$108 million with price
discounts. An interesting result is that the value actually pledged to the Yasuni
Trust Fund (US$336 million) was within the range of our valuation of the
YGCs (US$108–544 million). In addition, with YGCs price discounting, the
probability that the YGCs would be valued at US$336 million is approximately
0 per cent, indicating that international donors discounted the YGCs at a
lower rate than Bucaram, Fernández, and Grijalva (2016) considered appro-
priate (i.e., between 60 per cent and 100 per cent). Speciﬁcally, we estimate
that donors discounted the price of YGC bonds at 40 per cent approximately.
This shows that the willingness of the international community to contribute
to the Initiative was mainly for altruistic reasons.
The introduction of additionality to the valuation would render the ITT
Initiative completely valueless, reinforcing our ﬁndings and conclusion that
donors contributed more than could have been expected according to a
rational-economic perspective.
22 .3 A NEW YASUNI-ITT INITIATIVE
Based on the analysis in Section 22.2, we argue that no practical implemen-
tation steps exist that guarantee the success of the original Initiative. Hence, we
propose the adoption of a new ITT initiative, as outlined in Section 22.3.1.
22.3.1 The Model
We use the static framework of Harstad (2012b), which entails a coalition of
(Kyoto Protocol Annex-I) countries purchasing or leasing the rights to exploit
the fossil-fuel deposits in non-coalition countries. That is, the property rights
to the oil deposits are transferred to the coalition, which prefers not to extract
oil in order to prevent leakage effects when non-coalition countries free ride
on the environmental policies of the coalition.
Consider a cost function CiðxiÞ of producing or extracting xi units of oil,
and a beneﬁt function BiðyiÞof consuming yi units of oil, for all icountries.
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CiðxiÞ is an increasing strictly convex function, while BiðyiÞ is an increasing
and concave function. CiðxiÞorders a country’s deposits according to their
extraction costs. This ordering is natural as a country that is extracting xi units
would prefer to ﬁrst extract the deposits that have the lowest extraction costs.
M denotes the coalition countries, which are assumed to act as a single agent,
and Nrepresents the set of non-coalition countries. The maximization prob-
lems for i 2 N(e.g., Ecuador) and M are, respectively:
max
xi, yi
BiðyiÞCiðxiÞ pðyi xiÞ, 8i 2 N ð1Þ
max
p, xM
BMðyMÞCMðxMÞ pðxM yMÞHðxM þ SðpÞÞ,
where the harm, Hð⋅Þ, experienced by M, is a strictly increasing and convex
function. Similar to Harstad (2012b), for simplicity we assume that onlyM takes
the environmental harm into account in the objective function. Equilibrium
conditions in the oil market lead the equilibrium price, p, to equal the marginal
beneﬁt of consumption and the marginal cost of extraction such that
B 0i ðyiÞ¼p! yi¼DiðpÞB 01i ðpÞ, and p2C 0i ðxiÞ!xi¼SiðpÞC 01i ðpÞ8i2N .
These conditions imply that yM¼xMþSðpÞDðpÞ where SðpÞXN SiðpÞ and
DðpÞXN DiðpÞ.
Let a deposit ordered between, say, x 0i and xi
00, be characterized by its size or
fossil-fuel content, Δ  x00i -x 0i , and by a marginal extraction cost
c  ½Ciðx00i ÞCiðx 0i Þ=Δ. At this stage, while C 0i ð∙Þ describes i’s marginal
extraction cost, given a set of deposits, c represents the actual extraction cost
for a speciﬁc but small (marginal) deposit. Different marginal deposits have
different c’s, and when ordering country i’s deposits according to costs, the
cost correspondence is given by C 0i ð∙Þ, whereas C 0i ðxiÞ is the actual marginal
cost when xi units are extracted. The deposit is owned by i 2 N , and if the
marginal exploitation cost is such that c < p, then i 2 N would prefer to exploit
the deposit.
Coalition M 0s equilibrium policy means that B 0MðyMÞH 0 2 C 0MðxMÞ,
implying that M would prefer to exploit the deposit if and only if
B 0MðyMÞH 0  c. If cþ H 0 <B 0ðyMÞ, the deposit will be exploited, whether
owned by i orM. If the right to exploit the deposit is transferred from i toM, i
saves the extraction cost but loses some proﬁt. Thus, for a given p, the utility
of i 2 N becomes:
Ui ¼ max
xi, yi
BiðyiÞCiðxiÞpðyi xiÞðp cÞΔ , ð2Þ
We use the envelope theorem to differentiate (2), such that
dUi
dΔ
¼ c pðyi xiÞ dpdΔ : ð3Þ
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Similarly, M0s utility becomes
UM ¼ max
p, xM
BMðyMÞCMðxMÞ pðxM yMÞHðxM þ SðpÞÞ þ ðp cÞΔ: ð4Þ
We differentiate (4) with respect to Δ, and through the envelope theorem, such
that
dUM
dΔ
¼ p c: ð5Þ
Thus, the transaction of the deposit increases UM þ Ui if ðxi yiÞdp=dΔ>0
when cþ H 0 <B 0ðyMÞ.
If c 2 ½B 0MðyMÞH 0, p, i would exploit the deposit, butM would not. If the
deposit is transferred from i to M, i 0s payoff changes in line with (3). For a
given p, the non-coalition’s total supply changes from SðpÞ to SðpÞΔ. Thus,
M 0s utility can be written as:
UM ¼max
p, xM
BMðyMÞCMðxMÞHðxMþ½SðpÞΔÞþpðDðpÞ½SðpÞΔÞ. ð6Þ
We use the envelope theorem and differentiate (6) to get
dUM
dΔ
¼B 0MðyMÞ þ H 0 þ p: ð7Þ
Hence, the transaction of the deposit increases UM þ Ui if
cB 0MðyMÞ þH 0  ðyixiÞdp=dΔ>0 when cþ H0  B 0ðyMÞ. For a third
country, the transaction between Mand i generates the additional beneﬁt
ðxi yiÞdp=dΔ, j 2 N\i, where dp=dΔ>0.
In summary, if i 2 N transfers the deposit to M, then
a) UM þ Ui increases if and only if
maxf0, cþ H 0 B 0MðyMÞg þ ðxi yiÞ
∂p
∂Δ
>0:
b)
X
M[N Ui increases if and only if
maxf0, cþ H 0 B 0MðyMÞg þ
X
N
ðxi yiÞ ∂p∂Δ >0:
22.3.2 The YNP in the Market of Deposits
We propose that the YNP (and, consequently, its oil deposits) can be analysed
within the framework of Section 22.3.1.
The public debate is divided between the preservation of the YNP and
Ecuador’s need for the foregone oil revenues. This debate is resolved through
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the sale or leasing of the rights of extraction to a coalition that may be
interested in keeping the oil underground. The revenue raised through this
transaction may be taken as a form of compensation for the ecosystem services
provided by the YNP. To estimate the price for the transaction of the oil
deposit, we rely on Pethig and Eichner (2015). Suppose that the deposit price
is pz . If pz ¼ p, then all non-coalition countries offer for sale all deposits with
extraction costs c  p because the revenues from selling those deposits are
higher than the proﬁt in the absence of deposit trading (i.e., no leasing or sale of
oil extraction rights). Thus, the oil price p is an upper bound for the deposit
price pz . If pz >p the coalition will not accept this price since it can purchase
non-coalition countries’ proﬁtable deposits at pz ¼ p. Finally, if pz ¼ 0, no
country gives away for free any deposit with extraction costs c < p, because
the extraction of those deposits generates a proﬁt. Hence, pz 2 ½0,p, that is, the
transaction is linked only to the dynamics of the oil prices. Then, the revenue
from the trade of the deposit would need to be negotiated and agreed between
the parties on, say, a yearly-basis, for which ﬁnancial instruments (e.g.,
futures) may be used to facilitate the transaction. The revenues from the
transaction of the extraction rights are thus variable but their calculation is
more transparent than the claimed compensation in the original ITT Initia-
tive (i.e., US$3.6 billion).
The cost function CiðxiÞ orders the deposits according to the costs of extrac-
tion, and those deposits with high extraction costs are preserved because of their
unproﬁtability. For the YNP we do not know exact extraction costs, but it is
reasonable to assume these are not negligible, given the remote location of the
deposit. Moreover, given the fragility of the YNP’s ecosystem and the risk of
signiﬁcant environmental harm, c 2

B 0MðyMÞH 0, p

still holds as long as the
coalition internalizes the harm independently of the oil price.
Finally, wemay further assume that the size of the deposit is not large enough
to affect oil prices, so that ∂p=∂Δ ¼ 0. For Ecuador and the coalition to beneﬁt
from the transaction of the deposit, c 2

B 0MðyMÞH 0, p

. Thus, the coalition
will keep the oil underground since the revenues gained by exploiting it are less
than the costs to offset/mitigate the environmental harm from its extraction.
Our ﬁnancial approach incorporates the marginal harm H 0 and provides a
wider set of conditions for which the YNP may be preserved. In this sense, it is
a more informative and simpliﬁed approach than the original ITT Initiative.
22.3.3 Financial Issues and Implications
The main implications of our theoretical model are as follows:
1) our proposal effectively reduces the counterparty risk (i.e., the risk of
default or non-compliance) because of the direct transfer of property
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rights (the extraction rights) from the Ecuadorian government to investors
or donors (the coalition), and
2) our proposal constructs a realistic appraisal (i.e., mark-to-market) of the
ITT-block oil reserves.
The ITT Initiative may be considered a forward contract that is contingent
on the price of oil, with indeﬁnite maturity and a strike price of US$36.64 (US
$47.24) at a discount rate of 6 per cent (12 per cent) (Figure 22.3). Based on
our simulations and the increase in oil prices observed between June 2007 and
August 2013, this contract was in-the-money (i.e., it generated value to the
Ecuadorian government) only 0.6 per cent (4.4 per cent) of the time. This
situation was exacerbated by the non-permanent nature of the commitment
to keep oil underground (commonly labelled as Plan B) so that, from the
perspective of the investors/donors, there was a high counterparty risk, which
made the Initiative unattractive from a ﬁnancial point of view. Our proposal,
however, effectively reduces the counterparty risk because of the direct trans-
fer of the property rights from the Ecuadorian government to the coalition.
This transaction aligns the incentives of both parties: the government succeeds
in keeping the oil underground for a fair compensation obtained from selling
property shares of the ITT block, and the coalition obtains an asset at its fair
value with a perspective of revalorization over time. Furthermore, as we proved
in Section 22.3.2, for both parties their optimal strategy consists of delaying oil
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extraction in order to capitalize the value of the ITT block, which was, in fact,
the objective of the ITT Initiative in the ﬁrst place.
In 2010, the ITT Initiative was restructured to make it more attractive to
investors/donors. The objective was to reduce the (non-compliance or de-
fault) risk by framing the Initiative as a carbon offset instrument to be
implemented through an independent Trust Fund. The TOR established
that the Initiative should be valued based on the YGCs and that if the
Ecuadorian government failed on its promise, the bond holders would be
reimbursed at the YGCs’ face value. It remains an open question if these
provisions actually helped to reduce the counterparty risk, but it is clear that
the incentives were never appropriate either for the donors/investors or for
the Ecuadorian government.
The main factor that negatively affected the incentives was the structure of
the Initiative, and the estimation of its fair value. On one hand, for the
Ecuadorian government, the value of the Initiative (particularly its opportun-
ity cost) was linked to the foregone oil revenues from the ITT ﬁeld. As the
price of oil increased, the opportunity cost of the Initiative also increased,
making it less likely for the Ecuadorian government to keep its promise. On
the other hand, for the donors/investors the value of the Initiative derived
from two sources: 1) an intrinsic value related to their altruistic behaviour,
and 2) the possibility of trading the YGCs. Figure 22.4 shows that until late
2009 the behaviour of carbon credits followed closely the behaviour of oil
prices. From late 2009 onwards, however, the two markets showed a tendency
to divorce from one another. In particular, while oil prices showed a tendency
to recover following their fall during the ﬁnancial crisis, the prices of carbon
offsets remained ﬂat until 2011 when they experienced a dramatic fall. In other
words, from 2011 the value of the ITT Initiative for the Ecuadorian govern-
ment declined because oil extraction became more valuable, while for the
investor/donors the value of the Initiative decreased because hypothetically
the YGCs became less valuable in the carbon market. Hence, the strategy of
incorporating carbon offsetting did not eliminate an important problem,
because by deﬁnition the YGCs did not allow mark-to-market of the fair
value of the Initiative from both the perspective of the government of Ecuador
and that of the investors/donors. Our approach resolves this incompatibility of
incentives between the government and the coalition by setting an unambigu-
ous and realistic appraisal of the ITT-block oil reserves: linking its fair value
only to oil prices.
Our proposed initiative is also more ﬂexible, as the negotiations for the
lease/transfer of the oil ﬁelds may involve the terms and time horizon of the
contract, so the compensation may be calculated on a period-by-period basis
according to the behaviour of oil markets. Furthermore, we gain in simpli-
ﬁcation as we do not need complex valuations of the ecosystem services of
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the YNP in order to set up the transaction of the property rights within this
market setting.
22 .4 DISCUSSION
The ITT Initiative sought to become an innovative instrument for the miti-
gation of GHG emissions and climate change. Its main premise was to keep oil
underground in exchange for a monetary compensation equivalent to half of
the foregone oil revenues, that is US$3.6 billion over a period of ten years.
Despite the interest and support it garnered after its announcement, the
Initiative was terminated in 2013 because of its inability to collect the request-
ed compensation. Numerous authors still defend the Initiative and argue that
it should be reinstated and serve as a model to other countries.
In this chapter we prove that the ITT Initiative was severely ﬂawed since its
inception. Not only it was infeasible from a ﬁnancial perspective, but it also
lacked sound theoretical grounds that would make it credible and compatible
to the incentives of potential donors or investors. Thus, there was no possi-
bility that the compensation could have been raised. First, the YGCs did not
have any ﬁnancial value because they did not comply with any of the CDM/
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REDD+ criteria (i.e., permanence, additionality, non-leakage, and certainty)
to be considered equivalent to the CERs and be part of carbon markets.
Second, although donors’ contributions went further than could have been
expected according to a rational-economic perspective, a higher level of altruism
would have been required to reach the requested compensation.
We propose a theoretical and practical framework for the development of a
‘New ITT Initiative’ based on Harstad (2012b). Our main premise is the sale or
transfer of the property rights to the ITT ﬁelds from the Ecuadorian govern-
ment to a coalition of countries or parties that would be interested in keeping
the oil underground. We develop conditions for the maximization of the
utility for both parties. In particular, we prove that the price for this transac-
tion is linked to the behaviour of oil prices.
Several caveats should be mentioned, however. First, the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment claims that oil activities would only affect 0.01 per cent of the
Reserve. In this case, the coalition would not be motivated to preserve that
share of the Reserve given its negligible size. Second, our approach does not
resolve the non-additionality of the ITT Initiative: that is, the YNP has been a
protected reserve for decades and no further efforts should be invested in what
is supposed to be a commitment from the Ecuadorian government. Third, we
acknowledge that our proposal is not free of controversy, particularly for a
country and government that might claim that the lease/transfer of the oil
ﬁelds would be a violation of national sovereignty.
Finally, there are several political and practical implementation consider-
ations. Most importantly, there are two aspects of our proposal that need to be
considered: the structure of the coalition and its ability to coordinate, and the
guarantee of the rights to oil ﬁelds.
Consider ﬁrst the structure of the coalition. While the proposed transfer of
rights reduces the counterparty risk, it comes at the cost of creating a coord-
ination problem on the demand side. From the perspective of the coalition
members, it makes sense to acquire rights to the oil ﬁelds only if they trust that
the other members will also do so and that they will keep the oil underground.
If oil starts being extracted by any one of the members, or if they sell their
rights to an oil producer, the value of the others’ rights will fall. Thus, the
counterparty risk is indeed transferred from one actor (the Ecuadorian gov-
ernment) to multiple actors (the members of the coalition). This is important
because it can create a hold-up problem: anticipating the inability of other
members to commit not to exploit oil in the YNP, each member decides not to
acquire rights to the oil ﬁelds in the ﬁrst place. Besides, the non-additionality
of oil extraction from the YNP also limits the incentives of the coalition
members to buy these rights. We highlight two elements that can help solve
the hold-up problem.
First, suppose that before the transfer of property rights takes place there is
an opportunity for coalition members to (credibly) signal their commitment
Sell the Oil Deposits! 447
to the proposal. This signal could come for instance from their current
commitments regarding the Intended National Determined Contributions
(INDCs) under the UNFCCC, or from their previous achievements on emis-
sion reductions. Using this information, the transfer contract could restrict
participation only to those countries that have reduced emissions beyond a
particular level in the past and whose promises for further reductions surpass a
speciﬁc threshold. Alternatively, the contract could provide incentives for the
members satisfying these conditions such as deductions from the buying price.
Second, to limit the incentives to breach their commitments, the contracts
could establish clauses explicitly disallowing oil extraction by the members of
the coalition as well as the sale of rights for that purpose. In the case of violations,
the contracts could specify damage payments following a Pigovian structure that
would impose a payment on those reneging on their promises equal to the social
cost generated (i.e., the fall in the value of other members’ rights).
Consider next the guarantee of rights to oil ﬁelds. The fact that the ﬁelds
remain under the geographic domain of the Ecuadorian government implies
that a risk of expropriation exists even after the transfer of rights. While it is
not easy to eliminate, the experience with oil contracts provides important
insights about possible ways to reduce this risk. In the past, oil companies
have recurred to international settlement mechanisms to solve disputes with
governments in cases of expropriation. An important case is the recent
settlement of the Ecuadorian government with Occidental Petroleum
Corporation-Oxy. After nine years of litigation, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) concluded that the actions of the
Ecuadorian government vis-à-vis Oxy back in 2006 amounted to expropriation
and established a compensation of around US$1 billion that the Ecuadorian
government has agreed to pay. While the process was slow and costly, it shows
that if the transfer of rights to the oil ﬁelds can be framed within the rules of
investment protection governing this type of contracts, the ICSID can serve as a
third-party guarantor of those rights.
The proposed tools for implementing our proposal have the added
advantage of providing a better commitment mechanism for the Ecuadorian
government to signal compromise and to establish a reputation for protecting
the environment.
22 .5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we presented a new ITT Initiative which is much more trans-
parent and simpliﬁed than the failed original ITT Initiative. Our approach is
more transparent than the original Initiative because it uses existing ﬁnancial
mechanisms through forward contracts on oil prices. Furthermore, the fair
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value of our proposal would mark-to-market at oil prices, aligning the incen-
tives of the Ecuadorian government and the coalitionmembers; and, ﬁnally, the
counterparty risk is reduced because our approach entails the effective transfer
of property rights to the coalition.
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Part VII
Social Inclusion
While clean energy can serve as a robust enabler of economic growth, ensuring
socially inclusive development remains a signature political economy chal-
lenge for clean energy transitions. With that in mind, this part features
chapters that explore the linkages between social development programmes
and clean energy aspirations, climate and development implications of energy
poverty reduction programmes, and the impacts of energy development actors
and interests on local communities and their agendas. Achieving inclusive
economic growth in concert with clean energy and climate goals is a complex
task; the subsequent case studies intend to illustrate some of the relevant,
governing political economy elements to be considered by policy makers in
this realm.
Ezeanya and Kennedy explore the various strategies employed by the
Government of Rwanda in achieving increased biogas use among the rural
poor, particularly through an agricultural direct assistance and poverty reduc-
tion programme known as Girinika. This case study, more generally, attempts
to shed light on the conditions necessary for successful implementation of
clean energy pro-poor reforms in rural communities. McCormick explores
hydroelectricity and biomass development in the Brazilian Amazon, and the
linkages between the needs and agendas of local communities, the economic
interests, and politics at the national level, and international social actors and
ﬁnancial interests. Kruger, Tait, and de Groot characterize the political econ-
omy of residential energy choices and energy poverty reduction programmes
in developing countries through comparative analysis of South Africa and
Indonesia.

23
Integrating Clean Energy Use in National
Poverty Reduction Strategies
Opportunities and Challenges in Rwanda’s
Girinka Programme
Chika Ezeanya and Abel Kennedy
23.1 INTRODUCTION
Poverty reduction programmes set up by national governments and targeted
at rural communities have experienced the twin challenges of dearth of
adequate energy sources and the effects of climate change on the rural
landscape such as forest degradation and increased household air pollution
(Barnett 2000). Although the poorest segment of the global population con-
tribute only about 10 per cent to total global emissions, they live in areas that
are most vulnerable to climate change. Outside of the general impact of the
harmful environmental footprints of the richest 1 per cent globally, which
could be as much as 175 times that of the poorest 10 per cent, poor people,
especially in rural areas often have to bear the direct consequences of their
own natural resource use. Casillas and Kammen (2010: 1) assert that ‘miti-
gating climate change, increasing energy access, and alleviating rural poverty
can all be complementary, their overlap deﬁning an energy-poverty-climate
nexus’. SSA is a region with many rural communities whose energy use lead to
impactful economic, health, and environmental consequences, especially on
women and children (Banerjee et al. 2012). Governments across the region
must work to reduce dependence on depleting and potentially harmful energy
sources while tackling rural poverty.
Integrating clean energy use in poverty alleviation discourse is increasingly
gaining global attention, mostly due to the established connection between
high-level poverty and its economic, environmental, and health effects on
poor communities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
has connected the dots between energy, poverty, and sustainable development.
In publications and in policy advice to national governments, UNDP empha-
sizes the need to focus on generating clean and modern energy that is
sustainable, since it ‘can be an engine for poverty reduction, social progress,
equity, enhanced resilience, economic growth, and environmental sustainabil-
ity’ (UNDP 2015: 1). The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that in
2014, more than 2.6 billion global citizens were without clean energy for
household use and were utilizing fuelwood as well as other forms of resources
that result in high levels of household air pollution with its attendant adverse
effects; more than 95 per cent of this ﬁgure are either in sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) or in developing Asia and 84 per cent are in rural areas (IEA 2014).
The country of Rwanda in East Africa presents a good case in point where
poverty levels is synonymous with fast depleting natural energy sources. In
2014, 85 per cent of Rwanda’s population relied on wood as main source of
energy, a ﬁgure that represents a 5 per cent decline from four years earlier
when 90 per cent was dependent on fuel burning (FAO 2011; The New Times
2015). The high number of Rwandans using fuelwood has led to a recorded
national deﬁcit of 8.5 million trees per year, mainly lost to burning wood for
household energy use. Forty-ﬁve per cent of Rwandans live below the poverty
line, representing roughly half of the current population dependent on fuel-
wood in meeting their energy needs (NISR 2012). By building in the adoption
of clean energy use within poverty alleviation programmes, the government of
Rwanda has strived to promote clean energy use among rural dwellers, with
emphasis on the rural poor.
This chapter focuses on the use of cow dung for domestic biogas among
beneﬁciaries of the Rwandan government’s agricultural direct assistance pro-
gramme, known as Girinka. Girinka entails the gifting of pregnant dairy cows
to the poorest of the poor of rural dwellers by the government. Under Girinka,
beneﬁciaries, when they have a minimum of two cows in kraal, are strongly
encouraged and assisted—materially and ﬁnancially—to install domestic bio-
gas plants that use dung and urine to generate energy. The government
worked through the National Domestic Biogas Programme (NDBP) and the
result has been the migration of a number of rural dwellers who are Girinka
beneﬁciaries away from fuelwood use to using biogas (Bedi, Pellegrini, and
Tasciotti 2013). This chapter aims to improve our understanding of the
various strategies utilized by the government in achieving increased biogas
use among the rural poor, with emphasis on beneﬁciaries of the Girinka
programme. Understanding gained from this study will bring increased
enlightenment on the conditions necessary for successful implementation of
clean energy promoting pro-poor reforms in rural communities.
Questions guiding this analysis will centrally arise from two key political
economy variables—institutions and actors. Along that line, the role of the
government of Rwanda and donors as drivers of change in clean energy use
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among the rural poor will be discussed, and questions that will establish who
the main actors are in the promotion of clean energy use among the rural poor
in Rwanda will be answered. Other questions along that axis include: What is
the current policy environment and what alignments exist with international
frameworks?What political and economic factors were at play in the increased
use of biogas by rural Rwandans? Further, this chapter will apply the Power
Analysis tool of political economy by raising questions around who is included
and who is excluded from government of Rwanda’s promotion of clean energy
use for the rural poor. Finally, social inclusion approach to rural poverty or
pro-poor policy-making requires that questions be raised on the perceptions
of the rural poor regarding the whole exercise. This is extremely necessary
since ‘an effective rural development transformation programme that focus on
the rural poor requires that a clear understanding of who the rural poor are,
where they live, [their aspirations] and the challenges posed by the prevailing
poverty levels in their respective habitats is known’ (Ewang 2013: 11).
23 .2 RWANDA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Rwanda is the most densely populated country in SSA and covers a surface area
of 26,338 km2. Rainfall is plentiful, and annual temperature average ranges
between 16–20°C, but with a 0.60 ha per household availability, arable land is
scarce. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR),
Rwanda’s population density has increased from 321 persons perkm2 in 2002
to 416 in 2012 (NISR 2012). Overexploitation is the result, accompanied by
disastrous environmental consequences. Rwanda’s protection areas consist of
three national parks: Volcanoes National Park, Nyungwe National Park, and
Akagera National Park. Combined, all three have lost more than 50 per cent of
their original surface area in the past 40 years (Twagiramungu 2006).
The republic of Rwanda came forcefully and widely into global conscious-
ness with the genocide of 1994 where an estimated 1 million, mostly Tutsi
citizens, were killed. At the root cause of the genocide is economic displace-
ment, food, and land insecurity. The end of the genocide marked a transition
to a post-conﬂict nation building stage where there is collaboration between
government, private sector, international development partners, and interest
groups to advance the interest of the majority poor citizen. Rwanda is classi-
ﬁed among the poorest countries in the world; 166th out of 186 (UNDP 2012);
the household poverty survey stood at 44.9 per cent in 2010–11 down from
58.9 per cent in 2000–01 (NISR 2012). Extreme poverty in 2012 stood at
24.1 per cent down from the 40 per cent of ten years earlier (IFAD 2012).
Rwanda’s 2003 constitution was speciﬁcally crafted to reduce poverty and to
empower citizens economically (MINECOFIN 2007). Subsequent documents
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in support of the constitution include the Economic Development and Poverty
Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), which came into effect in 2007, and is focused
on the reduction of poverty in Rwanda from 64 per cent to 30 per cent, and
increasing gross domestic product per capita from US$220 to US$1,240 by
2017 (MINECOFIN 2007). An agrarian country with approximately 90 per cent
rural dwellers, poverty reduction strategies in Rwanda, to be effective, must be
structured for widespread appeal in rural agrarian settings.
Environmentally, Rwanda’s ecosystem is at risk due to high population
density and the heavy demand for natural resources. Rwanda’s efforts in urban
planning have been overtaken by massive post-conﬂict movements from rural
to urban areas, which have placed signiﬁcant stress on the environment. The
nation’s industrial sector is also expanding at an appreciable pace, bringing
with it additional demands on the already overburdened environment.
Deforestation was a serious menace until targeted efforts at reforestation
began in 2010 through tree planting and support for cleaner cook stoves
(EUEI 2009a). Between 2010 and 2014, Rwanda’s sustainable climate man-
agement strategy has proved successful; an additional 10 per cent surface area
in the country is now occupied by forests and 5 per cent less Rwandans use
fuelwood for energy generation (The New Times 2015).
23.2.1 Household Energy Use in Rwanda
In 2010, Rwanda’s Director of Forestry Field Programmes in the nation’s
National Forestry Authority warned of a real threat of desertiﬁcation, with
the revelation that in that year, only 533,000 hectares or 20 per cent of the
country was covered by forests (FAO 2011). In response, the government
embarked on a concerted policy effort aimed at reforestation. Seventy-six per
cent of Rwanda’s rural land (2,467,000 ha) is used for agricultural purposes,
speciﬁcally for crops and animal production, while 16 per cent is forested.
Currently, 1.6 per cent of Rwanda’s rural land mass is designated as ‘other
land’, and is neither used for agricultural purposes nor classiﬁed as a forested
area, but includes barren, built-up, andwooded land (World Bank 2012: 7). Since
ﬁrewood and charcoal usage record highest in the rural areas of Rwanda, ways
were sought to introduce agricultural rural communities to alternative clean
energy sources, with emphasis on biogas that runs on cow dung (FAO 2011).
As far as energy sources are concerned, biomass, including charcoal, dom-
inates other forms of energy in Rwanda. Down from 90–95 per cent in
previous years, it is estimated that approximately 85 per cent of Rwandans
depend on biomass for use in household cooking. The use of energy sources
such as liquid petroleum gas or kerosene is insigniﬁcant. Over the past
15 years, energy demand in Rwanda has grown at the same rate as population
growth, fast-paced urban expansion, and economic activities (FAO 2011). The
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increasing cost of petrol, low access to electricity, and the signiﬁcant growth of
industries have combined to place pressure on fuelwood as a reliable and
inexpensive source of energy for most households in Rwanda. In the rural and
urban areas, all but the wealthiest 5 per cent of households rely on ﬁrewood
and/or charcoal for household cooking. Wood is sometimes used directly as
fuel or converted into charcoal for use in cooking (FAO 2011). About 6 per
cent of households use crop residues and peat to cook with, especially in rural
areas (FAO 2011).
Annually, total fuelwood consumption in Rwanda is at 2.8 million tonnes,
while it is estimated that charcoal, when converted into wood usage, accounts
for up to 50 per cent of total wood-fuel consumption in the country (World
Bank 2012). In all, Rwanda loses up to 35 per cent of wood used in charcoal-
making due to the conversion process (GTZ 2009).
Economically, fuelwood usage is also costly for the average Rwandan
household. On average, households spend between 10–15 per cent of their
monthly incomes on purchasing fuelwood and charcoal (FAO 2011). In 1991,
the average consumption of fuelwood and charcoal in Rwanda was 0.33 kg per
person per day (World Bank 1991); by 2000, the ﬁgure had risen to 1.93 kg per
person per day, with an annual per capita consumption of more than 1m³ of
wood for the entire population (GTZ 2009). The increase is directly propor-
tional to growth in population. In 1991, Rwanda’s population stood at
7.1 million while in 2002, the ﬁgure was 8.1 (NISR 2016). Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) estimates that in Rwanda, woodfuel consumption is
estimated at 2.7 million t/year, out of which the urban capital accounts for an
annual charcoal consumption of 120,000 t, equivalent to 1.2 million m³ or
850,000 t of wood (FAO 2011). Rwanda’s Ministry of Natural Resources
projects that between 2009 and 2020, ‘the consumption of charcoal and
fuelwood in Kigali [Rwanda’s capital city alone] will increase from 0.99 to 1.4
million tons’ annually (GoR 2013: 18).
23.2.2 Domestic Energy Policy in Rwanda
The need to manage Rwanda’s biomass and fuelwood production and con-
sumption adequately has led to the formulation of policies and strategies, and
the establishment of speciﬁcally mandated government agencies. Rwanda’s
Energy Policy is based on three major documents: the National Energy Policy,
the National Energy Strategy for 2008–12, and the Biomass Energy Strategy
(BEST) from 2008 (Bedi, Pellegrini, and Tasciotti 2013). One major reason
for policy action on energy in Rwanda has been identiﬁed as ‘economic
growth, which in turn is seen as a prerequisite for tackling poverty’ (World
Bank 2012: 21). The National Energy Policy was drafted in 2008 as an update of
the 2004 Energy Policy statement. With particular concern to this study, the
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policy among others, aims to ‘set the National Energy Policy within Rwanda’s
long-term development plans and strategies’ and to focus on household energy
requirement in addition to gender issues arising from such (EUEI 2009b: 1).
The Ministry of Infrastructure (MININFRA) and the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Natural Resources (MINIRENA), developed the Biomass Energy
Strategy (BEST) in 2008–9. The BEST was designed to address four key areas:
(1) To sustainably increase fuelwood supply including the establishment of
new, and management of existing plantations, and the ‘professionaliza-
tion of the charcoal value-chain’ (EUEI 2009a).
(2) Improvement of energy use efﬁciency in Rwanda’s households through
the extension of all necessary support to manufacturers and importers
to produce innovative materials that conserve biomass.
(3) The promotion of alternatives to fuelwood, with particular emphasis on
peat, papyrus, and biogas.
(4) Development of institutional capacity within government agencies to
be in charge of biomass and energy within the short and medium terms
(EUEI 2009a).
Rwanda’s National Domestic Biogas Program (NDBP) was established in
2007 and was supported by development partners in Rwanda, speciﬁcally
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), and the German Aid
Organization known as GIZ. The objective of the project is to improve the
provision of biogas to meet the cooking and lighting needs of households that
own a minimum of two cows. Rwanda’s NDBP aims to install at least 15,000
biogas digesters in rural households, in addition to institutional digesters to be
installed in prisons and schools (SNV 2012). Since inception, NDBP has
installed domestic biogas in 4,600 households. NDBP is also involved in
training of masons, and the project has trained 555 masons in household
biogas constructions and maintenance, out of which 195 have registered
businesses; 52 masons have been trained in the mechanics of institutional
digesters construction and maintenance (REG 2014).
23 .3 GIRINKA AND DOMESTIC BIOGAS USE IN RWANDA
The decision of the government of Rwanda to promote biogas use in the
country is hinged on the rapid occurrence of deforestation and the availability
of cow dung across rural areas of Rwanda. The disappearance of Rwanda’s
forests, in addition to the change noticed in Rwanda’s climate because of
greenhouse gas emissions, prompted the government to explore other clean
energy alternatives (EUEI 2009b). Biogas was seen as a veritable alternative
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since it is a renewable fuel cooking solution and is environmentally friendly
(EUEI 2009b). Most important in the government’s decision to expand biogas
access in the country is that unlike at any other times in Rwanda’s history,
more and more Rwandans in rural areas are becoming owners of cattle. The
rise in cattle ownership in Rwanda is a result of a government poverty
reduction programme known as Girinka.
Girinka is a government poverty reduction strategy created exclusively for
rural communities in Rwanda in 2006. Girinka entails the gifting of a pregnant
dairy cow to selected poor and vulnerable households in rural communities by
the government. Historically, Rwanda’s culture, politics, and economy revolve
around cattle. Cattle ownership has played a determining role in the state of
Rwanda’s economy; indeed, the genocide of 1994 could, in the ﬁnal analysis,
be summarized as a class and economic warfare between the owners of cattle
and the non-owners (Mamdani 2001). Selection of beneﬁciaries for the Girinka
programme are left almost entirely in the hands of communities who are given
certain criteria from where eligible candidates are presented to the Rwanda
Agriculture Board, through the districts. The basic requirements being that a
person must be malnourished and destitute, but must be of good standing in
community (i.e., not an alcoholic, gambler, or lazy person). The proposed
recipient must also have a small patch of land where cattle shed can be built
since the programme operates a zero-grazing policy (Ezeanya 2014).
As a modern poverty alleviation strategy, Girinka can be traced back to the
ancient practice of richer, cattle owning Rwandans giving cows to their poorer
neighbours. Within the Rwandan culture, heads of cattle are usually extended
as goodwill gifts during such landmark events as births, deaths, and marriage,
while exchange of cattle between previously warring factions often signify a
successfully resolved conﬂict (Rwanda Governance Board 2013). Lifelong
friendships are consolidated through the exchange of cows, while no form of
recognition for service rendered to the state or a person is ever complete
without the gifting of a cow to the recognized individual (Rwanda Governance
Board 2013).
Rwanda’s Girinka programme is an indigenous knowledge-based poverty
alleviation strategy, which was widely accepted by rural Rwandans owing to
the cultural signiﬁcance of cattle. Girinka—which in its loose Kinyarwanda
translation means ‘may you own a cow’—was established to address the
challenges of entrenched malnutrition and extreme poverty, which plagued
several parts of rural Rwanda. The idea behind the exercise is that cows will
provide milk for starving households, while at the same time the sale from
excess milk production could be beneﬁcial in providing a means of income to
very low-income households, usually subsistence farmers (Rwanda
Agricultural Board 2013). Outside of the direct gift from government to
poor farmers, cattle recipients are also mandated to give the second female
offspring produced by the original dairy cow to another poor and vulnerable
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household within the community. Girinka has been supported by several
organizations and high net worth individuals in and outside of Rwanda,
thereby greatly reducing the burden of sustainability placed on the shoulders
of the government.
From the time of its establishment until early 2015, Girinka has bestowed
about 200,000 cows upon as many households. This is not inclusive of the
mandatory requirement on recipients to pass on the second female offspring
to another poor household in the community. The number of households that
have received cows because of the Girinka programme is signiﬁcant in a
country of a little less than 12 million.
Among the achievements of the Girinka programme is the reduction in
level of malnutrition among Rwandans in rural areas through increased milk
production and consumption (Ezeanya 2014). In fact, national production of
milk is recorded to have increased by 11.3 per cent during 2009–11, while beef
production increased by an estimated 10 per cent (IFAD 2012).
23.3.1 Biogas Use among the Rural Poor in Rwanda
When in 2007 the government of Rwanda established the NDBP, it was with
the intention of harnessing the reality of cattle ownership being a growing
phenomenon in rural Rwanda. In view of the establishment of the Girinka
programme in 2006, there were hopes that more and more villagers would
become cattle owners and be able to migrate away from fuelwood to using
biogas in meeting household energy needs. A decade after the establishment of
Girinka, several Girinka beneﬁciary households have started using biogas
(Kagabo 2014).
Using mostly structured and unstructured interviews, including focus
group discussions, the researchers sought to understand the reasons why
some Girinka beneﬁciary households have adopted biogas use while others
have not. The lead researcher also conducted interviews among policy makers
to determine the efforts of the state, and other supporting institutions, and
agencies in promoting the use of biogas across Rwanda.
A total of 130 households were interviewed drawn from three rural prov-
inces of Rwanda: the Northern, Eastern, and Southern provinces. Across the
three provinces, 59 Girinka beneﬁciary households that installed biogas and
71 Girinka beneﬁciary households that did not install biogas were surveyed.
Sample size was selected based on the estimated number of Girinka beneﬁ-
ciaries vis-à-vis those among them who are using biogas within each province,
and on the ease of accessibility of the researcher to biogas and non-biogas
users. An interview conducted with the director of the Girinka programme,
prior to going to the ﬁeld, was essential in identifying possible respondents,
since it was difﬁcult to establish actual numbers of Girinka beneﬁciaries who
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are also biogas users. This absence of ofﬁcial records is due to a lack of
coordination between the NDBP and the Rwanda Agriculture Board.
Respondents are household heads with mostly only primary education.
Average monthly income is about US$15, while the average number of
persons in a household is six. Ages of respondents across the provinces ranged
from 25 to 72, while average cow ownership stood at two per household.
Seventy per cent of those without biogas go to the forest to search for ﬁrewood,
dry leaves, and splints, while about 30 per cent have to buy ﬁrewood or
charcoal because of deforestation. A ﬁve-foot log of ﬁrewood costs about
US$7, while a 23 kg bag of charcoal costs approximately US$12.
All respondents attested to how the Girinka programme has assisted in
lifting them out of extreme poverty. Many could not afford one square meal
and lived off corn porridge, but since receiving a cow from the programme,
they have access to nourishing milk, and manure for their farms, leading to
increased crop production. Proﬁt from sale of excess milk has often been
invested in purchase of health insurance, school fees payment, home improve-
ments, agribusiness investment, starting small businesses, and so on. A few
beneﬁciaries had sick and unproductive cows, but some were able to get
replacements while others are still awaiting replacement.
23.3.2 Biogas Use among Girinka Beneﬁciaries
in Rwanda: An Analysis
Girinka beneﬁciaries who are biogas users noted numerous beneﬁts starting
with restoration of neighbourhood forests that were previously over-foraged
for ﬁrewood. The economic beneﬁt is in a reduction in money spent on buying
expensive ﬁrewood or charcoal. Although this might not be so in many rural
communities across Africa, deforestation has caused some parts of rural
Rwanda to become bare of bushes and forests where ﬁrewood can be foraged
forcing the rural poor in such areas to buy ﬁrewood for cooking. A 72-year-old
respondent who is not a biogas user notes the extent of deforestation within
his vicinity; when asked how he sources ﬁrewood for cooking said ‘I just pick
small splints and leaves. We no longer have a forest where to get ﬁrewood.’
Biogas also provides manure for the garden saving money on fertilizers and
boosting organic agriculture. This is because not all of the dung and urine
are converted to gas, and the residue can still be useful in providing nutrition
to plants.
Cooking with ﬁrewood and charcoal can take its toll on the health of
household members. Respondents who use biogas note that their health is
better since adopting biogas. This is mostly as a result of the prevention of
diseases resulting from smoke such as pulmonary heart disease, respiratory
disease, and so on. As a respondent from Eastern province said, ‘I was suffering
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from asthma when I was cooking with ﬁrewood, but since I migrated to
biogas, I am now OK’. In addition, cleanliness in the kitchen can be main-
tained more with biogas cookstoves than with ﬁrewood or charcoal, leading to
improved sanitary conditions. Biogas has also resulted in improved household
nutrition as users are able to cook more frequently; ﬁrewood and charcoal
take a lot of effort and time to light up. Safety wise, household ﬁre incidents
that usually occur with the use of ﬁrewood and charcoal can be prevented
with biogas.
Much of rural Rwanda is yet to be electriﬁed and biogas can provide light at
homes without electricity. With biogas, many beneﬁciaries are able to charge
their phones, iron their clothes, and carry out other such household activities
that require energy usage. Improved lighting provided by biogas lamps has led
to the availability of prolonged study time for children after sunset. With
biogas unlike ﬁrewood, cooking can be done at any time of the day and any
season in the year. With ﬁrewood, however, cooking can hardly be done at
night since kitchens are located outside of the main building, are usually
without electricity or security lock, and are not constructed to offer warmth
during cold seasons. Additionally, cooking with ﬁrewood during rainy season
can be a difﬁcult endeavour once wood becomes wet and difﬁcult to light, and
charcoal is very expensive.
Children and women have saved much time that was previously spent on
gathering ﬁrewood and on the cooking process, since biogas demands little
attention during cooking time, therefore users are able to multitask. Cooking
with biogas is cheaper and faster than any other method. Money and time
saved from buying ﬁrewood and charcoal, from gathering ﬁrewood, or lighting
charcoal can be invested in other more economically productive endeavours.
This is more so when account is taken of time spent on gathering ﬁrewood,
preparing ﬁre hearth, scrubbing soiled pots and pans, and cleaning the kitchen
are factored in. Using biogas is much simpler. As a respondent from the
Northern Province said, ‘even a child can use it because it is convenient’.
Despite the noted beneﬁts of biogas use, many rural households that wish to
use biogas are unable to do so. For many of these poor rural households, the
major reason for their inability to use biogas is the costs involved in its
installation. Further questioning around this revealed discrepancies in gov-
ernment of Rwanda’s ﬁnancial requirements regarding provision of biogas to
citizens across rural Rwanda. According to government sources, standard
practice is for households to contribute RWF100,000 (US$150) and for gov-
ernment to provide RWF300,000 (US$450). In the Eastern province, several
respondents concurred that that they had to pay RWF100,000 to government
before biogas plants could be installed. However, others interviewed noted
that their contribution was only RWF50,000. The stated amount is in addition
to RWF300,000 (US$450) provided by the government as subsidy in the form
of material and technical support. However, in parts of the Southern and
462 Social Inclusion
Northern provinces, communal biogas plants were provided completely free
of charge by government to clusters of families (ﬁve each). Some Girinka
beneﬁciaries in the Eastern province who do not use biogas voiced their
feelings of marginalization since, according to them, government provided
biogas completely free for some, and why not for them as well. Although the
general emphasis of the non-biogas users for not installing the plant is as a
result of lack of funds, it appears the perceived sense of double standards is
partly responsible for preventing some who can afford the co-pay not to have
the willingness to contribute towards installation.
Differences in subsidy extended to rural dwellers for biogas installation,
according to government sources, is linked to the provision of free biogas
installation to clusters of households selected from the poorest of the poor in
the rural areas who were previously living in forests and far-ﬂung areas.
Providing free collective biogas is part of the incentive for attracting isolated
dwellers to come together and live in villages, to make for easier provision of
infrastructure. Regarding those who have refused to contribute towards in-
stallation of biogas in their households, government sources are of the view
that many who can afford it are held back by a sense of entitlement. This is
more so since these Girinka beneﬁciaries received cows free from the govern-
ment and are very likely expecting to get biogas installed free. However, there
is the need for consistency in dealing with beneﬁciaries in terms of how much
subsidy to be paid to government for installation. The fact that some beneﬁ-
ciaries had their biogas plants installed entirely free of charge while others had
to pay a certain amount might have discouraged those who wish to adopt
biogas from making any ﬁnancial contribution as they are convinced that by
holding out a little longer, government will install biogas in their homes
entirely for free. Part of the challenge for government could be the free
installation extended to encourage forest dwellers or the plants used as pilots.
Such issues should be addressed to prevent perceptions of marginalization and
a passive resistance attitude towards co-payment for biogas installation by
other equally poor citizens.
Several Girinka beneﬁciaries who are not biogas users claim that they have
made payments to the agency in charge of biogas installation, but as of yet do
not have their biogas plants installed. This is in addition to several broken
down biogas plants, but for which nothing has been accomplished after
months of reporting the fault. Other challenges being faced by users of biogas
include difﬁculties and costs of getting technical support and spare parts in the
case of breakdown of biogas plants. Respondents note that they end up going
back to cooking with ﬁrewood or charcoal until such time when a technician
can be found and they can save money needed for spare parts purchase.
Additionally, some respondents complained that their plants were not well
installed and that it leaks gas. This is a dangerous situation as it can result in
household ﬁre incident. In response, government agencies note that the biogas
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project was stalled as a result of loss of interest on the part of donors who
previously funded the programme. At the beginning of the biogas project,
donors such as SNV and GIZ actively supported the government in setting up
biogas plants in parts of rural areas. However, as most donor funds are short
term and project based, the two donors did not continue to renew funding for
the project after the term expiration leaving the government to bear the full
burden of biogas installation and maintenance. Rwanda’s government is
dependent on donors for up to 40 per cent of its annual budget (World
Bank 2016a); when donors pull out of development projects, progress slows
down and such is the case with the biogas installation among the rural poor.
The government by itself is not without sufﬁcient funds to continue with the
programme, thereby affecting the expansion and sustainability of domestic
biogas among Rwanda’s rural poor. The result is shortage of materials,
equipment, and technicians to install and maintain biogas plants. At fewer
than 5,000 installed domestic biogas plants in Rwanda, the government is
presently short of the projected estimate of 15,000 installations (SNV 2012;
REG 2014).
However, despite the acute shortage of funds to continue with the pro-
gramme, the government has organized training of technicians with the help
of other donors not initially involved in the project. The former situation
where only one technician was assigned to a district is being changed. Three
technicians are currently being trained per district and two masons per sector.
There are plans to train several technicians in each district. In addition, the
previous method of a centralized biogas programme implementation is grad-
ually being reversed. Technicians, for instance, are being trained and are
working at the district level. When technicians are available, government is
convinced that other related issues such as unavailability of biogas plant spare-
parts will be taken care of, since the raw materials used in manufacturing
biogas plants are 100 per cent sourced from Rwanda. The problem of faulty
installations will also be solved by availability of technicians, as there is one-
year post-installation warranty on repairs. Donors are also assisting govern-
ment on a short-term basis to train trainers with trainees being biogas users
who are instructed to train others within their communities. Indeed, 5 per cent
of respondents in the Eastern province indicated that they travelled to
Kayonza district ofﬁce to be trained on the use of biogas. Others say they
were neither adequately trained nor briefed prior to installation of the plants.
However, there is no indication that information gained from these trainings
was passed on to their neighbours as many stated that there was no formal
training before they began to use biogas. Even prior to initiation installation,
there is need to enlighten Rwandans on the beneﬁts of biogas use since about
50 per cent of non-biogas using respondents did not understand the need for
biogas installation although they had heard that it is beneﬁcial. Efforts ought
to be invested into making Rwandans aware of the dangers of ﬁrewood use,
464 Social Inclusion
through widespread awareness campaigns. This will be useful in expanding
national biogas reach, through for instance; encouraging citizens who can
afford the full price for biogas installation to cooperate with the government in
its procurement.
In crafting pro-poor policies, it is important that government ﬁnds out what
the rural poor really need and what can work best in their environment. It is
important for local knowledge to act as the foundation to development
policies, this inside-out, rather than outside-in model has been developed
into many frameworks and approaches including the participatory develop-
ment model (Zewde 2010). Another approach known as Participatory Rural
Appraisal (PRA) is gaining acceptance within scholarly and development
circles, and refers to all methods that ‘emphasize local knowledge and enable
local people to make their own appraisal, analysis, and plans’ (World Bank
2016b: 1). Inability of government and donors to engage fully and actively,
rural communities in crafting pro-poor policies can result in several chal-
lenges. Under the biogas project such challenges include the fact that the
variant of biogas plants installed in rural Rwanda usually come with open
ditches to collect dung. Children in villages play around the compound and
are not always watched due to the very low crime rate and other cultural
factors. There are risks that a child can fall in the ditch and die, and in the
Eastern province, respondents noted that a child had fallen in a biogas ditch
and died. Government response to this is that the open ditch model is the
cheapest and most affordable variety for rural dwellers. There are safer
varieties that use covered tanks but that is not within budget. Part of the
biogas installation instruction is to locate ditches away from access areas and
to cover it with wood planks or other such materials to prevent accidents.
However, the possibility of poor rural dwellers to locate biogas open ditches
away from access areas is limited due to inadequate living spaces, the country’s
high population density makes land a coveted commodity across the country.
Other related challenges revolving around adequate consultations with the
rural poor include that biogas cannot be used to cook foods that take too long
to tenderize such as dry beans (a very affordable staple in rural Rwanda). The
daily portion of biogas in the plant does not usually carry the number of hours
needed to boil dry beans. Biogas plants need water for cleaning and for mixing
with dung in case of insufﬁcient urine. During dry season, there is usually
shortage of water in Rwanda and this requires the purchase of water tanks,
which could be too expensive for most rural farmers interviewed. Many
respondents have large families and have to use large pans to cook. However,
such pans cannot be used on the type of biogas cookstoves provided by the
government. According to a respondent from the Southern province, ‘yes,
I still use charcoal and ﬁrewood because I have a large family, because we
cannot use large pans on the small biogas stoves’. Response of the government
ofﬁcial interviewed is that the model being produced at this time can only
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accommodate smaller cook pans and that is what is available for distribution
to all users of biogas.
Further, the government’s efforts in providing clusters of households with
free biogas as an incentive to move them away from isolated forest living
appears well intentioned, but some questions needs to be addressed. It is
important for government to note that some of these communal owners of
biogas plants are dissatisﬁed with the situation, and perhaps if they were
properly consulted prior to installation might have a different perspective on
the issue. Some beneﬁciaries of communal cow sheds and biogas plants say it is
a disadvantage as they do not get enough dung and urine as a community,
while some say it is an advantage as it makes sure they do not lack dung and
urine. It depends on the availability of cows within each commune inter-
viewed. In addition, there were complaints about co-owners of biogas plants
reneging on agreed usage times, and stealthily using and ﬁnishing off biogas
during periods the plants were supposed to be shut down. These are issues to
be taken seriously in further expansion of plans by Rwanda’s government.
So while it would be beneﬁcial to strengthen biogas ‘cooperatives’ in order to
provide members who individually have few cows the opportunity to pool
resources and own biogas, the cooperatives must be structured in such a way
that there will be tight control over gas plant usage.
23 .4 IMPLICATIONS FOR A TRANSITION
TO A CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY
Exploring Rwanda’s experience with integrating clean energy use in national
poverty reduction strategies offers several implications for nations with a high
number of rural poor. First, the government of Rwanda’s dependence on
donor support for the success of the programme has brought about a situation
where progress is slow due to cutback in funding from donors. Nations
intending to integrate clean energy use may plan well ahead using sustainable
sources of funding such as domestic revenue mobilization or other more
reliable funding options. Donor funding, of course, could provide initial
start-up capital including the necessary publicity generation and the funding
of some pilot projects, but it is important that medium- to long-term planning
on biogas not depend on donors. There is a need to explore further the
possibility of public–private partnerships in the installation and maintenance
of biogas plants, but this should be done with the full consideration of the
economic situation of the rural poor.
Another case to consider seriously is the dependency syndrome, whereby
many rural poor interviewed who have yet to pay for biogas installation are
convinced that with the passage of time, government will change its mind on
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the co-pay requirement and extend biogas plants to them free of obligation.
Several reasons can be advanced for this belief, including previous experiences
with direct assistance from the government and lack of awareness creation on
the part of the government.
There is a need for coordination between the government agency in charge
of the concerned poverty reduction programme and the government agency in
charge of biodiversity. Although many Girinka beneﬁciaries have biogas
installed, there is no structure or platform in place to address speciﬁcally or
actively promote biogas use among Girinka beneﬁciaries. Beneﬁciaries are
lumped together among the poor rural dwellers in need of biogas. When
request was made for information regarding the number of beneﬁciaries
who use biogas, it was discovered that information was not available within
the government ofﬁce in charge of Girinka. In such settings, however, it will do
well for several reasons including promotion of biogas, ensuring compliance,
and monitoring progress, for a clearly designated platform of coordination
between poverty alleviation strategies that have incorporated clean energy use.
There is a need to make biogas installation grassroots-driven. From 2007
until 2014, the promotion of domestic biogas use was championed mainly by
the central government. The provincial and district governments, both of
which are closest to the rural poor, were not active in the drive to increase
biogas usage among that segment of the population. However, by 2015, this
situation was gradually being reversed. There is a need, therefore, for central
government, from the onset, to generate and maintain the support of the
lowest tier government and if possible, ensure it plays a major role in inte-
grating clean energy use in national poverty alleviation strategies.
23 .5 CONCLUSION
Governments around the world in search of strategies to reduce poverty
within their borders must of necessity, consider the integration of clean energy
in such policy action. Clean cooking is an ‘energy issue, a health issue, an
environmental issue, a women’s empowerment issue, and in many countries—
a social and cultural issue’ (Calvin and Venkataramanan 2015: 1). The search
for policies that represent a nexus between poverty reduction and environ-
mental preservation should collaborate with the masses; it should be fashioned
within existing cultural, social, and economic realities of the poor. Rwanda,
through the Girinka programme, has tried to leverage the cultural acceptance
and prestige attached to cattle rearing to integrate biogas in household energy
use of the rural poor, thereby reducing dependence on ﬁrewood and charcoal.
Through the NDBP, the government is encouraging Girinka beneﬁciaries to
install domestic biogas plants that would use cow dung and urine to generate
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methane for cooking and lighting. Biogas is much cheaper, easier, convenient,
and better for the user and the environment to use than ﬁrewood or charcoal.
While some beneﬁciaries have opted to install biogas and report an appre-
ciable level of satisfaction, many have yet to install biogas plants due to several
reasons. Mostly ﬁnancing, and perhaps an additional feeling of entitlement, is
at the centre of why many Girinka beneﬁciaries in rural Rwanda have yet to
install biogas. On the side of the government, a dependency on donor funding
has crippled the progress and slowed down the drive towards extensive
coverage of rural communities with domestic biogas plants. Inconsistencies
in government policies regarding funding of biogas plants also appears to be
sending the wrong signal to the rural poor, leading to a cautious response to
government’s call for co-pay prior to installation.
For developing countries wanting to expand the rural poor’s access to clean
energy use, there is a need to be careful about a dependence on donor funds
from the policy-making process down to implementation. The need for strong
political will on the part of the government is necessary, in addition to a
harmonization of policies regarding provision of biogas plants. Decentraliza-
tion and appropriate communication of the entire process will be helpful in
ensuring grassroots ownership and more widespread coverage.
The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals approved in September 2015
and in place for the next 15 years has clearly indicated the need for national
development agendas to be inclusive of eradication of extreme poverty, pro-
motion of inclusive economic growth, and environmental protection. The
three stated goals will be easier to reach by the year 2030 if concerted efforts
are made by governments to integrate clean energy use in national poverty
reduction strategies.
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Renewable Energy in the Brazilian Amazon
The Drivers of Political Economy and Climate
Sabrina McCormick
24.1 INTRODUCTION
Brazil has long been a nation leading the usage of renewable energy. Historically,
hydroelectricity has been the central energy source (Bermann 2007), and more
recently, biomass has developed. While energy resources have long existed
outside of the legal Brazilian Amazon, both types of energy development have
recently increased within that region (da Silva Soito and Freitas 2011). Yet,
expansion of energy development there threatens the rainforest with potentially
tremendous ramiﬁcations for Amazonian sustainability and climate change
(Schaeffer et al. 2013). The expansion of these energy types also affects local
populations who are actively attempting to shape energy development. The
political economy of energy including local community-level social actors,
Brazilian private sector investors, Brazilian government agencies, and inter-
national private sector interests intersect to affect this relatively new trajectory
of renewable energy. These social actors differentially consider and are differ-
entially affected by climate change in that region, with some taking current risks
and future projections into account and others discounting these effects.
While technical factors are important in decisions regarding renewable
Amazonian-based energy development, political economic factors are possibly
even more inﬂuential. Past research has shown that, in the other areas of Brazil
and the world, political economic factors are often bigger drivers of energy
decision-making than are considerations of economic viability or environ-
mental sustainability (Hochstetler 2011). Current research has only minimally
investigated this topic in regards to energy development in the Amazon.
This research investigates how political economy affects the growth of renewable
energy in the Brazilian Amazon, and the relationship of this energy development
to climate change. In this case, political economy is characterized by: 1) the needs
and agenda of local communities, 2) economic interests and politics at the
national level, and 3) international social actors and ﬁnancial interests. This
chapter seeks to make unique contributions to the literature on the political
economy of renewable energy transitions by including a multi-scalar approach
to considering political economic factors, such as considering the perspectives
of local and state actors, and by considering the role of climate change, both in
terms of how energy development may contribute to it and how climate change
may affect renewable energy potential. This is similar to the approach by Tanner
and Allouche (2011) who see the intersection of development and climate
change across scales, but distinct in focus on political economy. Several bodies
of research have previously considered the socioeconomic needs of local Ama-
zonian communities, of the Brazilian state, and the effects of climate change on
renewable energy, but few previous analyses have looked at the political econ-
omy of renewable energy in theAmazon through a lens that includes them. In so
doing, this research seeks to create a comprehensive understanding of how
renewable energy in the Amazon may be sustainable from the perspective of
diverse social actors and over an extended period of time, such as that in which
climate change effects will be felt.
This research focuses on biomass and hydroelectricity since these are the
only two forms of renewable energy being developed in the Amazon. Since
hydrological planning is expanding more rapidly, this research focuses on
large hydroelectric dams in the Brazilian Amazon and on the case of Belo
Monte dam, in particular. Belo Monte has recently been constructed after
almost thirty years of planning, local contestation, and renegotiated planning.
Understanding the political economic drivers of decision-making in the
Brazilian Amazon is critical since the forest is increasingly vulnerable to
destruction and related increased poverty. While renewable energy develop-
ment, and more speciﬁcally hydroelectricity, which is the largest area of focus,
may increase temporary opportunities for economic development and
employment, it is also likely to increase the destruction of rainforest, driving
massive in-migration by workers and supporting populations, as well as
ﬂooding forest, disrupting livelihoods, and altering ecosystems for decades.
By examining the political economy of renewable energy in the Amazon rather
than the ecological or economic viability alone, this research seeks to identify
how sustainability is being considered in its broadest sense. In other words,
this research seeks to answer questions regarding how the current trajectory of
renewable energy development in the Amazon can consider long-term
impacts it may have on climate change, the effects climate change may have
on it, and the effects these developments have on local populations.
This chapter is based on interviews with experts, non-governmental leaders,
community members affected by energy development, and governmental rep-
resentatives working in the area of renewable energy and deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon. Twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted
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with these actors from summer 2015 through winter 2016. Interviews were
recorded or extensive notes were taken. Themes were identiﬁed across inter-
views. Data in this chapter are also drawn from extensive research of govern-
ment documents and media coverage, when necessary. For example, evidence
regarding corruption in the energy sector is largely only available through
investigative reporting, and so was drawn from such media venues.
The ﬁndings of this research promise the following conclusions relevant to
policy makers. First, it will articulate the big picture of how political economy
affects energy development in the Amazon. Second, this research will offer a
coherent understanding of how energy development in the Amazon accounts
for local populations. It, therefore, provides a cohesive picture of how poverty
alleviation and sustainability can best be implemented in congruence with their
needs. Third, ﬁndings clarify the degree to which diverse social actors consider
climate change. As such, it will point to speciﬁc policies that can better account
for climate factors, improving the actualization of real energy potential in the
face of climate change. Without such an analysis, it is possible that planners will
fail to reach this potential, thus undermining Brazilian economic development
and possibly repeating the energy crisis that occurred in 2001.
This research was conducted at a particularly historic moment wherein the
country is in transition. While Brazil has been seen as a transitional nation for
many decades, the current transition is a relatively new one. This transition is
from a model of deforestation that is driven largely by private landholders in
the region, to one that accommodates large-scale government energy and
infrastructure projects. This moment is one in which a new model of both
forest protection and energy development must be made if the Amazon is to
be protected. By documenting this moment and exploring the dilemmas
therein, this research seeks to demonstrate how unexamined social costs of
Amazonian energy generation may undo recent widely-publicized decreases
in deforestation, consequently having negative impacts on climate change.
I argue that only through addressing these unexamined, and sometimes
illegally affected, social costs, can deforestation rates remain relatively consist-
ent or decrease. As such, this analysis offers a warning against the advance-
ment of energy infrastructure in the Amazon without serious consideration of
concomitant measures to reduce deforestation and social impacts.
24 .2 BACKGROUND
24.2.1 Energy Development in the Amazon
Brazil’s energy mix encompasses 82 per cent hydroelectricity, followed by
7 per cent biomass, 5 per cent natural gas, 3 per cent nuclear, 2 per cent
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petroleum, and 1 per cent coal. While this energy mix is shifting due to
urbanization, international trade, and climate conditions, the long-term
dependence on hydroelectricity and the growing usage of biomass make
these two forms of energy some of the most important to understand.
Brazil has long been dependent on hydroelectricity for the majority of its
energy supply. The country has the third largest installed hydroelectric cap-
acity in the world and sees the Amazon as the hydroelectric frontier (da Silva
Soito and Freitas 2011). Planning for power generation is therefore generally
based on hydroelectric capacity. However, in the past four to ﬁve years,
hydroelectricity has generated less energy than projected resulting in difﬁcul-
ties in supplying the base load for the economy and also meeting increasing
economic growth. As a result, several other forms of energy have advanced in
the country, including oil, natural gas, and several other types of renewable
energy, particularly solar and wind. Biomass has also grown to 7 per cent of all
energy resources resulting in the Amazonian energy mix being focused in
these two areas—see McCormick (2016: ﬁgure.1). Installations planned in the
next eight years will be predominately large dams, small dams, and biomass, in
that order of investment. Two areas of petroleum extraction have been
developed already. Several ethanol plants will be developed in the north and
eastern part of the region. While hydroelectricity is planned across the region,
biomass is planned largely for the frontier region in the southern Amazon and
one installation in the northern Amazon. The exact number of installations
planned is a point of disagreement amongst experts and ofﬁcials. Figure 1 in
McCormick (2016), which is translated from the national energy plan for
2024, or the most recent documentation of energy planning, reﬂects the
planning of ﬁve new large dams. However, some other studies have argued
that there are up to thirty new dams being planned.
Since the installation of the democratic government, only one large dam
complex has been completed in the Amazon. The Rio Madeira Dam complex,
constituted by the Santo Antonio and Jirau Dams, are being built in the
western Amazon. The dams have an expected 3,150 MW installed capacity
that will be consumed in the northern and southern regions of the country.
They have had multiple negative localized consequences, such as displacing
local indigenous people, threatening the migration of ﬁsh populations, and
destroying the habitats for multiple species. Most importantly, however, the
dam complex reservoirs are meant to be a part of a series of waterways
facilitating the export of soy grown in the region (Fearnside 2014). The dam
complex began commercial production in 2012, but the second of the two,
Santo Antonio, is not yet complete. The second large dam that has been
proposed since the 1980s and recently has neared completion is the Belo
Monte Dam near Altamira in the western Amazon. Belo Monte will be the
third largest dam in the world. It is the most controversial dam project in the
history of Brazil and has resulted in numerous violations of human rights laws.
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The second largest source of energy in Brazil is biomass. While biomass can
be developed in many parts of the country, depending on the type, biomass
development in the Amazon has traditionally come from the centre-west
region and the north, focused on large-scale conversion of pasture and/or
rainforest to crops of carbohydrates, such as sugar cane, soy, and palm. It has
grown as an area of investment in recent years with promising future growth
(Lora and Andrade 2009). There are several major forms of biomass: sugar-
cane, soy, switchgrass, and wood. While 61 per cent of Brazil’s land is forest,
1 per cent is used for sugarcane, 0.8 per cent is manually forested, and
3.25 per cent is used for soy bean planting (Colodette et al. 2014). Recently,
sugar cane has been one of the forms resulting in approximately 30 million
tons of sugar and 20 million tons of ethanol annually (Grifﬁn and Scandifﬁo
2009). Wood production for charcoal, ﬁrewood, wood chips, and soy (Walter,
Dolzan, and Piacente 2006) has been based around several types of trees, such
as eucalyptus and acacia, that can be produced across the country. The
development of soy (along with cattle ranching) has been cited as a primary
driver of deforestation (Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Other forms of biomass have
been found to drive deforestation, although some of these resources can be
developed in locations outside of both the legal Amazon and the frontier area,
resulting in less deforestation risk.
24.2.2 Energy Development in the Context of Climate Change
Climate change is likely to affect how successful energy development is in the
Brazilian region (de Lucena et al. 2009). Droughts in the past decade have been
the worst in history, reﬂecting the effects of climate on forest health (Marengo
et al. 2011). The Amazon is an important climate resource as it represents a
carbon sink and its destruction could contribute signiﬁcantly to climate
change. The viability of local populations hangs in the balance, as they are
affected both by climate change impacts and energy development. Therefore,
the Brazilian government and global environmental community currently
must identify how to protect the Brazilian Amazon and its local populations
while also supporting the expansion of clean energy.
Climate change presents two challenges to energy development in the
Amazon. First, energy resources could be taxed or reduced due to a changing
climate. Second, the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions could
affect energy choices. A central mechanism for the release of GHGs in the
Amazon is deforestation. In 2009, Brazil committed to a 36–38 per cent
reduction in GHG emissions by 2020, which included a reduction in defor-
estation by 80 per cent in the legal Amazon. Therefore, energy development
should be sensitive to the way it affects deforestation, but may not always be.
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Energy development in the Amazon could be plagued by a variety of
challenges. Biomass development could be threatened by changes in rainfall
that, in turn, affect the growth of such resources. In addition, climate change
can reduce the availability of land necessary to grow biofuels and could shift
the distribution of insects that affect their growth, in addition to a wide
variety of other factors that could negatively affect biomass (de Lucena et al.
2009). This is unfortunate since biomass can be a critical source of energy
for the poorest local populations who depend on its burning for cooking
and livelihoods. Forest die-back may occur in the frontier region of the
Amazon as biomass is developed, reducing the availability of biomass and
further driving migration into the forest as the search for viable land to
develop continues.
Hydropower resources will likely be taxed by changes in seasonal water
availability, drought, dry spells, and changes in air temperature that increase
evaporation from reservoirs (de Lucena et al. 2013). Increasingly severe
droughts in the Amazon are likely to affect the viability of existing and
planned dams, especially if deforestation continues and impacts microclimates
driving precipitation patterns.
There are several critical impacts that energy development in the Amazon
may have on rainforest resources, possibly demonstrating that they are less
sustainable than generally considered for renewable energy resources. Defor-
estation is not a factor traditionally accounted for in environmental impact
assessments (EIAs) that preface the construction of energy installations.
However, large infrastructure projects in the Amazon often have unintended
and largely unmeasured effects on deforestation. Infrastructure development,
such as that for energy and transportation, in the Amazon may present a
newly inﬂuential factor driving deforestation rates to increase in the Amazon
(Southworth et al. 2011; Malingreau, Eva, and De Miranda 2012).
Recent studies of biomass development have demonstrated a clear connec-
tion between the planting of new crops to provide lesser-known biomass
resources and deforestation (Fearnside et al. 2009). This is a less-known
issue in the case of large dams, although a few studies have demonstrated
the effects of such installations on deforestation. There are several drivers for
this phenomenon. First, large dams require tens of thousands of employees
during the construction period. These workers often migrate from other areas
to the work site. In addition to individuals who work on the dam itself,
populations whose occupations support the workers generally appear in the
surrounding area. These include, but are not limited to, physicians, sex
workers, farmers, and restaurateurs. After the dam project is complete, its
workers and these additional populations often stay in the area, next devel-
oping new roads and housing to accommodate their permanence. They, in
turn, increase deforestation. In the case of Santo Antonio and Jirau in the
western Amazon, unexamined and unintended environmental and social
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impacts included the expansion of soy production amongst other long-term
consequences of development (Fearnside 2014).
In this way, infrastructure and migration patterns into the Amazon are
major determinants of deforestation and sustainability. In particular, migra-
tion into the Amazon can expand deforestation. Since some cities are already
established in the Amazon, some deforestation can be expected as it comes
from cities within the Amazon into adjacent areas. This migration is driven by
economic need and or familial networks (Randell and VanWey 2014). Many
who occupy the Amazon and could move to urban areas, therefore taxing the
Amazon less, choose to stay outside of urban areas because their skills are not
suited to the urban environment, but rather to rural activities (Macdonald and
Winklerprins 2014).
Deforestation rates have been decreasing in the Amazon for the past
decade with some slight variation over time. These rates have been widely
touted as a success and many believe will remain fairly static now that there
is a well-established surveillance system in place. However, infrastructure
development there may change this recent trend. There are large-scale plans
to develop many forms of infrastructure in the Amazon (Fearnside 2002).
Research has demonstrated that the development of such infrastructure will
lead to vastly increased deforestation rates due to ‘contagious deforestation’
wherein one small area of deforestation leads to more deforestation nearby
(Laurance et al. 2002). The development of roads is a well-known mechan-
ism for increases in deforestation, yet there is little analysis of how these
long-term infrastructure projects may affect deforestation (Barni, Fearnside,
and de Alencastro Graça 2015).
Some research has shown that infrastructure development, such as increases
in electriﬁcation, can decrease deforestation rates because it increases product-
ivity (Assunção et al. 2015). However, cost–beneﬁt analyses of large infrastruc-
ture in the Amazon is often insufﬁcient or mischaracterized. For example, the
economic value of the Belo Monte dam would change from US$1.62 billion to
negative US$3.56 billion if the estimation of water ﬂow were conducted
correctly (Amend, Fleck, and Reid 2013).
24 .3 DATA AND METHODS
This research is based on a broad-scale literature review, qualitative interviews
with ofﬁcials, local communities, and experts, and ethnographic observations
of local communities in the State of Para. The literature review encompassed
the ﬁelds of climate science, social sciences, energy studies, and sustainability
science in order to capture the multiple, intersecting factors affecting
the political economy of energy development. Twenty-nine interviews were
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conducted in person, over the phone, or on Skype from summer 2015 through
winter 2016. Interviews were either taped and transcribed, or in-depth notes
were taken, depending on the comfort of the interviewee. Interview subjects
were selected through a snowball sample approach, starting with experts,
ofﬁcials, and local non-governmental organization representatives who work
on related issues. Ethnographic observations were made of local communities
and their interactions with state representatives in the State of Para near the
site of the Belo Monte dam. This included the observation of a licensing
hearing for the dam, local protests, and newly constructed resettlement com-
munities in the City of Altamira.
24 .4 POLITICAL ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF
AMAZONIAN RENEWABLE ENERGY
Energy expansion and related infrastructure development in the Amazon is
driven by the political economy of energy in Brazil and internationally. There
are several key perspectives that shape the political economy of energy devel-
opment in the Amazon. They include: the local communities and social
movement organizations that represent them, Brazilian government agencies
on the local and federal levels, Brazilian ﬁnancial interests that are sometimes
represented by government agencies but also include private interests, and
international entities such as lenders and governments. These diverse social
actors both conﬂict and align with one another to shape the political economy
and its outcome in the Amazon. Section 24.4.1 outlines the role and effects of
each factor in the political economy of renewable energy in the Amazon.
24.4.1 Local Socioeconomic Development: Communities
and Social Movement Organizations
The Amazon is an incredibly diverse region composed of over 200 indigenous
groups, people of Portuguese descent and of African descent. Energy devel-
opment is often characterized by conﬂicts with local communities. This is
especially true in Brazil where the long history of dam building has encom-
passed conﬂict with communities and social movements in sites across the
country (Cummings 2013). The shifting landscape of biomass is also affecting
socioeconomic development locally. Both forms of energy development often
involve the in-migration of larger economic investors and resources, which
have effects on local populations.
Biomass facilities are often characterized by the displacement of small-scale
landholders and the concentration of land tenures often involvingmechanization
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(Tanner and Allouche 2011). Jobs for sugar workers are low-paying and involve
difﬁcult working conditions. In order to protect the forest, conservation tech-
niques have been implemented and localized management strategies have been
employed (Naughton-Treves, Holland, and Brandon 2005). The Bolsa Floresta
programme, a programme in the State of Amazonas, supports the conservation of
forests with a targeted approach to engaging forest communities in resource
management, such as through payment for ecosystem services. Evaluations of
this programme have had mixed results, and few have paid attention explicitly to
biomass development in the context of forests.
Conﬂict with local communities regarding damdevelopment is largely driven
by displacement of local populations and community fragmentation (Windsor
and McVey 2005). Hydroelectric dams have displaced over one million people
in Brazil. They are controversial since many populations have not been reset-
tled, and those who have been resettled by the state often live in conditions of
greater poverty than before they were moved (de Araujo 1990). Displacement is
very common, which results in impacts on living patterns and kinship systems
(Tilt, Braun, and He 2009). Job capacity often actually decreases as mechaniza-
tion related to dam building takes the place of more labour-intensive industries.
Another human impact of dam construction is increased illness in directly
affected and adjacent communities. Often, infant mortality rises, malaria and
other illnesses increase at the local level (Lerer and Scudder 1999). Some of
these problems are caused by the fragmentation of community and home and
decreased access to proper nutrition, among other social determinants. Others
are related directly to environmental degradation, such as standing water,
causing proliferation of mosquitoes that cause malaria. For example, at Serra
da Mesa dam in Goias, schistosomiasis increased dramatically because of dam
construction (Thiengo, Santos, and Fernandez 2005). Mercury is also released
into the food chain through reservoir leaching.
Since these conﬂicts have generally occurred in tandem with development
of speciﬁc projects and most large dams in the country are in regions outside
of the Amazon, less conﬂict has occurred in this region than elsewhere. Local
communities are often divided over dam development, with some community
members in favour of dam building, anticipating positive effects on the local
economy. This is generally true of local political leaders whose governments
receive an annual portion of the proﬁts of such energy installations. Local
communities affected by ﬂooding or drying of river resources often protest
against dam building. This activity is reﬂected in a long history of the anti-dam
movement in Brazil that began in the south of the country in the 1970s and has
spread throughout the nation where dams are built (McCormick 2009). The
Movement for Dam-Affected People has often led this movement while
collaborating with local organizations. In the Amazon, this has included
organizations such as the Indigenous Missionary Counsel, the Xingu Lives,
and the Socio-Environmental Institute.
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In the Amazon, local communities that oppose dam construction and the
organizations that represent them are often focused on protecting the rights
and livelihoods in the area. These dynamics have occurred in several Ama-
zonian cases, especially in two built since the abandonment of the military
government. The ﬁrst was the Rio Madeira complex, whose impacts were close
to the city of Porto Velho. Two companies, FURNAS and Odebrecht, led the
development of these dams with support from the newly elected President
Inacio Lula da Silva. Viability studies for the Rio Madeira dams began around
the same time that the second model of Belo Monte was being developed in
2001 and 2002. When Belo Monte was again defeated in 2003, the Ministry of
Mines and Energy proposed a new focus on Rio Madeira rather than Belo
Monte. However, populations in the area around Porto Velho, the main town
that would be affected, were divided in their support for the dam complex. A
number of local organizations protested its construction citing law 10257/01,
which guarantees that indigenous communities impacted by development
projects will have access to information about it and ability to engage in
discussion regarding its planning, but they were defeated.
The Belo Monte dam was ﬁrst proposed and defeated in 1989 after a massive
local protest supported by international organizations and celebrities. In the
following 25 years, a variety of models of the Belo Monte dam were proposed,
discussed, and rejected. In 2005, it was proposed and it received the ﬁrst licence.
A variety of national and local organizations contested Belo Monte, siting its
environmental impacts and the potential it had to illegally displace indigenous
communities. MDTXworked in partnership with ForumCarajas, Living Rivers,
and the Catholic Church, protesting its construction. The Federal Prosecutor
supported these organizations by launching over a dozen lawsuits against the
dam. Even after the second licence of the necessary three was granted in 2011,
protests continued, including violent occupation of the dam site. As of January
2016, the third operating licence for the damhas been suspended due to the lack
of address for impacts on indigenous communities.
Local communities have some inﬂuence on the renewable energy portfolio
in the Amazon both through vocal opposition to speciﬁc projects and through
their ofﬁcial inclusion in national programmes for inclusion. However, their
increased participation could both bolster their socioeconomic development
and improve outcomes of projects through the use of their localized under-
standing of environment and land use.
24.4.2 Brazilian Governmental and Private Interests
Energy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon is meant to match the growing
economy and ﬁll the shortfall of energy generation, in part due to drought
conditions reducing the viability of hydroelectricity generation since 2010.
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Negative trade balances also drove the further expansion of hydroelectricity
and biomass development, especially as a replacement for other oil derivatives
in the case of the latter (Grifﬁn and Scandifﬁo 2009). Renewable energy in the
Amazon is also driven by the need for continued economic development in
the south to which energy in the Amazon is transmitted, and for electro-
intensive industries in the Amazon, such as mineral extraction (Fearnside and
Figueiredo 2015).
Biomass has been an important form of energy crops especially in light of
addressing climate change and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Sugar cane has been a central crop in the production of ethanol both for
domestic consumption and export to advance the Brazilian agricultural sector.
Due to the increasing efﬁciency of the agricultural sector and especially cattle
ranching, sugar cane production has massive potential for expansion in Brazil
without interfering with other food resources, which is driving increased
national investment (Pimentel and Patzek 2008). Subsidized development of
biomass development has been focused on the Amazon and the cerrado (bor-
dering the southwest of the legal Amazon) with a portion of these developments
planned as community managed (Walter, Dolzan, and Piacente 2006). National
programmes have been developed to support research and development in
biomass across the country.
The northern region of Brazil, dominated byAmazonian rainforest, currently
has the most hydrological potential and is characterized by the greatest risk
(Tundisi et al. 2014). Large dams have clearly caused long-term adverse impacts
on biodiversity in the Amazon (Benchimol and Peres 2015). Some legally
protected areas presentmajor impediments to dam building. This is particularly
true of indigenous lands whose inundation requires approval by the indigenous
group living there. Drought conditions in other parts of the country also make
this a particularly important region for development. Renewable energy is
expanding throughout the country; however, the history of dam building in
the country makes this form of renewable energy one of the more appealing
approaches to supporting an expanding economy. Existing infrastructure for
dam construction and relationships between political representatives and dam
builders means that hydroelectricity may be prioritized over other forms.
While the hydrological resources in the Amazon have also played a role in
attracting investors, the instability of precipitation patterns and the social
conﬂict surrounding these projects has shifted who is willing to invest. For
example, when the state-run public–private partnership for northern Brazil,
Norte Energia, won the bid to build the Belo Monte dam, it was constituted by
a group of medium-sized production companies including Bertin, Queiroz
Galvão, J. Malucelli, Cetenco, Galvão Engenharia, Mendes Junior, and Serveng
in collaboration with state-led CHESF (the Hydroelectric Company of San
Francisco). Since then, it has evolved into an association between the Brazilian
government and pension funds. Today, the central Brazilian bank, the BNDES
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(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social), has provided the
biggest ﬁnancial support for the project.
Government leaders have supported the expansion of large dams in the
Amazon, including the recent President Lula and the current President Dilma
Roussef, who was previously the Minister of Mines and Energy. Both of these
presidents campaigned on platforms that included the completion of the Belo
Monte dam. Traditionally, billions of dollars have been lent to the Brazilian
government by external sources; however, Belo Monte is funded largely by a
US$10.8 billion loan from the BNDES (Reuters 2012). Investors like Vale, the
second largest iron-ore producer in the world, have supported the project
(Leahy 2011).
Recently, the role of corruption in their platforms and political economy of
energy generation has gained attention. Corruption in the Brazilian govern-
ment has inﬂuenced the construction of infrastructure and energy projects.
The former director of the Brazilian oil company, Petrobras, was arrested and
convicted for corruption in dam construction. A consortium of Brazilian
companies that won the bid to build the Belo Monte dam complex, such as
Odebrecht, and Andrade Gutierrez were discovered to have given around
US$6 million in bribes to local ofﬁcials in order to gain the contracts to
build the dam. A former president of Camargo Correa admitted that his
company gave millions of dollars to political parties in order to gain 15 per
cent of the Belo Monte construction contract (R7 Noticias 2015). These
examples have recently revealed the ways in which large private companies
are able to inﬂuence the planning of dams and energy infrastructure through
bribes to public ofﬁcials.
24.4.3 International Actors and Financial Interests
The political economy of Brazil’s energy development is embedded within
international markets and ﬁnancial interests that drive and inhibit particular
pathways of energy development. On this global scale, there are three inter-
related types of inﬂuence: international companies and investors that invest in
or gain contracts for the construction of energy installations, international
demand for forms of energy, and growing international needs to meet agree-
ments made in the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). International actors that affect renewable energy development in
Brazil include investors and ﬁnanciers. This landscape of these social actors
has been shifting. For example, although all private international investors
originally interested in Belo Monte dam removed their involvement, some
companies were paid for their role in construction. The French construction
company, Alstrom, was paid over US$500 million to provide equipment and
turbines for Belo Monte. The Chinese play a critical role in Amazonian
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development in that 82.3 per cent of their foreign direct investment (FDI) was
allocated to extractive industries in 2012 (Fearnside and Figueiredo 2015) and
7 per cent of Brazil’s FDI was from China between 2005 and 2013. China has
invested in renewable energy and related infrastructure development. While
China does not have formal decision-making power regarding these measures,
other than through the indirect governance framework regarding climate
change of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the availability of its resources to advance speciﬁc projects in
which the country has interests may also catalyse the development of dams,
canals, railways, and other transportation infrastructure. China is the largest
importer of Brazilian soy, whose export can be made more economically
efﬁcient by these developments.
Domestic and global policy frameworks inﬂuence decisions made by inter-
national investors. Global interest in reducing the effects of climate change
have included increased commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and policies
therein. As nations around the world attempt to decrease their emissions,
demand for ethanol has increased, subsequently increasing its development in
Brazil. The United States and India are the biggest importers of ethanol from
Brazil. The UNFCCC has provided the international platform for Brazil to
commit to a particular approach to the reduction of GHGs, or more speciﬁc-
ally, to the commitment of reducing deforestation rather than shifting the
energy matrix. The CDM has given Brazil credit for the construction of large
dams despite the lack of estimation regarding their impacts (Fearnside 2013).
The cases of new large dams already constructed in the Amazon demonstrate
that the CDM facilitates the false impression of GHG reductions, when it may
actually be increasing them due to methane emissions and other unintended
impacts (Fearnside 2015).
24 .5 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CLEAN
ENERGY TRANSITION
This research has taken a trans-scalar approach to the political economy of
renewable energy development in the Brazilian Amazon to demonstrate how it
interrelates with local and global actors across scales and sits within the
context of global markets and investors. By using this approach, it is possible
to see how the needs of local, statal, and transnational actors are often in
competition with one another, and the ways in which unresolved conﬂicts can
decrease the quality of planning. Most centrally, local actors often stake claims
that they lose livelihoods, land, and community cohesion due to energy
development, often demonstrating the lack of sustainability in energy sources
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generally called renewable. State and international actors are more driven by
market forces that can adversely affect the sustainability of Amazonian
resources. While issues of deforestation, sustainability, climate change, and
energy are incredibly complex in the Brazilian Amazon, this conceptualization
of the political economy begins to highlight how the alignment of interests
therein could improve long-term outcomes for both energy development and
Amazonian preservation.
This research offers three implications for the expansion and improved
implementation of clean energy in the Brazilian Amazon. First, any energy
planning for the Amazon should take a more comprehensive approach to
assessing environmental and social impacts than current planning methods
do. This would include impacts outside of the project itself, such as the
surrounding area, and the long-term consequences of each project. This is
critical both to the preservation of the rainforest and to the sustainability of
livelihoods and culture in the region. Without this, it will be impossible for the
advancement of clean energy to take place that considers the needs of local
populations who live and work adjacent to such facilities.
Second, renewable energy development in the Amazon must consider the
role of climate change, both in terms of how it may affect hydrological
resources and energy potential, and how it may affect the needs of local
populations. Amazonian energy development has largely ignored both the
needs of local populations and climate projections. However, the latter prom-
ises to reduce economic viability of renewable energy in the Amazon. Assessing
the needs and legal rights of local populations is critical to advancing sustain-
ability in the region. These populations are generally not the recipients of
energy generated locally, and may, instead, face negative ramiﬁcations of
infrastructure development, such as lack of access to water and displacement.
Finally, in the international sphere, Brazil needs to expand its presentation
of national impacts on climate change by including the real potential changing
deforestation rates that accompany infrastructure development, and the chan-
ging energy mix. This presentation should include both the increasing
dependence on fossil fuels and, possibly even more critically, present and
future methane emissions from hydroelectric dams in the Amazon.
A consideration of these three factors would help support the adoption of
renewable energy in Brazil that is truly sustainable for the people of the
Amazonian region and for the global community which is indirectly affected
by the changes in that region through climate change.
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The Political Economy of Household
Thermal Energy Choices in
Developing Countries
Comparing the LPG Sectors in Indonesia
and South Africa
Wikus Kruger, Louise Tait, and Jiska de Groot
25.1 INTRODUCTION
The central role of energy in human and economic development is widely
recognized (Hall, Lambert, and Balogh 2014). The United Nations has, for
example, identiﬁed universal access to modern energy as a major policy goal;
and sustainable energy has been a widely accepted pillar of the post-2015
development agenda (United Nations Foundation 2015). In the context of
developing countries, access to modern energy sources often signiﬁes a shift
away from traditional solid fuels (such as wood), which cause signiﬁcant
health and environmental impacts, towards modern energy sources, such as
electricity (preferably from renewable sources) and liquid petroleum gas
(LPG). In 2014, for example, over 2.6 billion people had no access to clean
energy, and used fuel wood and charcoal for thermal energy use (primarily
cooking and space heating). The majority of these people live in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) and Asia (IEA 2014). The resultant household air pollution
kills more than 4.3 million people per year (Global Alliance for Clean
Cookstoves 2015). Moving away from traditional fuels towards modern cook-
ing and heating fuels is, therefore, a global development priority and a key
component of energy transitions in developing countries.
Studies have identiﬁed that enabling policies have played an important role in
increasing access to and utilization of a key thermal fuel—LPG—in developing
countries, including, for example, Ghana and Senegal (Ahiataku-Togobo 2013;
Brew-Hammond, Mensah, and Amponsah 2014). These successes were not
solely the result of enabling policies, subsidies, or economic drivers, but part of
an interplay between policies, actors, and institutions, their values, and socio-
cultural and political factors more broadly, so that it is necessary to understand
the prevailing political and economic processes that have affected these
outcomes.
Residential LPG usage in South Africa is among the lowest in the develop-
ing world (Kojima 2011)—despite the country being one of the leaders in SSA
with regard to improving energy access. While South Africa has a relatively
limited residential thermal energy policy focus, Indonesia recently implement-
ed one of the largest household energy transition projects to date: the
kerosene-to-LPG conversion programme. The majority of Indonesian house-
holds switched from using kerosene (the major thermal fuel in most urban
poor South African households) to LPG in a relatively short amount of time
(Budya and Arofat 2011).1 It is useful to compare the South African experi-
ence with LPG with that of Indonesia, since both countries have a number of
signiﬁcant similarities:
• Indonesia and South Africa are both classiﬁed as ‘developing nations’
or ‘middle-income countries’, and characterized by good infrastructure
(especially transport, telecommunications) and relatively high levels of
industrialization.
• Both countries have signiﬁcant mineral resources that provide(d) an
important economic base for their development. These mineral resources
continue to play an important part in shaping the energy and economic
development trajectories of both countries.
• While they might not be ‘hegemonic’ powers as such, both are regional
‘powerhouses’, having the largest economies in their respective areas and
the ability to steer regional policy.
• Both Indonesia and South Africa have recently established democratic
political systems, coming out of several decades of autocratic regimes that
followed the end of colonial rule.
• Both countries have had recent successful energy initiatives. Where South
Africa has been remarkably successful in terms of its electriﬁcation
programme, Indonesia has been particularly successful in terms of LPG
provision. Various social grant mechanisms and subsidies are also used in
both nations to provide public goods and services to the poor.
1 At the time this chapter was being written, Hanung Budya was Marketing Director of PT
Pertamina (Persero), and Muhammad Yasir Arofat was Senior Analyst Strategy Planning—
Marketing Directorate PT Pertamina (Persero).
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By exploring and contrasting the Indonesian experience with that of South
Africa, the political economic factors that have affected the widespread adop-
tion of certain energy carriers can become more visible.
25.1.1 Political Economy Analysis
The analytical framework employed here is that of political economy analysis,
a tool that improves understanding of the drivers of political behaviour, and
how this shapes policies and programmes, winners and losers, and the impli-
cations for development. This type of analysis, which has a long tradition in
the social sciences, has recently gained increased attention in the context of
international development, and is promoted by organizations such as the
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and the
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. Although there is no
single conceptual framework for the analysis, and the concept is sometimes
contested, generally political economy concerns ‘the social relations, particu-
larly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, distribution
and consumption of resources’ (Mosco 2009: 74).
A comprehensive deﬁnition of political economy analysis is provided by the
OECD-DAC report (Dahl-Østergaard et al. 2005), which describes it as ‘the
interaction of political and economic processes in a society; the distribution of
power and wealth between different groups and individuals; and the processes
that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time’. Its main
components are: ﬁrst, politics, understood in terms of contestation and bar-
gaining between interest groups with competing claims over rights and
resources; and, second, economic processes that generate wealth, and which
inﬂuence how political choices are made. In current world affairs, these
processes, which are shaped by incentives, relationships, the distribution and
contestation of power between different actors (often closely interrelated),
constitute a uniﬁed set of dynamics that largely inﬂuence development out-
comes (DfID 2009; Mcloughlin 2014). Crucial to this study, political economy
analysis considers historical legacies, social trends, and prior experience
(Mcloughlin 2014), and how all of these factors affect or impede the adoption
of a particular technology (in our case, the large-scale use of LPG). Political
economy analysis allows for the inclusion of these factors, as well as informal
institutions and cultural and social practices in the analysis (Williams,
Duncan, and Landel-Mills 2007).
In the context of international development, political economy analysis is
often employed as a tool to improve development effectiveness by identifying
how and where focus should be directed to promote positive change. Here
the tool is used to shed light on SouthAfrica’s and Indonesia’s residential energy
transitions and will highlight, through the case studies, that the implementation
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of energy transitions (in this case LPG) is a highly politicized, locally-driven
process. The present analysis, using policy documents, reports, websites, and
academic and grey literatures, focuses on the period from when the transition
was initiated up to the point where it has become mainstream. Examining this
period enables focus on the full adoption of the innovation curve as developed
by Rogers (1983). This allows time for economic and political processes to
unfold against the backdrop of the country’s development path.
The analysis focuses on three broad areas of the political economy:
(1) the interests and incentives facing different groups in society, and how
these generate particular policy outcomes that may encourage or hinder
development;
(2) the role of formal and informal institutions, as well as social, political,
and cultural norms in shaping human interaction and political and
economic competition;
(3) the impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, religion,
and cultural beliefs on political behaviour and public policy (DfID
2009).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, a political
economic analysis of Indonesia will be presented, followed by one of South
Africa. The case studies will be compared and contrasted and differences and
commonalities between the studies highlighted. The chapter concludes with a
brief summary of ﬁndings and concluding analysis.
25 .2 INDONESIA
Indonesia is an archipelago in South East Asia with a population of 255
million people, making it the world’s fourth most populous nation. Indone-
sia’s economy is the world’s sixteenth largest by nominal gross domestic
product (GDP) and eighth largest by GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity)—
making it the largest economy in South East Asia. The country emerged
from more than three centuries of Dutch colonial rule after the Second
World War, and has since gone through various turbulent political, economic,
and social transitions. The Indonesian economy is based largely on industry
(46.4 per cent of GDP), followed by services (38.6 per cent), and agriculture
(14.4 per cent). Economic growth levels have been sitting between 4 and
6 per cent for the past 15 years—weathering the global ﬁnancial crisis in
2008–9 particularly well. However, poverty remains a persistent problem,
with 11 per cent of the population living below the poverty line and un-
employment sitting at 5.9 per cent (Central Intelligence Agency 2013).
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The country remains a net energy exporter, although imports of oil and oil
products have been increasing rapidly. In the 1970s, however, Indonesia was a
leading oil exporter, producing more than a million barrels a day, and oil
revenues contributed over 70 per cent of GDP. The oil price shocks of the
mid-1970s, which saw rapidly rising oil prices, enabled the government to
introduce signiﬁcant fuel subsidies to buoy domestic energy affordability—on
the back of increasing state revenues. This enabled the country to maintain the
price of petrol at less than US$0.20 per litre up to 2005. Almost half of all energy
subsidies went to kerosene, used largely for domestic cooking and lighting by
poor households (Diop 2014; Tumiwa et al. 2012; Kumoro and Astriana 2015;
Mourougane 2010). Recent years, however, have seen Indonesia importing oil,
as domestic production volumes have fallen while, at the same time, domestic
consumption has increased. Signiﬁcant rises in the global oil price placed a great
deal of pressure on the Indonesian treasury as it continued its policy of highly
subsidized energy provision (Kumoro and Astriana 2015; Tumiwa et al. 2012).
The Indonesian kerosene subsidy is substantial in both absolute and relative
terms. By 2006 overall fuel subsidies grew to such a level that they made up
more than 10 per cent of state expenditure—despite kerosene consumption
actually dropping in this period. Continuing with the subsidy scheme was
consequently deemed unsustainable by the Indonesian government (Arofat
2014; ASTAE 2013; Budya and Arofat 2011; Kasih 2012).
The Indonesian government’s response was to introduce the kerosene-to-
LPG conversion programme in 2007. The programme had distributed more
than 55.3 million LPG conversion packages (3 kg ﬁlled LPG canister, stove,
regulator, pipes) by late 2013, covering most of Indonesia’s previously subsid-
ized low-income kerosene users. As a result, LPG use has climbed steadily,
while kerosene use has dropped, saving the Indonesian government more than
US$1 billion in its ﬁrst year of implementation (Arofat 2014; ASTAE 2013;
Budya and Arofat 2011; Kasih 2012).
The programme required signiﬁcant investments in distribution and retail
infrastructure, and was largely carried out by the state oil company, Pertamina,
and coordinated by the Ministry for Minerals and Energy. Pertamina incurred
all programme implementation costs, and was subsequently reimbursed by the
Indonesian government (Arofat 2014; ASTAE 2013; Budya and Arofat 2011;
Kasih 2012).
While this case study is an analysis of the political economy of the LPG
conversion programme, to properly appreciate the LPG programme’s context it
is necessary to understand the nature and need for Indonesia’s kerosene sub-
sidies and their impacts on the society and economy. Sections 25.2.1–25.2.3 will
examine the political economy factors of the LPG conversion programme, in the
context of the overall Indonesian fuel subsidy regime.
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25.2.1 Groups, Interests, and Incentives
The dynamics of the Indonesian government’s policy choices in respect of
residential energy policy has been, in large part, bound up with wider politics.
When Sukarno, the country’s ﬁrst post-colonial president, decided to nation-
alize energy interests, it was reasoned that this was to primarily beneﬁt
Indonesian households—the major energy consumers in Indonesia at that
time. General Suharto, the successor to Sukarno, continued with this policy.
Providing subsidized energy was a way of relieving some of the economic
pressures on households, as well as stimulating the Indonesian economy
towards rapid industrialization built on the back of cheap energy and
energy-based foreign earnings (Ascher 1998; Liddle 1991; Mourougane
2010). Given Indonesia’s relative oil resource abundance in the twentieth
century, it made sense to use these resources to secure political support and
stimulate economic development. At that stage, the most easily provided
household fuel was kerosene.
Domestic energy subsidies therefore formed part of a broader strategy to
secure and maintain political power. General Suharto learned just how much
of a stabilizing role these subsidies played in 1998, when he tried to reduce
energy (primarily kerosene) subsidies, and was consequently removed from
power by popular protests. While the protests were in part stimulated by the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the 1990s, the massive hikes in fuel tariffs played an
important role (Mourougane 2010; Seah 2014).
Protests related to kerosene pricing occurred again in 2003 and 2005,
although in these cases the opposition was less severe—in part because the
country was not facing the same level of economic instability as in 1998.
Household energy subsidies have remained politically sensitive in Indonesia,
often triggering instability (Braithwaite et al. 2012; Mourougane 2010). The
Indonesian government’s response to the ﬁnancial pressure of kerosene sub-
sidies in the ﬁrst part of this century was therefore the provision of a cheaper
and more efﬁcient household fuel alternative—LPG.
Pertamina had to manage various interests and incentives from numerous
groups in rolling out this programme. It had to ensure not only that it had
the capacity to guarantee the continuous supply of LPG to a geographically
challenging populace, but also the overall acceptance of the conversion
programme by different interest groups, which had varying objectives:
• The government was ultimately interested in saving money through the
reduction of the kerosene subsidy.
• Households and small- and medium-sized enterprises wanted a cheap,
reliable, and convenient energy source.
Household Thermal Energy Choices in Developing Countries 493
• Retailers—up to that point responsible for selling subsidized kerosene to
households—needed to retain their proﬁt margin while switching to a
fuel source that required signiﬁcant new infrastructural investment.
• Various interests groups—non-governmental organizations, political
parties, trade associations, and so on—had political and other locally
driven agendas that could quite easily be served by undermining the
conversion programme or using its failure as political leverage.
The interests and agendas of most of the stakeholder groups were aligned
with the success of transitioning from kerosene to LPG. For the government,
their support stemmed from the fact that the kerosene subsidy, at that stage,
was undermining its ﬁscal sustainability and endangering the country’s eco-
nomic and political stability. Pertamina was to execute a programme that
ultimately served the national oil company’s goals too: increasing its produc-
tion, storage, and distribution infrastructure, while enlarging the consumer
base. For households, the switch from kerosene to LPG did not encounter
acceptability barriers that often emerge when implementing fuel-switching
programmes. LPG is cleaner burning, more convenient, and is seen as a more
modern fuel. The provision of free conversion kits (including the LPG cylinder
and stove) helped a great deal with regard to acceptability. The most prob-
lematic group proved to be the kerosene retailers. Pertamina had to assist
retailers in changing business models and practices. Retailers had for years
enjoyed the convenience of the kerosene business, but now had to engage in a
more complex business with lower proﬁt margins. However, despite their
reluctance, of all the groups represented, private sector retailers were also
the least powerful, with little collective bargaining power and highly
dependent on the state for the provision of subsidized fuel (ASTAE 2013;
Budya and Arofat 2011; Kasih 2012).
25.2.2 Institutions
Indonesia’s post-colonial political institutions have gone through a number of
variations over the years, but have principally conformed to the principles of a
unitary presidential system where almost all governing power resides in the
centralized government (Macasaquit 2006). The country has, however, moved
from authoritarianism and centralized dictatorship to a more decentralized
version in the democratic era post-1998 (Ascher 1998; Liddle 1991).
The post-1998 democratic reforms have ushered in signiﬁcant changes.
While a unitary, presidential system is still in place, there has been noteworthy
decentralization. The role of the legislature has been restored and strengthened,
and it now plays an important role in checking the executive’s authority, as well
as developing, amending, and approving legislation. The kerosene-to-LPG
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conversion programme is illustrative of this changing dynamic. It was initiated
by presidential decree in 2007, but implementation was delayed by several
months due to the Indonesian parliament having several concerns that it
wanted to be addressed before the decree would be approved. According to
Braithwaite et al. (2012), political alignment on energy issues has become
politically loaded. No single party holds an overall majority in parliament,
and parliamentary voting history shows that energy reform is being used for
political gain. However, stability appears to be even more important for
politicians, and the overriding factor that pushed the LPG conversion pro-
gramme through parliament was the ﬁscal threat posed by kerosene subsidies.
This process contrasts with the introduction of the kerosene subsidy under
General Suharto, where there was virtually no chance of parliament delaying or
blocking legislation coming from the executive.
Indonesia’s political culture has also shaped the form and design of the
energy transition programme. As opposed to, for example, using market-
based incentives and involving the private sector, it was largely driven,
planned, and implemented by central government actors. Private sector
involvement was limited to ‘last-mile’ distribution—serving as the link with
customers. According to Karim (2014), there is wide acceptance in most
Southeast Asian nations (as well as China) of a (benign) dictatorship as a
road to economic development. This seemingly authoritarian political culture,
forged in Indonesia’s case through more than 30 years of authoritarian rule,
appears to be one of the reasons that state-led development planning is not
only accepted but also in fact expected by Indonesia’s policy makers. It should
be noted, however, that the existence of a well-resourced national oil company,
the level of investment required, the timeframes required (government con-
sistently pushed for earlier deadlines), and the real political threat of instability
were all factors that also inﬂuenced the choice of programme design. None-
theless, the shaping and enabling role of the prevailing political culture needs
to be acknowledged as well.
25.2.3 Values and Ideas
Given how deeply rooted energy subsidies are in the Indonesian value system,
the pressures on the treasury from kerosene subsidies could not be addressed
through merely removing these subsidies. The Indonesian government had to
ﬁnd an alternative means of providing subsidized household fuel that was
more affordable for the national budget. LPG was seen as this fuel, largely
because it is a more effective fuel that requires a lower level of subsidy for an
equivalent amount of energy. As mentioned in Section 25.2, the initial years of
the programme seemed to indicate that there were signiﬁcant savings for the
Indonesian state. However, it appears that they are now starting to face the
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same budgetary pressures with the LPG subsidies as they had with kerosene
(Cahyaﬁtri 2015). The longer-term issue of how to decrease energy subsidies
therefore remains unsolved—in large part because it is such an integral part of
Indonesian society.
25 .3 SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa, since emerging from apartheid rule to democracy in 1994, has
put service delivery high on the political and economic agenda. The goal of
providing universal access to services, including housing, water, electricity,
and sanitation, has been a deﬁning feature of the democratic government’s
rule. It has successfully implemented one of the largest electriﬁcation pro-
grammes in the world, and almost 6 million households (or 80 per cent of the
population) now have access to the national grid—compared to 30 per cent in
1994 (Department of Energy 2012a). This programme has for many years
dominated the household energy agenda. Viewed as the solution to all house-
hold energy issues, it has crowded out other supply options. But grid electri-
ﬁcation is unlikely, on its own, to achieve universal energy access goals. First,
the grid is unlikely to reach all households. In remote rural areas, low
settlement densities make extension of the grid technically or economically
infeasible. In urban areas, informal settlements are not eligible for their own
connections due to land-use and planning restrictions related to the illegality
of these settlements. Second, poor households are multiple fuel users, employ-
ing a range of energy carriers for different end-uses. Pursuing electricity as the
only supply solution does not, therefore, match the basic demand proﬁles of
households.
Residential LPG usage in South Africa is among the lowest in the develop-
ing world (Kojima 2011). A supply-constrained market and a high retail price
have limited LPG’s expansion into the low-income market. While household
energy policy has focused on electriﬁcation, the liquid fuels policy sub-sector
has also not incentivized expansion in LPG supply chains. LPG, as a result,
plays a minor role in the overall energy mix. Most of what is produced
domestically supplies industrial and commercial users.
South Africa has no signiﬁcant oil or gas reserves. The supply of LPG comes
predominantly from local reﬁneries using imported crude oil, but also from
coal, through a coal-to-liquids process, and natural gas, in a gas-to-liquids
process. South Africa’s reﬁneries are old, inefﬁcient, and experience many
unplanned shutdowns, causing regular LPG supply shortages in the winter
months. Many of the energy sector’s resource allocation decisions are rooted
in the country’s socio-political history. This section aims to explore the key
ways in which the legacy of apartheid continues to shape contemporary
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economic and political decisions in energy policy, ﬁrst by looking at the legacy
of close relationships that exist between the state and the petrochemical sector,
and, second, by investigating the politicization of service delivery and how
technology supply choices are framed.
25.3.1 Group, Interests, and Incentives
Understanding the framework of existing power relations in the private sector
and dominant interests is essential to understanding LPG markets in South
Africa. Although a range of supply and demand barriers exist in the low-
income market, a key reason for LPG not expanding into the domestic market
is that there is insufﬁcient supply to do so, and retail prices are too high. The
limited supply appears to be related to maintaining the market power of the
dominant oil companies. The reﬁneries, owned by international oil compan-
ies, control virtually all of LPG production in South Africa. There is evidence
of signiﬁcant anti-competitive behaviour that has limited market growth and
entry by new players, which has spurred the Competition Commission to
launch an industry-wide investigation (Ensor 2015). This investigation is not
the ﬁrst of its kind in this broader sector.2 There is therefore a long-standing
and entrenched pattern of market dominance and collusive behaviour in
South African oil product markets.
Some of the ways in which barriers to entry are enforced are: preferential
supply arrangements with reﬁneries, costs of entry, control over infrastructure,
and collusive pricing strategies. There is a high degree of vertical integration in
LPG supply chains, from the reﬁneries through to wholesaling, distribution,
and retail (Paelo, Robb, and Vilakazi 2014). Reﬁneries tend to sell their product
to their own wholesalers. In the absence of adequate importing infrastructure,
smaller independent wholesalers ﬁnd it difﬁcult to source product. Over
80 per cent of the wholesaling market is in the hands of the four major resellers
who get their product directly from reﬁneries (Lloyd 2014).
Another barrier to entry in the wholesale market is the cost structure.
Wholesaling of LPG is highly capital-intensive, requiring investment in bulk
transporter tankers, bulk storage facilities, cylinder-ﬁlling plants, cylinders,
cylinder delivery vehicles, and installation on customers’ premises. There are
also anti-competitive long-term selling agreements between wholesalers, dis-
tributors, and customers around access to infrastructure—such as pipe net-
works and storage in a shopping mall—that prevent smaller players from
2 The commission has also investigated and found cases of collusive conduct by the oil
companies in the bitumen, piped natural gas, and diesel markets. Oil companies have been
found guilty of sharing information, price ﬁxing, and other coordinated behaviour (Das Nair,
Pamela, and Roberts 2015).
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entering certain customer markets (Lloyd 2014). The major wholesalers also
allegedly under-price cylinders to keep new entrants out of the retail market.
Even in the absence of explicit anti-competitive practices, informal institu-
tional norms typical in tight oligopolies—such as relationships, having tacit
industry knowledge and inside information that beneﬁt those who have
already worked with or for major oil companies—serve to keep out new-
comers (Das Nair, Pamela, and Roberts 2015; Paelo, Robb, and Vilakazi 2014).
The industry is in general characterized by secrecy and lack of information in
the public domain (Lloyd 2014).
The regulatory framework appears to be tied in to a supply limiting
market—suggesting regulatory capture. Very speciﬁc conditions of market
control, price regulation, and limited supply appear to beneﬁt certain market
players. Wholesalers appear to enjoy a low-risk market and are potentially
drawing signiﬁcant economic rents from the mark-up between the regulated
wholesale and retail prices. Retail prices approximately double the wholesale
reﬁnery gate price (Lloyd 2014). For reﬁneries, enabling further growth in the
LPG market has no direct beneﬁts. The vertically integrated supply chains
suggest they are extracting economic rents through transfer pricing. Since
their reﬁneries are old and cannot expand, any increase in supply would have
to come from imports, which would be beyond their control. Furthermore,
expanding residential LPG usage would only steal market share from their
parafﬁn (kerosene) sales.
Most of the big wholesalers have shown little interest in expanding into the
low-income domestic market, and these more peripheral markets have been
left to the small players. These retail markets are expensive and difﬁcult to
operate in, compared to industrial and commercial markets. Challenges relate
to restrictive municipal by-laws around ﬁre safety standards as well as a retail
price for LPG, which makes the cost of cooking or heating with it much higher
than with electricity or parafﬁn, both of which are subsidized. Consumers are
also not familiar with LPG, and fear explosions. Creating market demand
would require running awareness campaigns and advertising, thus raising
operating costs. Furthermore, when there are winter supply shortages caused
by a reﬁnery shutdown, the residential market is usually the ﬁrst to experience
shortages as distributors try to cushion other sectors. This supply insecurity
decreases attractiveness of the energy carrier to low-income households
(Mohlakoana and Annecke 2008).
There are, however, current developments which threaten to undermine the
status quo and affect the current market power the majors enjoy. The ﬁrst is
the Competition Commission enquiry (Ensor 2015). The second is the con-
struction of new importing and storage infrastructure on South Africa’s west
coast, with massive investment going into developing a gas terminal at
Saldanha Bay. The facility, designed to be open access, will enable smaller
players to access infrastructure and help to break the current monopoly hold
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on product supply. While this import infrastructure is a major step forward
for market expansion, it is only part of the infrastructure picture. The need
remains for associated investments into LPG cylinders and distributed ﬁlling
facilities.
25.3.2 Institutions
Existing industry players clearly beneﬁt from current market conditions, but
of particular interest is the way the regulatory framework appears to entrench
their market power and limit competition. This gives rise to questions around
the private sector’s inﬂuence among decision makers. In many ways this
pattern can be traced back to state–business relations under apartheid—
which left a legacy of concentration and control in this and many other sectors
(Das Nair, Pamela, and Roberts 2015). There is a long history of close
relationships between the state and the petrochemical sector in South Africa.
During apartheid, petrochemical companies enjoyed guaranteed market
returns, tariff protection, and removal of competition in various ways, as the
threat of sanctions pushed security of supply in liquid fuels high up the
political agenda (Baker, Newell, and Philips 2015; Das Nair, Pamela, and
Roberts 2015). An innovative coal-to-liquids process was pioneered by Sasol
and, in order to develop this source and protect the proﬁtability of Sasol,
competition was removed from the market. Oil companies were forced to cut
expansion and buy product from Sasol, but in return they received guaranteed
returns in the marketing and retailing sectors. In the post-apartheid dispen-
sation, the state has formally tried to promote liberalization of the sector
and a reduction in regulation, for example as laid out in the Energy White
Paper (Department of Minerals and Energy 1998) and the Competition Act
(Republic of South Africa, 1998). Interestingly, however, the petrochemical
sector managed to obtain an exemption from this deregulation.
Regulated markets can lend themselves to regulatory capture. It has poten-
tially been in the interests of oil companies to maintain regulation if they are
behaving in cartel-like ways. Competitive markets can be damaging to cartels
if they cannot ensure there are barriers to entry. Under more highly regulated
regimes, and where dominant actors have sufﬁcient inﬂuence, barriers to entry
can be enforced through regulation. The South African regulatory framework
appears to support the market power of the oil majors in a number of ways,
such as through pricing and safety standards. Both wholesale and retail prices
are regulated. The regulated wholesale price, known as the maximum reﬁnery
gate price (MRGP), has been widely acknowledged to make imports uncom-
petitive with reﬁnery production. Importing and storage infrastructure is
limited in South Africa; as wholesalers can import only small parcels at a
time, they incur higher unit costs (Lloyd 2014). A discussion document on
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reviewing the MRGP released by the Department of Energy in 2012
(Department of Energy 2012b) notes that the MRGP has limited the expan-
sion of import facilities and does not compensate for infrastructural invest-
ments. No further mechanism adjustments have been forthcoming since this
discussion document, however. Similarly, cylinder safety standards in the
industry are set such that only one manufacturer’s product complies—thereby
keeping others out.
The ways in which various aspects of regulation interact with market power
suggest that oil companies may be inﬂuencing decision makers. The Depart-
ment of Energy, the government institution responsible for regulating pricing,
is characterized by inaction, which appears to implicitly beneﬁt and maintain
the power of certain actors. This is not unique to the liquid fuels energy sub-
sector in South Africa. In an analysis of the electricity sector, Baker (2011)
ﬁnds that many government departments and private players exert their
inﬂuence over the energy policy-making process. Industrial stakeholders and
heavy industry enjoy privileged levels of access (Baker, Newell, and Philips
2015). Broader structural drivers during the apartheid administration estab-
lished a certain culture of state–business relations in the energy sector, and
close relationships and beneﬁcial arrangements for the petrochemical sector
continue to shape their interactions and policy-making today.
Weak institutional capacity also exerts its inﬂuence over the policy-making
environment (Baker 2011; Newbery and Eberhard 2008). Confusion about
roles and responsibilities, and a lack of coordination, often compounds the
already weak capacity within the Department of Energy. Different government
departments often undertake seemingly contradictory actions that may not be
in alignment with other policy objectives. Entities act according to their own
goals and, in the absence of a strong guiding policy framework or governing
department, different departments may pursue their own strategies. The
construction of the new LPG import terminal at Saldanha Bay illustrates
this. The tendering, licensing, and construction process has been long drawn
out and characterized by multiple disputes. Different government departments
with overlapping jurisdictions are pursuing their own agendas according to
how they see LPG market expansion developing. The National Energy
Regulator of South Africa wants to enable competition in the sector by
establishing multiple import terminals and deregulating the market, while the
Transnet National Ports Authority wishes to create one large facility to bring
down costs. This would be an open access facility but well regulated to reduce
players extracting economic rents. Both models have strengths and weaknesses,
but currently both players are undermining the actions of the other, and in so
doing making for a lack of clarity retarding longer-term market development.
Their respective preferred models are likely also related to the particular
institutional interests around market inﬂuence (e.g., through regulation) or
control over infrastructure.
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25.3.3 Values and Ideas
For various political reasons, the electriﬁcation programme has crowded out
other energy access considerations and has dominated the household energy
agenda (Matinga, Clancy, and Annegarn 2014; SEA 2014; Tait, Merven and
Senatla 2013). Alternative energy carriers for the household market, such as
biomass, parafﬁn, LPG, and off-grid solar, have all received limited policy
attention. South Africa has adopted a traditional approach to energy access as
a supply-oriented service based on big infrastructure rollouts. Much of the
policy focus has centred on the provision of infrastructure rather than on the
energy services delivered. As such, issues such as the various institutional and
technical barriers to achieving high annual connection rates have dominated.
But there has been far less focus on a demand-side appreciation of the services
that households derive from electricity and whether these meet households’
basic needs. A supply-side orientation tends to embrace standardization and
uniformity, to plan technology rollouts that largely aim to be independent of
contextual variations (Furlong 2014). The supply-side orientation has argu-
ably blinded decision makers to the ways in which the delivery of an electricity
meter may not actually result in users being able to access sufﬁcient safe and
affordable energy services to meet all of the household’s basic needs. In a
technocratic approach to electrical infrastructure planning there is no space to
consider an integrated approach to delivering energy services that can con-
sider multiple fuels and technologies, based on the demand context. Thus the
fact that many poor households may not cook with electricity and continue to
use parafﬁn gets overlooked in energy policy.
Various political and historic factors have come to shape South Africa’s
approach to household energy and the favouring of electricity. First, the
framing of energy poverty as a policy problem in the early 1990s, and the
role key actors played in shaping that agenda; and, second, the values attached
to certain technology choices in the post-apartheid socio-political realm. The
national electricity utility, Eskom, played a key role in the electriﬁcation
programme from a very early stage. In the early 1990s, Eskom developed,
managed, and ﬁnanced the ‘Electricity for All’ programme, aimed at electri-
fying citizens who had been excluded from service delivery under apartheid.
This has largely been seen as a way of demonstrating its commitment to, and
alignment with, the values of the new democratic dispensation (Matinga
2010). Eskom at that time also had excess generation capacity and the ﬁnancial
reserves to enable quick rollouts at scale. Their central role at this early stage of
the programme meant they became a key actor inﬂuencing how energy
poverty, as a policy problem, was framed. An engineering focus to infrastruc-
ture planning dominated. Even though the programme no longer sits under
Eskom’s ambit, this legacy remains. The Department of Energy now has an
electriﬁcation programme, rather than a household energy strategy. Most
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other household energy initiatives that have been undertaken in South Africa
can be traced to the interests of the electricity sector. For example, the only
signiﬁcant programme promoting LPG among poor households, instituted in
2008, came at a time when the country was experiencing blackouts and needed
to reduce peak demand. It was discontinued shortly after electricity supply
returned to something like normal. From a household welfare perspective, any
switching programme should be looking to switch users from parafﬁn to LPG,
rather than electricity to LPG, which has neutral impact on household welfare.
The second consideration of the dominance of electricity has been around
how the service delivery agenda of the democratic government has been set.
Services such as energy, water, and sanitation have become key features of the
government’s policy to redress past imbalances. During apartheid, the state
systematically denied basic services to non-white citizens, and equality has
therefore become a key symbol in current service delivery programmes.
Electricity, as the technology enjoyed by the privileged under apartheid, was
thus ensured primacy in the government’s service delivery agendas, its dom-
inance being as much for its political attributes as its technical ones. Tech-
nologies such as electricity represent much more than the direct services they
provide, having become symbolic of inclusivity in government policy and of
the development aspirations of post-apartheid South Africa (Matinga, Clancy,
and Annegarn 2014; Merven and Senatla 2013). Energy options other than an
electric grid connection are often perceived to be inferior or not ‘modern’
(Matinga 2010). When the poor protest about service delivery, their demands
relate to electricity and not energy. With the political currency attached to
electricity, there is little incentive for politicians to promote alternative energy
sources, such as LPG.
The government’s electriﬁcation programme has also become deeply dis-
torting in household energy markets. The programme consists of a fully
subsidized connection as well as a subsidized monthly allocation of free
kilowatt hours. Furthermore, electricity tariffs in South Africa were under-
priced for many years, leading South Africa to have had one of the lowest
electricity prices in the world (Newbery and Eberhard 2008). Even with recent
electricity price hikes, the country’s electricity tariffs remain among the
lowest on the African continent (Fripp 2015). In comparison, LPG’s retail
price is one of the highest in the world (Kojima 2011) and the upfront costs of
purchasing cylinders and appliances are not subsidized. A combination of a
bias towards electricity in household energy policy and imperfections in LPG
regulations thus make it an uneconomic option for the poor and limit its
market penetration. But electricity tariffs are rising substantially as the elec-
tricity sector moves towards cost-reﬂective pricing (Deloitte 2012). The
previously stark cost differential between the two energy carriers is therefore
fast changing—potentially ushering in a new era of residential energy use
patterns in the country.
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25.4 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
This chapter set out to discover the political economy elements and mechan-
isms inﬂuencing residential thermal energy transitions in Indonesia and South
Africa, through the lens of the LPG sector. The following key elements
emerged from the analysis.
25.4.1 State Power and Control
The relative power of the state, its implementing institutions and the private
sector, especially with regard to the energy sector, plays a signiﬁcant role in
residential energy policy. This is, for example, one of the reasons why
countries with relatively strong and capable national oil companies—like
Pertamina in Indonesia—are able and willing to provide LPG to households
at signiﬁcant scale, and why South Africa, through its national electricity
utility company, exhibits a clear, and almost exclusive, preference for
household electriﬁcation. The more control government is able to exercise
over a particular sector or fuel, the more likely it seems that this sector or
fuel will be supported for wide-scale adoption. The converse of this argu-
ment is, of course, not only that government might not be willing to support
sectors where its power is more limited, but also that it might in fact not be
able to. The South African LPG sector seems to offer a picture of an
industry with enough collective power to not only resist government efforts
to entice it into serving low-income, potentially less proﬁtable customers—
but to use government regulation to maintain competition-limiting market
dominance.
25.4.2 Stability and the Politics of Discontent
Energy provision and, in particular, household thermal energy provision, is
distinctly political in both countries, with the potential to cause great instabil-
ity. Energy cost is recognized as a signiﬁcant political factor in Indonesia,
prompting proactive measures such as the LPG conversion programme.
Energy subsidies are also of great ﬁnancial and political consequence in
Indonesia, largely due to the high level of subsidies provided. South Africa’s
residential energy policy is inﬂuenced by the country’s socio-political
history to such an extent that subsidized electricity provision remains
the only acceptable form of energy provision. In both countries extensive
political currency is derived from energy subsidies—regardless of the fuel or
technology used.
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25.4.3 Aligning Interests and Objectives
A key factor inﬂuencing the implementation of residential energy policy in
both countries is the alignment of policy objectives with the interests and
strengths of key actors. This is why, for example, both the Indonesian LPG
conversion programme as well as the South African electriﬁcation programme
were able to achieve such massive rollout in a short time frame. Through
actively involving the implementing agency—whether Pertamina or Eskom—
in the design of the programme, it was guaranteed that the eventual product
would speak to these agencies’ strengths and interests. Where this alignment
of objectives and interests is not in place—as is the case in South Africa’s LPG
sector—there is very little chance of successful policy implementation.
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Part VIII
Regional Dynamics
This part of the book features chapters that explore how clean energy transi-
tions challenge traditional national boundaries and institutional architectures.
As climate and clean energy commitments are made at the national level, a
broad observation is that political economy factors may lead to growing
territorialization or institutional friction at the sub-national level as regional
development and integration dialogues ensue—and so it goes, as international
climate commitments are made on behalf of groups of nations. This can occur
for a host of reasons, inter alia: conﬂicts over land and resource use; a desire
to localize investment and development beneﬁts; and a desire to avoid the
economic negative impacts of fossil fuel infrastructure retirement.
Pham Do and Dinar offer a case study of the Mekong River region, and
how the rush to acquire sources of alternative energy and other beneﬁts to
meet rapid demand growth have led to circumstances of risk for the broader
economic areas, including Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and the
Yunnan province of China. The struggle over hydropower development and
decision-making on water and land across this region offers valuable insights
into the complex political economy dynamics at play in regional energy
transition efforts. Puppim de Oliveira and Andrade examine the political
economy aspects, particularly the inﬂuence of Clean Development Mechan-
isms (CDMs), in clean energy and climate change policies in the Brazilian
states of Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul. The case study identiﬁes pitfalls and
opportunities for new strategies and mechanisms for boosting clean energy
in Brazil, and the efﬁcacy of CDMs and potential future mechanisms for
supporting sub-national climate change mitigation efforts. Lepesant reviews
tensions and institutional innovations that can arise at local and national levels
when implementing regional energy policies—in this case, the European
Union’s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive. In systematically exploring the
conﬂicting interests and natural tensions, the case study provides insights
into how best to encourage adoption and implementation of regional priorities
at the local level.

26
The Linkages of Energy, Water, and Land
Use in Southeast Asia
Challenges and Opportunities for the Mekong Region
Kim Hang Pham Do and Ariel Dinar
26.1 INTRODUCTION
The Mekong region (MR) is a natural economic area, consisting of Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, and the Yunnan province of China,
bound together by the Mekong River.1 Originating at an elevation of over 4500
m in the Tibet Qinghai plateau, the Mekong River, with a total catchment area
of 795,000 km2, not only is the major water source in Southeast Asia but also
harbours a wealth of natural resources including important stocks of forest,
ﬁsh, biological biodiversity, transportation, wetlands, and tourism (ADB 2004;
Mehtonen, Keskinen, and Varis 2008; MRC 2005). Land and water resources
are central to agriculture and rural development, and are intrinsically linked to
regional challenges of food insecurity and poverty. For over 20 years, South-
east Asia has been one of the fastest growing regional economies in the world
and water resource has assumed a central role in the region’s economic growth
(ADB 2013). Economy and population, particularly in urban centres, have
grown remarkably, leading to increased use of energy and natural resources.
The basis for sustainable development is the access to these resources and their
sustainable management (FAO 2011).2
1 ‘The boundary of the Mekong River region includes the entire Mekong River Basin (MRB)
and the coastal area adjacent to the Mekong Delta’ (UNEP 2006).
2 Sustainable energy is one of 17 global goals that make up the 2030 United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations,
2015).
In the MR, the linkages between energy, water, land use, and development
are numerous and complex, driven by increasing demands for clean energy,
cheap electricity, and potential proﬁts. Water is not only lifeblood, it is also an
economic resource. The production and consumption of goods and services
require energy. Energy development requires water. Food production and
land-use planning require water and energy. The fast development of hydro-
power, mining, infrastructure and urbanization are main factors for change in
land use. As the most populous region and the world’s manufacturing hub,
Southeast Asia and the MR demand water, energy, and land resources in ever-
increasing amounts, leading to shortages that are creating serious choke points
in the country’s development. Pressure on water is at the heart of these
resource constraints facing the MR (ADB 2013; Kubiszewski et al. 2012;
Matthews and Geheb 2015).
Owing to sustainable development and managing natural resources, espe-
cially given the very high economic growth rates in China, the MR is of global
importance, in terms of population size, land use, resource base, regime, gross
domestic product (GDP) size, GDP per capita, or comparative advantages
(Table 26.1). Currently, over 100 larger dams are planned for the main stream
of the Mekong River and its tributaries (MRC 2010). Power distribution
within the MR is deﬁned by strategic position, making the region a scene for
one of the most intensive hydropower developments globally. Dam construc-
tion has almost always created conﬂicts between energy supply and related
economic interests and their social and environmental impacts (King, Bird,
and Haas 2007; MRC 2010). Life in the MR is facing threats as major dams
begin to rise. Deforestation for timber or fuel wood supplies, agricultural expan-
sion, urbanization, and infrastructure creation, all contribute to increased erosion.
Consequently, about 21 per cent of the MR area is experiencing problems with
Table 26.1. Selected aggregate indicators for the Mekong region (MR) and China
in 2014
Population
(million)
Population
growth (%)
Population
(per km2)
Land area
(103 km2)
Water
area
(103 km2)
GDP
growth (%)
GNI per
capita
(USD 2014)a
Cambodia 15.18 1.50 84 181.04 4.5 7.0 1020
Laos 6.77 2.00 29 236.80 6.0 7.4 1650
Myanmar 51.42 1.17 76 676.59 23.1 7.7 1270
Thailand 67.09 0.40 131 513.12 2.2 0.7b 5370
Viet Nam 91.52 1.05 274 330.95 21.1 6.0 1890
China 1367.82 0.48 143 9569.96 27.1 7.4 7380
Note: GDP, gross domestic product; GNI, gross national income. a Data from World Bank (2015). b The Thai
economy, however, has slowed signiﬁcantly since the fourth quarter of 2013 because of the delay of a complete
election and the limited role of the caretaker government.
Source: Based on ADB (2015) and World Bank (2015).
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erosion;3 only 31 per cent of its original forests have been left intact and only 5
per cent are under regulated protection (UNEP 2006). Together with climate
change adaptation and mitigation, the livelihoods of some hundred million
rural people across the MR are affected by degradation and depletion of
natural resources.
To meet demands of population growth and energy development, the
increase in water consumption as alternative energy is intensive. Water
needs to be part of energy strategies, and the management of water resources
is one of the most urgent development challenges. Hence, it is vital to
understand how transboundary rivers can meet water, food, and energy
needs of riparian populations while minimizing negative impacts (Bach et al.
2012). This chapter addresses the relationship between energy, water, and land
use in the MR.4 The aim of the chapter is to: (i) provide a comprehensive
overview and identify historical indicators of regional conﬂict and cooperation;
and (ii) create a framework to enhance understanding management for sus-
tainable development in the context of the transboundary water resources. It
sheds light on the opportunities to mitigate the possible negative impacts of
hydropower development for simultaneously protecting the environment and
growing the economy by highlighting the role of issue linkages in achieving a
regional agreement (Pham Do, Dinar, and McKinney 2012). The results
contribute to policy-making as recommendations of how the Mekong River
Commission (MRC) should deal with and without the rising power of China
and the role of the United Nations as well as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 26.2 presents an
overview of the MR and its water resources. Section 26.3 provides a brief
historical development and regional integration. Section 26.4 analyses the role
of issue linkages in designing a mechanism of regional and international
cooperation. Concluding remarks follow Section 26.5.
26 .2 OVERVIEW OF THE MR
With a total land area of 2,334,000 km2 (Xing 2013: 180), a long history of
wars and peace, and the recent challenges in of the potential alteration of
complex ecological and social systems (Campbell 2009; Dore and Xiaogang
3 The ‘increased rates of surface water run-off resulting from deforestation and land clearance
in upland areas of the MRB are causing increased soil erosion and the consequent entrainment of
suspended and bed-load sediments into water courses’ (UNEP 2006: 12).
4 This chapter seeks to update and add to previous studies on transboundary water manage-
ment (see Pham Do et al. 2012; Pham Do and Dinar 2014).
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2004; Kaisti and Kakonen 2012; Pham Do and Dinar 2014), the MR has
attracted considerable international attention since 1950.
As seen in Table 26.1, economic disparities are very wide, ranging from four
low-income member countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam)
with a low gross national income (GNI) per capita (formerly, gross national
product per capita) of US$1020–1890 (at 2014 US$ price) to two middle-
income member countries (Thailand and China) with a high GNI per capita of
US$5370–7380. Populations range from 6.8 million people in Laos to over 90
million in the combined Yunnan and Guanxi regions. Generally, the average
growth of real GDP in the MR has continuously increased in recent years
(ADB 2015). However, poverty is a critical issue across the MRB, despite the
signiﬁcant economic growth of China, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Ac-
cording to UNEP (2008), the proportion of population living below the
poverty line exceeds 30 per cent in many different ethnic groups of Laos,
Cambodia, and Viet Nam.
26.2.1 Water Resources in the MR
Historically and geographically, the MRB can be divided into two parts:
the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) constituting China and Myanmar (24
per cent of the total catchment area) and the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB)
constituting Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam (76 per cent of the
total catchment area). The MRB is home to nearly 75 million people with
90 distinct ethnic groups (Matthews and Geheb 2015). Encompassing
a vast range of geographic and climatic zones, the amount of water
resources internally renewable annually varies widely by country.
Moreover, land and water resources in the region also vary with location
and season. For example, although only 16 per cent of the total discharge
originates from the UMB, during the critical dry season, China discharges
water to most of the Mekong mainstream ﬂow in Laos and Thailand
and contributes to almost 45 per cent of the average ﬂow in Cambodia
(Goh 2004).
As the longest river in Southeast Asia, the name roughly translating to
‘mother of water’ in the Lao and Thai languages, the Mekong is the region’s
largest water resource and provides the largest related resources with power
generation potential that support on-going economic development and MRB
community livelihoods. Particularly, water use for irrigation is expected to
increase in the LMB (FAO 2012). Table 26.2 reports a summary of distribu-
tions of water and land resources in the MRB.
Although the MRB is one of the richest areas of biodiversity in the world,
the six riparian states have quite different long-term major use patterns of the
river. Three primary economic services for the millions who live in the MR are
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transportation, renewable freshwater, and electric power (Roland-Holst and
Heft-Neal 2012). Water resources are used mainly for hydropower production
and irrigation (MRC 2010). Based on the calculated models of four main
different sectors of water uses in 2010, Houba, PhamDo, and Zhu (2013) show
that (i) water use for irrigation generates the highest aggregate economic value
for China and the LMB; and (ii) water use for hydropower generation con-
tributes the second highest economic value for China, whereas ﬁshery is the
second highest for the LMB.
26.2.2 Energy Demand and Hydropower Plants in the MR
The MR is endowed with abundant resources that have power generation
potential, such as hydropower, natural gas, and coal. However, many countries
in the region face difﬁculties in accessing ﬁnancial resources and technologies to
exploit the energy potential of these resources. Most of the oil and gas for
potential development is located in the territorial waters of Cambodia, Myanmar,
Thailand, and Viet Nam, whereas coal is in Yunnan province of China (ADB
2013). Owing to the regional diversity in economic development and rise in
population, growth in primary energy demand differs by nations (Table 26.3).
As shown in Table 26.3, China has a highest potential for reducing energy
demand compared with any other nations in the MR: its annual growth rate
reduces from 2.3 per cent in a BAU case to 1.4 per cent in the alternative case.
Within the MR, it must be recognized that hydropower is only one of a
number of purposes for which water is diverted or stored. Houba, Pham Do,
and Zhu (2013) report that hydropower generation in the LMB takes place in
the tributaries and produces only 2 per cent of the total economic value of the
LMB. This low value reﬂects the undeveloped hydropower potential. To date,
China is the only country to have built dams on the Mekong mainstream.
Table 26.2. Territory of six countries and their contribution to the Mekong’s ﬂow
Description Yunnan
(China)
Myanmar Laos Thailand Cambodia Viet
Nam
Area (103 km2) 165 24 202 184 155 65
Area as percentage of
MRB
21 3 25 23 20 8
Percentage of total area
of country/province
38 4 97 36 86 20
Flow as percentage of
MRB
16 2 35 18 18 11
Average ﬂow (m3/sec) 2410 300 5270 2560 2860 1660
Note: MRB, Mekong River Basin.
Source: Based on MRC (2005).
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According to King, Bird, and Haas (2007), Cambodia has a hydropower
potential of 10,000 MW but an installed capacity of only 160 MW. With
90 per cent of land area in the basin, Laos has the greatest potential for
hydropower development (13,000 MW) and could become a power hub for
Thailand, Viet Nam, and the ASEAN power grid. Whereas Thailand is a major
importer of hydropower and a potential hub for the ASEAN power grid, Viet
Nam and Myanmar are important both as hydropower developers and as
potential importers. The MRC has proposed many plans for developing this
potential through dam projects; there are 11 mainstream dam proposals and
30 planned tributary dams to be developed between 2015 and 2030
(Kubiszewski et al. 2012). Moreover, Laos has started constructing the ﬁrst
of 11 planned hydropower projects on the Lower Mekong River mainstream,
and hopes to become the ‘battery of Southeast Asia’, selling electricity to MR
neighbours. Yunnan also installed 68 per cent of provincial power generation
and is constructing a cascade of hydropower plants on the mainstream of the
Mekong with 15,600 MW to be completed by 2025 (King, Bird, and Haas
2007: xi). Construction of dams on the Mekong River may pose immediate
and long-term threats to the food security and livelihoods of over 60 million
people in the LMB (MRC 2010).
26.2.3 Land-Use Change
Land and water are ecologically linked in a natural system (called a catchment,5
drainage basin, or watershed). One of the major components that would affect
Table 26.3. Energy demand in business-as-usual and alternative scenarios
Primary energy
demand (Mtoe)
Annual
growth rate (%)
Primary energy
demand per
capita (toe)
Primary energy
demand and growth
rate with advanced
technology
2010 2035 2010 2035 2035
(Mtoe)
Growth
rate (%)
Cambodia 5.0 8.9 2.3 0.36 0.5 7.4 1.7
Laos 2.8 7.9 4.3 0.45 0.99 7.7 4.0
Myanmar 14.0 30.3 3.1 0.29 0.55 29.2 3.0
Thailand 117.4 204.8 2.2 1.70 2.79 183.5 1.8
Viet Nam 67.7 186.0 4.1 0.77 1.80 167.9 3.7
China 2471.1 4218.1 2.3 1.80 3.05 3418.7 1.4
Note: Mtoe, million tonnes of oil equivalent.
Source: Based on ADB (2013).
5 The catchment surface can be one of three types: water, forest (sparse dry deciduous), or
agricultural land (including all non-forest land uses).
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future water and energy resources is change in land use. Different drivers cause
different changes in land use. The impact that land-use changes can have on
water resources is large, but quantifying these impacts presents many chal-
lenges. According to Rowcroft (2008), land-use changes are multifaceted and
mainly caused by prices of agricultural and forest products. To maintain the
MR as an important food production area with irrigation farmland, aquatic
agriculture, and pasture, governments in the region have undertaken land
reforms and put limits on shifting cultivation for conservation since 1980.
However, rapid land-use change has occurred in the region since 2000.
The MRC Strategic Environmental Assessment report identiﬁes expanding
irrigation and loss of forest, farmland, and aquatic resource as the main
consequences of mainstream dams (ICEM 2010). The loss of land is a direct
impact of hydropower projects (MRC 2010) through construction of reservoirs,
access roads, and transportations. According to Smajgl and Ward (2013), there
are six national developments that would signiﬁcantly inﬂuence land-use
change in the MR till 2050: (i) expansion of mainstream dams, (ii) water
diversion, (iii) rise in sea level, (iv) adaptation strategies in the Mekong delta,
(v) expansion of rubber plantations, and (vi) transnational transport infrastruc-
ture (in particular, railway projects linking Kunming to Cambodia).
Having provided an assessment of the impacts of these developments related
changes in land use, Xing (2013) shows that during 2000–8 farmland increased
in Yunnan (61.3 per cent) and Laos (42.5 per cent) whereas pasture increased in
Cambodia (61.3 per cent) but decreased in Yunnan (21.3 per cent). In addition,
it is expected that 22,692.42 km2 of forest will be converted to commercial
plantations and mainstream dams may submerge 119.66 km2 of riverbank
gardens. Total area of land-use change is predicted to be 34,068.71 km2
(see Xing 2013: table 6.10).
26 .3 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTEGRATION,
AND CHALLENGES
The MR has a long history of development and dialogue among lower riparian
countries. An increasing number of river-based cooperation institutions have
emerged in mainland Southeast Asia since the early 1990s. Among these are
the MRC, the GMS, and the Mekong Basin Development (MBD) that take
place under the overarching framework of the ASEAN.
26.3.1 Regional Development and Integration
The MRC is an intergovernmental organization for regional dialogue and
cooperation in the LMB, established in 1995, based on the Mekong Agreement
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on Cooperation for Sustainable Development of the MR (the so-called 1995
Mekong Agreement). As a successor of the Mekong committee, which was
established in 1957, the MRC has the longest history of cooperation in the
region. This regional institution works with many different partners, respon-
sible for promoting and developing sustainable management strategies across
all sectors including sustaining ﬁsheries, identifying opportunities for agricul-
ture, maintaining the freedom of navigation, ﬂood management, and preserv-
ing important ecosystems (see MRC 2016: annex A). However, the MRC has
failed to attract China and Myanmar to join.
In 1992, the MR nations launched the GMS Economic Cooperation Pro-
gram to promote integrative economic links among riparian nations. The
GMS comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nam, and the Yunnan
province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China. With
support from the ADB and other donors, the GMS programme has become
a key for growth and development in mainland Southeast Asia over the past
few decades. Particularly, the new GMS Strategic Framework for 2012–22,
adopted in December 2011, expands the GMS programme from conventional
infrastructure to multi-sector investments designed to allow the implementa-
tion of large-scale water infrastructures (such as building commercial rela-
tionships in terms of cross-border trade and transportation, energy
development, investment, and water resource usage). This was also considered
as a peaceful resolution of conﬂict in Indo-China relationships in the early
1990s: the integration of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam into the
ASEAN; the gradual opening of the Yunnan province and China itself to its
southern neighbours; and with ﬁnancial support.
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the
signing of the ASEAN Declaration by ﬁve countries: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It was extended to ﬁve other
nations: Brunei (1984), Viet Nam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and
Cambodia (1999). To strengthen the interconnections and economic linkages
between ASEAN and MR countries, ASEAN set up an ASEAN–MBD Cooper-
ation (AMBDC) on 17 June 1996, consisting of all member states of ASEAN
and China. The AMBDC is considered an important framework to enhance and
sustain growth of the MR and a policy dialogue for ASEAN and China to foster
economic development and cooperation.6 In addition, the establishment of
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in December 2015 is a major
milestone for regional economic integration in ASEAN. According to Petri,
Plummer, and Zhai (2012), the AEC offers many opportunities to the business
community and general public because it permits free movement of goods,
6 ASEAN’s Mekong concept document emphasizes the complementarity of existing develop-
ment programmes linking them to the Asian Development Bank–Greater Mekong Sub-region
and the UNDP–Mekong River Commission (Weatherbee 1997).
518 Regional Dynamics
services, foreign direct investment, and skilled labour and free ﬂow of capital.
However, how Mekong countries decide to pursue future hydropower develop-
ment is perhaps one of the most challenging strategic decisions they have faced
since the signing of the 1995 Mekong Agreement (MRC 2010).
26.3.2 Hydropower Projects in the MRB and Their Impact
Transiting from its headwaters to a delta, with more than 4500 km of ﬂow, the
Mekong River provides a major source of energy potential through its basin.
Hydropower projects in the MRB were ﬁrst constructed in Laos and Thailand
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1986, China began building the ﬁrst
of a series of dams in the upper mainstream. At present (2015), hydropower
opportunities are largely related to the mainstream and its immediate tribu-
taries. The total potential for hydropower generation in the MRB is estimated
as ~250,000 MW (ADB 2015). However, only a portion of this potential could
be considered economically and environmentally feasible.
Table 26.4 presents an inventory of hydropower development projects in
the MRB, revealing 66 hydropower dams that have been commissioned, 37
dams that are under construction, and 93 dams that are planned or proposed.
Note that the total number of hydropower projects in China is 46 dams.
However, two dams have been cancelled because of environmental problems
(WLE Greater Mekong 2015). Before 1990, most hydropower development in
the MR was publicly funded. However, since the early 1990s this development
has been transferred and led by commercial partnerships between private sector
developers and local governments (Hirsch 2011). Hydropower projects in the
MR have generally been proﬁtable for both host governments and private sector
sponsors. The total monetary proﬁt of hydropower operations in the next 20
years in the region is estimated to be US$15–20 billion, according to Li (2012).
Although dams can help with ﬂood control in the wet season and with
increased water supply for irrigation and navigation during the dry season for
downstream riparian states, the potential negative consequences for the LMB
Table 26.4. Number of hydropower development projects in the MRB
Country Commissioned Under construction Planned Total
China 17 10 17 44
Myanmar 0 0 6 6
Laos 20 26 57 103
Thailand 7 0 0 7
Cambodia 0 1 11 12
Viet Nam 22 0 2 24
Source: Based on WLE Greater Mekong (2015).
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are multifaceted and likely to materialize in ecological, economic, and negative
political outcomes (Biba 2012). Ziv et al. (2012) also show that the completion
of 78 dams on tributaries would have catastrophic impacts on ﬁsh productivity
and biodiversity. According to Kubiszewski et al. (2012), the value of
lost capture ﬁsheries, future aquaculture production in the LBM,7 and the
value of lost ecosystem services are estimated to be in the range of US$33
billion to 274 billion.
26.3.3 Challenges and Opportunities in the MR
The rich human and natural resources, as well as the current peaceful political
situation in the MR, have attracted many foreign investments and made it one
of the world’s fast growing regions (UNEP 2008). However, with globalization
and population growth, development in the MR has had losses as well as
beneﬁts, thereby increasing pressure on land and water use. The series of
ﬂoods in Laos (during 2011, 2013, 2015) and the current drought in the
Mekong delta (one of the world’s granaries and Viet Nam’s rice bowl) provide
dramatic examples of how environmental mismanagement can be costly for
the region (for details, see MRC 2012). Particularly, the heavy socioeconomic
costs are disproportionately borne by downstream countries, especially
Cambodia, Viet Nam, and riverine parts of Thailand (Cronin and Hamlin 2012).
According to Cronin (2012), the cumulative net economic proﬁt was
US$33.4 billion over 20 years, and total economic proﬁts for 11 proposed
dams ranged from a small positive sum of US$6.6 million to a larger negative
(cost) sum of US$274.4 billion. Moreover, under the MBD plan, only Laos has
a net proﬁt whereas three other members of the MRC faced a loss ranging
from US$50–128.9 billion (Kubiszewski et al. 2012). A particular challenge for
the Mekong River is its tremendous diversity of ﬁsh species, which contribute
to the well-being of more than 60 million people in the LMB. All of the giant
ﬁsh is highly threatened by pressure on ﬁshing, and will be possibly driven to
extinction by the construction of mainstream dams (Matthews and Geheb
2015; Ziv et al. 2012).
The growing human population and increasing energy demand have been
accompanied by the spread of land-use change. Managing land resources,
therefore, is a major challenge in meeting with demand for agricultural
production, urban expansion, and other uses. In terms of electric power
trading, exporting countries are China, Myanmar, and Laos (see ADB 2012:
tables 1 and A1.1). China and Laos have the most potential for mainstream
hydropower generation and are positioned to reap the most beneﬁts from
7 Further details of future impact on hydropower development in the Mekong region can be
found in Kuenzer et al. (2013).
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building dams on the Mekong. However, owing to climate change and to meet
growing energy needs, the promotion of regional power generation, boosting
low carbon source trade, reduction of the dependence on oil and coal imports,
and the lowering of greenhouse gas emissions from power generation are not
only challenges but also opportunities.
In terms of intra-regional trade dependence and the degree to which China
plays a role in that dependence, China has grown faster than the other ﬁve
GMS countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam). As the
China–ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) came into force in January
2010, it established the third-largest free trade area in the world, following the
European Union and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). How-
ever, since then China has been facing a challenge in getting the agreement
formally implemented because the trade structure between China and ASEAN
countries is competitive rather than complementary (Wang 2011).
Although China and Myanmar are not members of the MRC, the ASEAN
has played an important role in economic development of the MR and has
attracted international attention since 1995 (Hensergerth 2009; Weatherbee
1997). In this regard, the MRC, ASEAN, and GMS play a role in analysing
opportunities of issue linkage in reaching a basin-wide agreement and clean
energy transaction.
26 .4 THE ROLE OF ISSUE LINKAGES
IN MANAGING THE MR
As in most transboundary river basins, the relationships between upstream
and downstream nations in the MR are politicized and disputed. China views
the UMB primarily as a source of hydropower and as a trade route. Laos also
considers the MR primarily as a source of hydropower, whereas Thailand
seeks cheap energy and water for irrigation and agricultural sectors. More
than 90 per cent of electricity in Laos is produced from hydroelectric
plants, whereas the main value of the Mekong River for Cambodia is for
ﬁshery (Campbell 2009). Cambodia prefers the conservation of the current
hydrological region, including the seasonal ﬂooding, which gives rise to its
signiﬁcant ﬁshery industry. Viet Nam, on the other hand, relies on the water to
support the Mekong delta’s agricultural production.
Owing to the impact of climate change and the rise in sea level, Viet Nam
wants to protect its efﬁcient agriculture and aquaculture production in the delta
from saltwater intrusion. In addition, it is believed that the highly centralized
Chinese government hasmore grips on its water resources than the fragmented
MRC with its less effective management (Houba, Pham Do, and Zhu 2013).
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Hence, potential conﬂicts exist between these demands for water, land use, and
energy, which will require trade-offs among water-using sectors.
26.4.1 A Basic Framework
Game theory is the formal study of conﬂict and cooperation.8 In the context
of the historical development and integration of the MR, Pham Do and
Dinar (2014) argue that a negotiation process between upstream (China)
and downstream (four LMB countries, represented by MRC) can be con-
sidered as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, countries (China and LMB) can
play at being non-cooperative over independent policy issues (strategies) such
as energy (hydropower generation), trading, and the ecosystem (ﬁshery and
agriculture) to determine (evaluate) their policy (variables). Final outcomes, as
the results of linked issues,9 are then considered in the second stage for
negotiating nations.
Mathematically, let N = {1,2 . . . , n} be a set of policy issues. Assume that the
upstream (U) and downstream (L) simultaneously make a policy choice
or action aJ=(aJ1, . . . aJn)∈AJ, where J =U, L; and each action (policy) proﬁle
a= (aU, aL)∈A =AU×AL speciﬁes a policy choice for each player (region) with
respect to each i ∈N. Furthermore, for each issue i ∈N, each player J has a
measurable payoff function waJi on action proﬁle a with the objective function
of players being linearly separable in policy issues; that is, wJ ¼ Σni ¼ 1waJi10 The
corresponding stage game with strategy space aJ=AJ1×AJ2 . . . ×AJn= {c,d}
n is
denoted by Γ. For example, for policy proﬁle a= (aU, aD) and two issues i and k
(e.g., water and trading), the two-person games Γi(a) and Γk(a) can be de-
scribed in the following two matrices:
8 Conﬂict or non-cooperative strategy refers to a situation in which a binding agreement
cannot be achieved; while it is possible in cooperative strategy.
9 The idea is that linking two (or more) policies (regimes) could allow countries to use
surplus enforcement power that may be available in one policy domain to discipline cooperation
in other domains.
10 Such as dam construction plan, trading and energy plan, ecosystem protection, and
environmental policy, and so on.
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To achieve a basin-wide agreement through linked issues, each player can
consider two possible actions: C (or c) for cooperating or D (or d) for defection
(selﬁsh policy action). For any two independent games, the values of a two-
linked game are determined as the sum of two values in these games. Hence, in
a linked game, player J’s payoff is wj ¼ waJi þ waJk. The objective of each player
is to maximize the ﬁnal outcome wj ¼ maxafwaJi þ waJkg (for further details,
see Pham Do, Dinar, and McKinney 2012). Without loss of generality, it is
assumed that both the LMB and China (UMB) are faced with two strategies—
cooperation and non-cooperation—in each independent game.
26.4.2 Independent Games in the First Stage
26.4.2.1 A Water Game
China’s water resources can be used for industrial and household activities
during the wet season and then stored for use in the dry season. China’s
outﬂow in the wet season fosters local ﬁsh reproduction before it runs to the
mainstream of the LMB downstream. During the dry season, water inﬂow plus
the stored water can be used for similar purposes as in the wet season and
outﬂow from the dams can also be used for irrigation. For the tributaries of the
LMB, water inﬂow can be used for similar economic activities as in China;
water ﬂows in the LMB are similar to those in the UMB, except for the impact
of dams on the ﬂow of tributaries.
Water inﬂow for the mainstream LMB solely consists of the outﬂow
received from China. In each region (UMB and LMB), the economic values
of water use are determined by aggregating four main activities for each season
(wet and dry) (for details, see Houba, Pham Do, and Zhu 2013): (i) dam
capacity for hydropower generation and mitigation of ﬂood damage,
(ii) industrial and household activities, (iii) irrigated agriculture, and (iv) envir-
onmental services or damages (i.e., wetland beneﬁts or damage from saltwater
intrusion in the estuary during the dry season). From the annual economic net
values under cooperation and non-cooperation, a water game can be deter-
mined as shown in Figure 26.1 (ﬁrst stage). In the water game, the dominant
strategy is either not to share water (i.e., upstream) or not to pay for the water
(i.e., downstream), because sharing or making side payment always costs
China/LMB some welfare reduction. The total basin level annual incremental
welfare gains are US$2.05 billion (i.e., 24.81–22.76) for moving from non-
cooperation (22.76) to cooperation (24.81) under weak governance, and US
$0.05 billion (24.81–24.74) under strong governance. In general, LMB nations
can obtain almost the same joint welfare with strong governance, regardless of
China’s situation. If LMB nations act individually (non-cooperation), however,
the total net aggregate economic welfare is lower. From the perspective of
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China, the incentives are quite different. China does not perform its best under
the Nash equilibrium (2.75, 22.06), although the total economic welfare could
be better under the cooperative situation for both parties. Particularly,
China can gain more with weak governance in the LMB. This observation
could explain why China is interested in signing bilateral agreements rather
than multilateral ones, as shown in studies of Naohiro (2012) and Yongqi and
Anfei (2013).
26.4.2.2 A Trade Game
Over the last two decades (1990–2010), the trade/GDP ratio is 131 per cent (in
2010) for the region as a whole (Petri, Plummer, and Zhai 2012). ASEAN
markets are especially important for Laos and Viet Nam. However, Laos
appears to be a ‘free rider’ in ASEAN and Viet Nam is a loser, although the
latter is a potential player for agricultural productions.11 As trade is an
important driver of economic growth, ten members of ASEAN agreed to
implement the AEC by the end of 2015, which commits to free movement
of goods, services, foreign direct investment, and free ﬂows of capital (ASEAN
2010). Hence, all ASEAN economies are open to trade and investment. With
AEC, the strategy of LMB members of ASEAN is either to retain barriers with
non-ASEAN partner economies (such as China) or to remove the barriers
(i.e., open trade with more partners of the world). According to Petri,
Plummer, and Zhai (2012), the region’s share pattern is essentially symmetric.
About one quarter of overall ASEAN trade is shared within ASEAN as well
with the United States, the European Union, China, and Japan, and the rest
of the world. China, therefore, is considered as a partner of ASEAN and is
involved with AEC only under two arrangements: (i) increased bilateral
free trade area with the four LMB states (under CAFTA) where the states
are members of AFTA, or (ii) bilateral free trade area with AEC
(under AFTA).
To determine the trading game, the welfare gain of the LMB is deﬁned as
the aggregated gains obtained from all four LMB nations in ASEAN (for
details, see Pham Do and Dinar 2014). From Figure 26.1 (trade game), one
can easily see that the LMB has open trade as the dominant strategy, whereas
China’s dominant strategy is CAFTA. In this game, the Nash equilibrium
(CAFTA, Open) is not efﬁcient as the total outcome is less than in (AFTA,
Open). Scrutiny of the MR water game and the MR trade game suggests clearly
that playing each game separately will lead to nowhere.
11 Owing to lack of data in a water game, the values of the trade game is based only on trade
results related to the four states of the LMB and China.
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26.4.3 Linked Game in the Second Stage
As mentioned in Sections 26.4.2.1 and 26.4.2.2, cooperation is the dominant
strategy in the water issue, whereas open is the dominant strategy in the
trade issue. Taking into account the two outcomes of the water issue and
the two outcomes of the trade issue, a linked game can be presented,12 as
shown in the second stage of Figure 26.1. Note that the values of the linked
game are determined from two independent games in the ﬁrst stage. For
example, (−5.05, 37.46)=(2.75−7.8, 22.06+15.4), (−4.04, 36.45)=(3.76−7.8,
21.05+15.4), (−9.25, 74.96)=(2.75−12.0, 22.06+52.9), and (−8.24, 73.95)=
(3.76−12.0, 21.05+52.9).
The linked game indicates that the total social welfare will increase when
water and trade issues are considered together. Note that the main uses of
water are taken into account in the water game, whereas all agricultural
products and the electric power trade are considered in the trade game.
Hence, with a higher outcome, the LMB could make a side payment to
China. The losses and gains are similar for China and the LMB in the linked
game. For example, the outcome (−9.25, 74.96) indicates the total payoff of
65.71, which is 74.96−9.25, whereas for the total outcome (−8.24, 73.95) the
payoff is 65.71, which is 74.96−9.25. For the others, the outcomes (−5.05,
37.46)* and (−4.04, 36.45) both lead to 32.41. Thus, linkage issue will give
more opportunities for countries in the negotiation process.
LMB
LMB
WATER GAME
LINKED GAME
Liberalize (c)
Liberalize (c)
(–5.05, 37.46)*
(–9.25, 74.96)
(–4.04, 36.45)
(–8.24, 73.95)Status quo (d)
Status quo (d)
China
China
First stage: independent games
Second stage: linked games
Cooperation
Strong
governance
(2.75, 22.06)*
(2.73, 22.03)
(3.76, 21.05)
(2.73, 20.03)
Weak
governance
Non-
Cooperation
LMB
TRADE GAME
China
(–7.8, 15.4)*
(–12.2, 52.9)
(0.4, 2.8)
(–4.6, 12.0)
Open Restrict
CAFTA
AFTA
Figure 26.1. MR two-stage game.
Note: = Nash equilibrium
Source: Authors’ illustration based
12 As we aim to investigate whether or not China will consider joining the MRC in the context
of ASEAN, we assume that the LMB states act in one voice in the linked game.
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26.5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Like any developing economy of the world, the MR is inﬂuenced in various
ways by pressures from global markets, increased demand for natural resource
and energy, as well as the impact of climate change and mitigation efforts. The
transboundary negative externality nature of the ﬂow of the Mekong River
adds an extra dimension of complexity to the debate about equitable sharing
of resources in the MR, particularly for hydropower plants as alternative
strategies in achieving clean energy transitions. In theory, beneﬁt sharing
can improve the livelihood of people impacted by hydropower development.
In practice, however, beneﬁt sharing in the MR has shown mixed results.
This chapter demonstrates the advantages of linked issues in bringing
together ﬁve (or six) countries into a common framework for coordinating
and managing the MR. Issue linkages allow balancing the interests of all
stakeholders in the MR. For example, the MRC is not a strong and solid
organization. However, with international and regional support, LMB nations
have the incentive to negotiate with China regarding the trade issue. This
opportunity will help the LMB nations (via MRC) to decide on how to strike a
balance between hydropower development and the preservation of conditions
necessary for sustaining (ﬁsh and agricultural production) ecosystems in the
future. In addition, further opportunities and investment should be considered
and added.
Having examined the ability of facilitating cooperation (by allowing coun-
tries to tie together issues in which they have dissimilar interests), this chapter
also shows that LMB countries can beneﬁt most from linked issues. Particu-
larly, the MR problem is not a lack of mechanism but of creating an effective
body out of a multiplicity. Hence, in managing the MR energy transition,
water is just one issue to be taken into account, and is insufﬁcient on its own to
establish a viable regime in managing sustainable development. The policy
measures, therefore, are to establish a legal framework in which more
issues should be considered simultaneously, thus implementing the beneﬁcial
procedures of issue linkages.
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The Political Economy of Clean Energy
Transitions at Sub-National Level
Understanding the Role of International Climate
Regimes in Energy Policy in Two Brazilian States
Jose A. Puppim de Oliveira and Celio Andrade
27.1 INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous potential for investments in clean energy over the next few
years to take the energy matrix in a more sustainable direction to tackle climate
change and air pollution. The global bill for oil, electricity, and natural gas is
around US$5 trillion annually and investments in clean energy reached US$230
billion in 2011 and US$286 billion in 2015 (UNEP, 2016). These annual
investments could reach US$500 billion in 2020 (Glemarec and Puppim de
Oliveira 2012). However, much larger investments in clean energy are needed,
particularly in developing economies, to change the course of unpredictable
climatic change (heading towards an average temperature increase of over 2°C)
in the near and medium-term future. Even though, in many instances, clean
energy is technically and economically viable, the political economy at the
national, sub-national, and local levels does not allow the fulﬁlment of the
possibilities for expansion in clean energy production. This could undermine
the implementation of the new Paris Agreement on climate change under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The analytical framework of this research focuses on the analysis of the
political economy of clean energy transitions, particularly understanding how
sub-national and local institutions for tackling climate change are established
and evolve, building on previous efforts (Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Bulkeley
and Betsill 2003; Puppim de Oliveira 2009, 2011). There is less research on the
dynamics of domestic policies and politics, and on the nature of federal
systems, in climate change discussions, as most of the research focuses on
international dynamics of climate negotiations (Harrison and Sundstrom
2010). The local and domestic political economy can shed light on the factors
that determine the effectiveness of international climate and energy regimes
locally, and how to align international institutions to national and local
institutions and context. The mismatch between the international goals and
the national and sub-national institutions already in place leads to ineffective
results in climate policy implementation (Puppim de Oliveira 2014). There is
often a decoupling between the networks of public and private actors and
institutions working on the ground and those coming from the top, particu-
larly at the international level (Pinto and Puppim de Oliveira 2008; Andrade
and Puppim de Oliveira 2015). Better connections between the international
regimes in climate change and sub-national political economy could identify
ways to boost clean energy sources both at demand and supply.
The objective of this chapter is to shed light on discussions about the
political economy at the sub-national/local level surrounding the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.1 The CDM is a good
research object for looking at the political economy of clean energy transitions
at sub-national level. Even though it is an international mechanism, its
implementation is done at the local level and inﬂuenced by sub-national
governance. Moreover, CDM could be implemented only in developing coun-
tries, where the energy demand will grow most in the next few years. We
examine the main political economy obstacles, particularly at the sub-national
levels, including international–national–sub-national relations, to enabling
global climate initiatives, such as the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, to have a larger
impact in developing countries. This enables us to recommend possible ways
to overcome those obstacles, strengthen the implementation of clean energy
policies, and inform the design of the implementation mechanisms for future
climate change agreements. We examine the policy process for climate and
energy policies in two states in Brazil (Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia), and, in
particular, the inﬂuence of CDM in the development of those policies.
27 .2 METHODOLOGY
The methodology consisted of a qualitative analysis of the political economy of
clean energy initiatives in the two states, including the inﬂuence of CDM
projects mentioned in Section 27.1. The research uses the case study method,
1 This chapter is also based on long-term research and several publications co-written by the
authors, particularly Andrade, Nascimento, and Puppim (2010); Andrade et al. (2010); Silva-
Junior et al. (2013a, 2013b); Falleiro et al. (2014, 2015); and Andrade and Puppim de Oliveira
(2015).
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which is well documented in the literature (Ragin and Becker 1992; Yin 1994).
Because quantitative analyses of policy and political regimes have several
limitations for the trade-off between accuracy and generalization and need
to simplify data (Mitchell 2004), qualitative study was chosen for two main
reasons. First, qualitative study is a good approach for analysing complex
processes of decision-making, such as for clean energy initiatives, which need
an in-depth understanding of the political economy involving different actors
and factors not known in advance that have inﬂuenced state energy and
climate policies. Second, there was not enough information and data to
make, for example, a quantitative study statistically signiﬁcant. A qualitative
analysis gives a broad perspective on the political economy of clean energy at
the various levels, enabling a comprehensive understanding of the inﬂuence of
international regimes in clean energy in Brazil at the sub-national level.
The empirical research was conducted in the Brazilian states of Bahia and
Rio Grande do Sul. The two states were chosen because they are the leading
states in terms of CDM projects in their regions (north-east and south
respectively) during the period of analysis. Moreover, the two states have
some of the most progressive policies for climate change and renewable energy
in Brazil. The authors also had good knowledge of their contexts and access to
state information and data.
The analyses focused on examining the political economy at the sub-
national level and its links to the national and international political economy.
The research aimed to track the main drivers of clean energy initiatives in the
two states, and how much they have been inﬂuenced by international climate
regimes, particularly the CDM. Thus, besides the broad state policies and
initiatives, the research analysed the CDM projects in clean energy, especially
those with a long history of implementation that have already received carbon
credits (Certiﬁed Emissions Reductions—CER). The research studied individ-
ual CDM projects to understand a typical local dynamic and also investigated,
in greater depth, one CDM project in each state involving wind energy (Bahia)
and small hydro power plant (Rio Grande do Sul). The chapter examines how
the electricity generation and distribution sector is evolving in Brazil and its
links with climate change. The study analyses governmental programmes and
provides an overview of the past, present, and future developments in wind
and hydro energy in the two states and their links with national and inter-
national climate regimes, particularly those related to the UNFCCC.
We conducted document analyses using material from the UNFCCC (CDM
database and Project Design Documents—PDD), Brazilian Ministry of Envir-
onment (MMA), the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation
(MCTI), and the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) in Brasilia; and
from the state environmental protection and energy agencies in the two states,
among other institutions. Field research for conducting semi-structured inter-
views and further data collection was carried out in the two states. One CDM
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project in each state was selected to illustrate the CDM impact at the local
level. There were also calls for interviews and email exchanges with the
different organizations, such as energy companies and consultants involved
in clean energy and CDM projects in 2015.
27 .3 NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL POLICIES
FOR CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
With the rise of scientiﬁc evidence about the causes and consequences of
climate change, a variety of market and political institutions have been
developed to govern those issues globally, nationally, and locally. Despite the
low price of carbon, due to recent crises in the carbon market, and criticism of
its ability to promote cleaner technologies and sustainable development, there
is an important role for carbon markets in national and sub-national climate
change regimes (Streck and Lin 2008; Okereke, Wittneben, and Bowen 2012;
Michaelowa 2012; CDM Policy Dialogue 2012). The Brazilian government,
though not committed to compulsory targets for reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions because the country is not included in Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol, enacted Law 12.187/2009, which established the National Policy on
Climate Change, committing to undertake a number of sectoral actions aimed
at mitigating and adapting to climate change; one of these is the rise in
investments in clean energy.
The different mechanisms for responding to climate change are creating
opportunities in some of the ‘green’ industries, such as renewable and clean
energy. Brazil already has an outstanding share of renewable energies, dom-
inated by its naturally endowed huge potential of hydro energy, providing a
share of 74.5 per cent of the domestic electricity supply in 2014 with a total
hydro power resources and reserves of 110.3 GW (EPE, 2015). The country
has created some incentive mechanisms such as the Programme of Incentives
for Alternative Electricity Sources (PROINFRA, Programa de Incentivo a
Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica) established by Law 10438/2002,
which gives subsidies and incentives for clean electricity projects using the
special ﬁnancial mechanisms of the Brazilian National Development Bank
(BNDES, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social). However,
this ‘clean’ energy proﬁle could change considerably depending on the growth
of electricity demand, the availability of resources for generation, environ-
mental constraints, the distribution networks, and the cost of exploiting
resources. Indeed, Brazilian emissions in the energy sector have increased
considerably in recent years through the use of non-renewable energy sources
(MME 2015). Thus the research examines how the CDM and other markets
and policies have stimulated the development of and investments in renewable
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energies in Brazil. By collecting and comparing different political and eco-
nomic preconditions, structures, and the overall development in the two states
and projects, the research identiﬁes pitfalls and opportunities for new strat-
egies and mechanisms for boosting clean energy in Brazil.
As part of a federal republic, the Brazilian states play a key role in climate
and energy initiatives, as they have a certain amount of autonomy in the way
they create new policy mechanisms and implement national policies. Several
states have advanced their own climate policies, stating the level of emission
reductions to be made, with these sometimes being even more stringent than
the national targets, and planning to establish different mechanisms such as
emission trading (CNI 2011). This was particularly the case around the time of
the UNFCCC COP-15 in Copenhagen in December 2009 (Forum Clima
2012). Most of the Brazilian state climate policies are a response to national
directive (Law 12.187/2009, which established the National Policy on Climate
Change). Only two out of 27 states—São Paulo and Santa Catarina—established
their climate policies before the National Policy on Climate Change. However,
recently, states have been becoming more active in climate policies. In 2015, in
response to targets set nationally, 16 out of 27 Brazilian states set their own
voluntary targets for emissions; four states (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Mato
Grosso do Sul, and Paraíba) had already deﬁned their compulsory targets for
emissions and seven others were in the process of deﬁning their state climate
policies (Forum Clima 2015).
One of the main mechanisms in Brazil for motivating GHG emission
reductions has been the CDM. There were more than 7,740 projects registered
at UNFCCC in December 2016 (UNFCCC 2016). Brazil registered the ﬁrst
CDM project in the UNFCCC and has been one of the leading countries in
executing CDM projects with 330 projects at the end of 2014 (MCTI 2014). In
Brazil, energy projects comprise the majority of CDM projects (55 per cent),
which are spread through various states across the country. Thus, this research
seeks to understand the political economy of the sub-national clean energy
initiatives in Brazil and the links with international energy and carbon mech-
anisms such as carbon markets and, particularly, the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.
27.3.1 The Case of Rio Grande do Sul
Rio Grande do Sul is the southernmost state in Brazil, bordering Uruguay and
Argentina. Although it is one of the largest producers of coal in Brazil, it
generates around 77 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources (hydro
71 per cent, wind 6 per cent)—more than the national average of 75 per cent
(CEE, 2014). The state also enacted the State Climate Change Policy Law
(Law 13.594/10) in 2010, which sets out the reduction of GHGs required by
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2020, proportional to what is established in the national policy. The Law
also aims to promote projects to reduce emissions through CDM (article 5)
(Falleiro, Gastaldini, and Andrade 2014).
In 2004, the state governor issued a decree (Decree 43.476) establishing a
commission to study CDM and its environmental implications, already
pointing to the potential of CDM to foster opportunities in Rio Grande do Sul.
The state now has the largest number of CDM projects in renewable energy
among Brazilian states (using methodology ACM0002 from the UNFCCC,
‘Consolidated baseline methodology for grid-connected electricity generation
from renewable sources’) in the ﬁrst period of the Kyoto Protocol (between
2005 and 2012). The state hosts 19 (11 small hydro, 2 hydro, 5 wind, and 1
biomass) of the 85 Brazilian CDM projects in renewable energy (22 per cent of
the total) comprising 1.9 million CERs (25 per cent of the total in Brazil from
renewable energy) (Falleiro, Gastaldini, and Andrade 2014).
The state government has worked with other stakeholders in mapping and
trying to tap the wind energy potential. The state has produced the Wind
Energy Atlas to identify opportunities in wind energy and guide public
policies. Wind, in particular, has an immense potential in the state as only
634 MW of installed capacity exists compared to the estimated potential of
102.3 GW. This potential is concentrated in the less economically dynamic
regions and could be harnessed to generate economic development, especially
taking into account the tradition of regional development policies in the state
(AGDI and Eletrosul 2014).
One of the CDM projects analysed in this research is the Ferradura small
hydropower plant located in Erval Seco in the north-western part of Rio
Grande do Sul. The project was managed by BT Geradora de Energia Elétrica
SA, a special-purpose company led by a local entrepreneur. Even though the
number of jobs generated (two jobs) is small and the technology transfer
limited, as it is a well-known technology, the project unexpectedly generated
an area for leisure (ﬁshing, swimming, and picnics) in a region with a lack of
such facilities.
27.3.2 The Case of Bahia
Bahia is located in the north-east region of Brazil. It generates more than
83 per cent of its electricity from renewable sources (wind and hydropower),
more than the national average (75 per cent). As in Rio Grande do Sul, the
Bahia state has a huge wind potential of untapped electricity generation.
Bahia’s Wind Energy Atlas identiﬁed only 1.2 GW of installed capacity as
compared to the estimated potential of 195 GW (MME 2015). The state only
enacted its Climate Change Policy (Law 12050) in 2011, but between 2005 and
2012 it had one of the highest numbers of CDM projects in renewable energy
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(ACM 0002 methodology) among all Brazilian states. It hosted 12 projects: 10
wind and 2 hydro by the end of 2012 (Falleiro, Gastaldini, and Andrade 2015).
One of these CDM projects is the Votorantim Hydropower Plant, registered
in 2006. It consists of a hydroelectric plant whose dam, reservoir, and ﬂooded
area have existed since the 1980s. The project just added sub-stations, tur-
bines, and generators (Fernandez et al. 2014) with no local environmental
impact. The hydropower plant is owned by Votorantim Cimentos Ltd and it
has an installed electric capacity of 162 MW. Votorantim is one of the largest
Brazilian industrial conglomerates in the ﬁelds of steel and cement. This CDM
project foresees a reduction of 59,485 tons of CO2e/year (Silva-Junior et al.
2013a). Economically, the project has contributed to the national economy
and has generated tax revenues. Socially, this CDM project has generated
employment, improved the public infrastructure of adjacent municipalities,
and provided professional training for plant operation and maintenance.
Direct jobs were created during the construction of the plant and indirect
jobs for its maintenance (Fernandez et al. 2014).
During the proposal phase, the company organized public hearings and
visits with diverse groups of stakeholders, mainly NGOs, local authorities, and
ﬁshermen. Environmentally, besides GHG emissions reduction, the project
has contributed to the reforestation of riparian vegetation, the conservation of
ﬂora and fauna, the recovery of degraded areas, the management of aquatic
ecosystems, the monitoring of water quality, and an environmental education
programme in its area of inﬂuence (Silva-Junior et al. 2013a).
Some of its carbon credits go to the Votorantim Institute, which is the
company’s organization for carrying out initiatives in corporate social respon-
sibility, such as income generation projects with the communities around the
dam (Fernandez et al. 2014). We also point out the main opportunities and
political economy obstacles to the implementation of CDM-like projects to
delivering local sustainable development in Section 27.4.
27 .4 ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF CDM IN THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY TRANSITION
In this section we analyse the impact of the CDM projects on the political
economy of clean energy transitions with a focus on the two states, and also
the role of the national government and the federal system (the division of
responsibilities between national and sub-national entities). We examine how
much CDM has been able to inﬂuence different processes and stakeholders to
facilitate energy transitions domestically, including the adoption of progres-
sive energy and climate policies, development of local technological capabil-
ities in clean energy, and strengthening local planning processes. The research
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provides some insights into the political economy for managing the transition
to a cleaner energy matrix in developing countries, particularly the role of
international mechanisms, such as CDM.
How to make climate change goals compatible with the development
agenda at the national and sub-national levels in the public and private sectors
is key to the implementation of climate-related policies such as clean energy
development (Pinto and Puppim de Oliveira 2008; Glemarec and Puppim de
Oliveira 2012; Puppim de Oliveira 2013). The research sheds light on the role
of CDM in inﬂuencing the way different clean energy and climate institutions
are being built. In Section 27.4.1, we examine in greater detail the links
between CDM and the changes in climate and energy policy and regulation
(for example, many states in Brazil are adopting different climate policies and
legislation to tackle climate change). We examine its inﬂuence on innovation
and technological policies in Section 27.4.2 (reducing GHGs from dissemin-
ation of innovations in clean energy) and the planning processes involved
in Section 27.4.3 (how energy planning decisions are based on local inputs
and take into consideration climate change issues and the interests of future
generations).
27.4.1 CDM Impacts on Domestic Climate and Energy Policies
International market mechanisms could change the domestic political econ-
omy balance towards the adoption of more progressive climate and energy
policies in developing countries. Nevertheless, the role of CDM as a global
climate and energy governance mechanism seems quite ambiguous. Even
though thousands of CDM projects were executed, issuing millions of carbon
credits (CERs), the effect on domestic and local policies is unclear. For
example, the GHGs in the main CDM host countries (China, India, and
Brazil) have continued to grow in the last decade. China, the largest CDM
recipient country, has increased its CO2 emissions during 2000–13 by 192 per
cent and its CO2 per capita emissions in the same period by 169 per cent, and
Brazil has increased its emissions by 48 per cent and 29 per cent respectively
(EC 2015).2 Even though countries have enacted laws, targets, and policies on
climate change, none of the large developing countries have included manda-
tory total emission reductions. The additionality component of CDM may
even have blocked national and state legislation for controlling GHGs, as this
could undermine additionality.
2 The emissions included are those from ‘the fossil fuel use and industrial processes (cement
production, carbonate use of limestone and dolomite, non-energy use of fuels and other
combustion). Excluded are: short-cycle biomass burning (such as agricultural waste burning)
and large-scale biomass burning (such as forest ﬁres)’ (EC 2015).
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The federal structure of a country can inﬂuence the way international
regimes inﬂuence national and sub-national policies (Harrison and
Sundstrom 2010). Even though there is a high degree of decentralization in
certain sectors (e.g., education and health), the autonomy of states and
municipalities limits the scope of their action in climate change, particularly
in clean energy supply and markets. The structure of the Brazilian federation
and the utilities allow little space for strong command-and-control regula-
tions and investment decisions at the sub-national level. Many existing
state energy companies have had some of their activities privatized, federal-
ized, or discontinued in recent decades. This is the case of the Rio Grande do
Sul’s State Company of Electric Energy (CEEE—Companhia Estadual de
Energia Elétrica), founded in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, which
had a large part of its distribution system privatized and power plants (like
coal power plants) nationalized in the 1990s (Rotulo Decuadra and Puppim
de Oliveira 2008).
Thus, the policies and legislation at sub-national levels in Brazil generally
mention, but give little incentive for clean energy and climate mitigation
including CDM projects, and there is no obligation to achieve certain targets
for clean energy generation either enforced or directly promoted by the
states. Most of the incentives come from the national level, such as PROIN-
FRA, which gives subsidized credit to energy projects.3 Sub-national gov-
ernments, such as the two states analysed, promote clean energy through
studies to map the energy potential and try to attract energy investments
from the public and private sectors. Climate change policies are more in line
with the national targets, and just a few states (like São Paulo) have been
more ambitious. The laws establishing those policies generally mention the
intention to encourage or promote CDM, but no speciﬁc mechanisms are
concretely deﬁned. Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia have been at the forefront
in attracting CDM projects, particularly in clean energy, both because of the
potential they have (in hydro, wind, and also solar) and the large size of their
economies and populations. CDM ends up being mostly business driven (by
the private sector) leading to stiff competition among states to attract those
projects, as an early decree to create a CDM commission in Rio Grande do
Sul in 2004 seemed to target. Thus, the impact of CDM has been mostly to
steer state and national policies towards an incentive-based approach
to clean energy and to try to attract private investors to tap into the
international opportunity.
3 World Resources Institute website, available at: <http://projects.wri.org/sd-pams-
database/brazil/programme-incentives-alternative-electricity-sources-proinfa> (accessed
15 December 2015).
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27.4.2 CDM Building Technological Capabilities
CDM can provide an opportunity to change the local political economy to
invest in building local technological capabilities in clean energy, as it involves
cooperation between developing and developed countries (the latter may pro-
vide the incentives or the technical background to build the capabilities).
However, the research has not found any direct changes in the political econ-
omy to promote capability building in clean energy at the sub-national level.
Even though CDM promoted the acquisition of the know-how and equipment
in Brazil, the technologies were well-known, and coming from outside the state.
For example, in the Votorantim CDM project in Bahia, the exogenous transfer
of technology was very limited—only evident in secondary equipment pur-
chased in Germany.Much of themachinery and know-how required for project
development were acquired in the domestic market. Thus, technology transfer
was mainly endogenous due to Brazil’s mastery in hydroelectric technology
production (Silva-Junior et al. 2013b). A similar outcome developed in the
Ferradura project in Rio Grande do Sul state, where the technology was already
dominated by Brazilian companies. The use of well-known technologies comes
about because they are tested technologies, posing less ﬁnancial and techno-
logical risks to the investors and promoters of the CDM projects.
The national government is the key actor in driving technology policies in
the CDM through the PROINFRA programme, which required that ﬁnanced
projects acquired more than 60 per cent of the equipment and technology
domestically. However, PROINFRA did not foster technology development
per se as a requirement for funding. On the other hand, the states have very
little inﬂuence in technology policies, as the climate policies do not specify any
concrete technological policies, even though promotion of clean technology is
mentioned in the policies, such as the State Climate Change Policy Law in Rio
Grande do Sul. The states have some science and technology funds managed
by their state research foundations that have tried to promote calls for clean
energy, but none of the projects seem to have used those funds.
In conclusion, the research found that the CDM projects in the two states
did not contribute signiﬁcantly to technological development locally. Tech-
nology transfer was also limited, but CDM projects have demanded mostly
locally produced equipment that indirectly can help technological develop-
ment (which would be just a spillover effect from the growing domestic
demand for clean energy).
27.4.3 Local Planning for Sustainability
International climate policy and market mechanisms could help local plan-
ning processes to be more sustainable by, for example, generating incentives or
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conditions for changing the local political economy to make planning more
inclusive and participatory. The evidence collected from different sources
(such as interviews, ﬁeld visits, and secondary information, such as CDM
reports in the UNFCCC page) shows that CDM projects in the energy sector
generated little participation and local development in the long term. They just
followed the common processes already in place in the two states (such as
Environmental Impact Assessment) without building more participatory,
engaging planning processes. Most of the projects created only a handful of
direct jobs in their operations as, once installed, large parts of the operations
are automated as in the case of Ferradura in RS (just two jobs), or such as was
the case in Votorantim in Bahia, where the facility was already operational.
The decisions on the CDM projects have indicated a prevalence of a single
bottom-line proﬁle for decision-making (ﬁnancial returns from carbon mar-
ket) over the long term, next generations’ interests (Falleiro, Gastaldini, and
Andrade 2015).
There is also little sign that CDM has created signiﬁcant opportunities for
engagement with local businesses. The direct participation of small organiza-
tions, ﬁrms, and communities in CDM projects is limited because of the high
transaction costs related to all phases of the projects. The complexity of
the registration process is beyond the reach of most local organizations.
Nevertheless, one of the CDMprojects in this research (Ferradura in Rio Grande
do Sul) was led by a local entrepreneur, demonstrating the possibility for
emergence of institutional arrangements that allow small local organizations to
engage in CDM. Thus, a small number of consultants, mostly international or
from outside the regions of the projects, dominate the services, generating few
opportunities for local ﬁrms to be engaged in the projects and develop the
expertise in CDM which could boost other CDM projects locally.
27 .5 CONCLUSIONS
The development of large-scale clean energy initiatives in developing coun-
tries depends heavily on the local political economy, as well as the local
technical capacity to carry out technological changes. International political
and market mechanisms in energy and climate change regimes could be an
opportunity to transform the balance in the domestic and sub-national polit-
ical economy to promote clean energy initiatives. However, the results of this
study showed limited evidence of the lasting impacts of CDM projects on
changing the sub-national political economy to boost clean energy initiatives
locally, though CDM brought resources to project implementation, mainly
through private actors. The CDM projects generated sparse incentives for local
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climate and energy policies, had little impact on local planning processes, and
showed little development of technological capabilities locally.
There are some features in Brazil that may have limited broader impacts of
CDM. Countries and states with better technical capacity and more sophisti-
cated industry can more easily adapt to changes coming from international
regimes through small incentives or funding (Puppim de Oliveira 2014). The
local market structure and its political economy may also inﬂuence clean
energy efforts. In countries where there is more effective regulation and
open competition in the local energy market, economically and technically
viable solutions may win quickly without much state intervention. However,
in a rigid energy market like the one in Brazil, we have seen, instead, depend-
ence on national government interventions, as the states promote and com-
pete to attract clean energy investments with the few resources they have. The
states of Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia are those traditionally with the largest
capacity to implement environmental and energy policies in their respective
regions (south and north-east), and this has been reﬂected in the number of
CDM projects they were able to attract, particularly in the area of energy.
We have witnessed the national government introducing incentives to
reduce risks and make clean energy more attractive (such as PROINFRA),
and CDM helped in offering greater incentives for local implementation. Sub-
national governments could play a larger role in such transitions if they had
more autonomy to push for different sustainable policies, but there is a
mismatch between what locals could do and what the CDM projects could
fund. In Brazil, urban policies, in areas such as urban transport and land use,
are mostly in the hands of local governments, but there are few opportunities
for CDM projects because of the difﬁculties of designing a methodology
and transaction costs, as many projects would be small scale. Moreover, in
the area of energy generation the capacity of sub-national governments in
countries like Brazil is limited. The new international mechanisms in the Paris
Agreement, based on the Nationally Determined Contributions, could open
more opportunities in those urban sectors, though there is no direct incentive
yet and ﬁnancial incentives would most likely have to be via national
governments.
The research also provides a better understanding of the speciﬁc features of
the political economy of energy transitions in developing countries, where
challenges for coping with climate change and energy governance and risks are
different from those of more established institutions in more developed
countries. Governance aspects, such as law enforcement, inter-sectoral coord-
ination, and participation, tend to be weaker in developing countries affecting
how organizations and individuals perceive the problems and act. Even in the
two leading states (Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul) there are signiﬁcant obs-
tacles to advance climate and clean energy policies. For example, there is a lack
of coordination capacity between the public and private sectors in Rio Grande
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do Sul to deﬁne concrete targets and mobilize resources for emission reduction
(Falleiro, Gastaldini, and Andrade 2014). Thus, priorities in capacity building
in management and governance are very distinct between developed and
developing countries.
The emergence of political or economic factors at the higher level can
change the balance of political and economic forces at the sub-national level,
which can facilitate or make difﬁcult the dissemination of clean energy in a
particular context/state. Political organizations or networks promoting clean
energy can become more powerful or legitimate to pursue their actions or
interests. Thus, the research also sheds light on the effectiveness of implemen-
tation of international environmental agreements adding the component to
the local political economy. International regimes can be important for chan-
ging national and sub-national political and market forces to promote the
objectives of the agreement. For example, the discussions leading up to
Copenhagen in 2009 helped to catalyse state legislations on climate policies
and GHG emission reductions in Brazil. Agreements can result in internation-
al projects or economic incentives forcing needed changes locally, such as the
CDM projects. Nevertheless, in many cases the objectives of the mechanisms
and their implementation are not completely allied to the local political
economy (Pinto and Puppim de Oliveira 2008). Thus, there is a need for
understanding the local political economy and creating ﬂexible mechanisms to
adapt global interests to local needs in the short and medium term.
CDM was one of the innovative mechanisms for facilitating the implementa-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol. CDM projects would engage developing countries
(Non-Annex B) in carbon reduction initiatives while giving ﬂexibility to devel-
oped countries (Annex B) to achieve the reduction targets, and at the same time
encouraging technology transfer between North and South. However, even
though CDM projects brought billions of dollars to projects in developing
countries, it looks like they were concentrated in just a few countries and
consulting companies, and the large societal goals, such as tackling climate
change and promoting sustainable development, were limited.
27.5.1 Moving Ahead: Lessons from the Paris Agreement
The rules for post-Kyoto (the new Paris Agreement of 12/2015) can be an
opportunity to develop mechanisms to reduce overall GHG emissions by
bringing development opportunities to the poorest and most vulnerable
populations of developing countries. Hopefully, Paragraph 2 of Article 6 of
the Paris Agreement (December 2015) established a voluntary mechanism in
order to: (a) promote the mitigation of GHG while fostering sustainable
development; (b) incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation
of GHG emissions by public and private entities; and (c) contribute to the
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reduction of emission levels in the host countries, which will beneﬁt from
mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by
another country to fulﬁl its nationally determined contribution and deliver
overall mitigation in global emissions.
Policy makers need to rethink the way CDM, or its substitute mechanism
post-Kyoto in the follow-ups to the Paris Agreement, can bring more
development outcomes to society and build technological capabilities in
poorer countries, while reducing overall carbon emissions globally. There
are several alternatives for incorporating more local development goals in
CDM or its follow-ups. For example, local development goals could be an
integrated part of the Project Design Documents (PDD) and the ﬁnal
validation of the carbon credits of speciﬁc projects, including the participa-
tion of the main local stakeholders in the veriﬁcation and validation pro-
cesses. Governments and companies participating in carbon ﬁnancing
mechanisms and markets should also have overall carbon reduction goals
for access to the credits, and these should not only be based on one isolated
project. Moreover, the simpliﬁcation of the bureaucracy could allow small
ﬁrms and local organizations to engage in global carbon markets. Finally, the
participation of local civil society in the decisions on carbon mechanisms
could strengthen planning processes and have a better share of the economic
beneﬁts of carbon credits.
On the other hand, greater reforms in the federal systems in some countries
like Brazil could encourage states and municipalities to take more responsi-
bilities in energy and climate policies. Providing more autonomy for more
stringent command-and-control regulations, incentives for local carbon and
energy markets, or even direct participation in energy investments could allow
more sub-national policy innovation and action in developing renewable
energy generation and markets at the sub-national level. Some reforms in
energy distribution and generation could help to boost cleaner energy initia-
tives with the participation of local actors.
The practice of CDM has been different to its original concept during the
Kyoto Protocol process, and we hope this is not repeated with the mechanisms
that will follow up the Paris Agreement. The credibility of international
mechanisms and agreements is based on their capacity to deliver sustainable
development, including reduction of total emissions. Promoters of voluntary
market-based carbon initiatives like CDM have focused on making those
markets work efﬁciently to grow in volume and ﬁnancial returns, and less
on total emission reduction and local development, which are the reasons they
were created in the ﬁrst place. National and states policies can play a key role
in steering those markets to bring more societal goals, but they require
concrete initiatives beyond general laws (as those we have seen in Brazilian
states) without grip, or they risk losing good opportunities to boost their own
clean energy initiatives.
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28
Implementing EU Renewable Energy
Policy at the Subnational Level
Navigating between Conﬂicting Interests
Gilles Lepesant
28.1 INTRODUCTION
The political economy of energy has undergone signiﬁcant changes in Europe
during the past 20 years. Energy has become a shared competence between the
European Union (EU) and member states with the inclusion of a dedicated
section of the Lisbon Treaty (signed on 13 December 2007). EU legislation has
signiﬁcantly expanded to promote energy efﬁciency and renewably generated
energy, pursuant to Article 194(2). The 2020 package—a set of binding rules
established in 2007 proposed three targets: a 20 per cent reduction in green-
house gas emissions (compared to the levels in 1990), 20 per cent renewable
energy in the EU, and a 20 per cent improvement in energy efﬁciency. In this
context, a directive on renewable energy deﬁned speciﬁc targets for each
member state in 2009 (European Union 2009).
On the other hand, subnational authorities are also seeking to help shape
the path towards a low-carbon economy. Because renewable energy makes
local energy solutions easier, bottom-up energy policies have become increas-
ingly common. European subnational actors are not only willing to curb
energy consumption, they also wish to be suppliers. As a result, the transition
to clean energy increases pressure on decentralization in centralized countries
and affects multi-level systems of governance even in federal states. The
interaction between the different levels of governance, as well as between
stakeholders at the local level, is very often linked to the concept of acceptance,
namely to the level of support enjoyed by renewables. The rise of the renew-
ables is indeed the outcome of technological innovation, local initiatives, and
legal as well as economic conditions provided at the national and European
levels. Hence, the need to better understand how institutional arrangements
may impact clean energy transitions at the local level.
Brandenburg (Germany) and Aquitaine (France) offer useful insights into
these debates, as both regions are forerunners in renewable energies, but they
are also exposed to rising discontent in terms of acceptance. Focusing on these
two regions, this chapter calls attention to factors that both inhibit and
accelerate the implementation of EU policy for a clean energy transition at
the subnational level in a federal state (Germany), and in a unitary one
(France). The chapter addresses the speciﬁc tensions arising in these two
regions and discusses governance issues raised by the surge of renewable
energies. We start by presenting theoretical insights related to the three
dimensions of acceptance as suggested by Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and
Bürer (2007) and to multi-level governance. We continue with lessons learnt
from the comparative assessment of the two regions and conclude by
suggesting how addressing the shortcomings of multi-level governance
might help defuse tensions.
28 .2 METHODOLOGY
Research on global climate change policy tends to focus on international
negotiations and national policies. The role of local authorities in the energy
planning process has recently become a signiﬁcant research issue, however,
and the need for both centralized and decentralized approaches has been
recognized (Comodi et al. 2012). As Schreurs suggests, ‘It is at the local and
regional level, in urban as well as in rural areas that many policy ideas are ﬁrst
generated and that is where some of the most creative solutions are being tried
out’ (2008: 346). Local innovations have been the object of speciﬁc studies
(Kern et al. 2005; Kern and Bulkeley 2009). However, alongside the innovative
solutions put forward by subnational actors, tensions have also risen, and
the social acceptance of renewable energy infrastructures has become a
major concern.
Because the concept of acceptance is not easily deﬁnable, Wüstenhagen,
Wolsink, and Bürer (2007) suggest differentiating between socio-political
acceptance, community acceptance, and market acceptance. Socio-political
acceptance is social acceptance on the broadest, most general level. Several
indicators demonstrate that public acceptance for renewable energy technolo-
gies and policies is high in many countries, especially in Germany. This positive
overall picture is, however, misleading. Moving from global to local, from
general support for more renewables to effective siting decisions, some conﬂicts
may arise. Community acceptance refers precisely to the speciﬁc acceptance of
siting decisions and renewable energy projects by local stakeholders. People’s
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actual motives may vary (Bell, Gray, and Haggett 2005;Wolsink 2006) and may
not be the same before, during, and after the project is completed. Opposition
may increase or decrease with the degree of being directly affected by a speciﬁc
wind power project (Simon andWüstenhagen 2006). It can be underpinned by
different factors—those related to distributional justice (how are costs and
beneﬁts shared?) and procedural justice (is there a fair decision-making process
giving all relevant stakeholders an opportunity to participate?) being the most
relevant in the case of wind energy in Brandenburg (Gross 2007).
Finally, Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, and Bürer (2007) stress the importance of
market acceptance being understood as the process of adoption of an innov-
ation and refer in this respect to literature on diffusion of innovation (Rogers
1995). We would argue that market acceptance can also refer to the growing
competition between different uses of wood resources. Forest biomass has
long been perceived as non-controversial since the total volumes of wood
available in Europe far exceed the demand. However, intensifying the use of
forest biomass can affect other forest functions. Conﬂicts are now common in
the governance and management of forests: they can be observed at different
levels and with varying dimensions and intensities. Research on forest-related
conﬂicts has thus developed considerably in recent years. Although there is
certain convergence in how different authors deﬁne conﬂict in this area
(Söderberg and Eckerberg 2013), motives and challenges differ from one
case to another. In Aquitaine, we would argue that conﬂicts refer to ‘one
group impairing the activities of another’ (Glasl (1999) quoted in Mola-
Yudego and Gritten (2010)).
This chapter focuses on community acceptance (with respect to wind
farms in Brandenburg) and market acceptance (concerning forest biomass
in Aquitaine). In our analysis, a mixed approach was adopted consisting of the
analysis of secondary data (e.g., project reports, website materials) and around
30 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (e.g., represen-
tatives of forest biomass and wind sectors, civil servants at the local and
regional level, business representatives, NGOs) during 2015 both in Aquitaine
and in Brandenburg.
28 .3 TWO REGIONS WITH HIGH POTENTIAL FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND GROWING TENSIONS
28.3.1 Two Regions with High Potential
Brandenburg is a pioneering region in terms of wind energy (in proportion to
the size of its population, it has the greatest number of wind turbines of any
German Land: there were 3,300 in 2015 and over 100 are being built every
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year). Indeed, Brandenburg enjoys numerous advantages for the creation of
wind farms: there is signiﬁcant wind power, demographic density is low, and
the region’s economic fabric has been weakened since reuniﬁcation (in 2013
GDP/inhabitant was €23,751 in the region, compared to €33,335 in the
entire country (Eurostat n.d.)). In 2008, 2010, and 2012, the Land was
awarded ﬁrst place in the ranking of the most dynamic regions in Germany
for its policy in support of renewable energy (Renewable Energies Agency
2015). The Energy Strategy for 2030 (Ministry of Economy and Energy of
Brandenburg 2012) predicts that by that date, ﬁnal energy consumption will
be reduced by 23 per cent with respect to 2007 ﬁgures, as 40 per cent of the
Land’s ﬁnal consumption will be covered by renewable energies and CO2
emissions will be reduced by 25 million tonnes (a 72 per cent reduction
compared to 1990).
The Brandenburg government has enshrined its strategy in a long-standing
energy tradition (it pictures itself as an Energieland) that dates back to
communist times, when lignite mines and thermal power plants located in
the Lusatia area provided a signiﬁcant share of the energy for the former GDR
(German Democratic Republic). Open-air lignite mines and power stations
still make Brandenburg one of the three principal mining regions in reuniﬁed
Germany. Thus, the State of Brandenburg has coined the expression ‘bridge-
technology’ (Brückentechnologie) to refer to its brown coal industry (von
Hirschhausen et al. 2012).
In France, several laws have broadened local responsibilities such as the
Brottes law in 2013 (Loi Brottes) or the law on energy transition in 2015.1 The
overall political economy of the French energy sector is indeed experiencing
structural changes in the context of the opening-up of the energy sector at the
European level. The transition to clean energy implies new stakeholders,
weakened monopolies, behavioural changes, bottom-up initiatives, and
increasingly decentralized management of the whole network. The institu-
tional landscape is thus evolving.
Forest covers 43 per cent of the surface of Aquitaine (Conseil Régional
d’Aquitaine, INRA 2012). Although French forests can be characterized by a
signiﬁcant diversity, maritime pines constitute the majority of the Landes Forest
1 Four major bills have been adopted since 2009: Grenelle I (Loi de programme relative à la
mise en oeuvre du Grenelle de l’environnement) (2009) stated the principles of the Grenelle
process, addressing issues of climate change and environmental policy in France; Grenelle II (Loi
portant engagement national pour l’environnement) (2010); the law on transition towards a more
efﬁcient energy system as well as on water pricing and wind farms (Loi visant à préparer la
transition vers un système énergétique sobre et portant diverses dispositions sur la tariﬁcation de
l’eau et sur les éoliennes) (2013); and the law on energy transition for green growth (Loi sur la
transition énergétique pour la croissance verte) (2015). The law also commits the country to
reducing its 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 40 per cent by 2030 and its 2012 energy
consumption by 50 per cent by 2050, and to achieving a 32 per cent consumption of renewables
in energy by 2030.
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(one of the three wooded areas in the Aquitaine Forest). As Brandenburg,
Aquitaine region has set more ambitious targets than the national government’s
ones: the share of renewable energies must double by 2020 to reach 32 per cent,
greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced by 30 per cent, and energy efﬁciency
must improve by 30 per cent.
28.3.2 Two Regions Where Tensions Are Developing in
the Context of a Transition to Clean Energy
Since the late 1990s, the question of acceptance has become a major topic in
research relating to wind energy in Europe, as evidenced by papers dedicated
to Sweden (Carlman 1988), the Netherlands (Wolsink 2000), and France and
Germany (Jobert, Laborgneb, and Mimlerb 2007). A number of authors
contend that the NIMBY (‘not in my backyard’) reﬂex does not fully explain
the perception of the proximate population (Musall and Kuik 2011), who are
sometimes less hostile to wind farm projects than populations residing further
away (Simon and Wüstenhagen 2006). Other researchers argue in favour of a
dynamic approach and refer to projects whose acceptance has developed
according to a U-shaped pattern between the initial and ﬁnal stages of the
project (Wolsink 2006). Analysing three French and two German projects,
Jobert, Laborgneb, and Mimlerb (2007) question the reasons for the success
or failure of a project in terms of its acceptance. They argue that two classes of
factors prevail: on one hand, the institutional framework (regulations,
economic and ﬁnancial stakes), and, on the other, local conditions (the site’s
economic and geographical context, the implementation of concertation
processes and planning processes).
In Germany, support for renewable energies has remained elevated despite
increased energy prices since the Energiewende was implemented. Community
acceptance may, however, differ from social acceptance. In spite of its role as a
pioneer, Brandenburg is the German Land with the lowest rates of social
acceptance (Figure 28.1). A 2014 survey indicated that 93 per cent of the
population of the Land believed that it was important to promote renewable
energies, but that only a little over 60 per cent of those questioned would
accept a plant near their homes (Figure 28.1). No other Land had such a low
ﬁgure. Citizen initiatives have been launched, such as Rettet Brandenburg, an
umbrella organization that regrouped about 80 opposition movements
throughout the Land in 2015.
In Aquitaine, conﬂicting views about competition for forest biomass have
emerged since pulp-and-paper industries are determined to protect this
resource against producers of biomass-based heat and energy. Forest covers
around 30 per cent of metropolitan France, an area that has continuously
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expanded over the past 150 years. Only 60 per cent of the annual natural
growth is harvested each year (CEMAGREF 2009).
Although French forestland appears to be statistically under-exploited, the
actual quantity of wood is in fact uncertain and only provides a vague
indication of the effective available wood resources. Various studies of this
issue have been conducted, notably in 2009 (CEMAGREF 2009) and in 2014
(ADEME, IGN, and FCBA 2014). The ﬁrst study highlights an availability of
28.3 million m³ IWEW (Industrial Wood and Energy Wood) per year and 8.1
m³ of wood residue. The second establishes the average yearly availability of
wood in the years 2006–20 at 71 million m³/year, of which 46.1 million m³/
year are readily available, and 14.9 million m³/year of wood residue, of which
1.6 million m³/year are readily available. A report by the École Nationale des
Ponts et Chaussées (2011) has, however, provided a lower estimate of this
potential, explaining that an area of fewer than 4 hectares cannot really be
considered readily available because management costs render it uneconom-
ical. And ﬁnally, the IFN (2010) believes that difﬁcult access to certain plots
means that up to 30 per cent of French forests are unavailable to be harvested.
The true potential of French forests is therefore unclear, and regional forecasts
in Aquitaine, home to one of Europe’s largest cultivated forests, indicate
that supply is proving inadequate in the face of anticipated demand
(see Table 28.1).
In this context, ‘market acceptance’ appears critical, with competition
between wood energy and other uses of forest resources gradually increasing.
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Figure 28.1. Responses to question ‘would you agree to a renewable energy facility in
the vicinity?’ (%), 2013.
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Renewable Energies Agency (2014).
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28.3.3 Market Acceptance in Aquitaine
In Aquitaine, the forest products industry is the fourth employer in the region,
with 9 per cent of the region’s industrial jobs (Dumartin 2009), a far higher
share than the renewable energy sector. Wood energy is developing while
demand for saw timber is decreasing, and as demand for less noble tree products
is increasing among a growing number of the region’s economic actors.
Until the 1980s and 1990s, a high level of complementarity between the
various uses of forest products prevailed, with high demand for lumber from
the furniture and ﬂooring industries and by-products employed by the pulp
industry. With increased demand in the wood energy sector, competition has
replaced the logic of complementarity, because wood energy and wood for
industry both require small wood shavings, trimmings, and residual products.
As a consequence, the packaging and palette sector is concerned by wood
price increases and argues that the development of bioenergy may trigger a
loss of competitiveness in the long run. According to its representatives, public
support for renewable energies has disrupted the market for wood, which has
very little elasticity.2 Indeed, in the forest products sector, strong demand does
not necessarily trigger an increase in available supply. Unlike other industrial
sectors, outlets do not necessarily structure production, in part because the
raw material belongs to a large number of forest owners who are not encour-
aged to actively manage their forest tracts. The fragmented ownership struc-
ture is thus one of several obstacles to mobilization for wood supplies that is
Table 28.1. The ‘standard’ scenario for maritime pine in Aquitaine
2012–015 2016–17 2018–20 2021–25
Roundwood
Availability 8,050 5,030 4,730 4,730
Demand 7,600 7,700 7,800 7,950
Softwood lumber 3,650 3,650 3,650 3,650
Industrial roundwood 3,700 3,700 3,700 3,700
Energy wood 250 350 450 600
Sawmill products + forest residue
Availability 2,540 2,500 2,460 2,440
Demand 2,400 2,800 2,970 3,170
Bark mulch 370 370 370 370
Softwood lumber 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350
Energy wood 880 1,080 1,250 1,450
Saldo +390 –2,970 –3,580 –3,950
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ADEME, IGN, and FCBA (2014).
2 Conversation with the author in Aquitaine, October 2015.
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required by the increasing demand. Hence, up-dated forest management
policies that tackle supply-side challenges without harming biodiversity and
soil protection are requested in parallel with the support provided to clean
energies by local and national actors.
28.3.4 In Brandenburg, Unequally Shared Proﬁts
Affect Community Acceptance
In Brandenburg, community acceptance is at stake (rather than market
acceptance as in Aquitaine), but socioeconomic factors also matter, the key
question being how the beneﬁts generated by the surge of wind farms are
distributed. Hübner and Pohl (2014) argue that citizen proﬁt-sharing is a far
more signiﬁcant determiner of public perception of wind farms than distance
between inhabitants and wind farms. Other studies have also shown that
proﬁt-sharing inﬂuences acceptance rates, particularly if residents are able to
become stakeholders (Brunt and Spooner 1998; Wolsink 2006). Wilfried
Bockholt, the Mayor of Niebüll (a town in Brandenburg), conﬁrms that
‘participation leads to acceptance’ (Renewable Energies Agency 2012), while
Zoellner, Schweizer-Ries, and Wemheuer (2008: 4138) contend that economic
considerations—‘seen as weighing costs against advantages made by each
individual’—are important factors in determining acceptance.
In Brandenburg, the landowners of wind farm sites negotiate leases that
vary from one case to the next but have a return of between €30,000 and
€40,000 per wind turbine per year (Ministry of Economy and Energy of
Brandenburg 2014). The plots are sometimes divided among a variety of
owners, farmers, and pensioners. In this case, there are numerous beneﬁciaries
in a neighbourhood who stand to enjoy substantial revenue increases over a
period of at least 20–25 years. In other instances, beneﬁciaries are not neigh-
bours but investors that have purchased ex-GDR land after reuniﬁcation.
Financial implications of wind energy for neighbouring towns can be direct
(via professional tax and property tax) or indirect (via the share of income tax
and turnover taxes given to the towns). The Deutscher Städte-und Gemeinde-
bund (Ministry of Economy and Energy of Brandenburg 2014) conducted a
survey, between August and September 2014, of local Brandenburg authorities
to determine wind farm proﬁts made by local communities.3 The major
ﬁnding was that proﬁts vary considerably but tend to be quite modest. The
most signiﬁcant long-term consequence of wind farms for municipalities
might therefore be limited to income taxes on residents with wind farm leases.
Property taxes, however, do not generate over €1,000/town and can be
3 Deutscher Städte-und Gemeindebund—GermanAssociation of Towns andMunicipalities.
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considered insigniﬁcant. This disparity between the income collected by
landowners and that earned by towns (when they do not own the land on
which wind farms are installed) illustrates a lack of ‘procedural justice’ that
some authors (Gross 2007) have cited as a factor in determining acceptability.
The Brandenburg example contextualizes the idea that one important
attribute of the Energiewende is citizens’ ﬁnancial involvement. At the national
level, German citizens are highly implicated in the energy transition since they
own about 47 per cent of the production capacities for renewable energies
(Morris and Pehnt 2012). Citizen involvement has taken the form of invest-
ment funds, associations, and cooperatives. However, most of the cooperatives
are situated in Bavaria, Bade-Wurttemberg, and Lower-Saxony. They remain
rare in Brandenburg and in most ex-GDR States. As a consequence, wind
farms are owned by investment funds or developers and the electricity
produced by wind farms is essentially injected into the national electricity
grid, and not consumed locally.
Moreover, ofﬁcials can hardly support arguments that energy prices are
lower than in states that have invested less than Brandenburg in wind energy.
The expensive modernization of the electric grid made necessary by wind
farms caused Brandenburg’s electric bill to be higher than in some other
German states. Grid charges differ, indeed, signiﬁcantly across Germany.
In 2014, the lowest grid charges were in Düsseldorf (4.75 cent €/KwH), the
highest in Brandenburg (9.88 cent €/KwH) (RAP 2014). According to the
Brandenburg Minister of Economy, Gerber, high electricity costs essentially
explain low acceptance rates amongst the population: ‘The installation of
many wind farms and solar farms in Brandenburg has caused the region to
have one of the most elevated electricity costs in Germany. We must renego-
tiate with the other states about how the costs of reorganizing the network are
distributed’ (Torsten 2014).
Ultimately, in both Aquitaine and Brandenburg, acceptance is determined
signiﬁcantly by socioeconomic factors. Both regions illustrate the complexity
of developing and implementing an energy transition without endangering the
economic fabric. This difﬁculty is not purely economic. It also stems from a
lack of appropriate coordination between policies adopted at the local, regional,
and national levels.
28 .4 ADDRESSING SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE SCHEMES
Because governance within the EU involves many levels of interaction between
a broad array of ofﬁcials, some researchers have used the term ‘multi-level
governance’ to describe the EU system since the 1990s. Marks (1993: 392,
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quoted in Hooghe and Marks (2003)) describes it as a ‘system of continuous
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational,
national, regional and local’. Section 28.3 explored the socioeconomic factors
involved in acceptance, while this section focuses on particular shortcomings
in how actions are articulated among actors in each region, as well as between
regional and national levels.
28.4.1 Governance Challenges at the Regional Level
Brandenburg State has planned to allocate 2 per cent of its territory for wind
farms by 2030, with a projected production level of 10,500 MW. This rate of
development will require the construction of about 130 wind turbines per year
(BWE 2014). In the face of rising discontent, and to avoid questioning their
targets, since 2003, Brandenburg ofﬁcials have emphasized the notion of
acceptance deﬁned as ‘a process enabling the development of direct dialogue’
(Ministry of Economy and Energy of Brandenburgh 2012).
Imposing an increase in the minimum distance deﬁned by the usual rule
(300–500 metres) between wind turbines and housing also represents an
option. In response to pressure from Bavaria, the Bund granted authority to
the states to rule on this issue in 2014, for a period ending on 31 December
2015. The Bavarian government has taken advantage of this opportunity
to introduce the 10H rule.4 Early in 2015, the Brandenburg government
announced that it would not adopt a similar provision since it would indeed
mean the abandonment of the initiative to install wind turbines on 2 per cent
of the region’s area.
The support provided by regional authorities to wind energy nevertheless
suffers from the parallel support granted to the mining industry (9,000 direct
jobs). The coalition contract considers the shutdown of thermal plants by
2040, but the transition period could last longer in view of the reaction
provoked by a federal government decision to impose a ‘climate levy’ on the
oldest coal plants. On 27 March 2015, the German Ministry for Economy and
Energy proposed to introduce a carbon emissions tax of €18–20 per tonne of
CO2 on old coal power plants in operation for more than 20 years. Such a
decision would push out of the market the oldest coal power plants and help to
reach the German targets related to greenhouse gas emissions (German
Ministry of Economy and Energy 2015). However, the decision sparked strong
reaction from coal miners’ unions from the industry. Three states with
signiﬁcant mining sectors, amongst them Brandenburg, argued that several
4 According to this rule, the distance between a wind turbine and the closest accommodation
should be factor 10 of the height of the wind turbine. The Land of Bavaria nevertheless
authorizes some derogations to this rule. See Zaspel-Heisters (2014).
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thousands of jobs might be at risk (Ministry of Economy and Energy of
Brandenburg 2015). The proposal was withdrawn in June 2015 (Frese 2015).
A new and much less controversial one suggested that lignite power plants
with a capacity of 2.7 GW (i.e., 13 per cent of the capacity of German lignite
power plants) will be put on ‘temporary standby’. These power plants will only
come into operation in emergency situations and, instead of being taxed as
planned by the previous proposal, will receive compensation for remaining on
standby for four years, and should then be closed (Ifo Institut 2015). This
solution could prove costly—its costs are estimated at €0.5–1 billion annually
(Bajczuk 2015)—and should cut emissions to 11 million tonnes only by 2020.
Thus, to reach the original objective of the government (reduction in carbon
emissions of 22 million tonnes) additional investments, in particular in the
area of energy efﬁciency, have been agreed (Ifo Institut 2015).
Thus, the example of Brandenburg illustrates the fact that a successful
energy transition requires more than creating a boom in alternative energies.
At the same time, at both the economic and social levels, the gradual margin-
alization of ‘failing’ energies must be prepared.
In terms of acceptance, territorial planning also plays an important role.
In this respect, Brandenburg can rely on two main documents: the ‘2030
Energy Strategy’, which has little legal constraint, and the land use plan for
the entire Berlin-Brandenburg region, ratiﬁed in 2009 before being legally
declared void and again becoming effective in June 2015.5 The plan does not
specify the eligible areas for wind farms, however, which are deﬁned by the ﬁve
Brandenburg planning regions (Regionalen Planungsgemeinschaften).6 A
planning region has its own legal persona and the decision-making organ is
an assembly that meets one to three times a year in which the Kreise and towns
of more than 10,000 inhabitants are represented.7 One of the planning region’s
responsibilities is the adoption of the plan specifying which zones are eligible
for wind energy. To this end, the assembly uses a process of elimination that
takes various aspects of Bund or regional legislation into account—such as
protected zones, noise pollution, army radars, and weather forecast services—
that enable the progressive limitation of territories that ban wind energy.
Residual areas constitute zones in which wind turbines can be implanted.8
The territories not included in these zones, in the case of Brandenburg, ban
wind farms (other states employ a different approach). As a result, the regional
plan is not so much a variation of the state strategy as a document that deﬁnes
5 See <http://gl.berlin-brandenburg.de/> (accessed 2 July 2015).
6 Havelland-Fläming, Lausitz-Spreewald, Oderland-Spree, Prignitz-Oberhavel, and
Uckermark-Barnim.
7 An intermediary level local authority, between the region (the Land) and the municipality
(Gemeinde).
8 The planning regions deal exclusively with the issue of wind turbines. Solar energy and
biomass requiring less space, their planning is left exclusively to towns.
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which zones are authorized for wind turbines under current legislation. Such a
plan requires time (at least three years) and can face disagreement between
representatives, leading to postponement and eventual cancellation. In the
absence of a plan, the regulations of the federal city-planning code according
to the 1997 reforms prevail.
Article 35 of the federal urbanism code, modiﬁed in 1997, granted a
privileged administrative regime to wind farms.9 Wind farm construction
must be authorized for any non-urban zone if it does not prejudice the general
interest and has no harmful consequences for environment, protected sites,
radars, and so on. In 1998, this provision was amended, with the federal code
specifying that an installation can have a negative impact on general interest
when a regional or municipal plan for wind turbines on other parts of the
same territory has been adopted. Within the framework of a land use plan
(Flächennutzungsplan), or, in the event of such a plan not existing, of a district
plan (Teilﬂächennutzungsplan), a town can therefore specify an area dedicated
to wind farms in order to avoid the scattering of installations. In 2002, the
Administrative Tribunal nevertheless speciﬁed that towns are unable to
prevent wind turbines from being installed on their entire territory, because
this would violate the principle of the preferred administrative regime given by
the federal urbanization code. Ultimately, developers can sue towns deter-
mined to restrict the possibility of installing wind turbines (in Brandenburg,
this happened to the town of Beelitz in 2015 (Steglich 2015)).
Like their counterparts in Brandenburg, regional authorities in Aquitaine
are attempting to redeﬁne their relations with other public actors in terms of
energy transition. As in Brandenburg, they are torn between a willingness to
develop renewable energies and determination to maintain the industrial
workforce (speciﬁcally with regard to the forest products industry). They
emphasize different ways of managing woodland, considering the fact that
the conﬂict over how such land is used has signiﬁcantly worsened since two
recent storms (Martin in December 1999 and Klaus in January 2009). After
the storms, the production potential for maritime pine plummeted from
9.5 million m3/year prior to Martin to 6 million m3/year after Klaus. Industrial
demand for wood is between 7 and 8 million m3, however. Finally, it appears
that recurrent violent climatic phenomena, which are arguably caused by
global warming (Le Treut 2013), are partly responsible for increased tensions
concerning forest resources. In this context, regional authorities support new
methods of forest management as well as exploiting forest biomass without
undermining forest products markets. Since responsibilities are fragmented
9 Paragraph 35 of the Urbanism Code. The federal Urbanism Code quotes various projects
under this regime. The decision to include the implantation of wind turbines was adopted by the
German Parliament in 1996.
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between different institutions, a highly cooperative approach is needed
between stakeholders.
Beyond institutional settings, more ﬂuid forms of governance are develop-
ing in the region, whether on the scale of a living area, a planted zone, or even,
for example,10 between urban areas and neighbouring rural areas. The energy
transition thus induces on the one hand (slow) progress in terms of decen-
tralization and on the other, informal cooperation at different levels, thus
echoing the distinction established by Hooghe and Marks between the Type
I and II of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks (2003), quoted in
Stead (2014)).11 However, responsibilities are fragmented between numerous
local, regional, and national stakeholders, partly because the national author-
ities have so far been reluctant to devolve more policy competences to the
regional level.
28.4.2 The Challenges of Multi-Level Governance:
Is the National Government the Leading Actor?
The forest products sector of the economy in France is in second place
in terms of external deﬁcit, despite the fact that France’s forested territory is
the third largest in Europe (Caullet 2013). This illustrates the difﬁculties
faced by public actors as they attempt to structure a diversiﬁed, fragmented
forest products market. From preparation to post-project phases, the sector
suffers from a lack of structure, and supply is limited by problems related to
mobilizing resources. The divergence of interests between the various wood
products actors, in particular between silviculture professionals and wood
industry professionals, impede consensus about the most effective approaches
to forest policy. These problems with respect to French forestry also prevail in
Aquitaine, where 92 per cent of woodlands are privately owned (AGRESTE
Aquitaine 2012).
In addition, the use of resources is constrained by tax policies that encourage
long-term woodland ownership through transmission from one generation to
the next but that do not encourage active forest management. The basis of this
policy goes back to the post-war period, when the government sought to avoid
over-exploitation of forest resources at a time when reconstruction generated
strong demand for forest products (Caullet 2013). This tax policy currently
contributes to weak market ﬂuidity and uneven supply, to the subdivision
10 As an example, one can mention the ‘forest exploitation charts’ or the ‘rural poles of
excellence’.
11 Hooghe and Marks distinguish between two basic types of multi-level governance, labelled
Type I and Type II. Type I governance is designed around territorial communities, while Type II
is designed around speciﬁc tasks or policy issues.
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of forestland through inheritance—France currently has 3.5 million forest
owners—and to passive forest management. In short, one of the principal
constraints on the development of the wood-based energy market is not the
availability of raw materials as it is the tax framework, which, in its current
form, does not encourage owners to manage their property actively. However,
these two features of the wood market are essentially the national government’s
responsibility, hence the crucial role of national policies for the success of the
regional-level energy transition.
More surprisingly, the national framework is also a key factor in the case of
Germany. The legal framework favours wind farms in terms of territorial
planning, and when added to the generous feed-in tariffs planned by the
EEG,12 partly explains the ﬂow of investors to Brandenburg. The regulations
deﬁned by the Bund in terms of purchasing feed-in tariffs and planning rights
have contributed signiﬁcantly to overall increases in wind energy at the
regional level. Although there are few cooperatives in Brandenburg, a number
of initiatives show that the energy transition has led some local authorities to
implement innovative policies. The energy autonomy plan developed in
the village of Feldheim, the citizen fund in Brandenburg an der Havel, and
the wind farms in Schlalach-Mühlenﬂieß and Frehne that entail neighbour
partners, offer several examples of this promising trend (Becker, Gailing, and
Naumann 2012). These experiences have conﬁrmed that citizen ownership of
wind energy production capacities dramatically improves community accept-
ance (Yildiz et al. 2015). The proliferation of local initiatives owes a great deal
to a positive ﬁnancial and legal framework, however. In this respect, the
introduction of the new Environmental and Energy State Aid Guidelines
(EEAG) in 2014 (European Commission 2014) led to the introduction of
new provisions in the national regulative framework (German Ministry of
Economy and Energy 2014) that might increase the sensitivity of renewable
energy projects to market conditions.
28 .5 CONCLUSION
By focusing on two regions, this chapter has attempted to call attention to
factors that both inhibit and contribute to the implementation of the EU clean
energy transition policy at the subnational level in a federal state (Germany),
and in a unitary one (France). The study invites the generalization of some
common assertions and the interrogation of others, despite the narrowness of
the two cases studied here. It conﬁrms that the infra-government actors in
12 Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (energy transition law).
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Europe are the driving force behind energy transition, it highlights how some
have made European and national priorities their own, and that rural areas
play a key role in energy transition. Factors proposed by other studies to
explain support for or hostility to wind farm projects from local actors can be
observed in Brandenburg. The competition with the coal sector, the ofﬁcial
rationale of the energy transition—doubts regarding the latter are nurtured by
the ambivalent attitude of the Brandenburg Land concerning the future of coal
mining—and certain attitudes inherited from the communist era and reuni-
ﬁcation are additional factors that must be considered. The case of Branden-
burg also conﬁrms the decisive importance of the spatial planning process.
These case studies nevertheless call for nuanced interpretation concerning
certain arguments that have been advanced at international and national
levels. For example, the largest cultivated forest in France is in Aquitaine
but, despite this abundance, the region continues to suffer from powerful
tensions implied by an increased competition over forest resources. The
acceptance of renewable energies and strong citizen involvement in the
production of renewable energies are two major characteristics of the Energie-
wende at the German level. However, none of them is reﬂected in the case of
Brandenburg, one of the most successful regions in Germany in terms of wind
policy. In this speciﬁc case, favourable natural and economic conditions added
to the very attractive feed-in tariffs agreed at the national level are far more
important than acceptance and citizen involvement. Brandenburg can rely on
a low population density and on numerous ﬂat and windy areas favourable to
wind machines. The adverse economic conditions in rural communities
(in comparison with other German Länder) have also made it very attractive
for investors and developers. The legal framework, namely the national
regulations on spatial planning have proved to be crucial too. The vocal
support provided by regional authorities and the reluctance to regulate some
key issues (such as the distance between wind farms and built neighbourhoods
that has been addressed by the State of Bavaria) have been instrumental.
However, the case study of Brandenburg demonstrates that low acceptance
and low citizen involvement (at least in comparison with other German
Länder that have seen far more grass- roots initiatives) do not necessarily
hamper clean energy transitions.
‘Do institutions matter for regional development?’ asks Rodriguez-Pose
(2013). Institutional arrangements above all are needed across administrative
boundaries at the vertical as well as at the horizontal level. We would argue
that it is not the institutional system itself that matters, whether unitary or
federal, as much as the ability of the various stakeholders to share common
visions and to act collectively. Further, the multi-level approach is justiﬁed by
the fact that the number of actors involved in energy has grown with the
implementation of the 3 x 20 package (see Section 28.1). Although decentral-
ized energy production imposes new responsibilities on local actors, the
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national government is in no way marginalized and remains crucial, particu-
larly in terms of tax policy (for forest lands), spatial planning, and deﬁning of
the feed-in tariffs.
These two cases also suggest the need to analyse the implications of growing
territorialization of the energy transition for regional actors. Leading this
transition calls for reinforced administrative capacities that can develop forest
resource by possessing both knowledge of local factors and of the global
market (in the case of Aquitaine), or even the ability to build a balanced
dialogue with private actors in the wind energy sector (in the case of
Brandenburg) in a context of increasingly complex energy laws. More broadly,
both of the cases studied here conﬁrm that regional strategies for facing
climate change should be coordinated within a vision of territorial develop-
ment to minimize conﬂicts over land and resource use (in the case of
Aquitaine) or to prepare the conversion of regions negatively affected by the
transition (in the case of Brandenburg).
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29.1 STAGES OF MITIGATION POLICY
In Chapter 1 of this volume, we asserted that the agreement reached at CoP21
in Paris in December 2015 represents a potentially decisive break from the
past. In the case where countries vigorously pursue their pledges for emissions
reductions codiﬁed within their Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (INDCs), then the world will have fully engaged in an era of global
mitigation.
This is, in our view, a big step in the right direction. The best available
evidence indicates that the emissions reductions implied by the sum of all
country level INDCs will signiﬁcantly reduce the probability of extreme
warming outcomes (e.g., an increase in average global temperatures greater
than seven degrees Celsius by the end of the twenty-ﬁrst century) (Webster
et al. 2012). This would be a real achievement that should be applauded. At the
same time, it is also well understood that the emissions reductions implied by
the INDCs pledged at CoP21 are insufﬁcient to maintain the global average
temperature rise within the two degrees Celsius target set by the international
community. To stabilize the global climate within (or even near) the two-
degree threshold, new rounds of mitigation efforts will be required.1
At this point, we believe it is possible to identify three stages of mitigation
policy/activity. With the passage of CoP21, the globe is now leaving stage 1
and entering stage 2. In stage 1, mitigation activity, while present, was largely
ineffective in altering the trajectory of global emissions. There are many
reasons for this. An incomplete list, drawn from Chapter 1, would include: a
paucity of low emissions technologies that could function at scale, the revealed
1 These same observations obviously apply to the more ambitious 1.5 degree target put forth
at CoP21.
difﬁculties of implementing ‘top-down’ approaches to global mitigation at the
international level, weak or non-existent developing country participation in
proposed mitigation regimes, and a scattered political commitment to miti-
gation policies with implications for private sector investment decisions.
It is noteworthy that nearly all the collective experience with mitigation
policies throughout the world, including but not limited to political economy
aspects, is drawn to date from stage 1. This includes the chapters in this book.
As highlighted in Chapter 1, this experience is all we have; and we should
study it. Importantly, with respect to this book, chapter authors considered
their particular issues in light of changing fundamentals, such as the agreement
reached at CoP21.
Nevertheless, with rapidly changing fundamentals, we are ushering in a
new era, which we are labeling stage 2. Stage 2 is characterized by a relative
abundance of attractive low emissions technologies, continued rapid technical
advance (including rapid advances in systems knowhow), growing scale of
low emissions systems, a functional global agreement to reduce emissions
involving pledges from more than 165 countries, and substantial private
investment in low emissions energy systems.
We also believe that Stage 2 will be characterized by a high degree of policy
experimentation across countries. Countries will pursue their INDCs in their
own ways. Doubtless, some approaches will be more effective than others.
Especially if the emissions reductions offers reﬂected in country INDCs are
vigorously pursued, stage 2 should over roughly the next ﬁve to ten years
generate ample information on what works and under what conditions.
It is also clear that stage 2 is not enough for at least three reasons. First, and
as already noted, the emissions reductions offered in the country INDCs are
insufﬁcient to prevent unacceptably high levels of warming with potentially
very damaging environmental and socio-economic impacts. More ambitious
emissions reductions will be required in future.
Second, while the architecture of the agreement adopted at CoP21 deserves
to be lauded for resulting in a global agreement, it is likely that this architec-
ture will have to evolve in order to achieve the very deep reductions in
emissions (or even negative emissions) necessary for stabilization of the global
climate. In particular, international trade is governed loosely or not at all
under the country-level offer system adopted at CoP21. Under a favourable
global policy regime, traditionally high-emitting industries will shift their
energy mix to low emissions technologies. The geographical distribution of
renewable or other low emitting resources (including nuclear power) may
imply a reshaped geographical redistribution of these industries around the
globe in the search for low cost sources of energy. Under an unfavourable
global policy regime, high emitting industries may concentrate in regions with
permissive emissions policies undercutting the global commitment to emis-
sions reductions. Adequate monitoring of total emissions and their sources
570 Moving Forward
would greatly assist in avoiding the latter unfavourable outcome. Eventually,
a penalty system for non-compliers may be required.
In addition, the policy diversity that appears to be a feature of stage 2
has the disadvantage of adding complexity to international comparisons. It
may not be immediately obvious whose emissions reductions policies are
more permissive and whose policies are stricter. This opacity is likely to
restrict potentially fruitful opportunities for carbon trade or offsets between
countries/regions. Restrictions on carbon trade or offsets may also limit
climate ﬁnance. The ﬁnancial ﬂows that mirror carbon trade or offsets
are widely viewed as a potential source of funds for climate ﬁnance
that would assist lower income countries to adapt, mitigate, and develop
(UNU-WIDER 2014).
Third, emissions reductions goals often remain perceived as aspirations
rather than expectations. The debate over stranded fossil fuel assets is indica-
tive in this regard. IPCC (2014) estimates a carbon budget that would limit
global temperature rises to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, which
amounts to between 1/5th and 1/3rd of the world’s proven reserves of oil,
gas and coal. As noted by Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England,
‘if that estimate is even approximately correct, it would render the vast
majority of reserves “stranded”—oil, gas and coal that will be literally unburn-
able without expensive carbon capture technology, which itself alters fossil fuel
economics’ (Carney 2015).
Despite this observation, considerable debate exists over whether these
assets (reserves) are in fact stranded. And, the debate turns largely on mitigation.
For example, in an open letter, Royal Dutch Shell plc, a major oil and gas
company, states that oil demand will continue to grow with two consequences.
First, Shell’s oil reserves are not, in fact, stranded (hence, they are valuable);
and, second, as a consequence of the emissions from burning these reserves,
the two degrees Celsius target is highly likely to be breached by the end of the
century (Royal Dutch Shell 2014).
In sum, a further stage of emissions reductions—stage 3—is almost certain
to be required. Ideally, stage 3 will chart a feasible path to a stabilized climate
and put in place the necessary policy architecture for following that path.
Fundamentally, stage 3 marks the passage across a global tipping point where
effective climate change mitigation is no longer an aspirational goal but rather
becomes an accepted fact on the ground with the associated broad implica-
tions for behaviour and decision-making, not least a massive reduction in the
resources allocated to prospecting for new fossil fuel reserves.
A clear proximate operational challenge for achieving this tipping point
involves effective implementation of country INDCs with attendant informa-
tion needs. Key research challenges also look further ahead towards achieving
this tipping point and entering a third stage of emissions reductions. To this
end, Section 29.2 presents four research frontiers.
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29.2 RESEARCH FRONTIERS
29.2.1 Frontier I: Enabling Environments
for Clean Energy Innovation
Continued technical advance in clean energy generation remains highly
desirable. These advances foundationally expand the solution space for con-
fronting climate change. As innovations become ready to enter markets,
supporting cost-effective development and deployment remains easily
expressed in principle but complex to achieve in practice.
Intentionally or not, energy systems have traditionally been implemented
by a handful of institutions—the few serving the many. This was an outgrowth
of historical paradigms related to large infrastructure, public services and
regulated utilities, and also reﬂected economies of scale in production of
fossil energy resources. Looking forward, the landscape for production and
consumption of clean energy may be vastly different. Economic, resilient,
distributed resources, combined with smart, individually optimized energy
service technology solutions offer an alternative. At the limit, relatively small
groups or even families may largely produce and consume their own energy.
At the same time, given the variability in supply associated with most
renewable energy generation technologies, there are portfolio effect gains
from system inter-linkages. These linkages can occur across energy types
and/or across space. The gains from distribution of renewable systems, par-
ticularly wind and solar, across large geographic areas augur for grid inter-
connections between large centres of supply (wind farms, solar farms, and
hydropower) and demand (cities and energy-intensive industrial clusters),
likely across countries in many settings. Reality will likely evolve to a hetero-
geneous combination of smart distributed and networked systems—a ‘system
of systems’ both physical and institutional and increasingly interlinked and
continuously evolving.
The policy, regulatory, and business model constructs that might allow this
suggested future to come about are still nascent, and as with other research
areas producing rapid technological advancement, we observe policy and
regulation frequently ‘playing catch-up’ with technology. With the opportun-
ity space for new energy systems growing, institutions in the energy system are
increasingly compelled to foster an enabling environment for investment. The
enabling environment for emerging technology solutions is highly likely to
represent a marked departure from the historical paradigm across a variety of
dimensions.
With that in mind, the research agenda should increasingly recognize
that innovation in the clean energy space is both broad and interactive,
comprising technology, business models, ﬁnance, institutional constructs,
asset optimization strategies, software/data, and more. While foundational
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research in individual system components (such as generation, storage, and
distribution) remains essential, it is quite possible that the most promising
innovations lie in the institutional space. Research into appropriate public
policies, regulations, institutions, and ﬁnancing schemes that efﬁciently foment
and deploy new technologies has high potential.
29.2.2 Frontier II: Big Think: Framing Resiliency Planning
While innovations have been expanding the clean energy solution space, this
book has emphasized the need for deliberate action, particularly in the public
sphere, in order to initiate, sustain, and eventually complete a clean energy
transition. Furthermore, these actions must take place within a framework of
ongoing growth and development while simultaneously confronting the
warming that is already built into the climate system. Both developed and
developing societies must address the question of how to achieve (inherently
interlinked) mitigation, adaptation, and economic/social objectives (including
environmental objectives not related to climate change). The IPCC has posed
this challenge as a quest for ‘climate-resilient pathways’ to desired economic,
environmental, and social outcomes.
Deﬁning these pathways is an integral element of the deliberate action
required to achieve an energy transition and thus remains an important
research frontier. The goal of constructing these pathways is to establish and
update a framework for decision-making that facilitates integrative planning
and policy-making with a view to effective policy implementation. Much has
been done to identify and investigate the properties of potentially feasible
pathways forward. Examples include the pathways developed with respect to
global emissions in the Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014); the long-term
adaptation strategy process undertaken in South Africa (Department of
Environmental Affairs 2013); and the climate action plan for the city of Fort
Collins, Colorado (City of Fort Collins 2015). Nevertheless, a great deal
remains to be done. As the examples illustrate, pathways are valuable at
local, country, regional, and global levels. The approaches to developing and
analysing pathways range from broad qualitative goal setting to more speciﬁc
and detailed quantitative analysis.
29.2.3 Frontier III: From Individual Actions to Global Impacts
In moving towards INDCs, CoP21 represents a shift from historically ‘top-
down’ approaches to mitigating climate change, to an increased focus on
participation from nations and regions to sub-national government entities
(e.g., cities, counties, provinces), non-governmental assemblages (e.g., social
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groups, companies/ﬁrms) and continuing to the level of families and individuals.
Undoubtedly, global climate change efforts will be aided signiﬁcantly by a
society of engaged individuals and groups, armed with credible information
and making informed choices. Such a vision—at its core—hinges on strategies
to cohesively link individual actions with global climate impacts. These link-
ages may be between individuals or mediated by the wide array of groupings
just mentioned.
We are only now beginning to understand the interlinkages of data and
information, informed choice, social networks, formal institutions, and the
dynamics of the political economy of change, particularly those related to
clean energy and sustainability. What is the appropriate role of institutions to
help create informed climate citizens? And, what are the efﬁcacies of various
strategies to do so? In what ways should successful initiatives at a local level be
extended to other localities or otherwise expanded?
Economists have long argued that a carbon tax represents one means to
strengthen perceptions of the climate implications of an individual’s choices.
It is a relatively clear and comparable signal that could operate via existing
pricing systems in nearly all countries in the world. The impacts of prices on
behaviour should not be lightly dismissed. At the same time, a carbon tax,
particularly a global one, is perhaps more likely to be a product of the tipping
point that marks stage 3 mitigation than a catalyst to achieving that tipping
point. The relatively recent ubiquity of communication technologies, social
networks, and information that increasingly tie together individuals and their
associated groupings, both large and small, provides a potentially effective
means for converting ‘bottom-up’ initiative into coherent action.
Understanding the transition pathways, choices and risks along those
pathways, and the dynamics of decision-making in this increasingly hetero-
geneous world of energy choices raises a complex, intriguing portfolio of
research areas. These areas span from understanding and informing decisions
and the solutions offered from the scale of each human being, to the complex
dynamics of social groups, companies, and ﬁrms, to sociopolitical constructs
such as cities and counties, states, countries, and regions.
29.2.4 Frontier IV: Informing Decision-Making
Informing decisions across the broad landscape of potential climate actors,
from individuals to social constructs to governments to international negoti-
ations, will also demand considerable enhancements. While political dynamics
continue to strongly inﬂuence climate and energy decisions within larger
political economy constructs, issues related to energy, electricity, and infrastruc-
ture (and their increasingly important roles throughout economies) necessitate
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credible and objective information to understand the options for and implica-
tions of decision-making.
With increasing quantity of data at nearly all scales, questions arise to the
efﬁcacy of providing the right data, in combination with the right analyses to
inform the decision at hand. In our view, an ‘uber model’ of billions of agents
and millions of social networks and decision bodies would be the wrong
direction (and perhaps prove intractable in the timeframes required to miti-
gate climate change). Focused, analytically rigorous tools with best-in-class
data, utilizing state-of-the-art decision science is the most fruitful path for-
ward. Good decisions depend on a solid understanding of today in combin-
ation with planning tools that deeply explore various pathways and their
implications. Not all planning tools are created equal, and ensuring that
well-formulated questions are receiving analytically robust, scale-appropriate,
and actionable answers will continue to be a signature challenge of this space.
We now, more than ever before, recognize that energy and the climate are
intimately interrelated to our economies, health, education, food and water,
and our interdependent relationship with the earth. Modelling tools must
continue to develop to represent this complexity (via relevant model
hybridizations to characterize sectoral interlinkages) in order to address
critical research questions moving forward. Efforts to achieve stated climate
goals and further raise climate ambitions will be strongly aided by founda-
tional investments in data, tools, and research to inform our decision-
making—advancing the state of knowledge in this space will thus be critical
to our future.
29 .3 FINAL WORDS
From a climate, clean energy, and political economy viewpoint, our collective
knowledge of systems, drivers of change, technology innovation, and decision-
making have grown exponentially over the past decade. This book captures
some of the leading examples and points towards future efforts.
The political ambition for the world to move forward has been articulated in
the Sustainable Development Goals. These include bold ambitions for climate
mitigation, codiﬁed by leaders across the world. Realizing these goals and
becoming true stewards of a sustainable, productive, and vibrant global
economy will take continued vision and leadership as well as formidable
political will to carry out necessary changes in practice. In pursuing these
goals, the pathways taken will reﬂect varying socio-political, physical, and
geographic contexts across societies. Multiple stakeholders within these
societies will make diverse pathway choices that will aggregate to collective
impacts. Ongoing high-quality research and knowledge-sharing, such that
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these diverse choices add up to desired outcomes, will remain a key input to
addressing the critical, timely issues that we face today and in the future.
REFERENCES
Carney, M. (2015). ‘Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon—Climate Change and
Financial Stability.’ Speech Given at Lloyd’s of London. 29 September. Available
at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.aspx>
(accessed 20 October 2016).
City of Fort Collins (2015). ‘Fort Collins 2105 Climate Action Plan Framework.’
Fort Collins. Available at: <http://www.fcgov.com/environmentalservices/pdf/
cap-framework-2015.pdf> (accessed 20 October 2016).
Department of Environmental Affairs (2013). ‘Long-Term Adaptation Scenarios Flag-
ship Research Programme (LTAS) for South Africa. Summary for Policy-Makers’.
Pretoria, South Africa.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) (2014). ‘Climate Change 2014:
Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’. IPCC,
Geneva.
Royal Dutch Shell (2014). Open Letter in Response to ‘Carbon Bubble’. Available at:
<http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/corporate/corporate/down
loads/pdf/investor/presentations/2014/sri-web-response-climate-change-may14.pdf>
(accessed 20 October 2016).
UNU-WIDER (2014). ‘Position Paper on Aid, Environment and Climate Change’,
UNU-WIDER, Helsinki. Available at: <http://recom.wider.unu.edu/article/position-
papers-how-does-aid-work> (accessed 20 October 2016).
Webster, M., A. P. Sokolov, J. M. Reilly, C. E. Forest, S. Paltsev, C. A. Schlosser,
C. Wang, D. Kicklighter, M. Saroﬁm, and J. Melillo (2012). ‘Analysis of Climate
Policy Targets under Uncertainty’. Climatic Change, 112(3–4): 569–83.
576 Moving Forward
Index
Abolhosseini, S. 229
Acemoglu, D. 131
actors and interests overview 229
Adejuwon, J. O. 212
African Development Bank 408
AGW (anthropogenic global warming) 213
air conditioning, United States 22, 24–5, 31
air pollution deaths 488
Akuru, U. B. 218
Allouche, J. 472, 479
Alvarez, J. 416
Amazon renewable energy see Brazil
AMBDC (ASEAN-MBD Cooperation) 518
Amobi, D. 218
ANBERD database 125, 126
ANC (African National Congress) 274, 280,
281, 286, 287, 377
Andrade, C. 509
ANT (actor network theory) 272
APEC (Asia-Paciﬁc Economic
Cooperation) 355–6, 360
Aquitaine (France), and EU renewable energy
policy 547–62
Araujo, K. M. 29
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) 513, 516, 518, 521, 524–5
Astoria, Ross 311
Attleboro Electric Steam Company 322
Auerswald, H. 215
Ayinde, O. 217
Bahia State see Brazil
Bailey, R. 214
Baker, L. 369
balancing area 264
battery storage 331
BCA (border carbon adjustments) 61–77
affected countries 66
and BAT (best available technology) 65–6
and BRIC countries 66
and competitiveness 76
and CoP21 agreement 60, 72, 75, 76
energy transition and developing
economies 73–4
enforcement of 62, 76
environmental policy instrument
categories 62–3
evaluating carbon content of imported
products 64–6
favoured nation statues see GATT
and GATT see GATT
and global GHG emissions 77
green growth 74
implementation 62–7
and international trade law 67–72
and LDCs (least developed countries) 66
legality of 62, 67–72
and PMP (predominant method of
production) 65–6
policy implications 72–6
political implementation and energy
transition 72–6
regulating instruments 63–4
targeted countries 70
TEPs (tradable emission permits) 63–4, 66–7
and WTO 68–70
see also carbon pricing
BEE (Black Economic Empowerment) 281
benchmark, generation price formation 256
Bhuyan, R. 229
bioenergy 163–84
and agricultural factors 177
analytical framework 167–72
BECCS (bioenergy with carbon capture and
storage) technology 163, 165
biodiesel production 164–6
biofuel mandates 171
data description 170–2, 184
data sources 184
econometric model 169–70
and EPS (environmental policy
stringency) 165, 174, 179–80, 182
estimation results excluding Brazil and
US 177
ethanol production 164–5
ethanol vehicles 17, 22–4, 30
explanatory variables 170–2
ﬁnancial development 170–1, 175
global production 163–4
and governance quality 165–6, 171, 172,
174, 176, 179–80, 182
and legal origins 172, 173, 180–2
and macroeconomic policies 165–6, 175,
176–7, 180, 182
and market factors 177, 179, 180, 183
and oil reserves 176, 179, 180
policy implications 182–3
and political economy factors 165–6, 182
bioenergy (cont.)
production determinants of 173–82
production evolution 164
random effects probit model 177, 179–80
renewable energy 176
RFS2 (Renewable Fuel Standard
Program) 163
supply function 166
theoretical model 167–9
Tobit model 174, 175, 178
and trade openness 175
biomass energy 144, 234, 456, 457, 458, 472,
473, 474, 475, 476, 478–9, 481, 551
bio-thermostat theory 213
Bird, J. 516
BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) (India) 240, 241
border adjustment mechanisms see BCA
(border carbon adjustment)
Borenstein, S. 417
BPE (Bureau of Public Enterprises)
(Nigeria) 399–400
Braithewaite, D. 495
Brandenburg (Germany) and EU renewable
energy policy 547–62
Brazil
Amazon ethnic diversity 478–80
background 473–7
Bahia State energy policy 530–43
biomass 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 478–9, 481
Brazilian governmental interests 480–2
and CDM (Clean Development
Mechanism) 482, 483, 531–43
CDM and domestic policies 537–8
CDM projects and technology 539–41
challenges 476
and Chinese investment 483
clean energy investment 530
clean energy policies, national/sub-
national 530, 531, 533–6, 538, 543
clean energy transition, implications 483–4
and climate change 484, 537
corruption 482
dams 474, 476, 477, 478, 479–80,
482
data and methods 477–8
deforestation 475, 476–7, 484
energy development in Amazon 473–5
energy sources 473–4
federal reform requirement 543
FFVs (ﬂex-fuel/ethanol vehicles) 17, 22–4, 30
ﬁnancial interests 482–3
future approaches to clean energy 484
GHG (greenhouse gases) emissions 475,
533, 534–5, 542
green industries 533
human costs 479
hydropower energy 471, 472, 473, 474, 476,
479, 481, 484, 535–6
incentive mechanisms 533
infrastructure development 477
international actors 482–3
investment 481, 483, 530, 533, 538
and Kyoto Protocol 482, 531, 533
local communities 478–80
local socioeconomic development 478–80
migration and dams 476–7
political economic drivers 471–2, 478–83
political economy analysis 530–43
political economy analysis
methodology 531–3
private interests 480–2
Proálcool programme 24
public–private partnership 481–2
rapid energy transitions 22
research methods 473
Rio Grande do Sul State energy
policy 530–43
social movement organizations 478–80
state energy privatization 538
sustainability planning 539–40
and UNFCCC 483, 530, 532, 534, 540
wind energy 535
Brazil renewable energy
Amazon region 471–84
energy development and climate
change 475–7
BRICS countries, nuclear energy 285
bridge-technology 550
Brottes Law (France) 550
Bucaram, S. J. 369, 431, 434, 435
Bueb, J. 37
Bürer, M. J. 548, 549
Bushnell, J. 417
Buzogány, A. 101
CAFTA (China–ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement) 521, 525
Calderón, President Felipe 413–14,
415–16, 423
Cambodia see MR (Mekong region)
Canada (Ontario)
coal 22, 25, 28
rapid energy transitions 22, 28
capital ROI (return on investment) 324
carbon leakage 63
carbon lock-in 89
carbon pricing
aggregate supply function model 46
clean energy supply and clean producer
surplus model 45–6, 55
consumer surplus constraint model 48
direct constraint on CO2 price 49–51
578 Index
direct CO2 price constraint model 47, 49–51
energy demand and consumer surplus
model 44–5
energy price constraint model 47–8
ﬁnal energy price increases constraint 51–3
fossil energy supply and fossil producer
surplus model 45
fossil producer surplus constraint model 48–9
government revenues and climate damages
model 46
maximum energy price constraint 52
Mexico 419–20
model formulation 44–6
model and scenario implementation 43–9
model simulation results 49–55
net energy consumer/fossil producer
surplus loss constraint 53–4
objective function and constraints model 46
policymaking implications 55–8
and political constraints 39–58
political economy constraint scenarios/
analytical solutions 47–9, 57
regional pricing 60
research implications 55–8
and SCC (social cost of carbon) 41–2
targeted subsidies 57
theory and practice 41–3
total CO2 emissions under political
constraints 51
total welfare gain 50
welfare disposition 53, 54–5
see also BCA (border carbon adjustments)
carbon tax 41, 43, 214, 574
see also BCA
Cassilas, C. 453
CBN (Central Bank of Nigeria) 210
CCS (carbon capture and storage) 193
CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) 482,
483, 531–43
CEER (Council of Europe Energy
Regulators) 334
CER (Certiﬁed Emissions Reductions) 532
Ĉetkovic, S. 101
CfD (Contracts for Difference) (UK) 108, 114
CFE (Federal Electricity Commission)
(Mexico) 413, 414, 420
Chikuni, E. 218
China
actors in generation planning 266
administrative hierarchy 237–8
agencies 237–8
aggregate indicators 512
barriers 236–8
CAFTA (China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement) 521
carbon pricing policy 43
CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 237–8,
244
central/local government 236–8
central planning 254
clean energy transitions 231–8, 244–5
climate change strategy 6–7
coal 234, 263, 515
concession model 260
cookstoves 22–3
corruption 237
drivers 233–6
energy consumption 301
energy policy 341–3
energy saving potential 515–16
energy types 233–4
FITs (feed-in-tariffs) 261
fossil fuel dependency 233
fossil fuel restriction 235
FYP (ﬁve-year plans) 234, 342
generation planning 266
GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions 231, 537
governance of power systems 253–4
governing coalitions 232–3, 245
government contract projects 260
grid capacity insufﬁciency 236
grid operations structure 264–6
INDC 6, 235
institutional capacity increase 235–6, 244
institutional change 233
institutional structure 245
interests in generation planning 266
investment in Brazil 483
and LMB governance 524
mandatory procurement policy 262
natural gas 295
NISP (National Improved Stove
Programme) 23–4
pollution 234–5
rapid energy transitions 22
renewable price surcharge 263
renewable targets 342
RETs (renewable energy
technologies) 231–7, 244
single buyer model 332
smart grid policy perspectives
summary 336, 344
smart grids and electricity demand
surge 341–3
smart meters 342
societal pressure 234–5, 244
SOE (state owned enterprises) 237, 245
state ownership of energy 337, 342, 343
UHV (ultra high voltage)
investment 342–3
vested interests 236–7, 244, 256–8, 266
water resources 523
Index 579
China (cont.)
wind energy 250–67, 342 see also wind
energy
wind energy actors 256–8, 266
wind energy balancing area
co-ordination 264–6
wind energy cost premium recovery 263–4
wind energy dispatch order 261–2, 265
wind energy economic institutions 255–6,
258
wind energy economic/political actors 252
wind energy ﬁxed cost recovery 262
wind energy generator cost recovery 261–4
wind energy industry restructuring
models 255–6
wind energy operating cost recovery 262–3
wind energy planning/project
approval 259–61
wind energy political institutions 253–4,
256–7
wind energy support mechanisms 261–2
wind energy vertical integration 257, 266
see also MR (Mekong region)
CHP (combined heat and power)
Denmark 22, 25, 27–8
smart grids 331
Christmas Effect 21
Clean Air Act (US) 313
clean energy innovation
enabling environments for 572–3
resiliency planning 573
clean energy policies 13
clean energy and poverty alleviation, Rwanda
see Rwanda
clean energy technology 7–9
clean energy transition
accelerating 39–58
deﬁnition 3
emissions mitigation policy stages 569–71
global 209–25, 573–4
informing decision-making 574–5
research frontiers 572–5
Clean Power Plan (US) 313
climate change 3, 73–4, 80, 209–25
climate change adaptation 213
climate change mitigation 212–17
and climate variability/ﬂuctuation 212
commitment levels 217
concept of 212
conceptual issues 212–13
deﬁnition 212
empirical studies 217–18
ﬁndings 218–24
GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions see GHG
global political economy, and
mitigation 214–15
national/global policies conﬂict and
mitigation 215–17
theories of 213–14
WTP (willingness to pay) approach 217
climate levy 91–2
climate negotiations, obstacles to 76–7
climate paradox 16
climate policy overview 37
climate science 4
climate variability/ﬂuctuation, and climate
change 212
CMEs (Coordinated Market Economies)
see wind energy
coal
Canada 22, 25
China 234, 263, 515
Germany 550
India 242, 245
major transitional shifts 18–20
Netherlands 26
power generation costs 296
South Africa 271, 499
US 320–5
Coalgate scandal 242
Competition Commission (South
Africa) 497, 498
COP1 (conference of the parties, Berlin) 4
COP15 (conference of the parties,
Copenhagen) 4–6, 60, 80, 215, 216,
534, 542
COP16 (conference of the parties,
Cancun) 410
COP20 (conference of the parties, Lima) 4
COP21 (conference of the parties, Paris) 4, 5,
6, 13–14, 60, 72, 74, 75, 76, 187, 235, 356,
361, 362, 410, 421, 530, 541, 542–3,
569–70, 573–4
Copenhagen Accord 216
COSS (cost of service study) 319
cost-competitiveness 7
cost-of-service, generation price
formation 256
CO2 see carbon pricing
crude oil see oil
CSP (concentrated solar power) (South
Africa) 384
Cuba, energy transitions 20
CUB (Citizens’ Utility Board) 319
dams
Brazil 474, 476, 477, 478, 479,
479–80, 482
MR (Mekong region) 519–20
Danish Energy Authority 115
Dasgupta, S. 101, 126, 127
Davidson, M. 229
580 Index
De Cian, E. 101, 126, 127
Deese, D. A. 294
deforestation
Brazil 475, 476–7, 484
and climate change 213
de Groot, J. 451
de Jong, M. 311
Denmark
CHP (combined heat and power) 22,
25, 27–8
Energy Policy (1976) 27
feed-in-tariffs 146–7
Heat Supply Act (1979) 27
LCET (low-carbon energy
technologies) 187–205
and oil crisis 109
private wind turbine owners 110
rapid energy transitions 22
wind energy and simple CME (coordinated
market economy) 106, 109–12, 115–17,
118, 203
dependency syndrome, Rwanda 466–7
deployment 13
DER (distributed energy resources) 331
de Silanes, F. L. 165, 173
developed countries, and greenhouse gas
emission 3–5, 9, 11
developing countries, clean energy
endowments 11
developing economies, challenges to 9–12
DG (distributed generation) units 331, 332
Dijkgraaf, E. 131
Dinar, Ariel 509, 522
discoms (electricity distribution
companies) 243–4, 245
DMEA (Department of Mineral and Energy
Affairs) (South Africa) 377
DME (Department of Mineral and Energy)
(South Africa) 377
DMR (Department of Mineral Resources)
(South Africa) 377
Doctrine of Ancient Lights (US) 321
DoE (Department of Energy) (South
Africa) 277, 377, 379
Doha Round 363
Dolsak, N. 216, 217
DPE (Department of Public Enterprise)
(South Africa) 375
ECN (Energy Commission of Nigeria) 220
economic transition challenges 88
Economies of Adaptation to Climate
Change 6
Ecuador, Yasuni National Park see ITT
Initiative, Ecuador
Eid, C. 311
Electricity for All programme (South
Africa) 501
Electricity Feed-in Law (Germany) 106
Electricity Market Reform (UK) 108
electricity policy, South Africa
see South Africa
Electricity Regulation Act (South Africa) 381,
384
Electric Power Sector Reform Act
(Nigeria) 391–2, 399
Eleri, E. 210
emissions see GHG
enabling environments, clean energy
innovation 572–3
Energy Charter Treaty 360
energy efﬁciency, and energy use 75
Energy Independence and Security Act
(US) 163
energy innovation 123–39
analysis results 132–8
empirical model 127–9
energy investments 125–6, 138
environmental patents 128
environmental policy stringency 123–4,
128, 129–30, 132, 134–6
governance quality 123–4, 130–1,
132, 136
and lobbying 132, 137–8
market size effect 131, 137–8
measuring trends in 124–7
patent intensity/statistics 125, 126–7,
128, 134
political orientation 123–4, 130–1,
132, 136–7
power markets 137
power patents 127, 128, 139
proxy variables and hypotheses 132
R&D policies 124, 125–6, 127, 128–9, 134,
136, 137, 138
research hypotheses 129–32
resource distribution 123–4, 137–8
trade openness 138
Energy Policy Act (US) 313
Energy Regulatory Commission
(Mexico) 414
energy security, in Europe see European
energy security
energy technology choice 272
energy transition as political challenge 80–3
energy transitions
big picture 20
complexity of 31–2
as cumulative 29–32
energy end-use devices 22–5
future transitions 29
history of 16–32
Index 581
energy transitions (cont.)
in national energy supply 25–8
path dependency of 20–1, 29–32
politics of 16–32
rapid transitions 17, 22–9
slow transitions 17, 18–21
speed of 16
varieties of 103–18
wind development see wind energy
energy, water, and land use in Southeast Asia
see MR (Mekong region)
environmental policy instrument
categories 62–3
EPSA (Electrical Power Supply
Association) 323
EPS (environmental policy stringency)
database 129
EREC (European Renewable Energy
Council) 209
EROI (energy returned on invested) 314,
317–25
ESCOs (energy service companies) 335
Eskom Conversion Act (South Africa) 376,
377
Eskom (South Africa) 274, 276, 277, 279, 283,
284, 371–7, 385, 501
Estonia, governance quality 136
ethanol production 164
ethanol vehicles 17, 23, 30
EU Commission State Aid Guidelines 94
EU common energy policy 306
EU energy diversiﬁcation policy 292
EU-ETS (EU Emissions Trading System) 43,
60, 63, 84
EU GHG (greenhouse gases emissions)
policy 293
EU growth strategy targets 300
EU multidimensional policy approach 306
EU renewable energy policy
at sub-national level 547–62
bridge-technology 550
clean energy transition tensions 551–3
community acceptance 548–58,
554–5, 561–2
conﬂicting interests 547–62
forest products 551–4
institutions and regional
development 561
and Lisbon Treaty 547
market acceptance 548–55, 558–60, 562
methodology 548–9
mining interests 556–7, 561
multi-level governance 548, 555–60, 561
national government and multi-level
governance 555–60
regional governance challenges 556–9
renewable energy interview results by
region 552
socio political acceptance 548
tax policies 559–60
territorial planning 557–8, 560, 562
unequally shared proﬁts 554–5
wind energy 106–8, 112–13, 118, 554–5,
557–8
see also France; Germany
EU Renewables Directive 108
EU Roadmap 2050 96
Europe
industry structure 344
retail competition model 332, 337
smart grid affordability/sustainability in
liberalized sector 340–1
smart grid policy perspectives
summary 336, 344
smart metering 344
European energy security 292–307
alternative sources for Europe 303–4
and Caucasus region 299
climate change and policy 293–4
effects of renewable energy development
on 293–8
energy consumption fuel-mix by
country 302–3
energy policy in Europe 299–300
energy security index by country 301–2
energy supply/demand balance 298–301
European policy framework 305–7
FITs (feed-in-tariffs) 305
fossil-fuel dependency 306
HHI (Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index) 293,
301, 302
import sources for Europe 303–4
Middle East challenges 298–301
monopolized energy markets 300–1
natural gas and renewables 294–5
new suppliers 300–1
nuclear energy policy 293–4
politically unstable suppliers 298, 299, 303, 307
regional integration policy 298–9
renewable energy development 295–8
renewable energy technologies as
alternative sources 304–5
RPS (renewable portfolio standard) 305
and Russian energy supply 293,
298–300, 303–4
supply diversiﬁcation 300
supportive mechanisms and
technology 305
tax incentives 305
European Union see EU
EVs (electric vehicles) and smart grids 331
Ezeanya, C. 453
582 Index
Farrel, J. 147
Federal Power Act (US) 322
Federal Power Commission 322
federal reform 543
feed-in-tariffs see FITs
FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) regulation 253, 322–4
Fernández, M. A. 369, 431, 434, 435
FFFSR (Friends of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy
Reform) 356, 358, 360, 363–4
FFSs (fossil-fuel subsidies) 349–64
agreement to phase out 359–60
commitments enforcement 359
deﬁnitions 350–1, 356, 357, 358
economic inefﬁciency of 354–5
and falling oil prices 353–4
global policy need 357
and IMF (International Monetary
Fund) 351, 360
inefﬁcient FFSs 356
intergovernmental initiatives to phase
out 354–6
key issues/challenges 357–60
multilateral agreement issues 356–63
multilateral legal regime 357
and Paris Agreement 356, 361, 362
phasing-out commitments 359
reform obstacles 352–4
and SCM Agreement 351, 362, 363
transparency enhancement 358–9
and UNFCCC (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change) 360,
361–2
and WTO (World Trade
Organization) 358, 362–3, 364
FFVs (ﬂex-fuel vehicles), Brazil 17, 22–4, 30
Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC) 12, 573
Finland, LCET (low-carbon energy
technologies) 187–205
Fischer, G. 183
FITs (feed in tariffs)
China 261
European energy security 305
Germany see Germany
South Africa 382–4
FITs (feed in tariffs) (Indonesia) 144–61
analysis 153–9
barriers to implementation 147–8
biomass energy 144
community/land acquisition
problems 158–9
data acquisition 150–3
electricity purchasing process 157–8
energy demands 145
further research 160–1
geothermal energy 144
guidance questions for key
respondents 153
hydropower 144, 154, 155, 156, 158
incoherence of regulations 156–7
LPG (liqueﬁed petroleum gas) stoves 22–3
policy deﬁnition 146–8
policy effectiveness 150, 153–5
policy impacts 158–9
policy implementation examples 146–7
policy in Indonesia 144–61
policy overview 146–9
power plant deployment 152
qualitative data 150, 152–3
quantitative data 150, 151–2
rapid energy transitions 22
recommendations 160
regulation in Indonesia 149
renewable energy deployment 144–61
renewable energy licences 155–8
renewables 86–7, 90, 144–61
solar PV (photovoltaic) power 154
study location 150–1
wind turbine power 154
see also FITs (feed in tariffs); Indonesia
Fort Collins (US) 573
fossil-fuel-based systems
decline in 5
and development 11
and electricity generation 10
fossil fuel dependency 214, 218, 221, 233
fossil fuel subsidies see FFSs (fossil-fuel
subsidies)
percentage of total energy supply 5, 10, 21
pollution by 10
problems with 10–12
in rural areas 10
taxation on 43
see also carbon pricing
Fouquet, Roger 19–20, 29
France
BCA (border carbon adjustments) 60–1, 77
biomass 551
EU renewable energy policy (Aquitaine) see
EU renewable energy policy
forest products 551–4, 558, 559
nuclear energy 22, 25, 27, 30
pine availability/demand 553
rapid energy transitions 22
wood energy 552
see also EU renewable energy policy
Fredriksson, P. G. 131, 132
Fukushima reactor accident 274, 294, 298
G7 Summits 356
G20 Summits 355, 356, 359, 360
Gan, J. 165
Index 583
gas see natural gas
Gas Master Plan (Nigeria) 398
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) 67–72
(article I) 68
(article II) 69
(article III) 68
(article XI) 68
(article XVI) 351
(article XX) 70–2
Gawel, E. 37
GCF (Green Climate Fund) 76, 413
GEA (Global Energy Assessment) 18
generation price formation 256
geothermal energy 144
power generation costs 296
Gerbaulet, C. 97
German Watch 215
Germany
climate levy 91–2
coal 550
emission reduction target 92, 556
energy transition instigation 81
EU renewable energy policy (Brandenburg)
see EU renewable energy policy
feed-in-tariffs 86–7, 90, 106, 107,
112–13, 146–7
grid extension 92–4
legal framework and EU renewable energy
policy 560
lignite power stations 92, 93
NIMBY protests 87, 93
nuclear reactor R&D 274
pluralist political environment 108
regional differentiation 87
renewable energy interview results by
region 552
renewables support policies 80–96, 551
RES levy exemption 87
RES support scheme 91, 94–5
TSO (Transmission System Operators) 113
wind energy 106–8, 112–13, 118, 554–5,
557–8, 560
wind energy and compound CME
(coordinated market economy) 106–8,
112–13, 118
see also EU renewable energy policy;
renewables; wind energy
GHG (greenhouse gases) emissions 3–5, 9,
11, 76, 77, 212–13, 215, 231, 293, 305,
350, 352, 410, 411, 413, 415, 422, 424,
475, 533, 534–5, 542, 570–1
Giddens, A. 16
Girinka Programme see Rwanda
global action policy motivation 3–7
global agreements 4
global average temperatures 3
global energy supply, major transitional
shifts 18–20
Global Status Report, on RES development 84
global warming 80
Gore, Vice-President Al 29
Goritz, A. 229
governance
dimensions of diversity 254
and innovation 8
green growth 74
green industrial policy 87
green jobs 86
green patents 127
Grijalva, D. 369, 431, 434, 435
Groningen natural gas ﬁeld 26–7
Grubler, A. 16, 27
Haas, L. 516
Haddad, R. 431, 434
Hakvoort, R. 311
Hall, C. A. S. 317
Hall, P. A. 103–4
Hanania, L. R. 37
Harstad, B. 431, 439, 447
Hasan, M. 148, 158
Hawkins, R. G. 131
Heat Supply Act (1979) (Denmark) 27
Hernández, César 416
Heshmati, A. 229
homeostatic feedback 330, 331
Hooghe, L. 559
horizontal integration, policy/regulatory
functions 257
Hotelling rule 167, 169
Houba, H. 515
household thermal energy choices, in
developing countries 488–504
see also Indonesia; South Africa
Hübner, G. 554
Hughes, L. 137
hydrocarbon infrastructure see US
hydrocarbon infrastructure
hydropower energy 8, 20, 112, 144, 154, 155,
156, 158, 234, 471, 472, 473, 474, 476,
479, 481, 484, 515, 515–16, 517, 519–20,
526, 535
power generation costs 296
Ibrahim, H. Y. 212
ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes) 448
IEA (International Energy Agency) 129, 360,
417, 454
IMF (International Monetary Fund), and FFSs
(fossil-fuel subsidies) 351, 360
584 Index
INC (Indian National Congress) 241
incumbency overview 311
INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions) 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 72, 235,
313, 410, 419, 448, 569, 570, 571, 573
India
barriers 242–4
central planning 254
clean energy transitions 231–3, 238–45
climate change strategy 6
coal 242, 245
Coalgate scandal 242
coal tax 242
corruption 242
discom indebtedness 243, 245
drivers 238–42
electricity theft 243
energy access 239–42
energy consumption 301
energy incentives 238–9
energy investment 239
fossil fuel dependence 242
geographical feasibility 241
GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions 231
governing coalitions 232–3, 240, 241
implementation costs 242
INDC 6
installed solar power capacity 240
land rights 244
nuclear energy 242
political feasibility 241
political variations 240–1
pollution 239–42
regional variation 239–42
RETs (renewable energy
technologies) 231–3, 238–41, 242, 243,
244, 245
solar energy 239, 240–2
state governing parties 240
state-owned discoms (electricity
distribution companies) 243–4
subsidized power 243
theoretical underpinnings 232–3
vested interests 242
wind energy 239
Indonesia
economic strength/inﬂuence 489
energy nationalization 493
energy prices and subsidies 304, 492, 493
exports 491
FITs (feed in tariffs) see FITs
GDP 491
infrastructure 489
mineral resources 489, 493
oil prices and subsidies 304, 492, 493
policy objective alignment 504
political economy analysis 490–6
post-colonial democracy 489
successful energy initiatives 489
Indonesia (household thermal energy
choices) 488–504
groups, interests, and incentives 491, 493–4
interests and objectives 504
LPG (liqueﬁed petroleum gas) 488–9,
490–1, 492–6
political institutions role 491, 494–5
political issues 503
state power/control 503
values and ideas 491, 495–6
Innovation Norway 204
institutions and governance overview 101
integrated power system policy 90
International Energy Agency 6, 21
investment leakage 63
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change) 12, 163, 165, 212, 213, 352,
571, 573
IPP (independent power producers)
(South Africa) 371, 376, 380–2, 386
IRP (integrated resource plan)
(South Africa) 274–5, 372
Ishpingo-Timbococha-Tiputini see ITT
Isoaho, K. 229
Israel, energy security 295
Italy
BCA (border carbon adjustments) 60–1
smart meters 341
ITT Initiative, Ecuador
additionality 433–4, 447
assumptions 432–3
CDM (Clean Development
Mechanism) 432
CERs (Certiﬁcates of Emissions
Reduction) 432, 433–4, 439, 447
crude oil prices 444, 446
design failure 431
discussion 446–8
feasibility analysis of 431, 432–9
ﬁnancial issues 443–6
ﬁnancial valuation of 435–9
ﬂaws in 431, 432–9, 446
implementation problems 431, 447
as incentive-compatible 437, 448
and investment 445
and Kyoto Protocol 432, 434, 439
model implications 442–6
New Yasuni-ITT Initiative 439–46, 447
New Yasuni-ITT Initiative model 431,
439–42
oil extraction in ITT block 432, 435–7, 448
oil NPV (Net Present Value) 435–9, 440
permanence of 433
Index 585
ITT Initiative, Ecuador (cont.)
price discounting 433–5
projected government oil revenue 438
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest
Degradation) 432, 433, 434–5, 447
structure of 445, 447
uncertainty 434–5
and UNESCO 430
US recognition of 434
and WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil
prices 436
Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund 432, 433, 439
YGCs revenue valuation 431, 437–9
YGCs (Yasuni Guarantee
Certiﬁcates) 430–1, 432, 433–4, 435,
440, 445, 446
YNP (Yasuni National Park) in market of
deposits 442–3
Jacobsson, S. 107
Japan
carbon tax 43
energy transitions 20
Jenkins, J. D. 37, 47, 48, 49
John, J. D. 221
Jumbe, C. B. 183
Junginger, M. 115
Kahrl, F. 229
Kalla, Jusuf 23
Kammen, D. 453
Karim, M. F. 495
Karplus, V. J. 37, 47, 48, 49, 229
Kennedy, A. 451
King, P. 516
Kirtley, J. L. 330
Klein, A. 147
Knopf, B. 92
Koblowsky, P. 218
Konrad, K. A. 215
Kruger, W. 451
Kubiszewski, I. 520
Kuwait
oil 25–6, 30
rapid energy transitions 22
Kyoto Protocol 8, 209–10, 211, 215–16, 355,
361, 410, 432, 434, 482, 531, 533, 542, 543
see also CDM; COP; UNFCCC
LAERFTE (Law for the Use of Renewable
Energy and Financing of Energy
Transition) (Mexico) 413
Laos see MR (Mekong region)
La Porta, R. 165, 173
LASE (Law for Sustainable Use of Energy)
(Mexico) 413
Lauber, V. 107
LCET (low-carbon energy technologies)
RD&D
abatement costs 187
acceptance of indicators 192, 193, 194, 196,
197, 198, 199–201
additionality indicators 190, 191, 192, 203–4
administrative capacity indicator 189,
191, 192
capital requirements 188
cleantech innovation 188–9
commercial effectiveness indicator 191
CO2 emissions indicator 190, 195–6, 204
and decarbonization 204
ease of monitoring indicators 192, 194–5,
196, 197, 198, 200, 201
effectiveness indicator 189–90, 191
environmental effectiveness indicator 191
exports indicator 197–9
ﬁnancing (public/private ratio)
indicator 200–2
indicator-based policy evaluation 189–90,
192, 193–202
indicator choice effects 202–4
jobs indicator 197–9
national level indicators 191
patents indicator 196–7
programme level indicators 191
research, development, and demonstration)
ﬁnancing 187–205
robustness of indicators 192, 194, 195, 196,
197, 198–9, 200, 201–2
ROI (return on investment) indicator 190,
199–200, 202–3
short-term economic performance 202–3
and social beneﬁts 203
spending assessment indicators 193–5
technological output indicators 191, 192
turnover indicator 197–9
VC (venture capital) 199, 200, 201
Le Clézio, A. 37
Lehmann, P. 37
Lepesant, Gilles 509
LGCC (General Climate Change Law)
(Mexico) 415, 416, 418
LIE (Law of Electric Industry) 420, 421
Li Peng 237
Lipscy, P. Y. 137
Lisbon Treaty 547
Liu Zhenya 237
Li Xaolin 237
Li Xiaopeng 237
LMEs (Liberal Market Economies) see wind
energy
LNG (liqueﬁed natural gas) 417
Löschell, A. 217
low emissions energy technology 4
586 Index
LPG (liqueﬁed petroleum gas)
as clean fuel 488–9
Indonesia 22–3, 488–9, 490–1, 492–6
South Africa 488–9, 490–1, 496, 497–8,
500, 501, 502, 503
LTE (Law on Energy Transition)
(Mexico) 421–2, 424
Lund, Peter 19–20, 29
McCormick, S. 451, 474
Madjera, M. 183
Malaysia, climate change mitigation 216
Marks, G. 555, 559
Martins, Ben 282
Mattoo, A. 73
Mekong Agreement (1995) 519
MEMR 148, 153
Messmer Plan 27, 30, 31
Messmer, Prime Minister Pierre 27
Mexico
carbon pricing 419–20
CFE 414, 420
clean energy deployment 420–2
clean energy mandates 420–2
climate change failure 415–16
climate change policy 410–16, 418–20
climate change risk 413
demand and energy reform 412
emissions 410, 411, 413, 415, 422, 424
energy auctions 420, 422, 424
energy consumption 412
energy politics and climate
change 412–14
energy prices as political priority 416–17
energy production/demands key
indicators 412
energy reform 410–25
energy transition 410–16
future policy 422–5
gas prices 418, 423
Henry Hub gas 417, 418
INDC emissions/pledges 419
industrial tariffs 418
LGCC policies 418–20
LNG (liqueﬁed natural gas) 417–18
natural gas 410, 416–18, 421
Pact for Mexico 416
policy instruments 415–16
political coherence 422–5
power system planning 424
pricing policy 424
public/private investment 414, 423
risk-mitigating instruments 424
world image 413
Middle East political instability/wars 298
Miller, C. A. 16
Mintz, N. 131
Modi, Prime Minister Narendra 239, 241,
244, 245
MoU (Memorandi of Understanding)
(South Africa) 286
MRC (Mekong River Commission) 513, 516,
517, 521, 522, 526
MRGP (maximum reﬁnery gate price) 499–500
MR (Mekong region) 511–26
aggregate indicators 512
and ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) 513, 516, 518, 521, 524–5
CAFTA (China–ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement) 521, 525
centralized/decentralized approaches 548
challenges 520–1
dams 519–21
deforestation 518
economic development 512
economic disparities 514
energy demand in 515–16
energy saving potential 515–16
erosion problems 512–13
extent of 511
game theory/cooperation 522–5
global importance of 512
and global market 526
GMS Economic Cooperation Program 518
GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-Region) 513,
517, 521
governance, strong/weak 523
hydropower plants 515–16
hydropower potential 516
hydropower projects in MRB 517,
519–20, 526
hydropower water 515
irrigation water 515
issue linkages and managing 521–5, 526
land-use change 516–17
land/water catchment 516–17
linked game 525
LMB (Lower Mekong Basin) 514, 515, 520,
522, 523, 524, 526
opportunities 520–1
overview of 513–17
population 514, 520
regional development 517–19
regional integration 517–19, 522
regional tensions 551–3
river ﬂow by country 515
sustainable development 512
trade game 524–5
UMB (Upper Mekong Basin) 514, 521, 523
water game 523–4
water resources 513, 514–15
Msiska, F. B. 186
Myanmar see MR (Mekong region)
MYTO (multi-year tariff order) 393, 405, 407
Index 587
NAEC (Nigeria Atomic Energy
Commission) 220
NAPTIN (National Power Training Institute
of Nigeria) 392, 395, 403, 404, 406
Narragansett Company 322
National Action Party (Mexico) 421
National Clean Energy Fund (India) 242
National Energy Policy (Nigeria) 210
National Policy on Climate Change
(Brazil) 533
natural gas
China 295
dependence on Russia 298
European consumption 304
major transitional shifts 18–20
Mexico 410, 416–18, 421
Netherlands 22, 25–7, 112
Nigeria 396–9
power generation costs 296
and renewables 294–5
United Kingdom 31
NCP (National Council on Privatization)
(Nigeria) 400
NDA (National Democratic Alliance)
(India) 240, 241
NDBP (National Domestic Biogas
Programme) (Rwanda) 454, 458,
460–1, 467
NDRC (National Development and Reform
Commission) (China) 260
NEA (National Energy Administration)
(China) 260
NEC (National Energy Commission)
(China) 236
NECSA (Nuclear Energy Cooperation South
Africa) 277, 372
NELMCO (Nigerian Electricity Liability
Management Company) 392
Nene, Nhlanhla 280
NEPA (National Electric Power Authority)
(Nigeria) 392, 393
NERC (Nigerian Electricity Regulatory
Commission) 392, 404, 405, 407
NERSA (National Energy Regulator of
South Africa) 377, 379, 380, 383, 384
Netherlands
coal 26
natural gas 22, 25–7, 112
oil 26
rapid energy transitions 22
wind energy and simple CME (coordinated
market economy) 106, 109–12,
115–17, 118
NFFO (Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation) 108
Nigeria (clean energy transition) 209–25
climate change and agricultural
productivity 217
climate change policy 216
crowding-out effect 221–2
delays to implementation 211, 222–4
efforts towards 221–2
ﬁscal policy and 218–24
and ﬁscal shocks 211, 224
fossil fuel dependency 218, 221–5
and governance 218–19
government agencies 220–1, 225
government capital expenditure 219–20, 224
institutional challenges 218
as Kyoto Protocol signatory 210, 211
nuclear energy 220
oil revenue 210–11, 221–5
tax reform 225
see also climate change
Nigeria (power sector reform) 391–408
assessment of 399–405
corruption 399–400, 402–3
cost-recovery challenge 393
cost-reﬂective tariffs 393
distribution metering 407
electricity production 396, 405
electricity tariff 404–5
future policy 405–8
gas production/utilization 396, 398, 405
gas reserves 396, 397
gas supply 396–9
goals 392
inadequate funding 393–4, 395
institutional framework weakness
403–4, 407
investment issues 393–4, 395, 405–6,
407, 408
key challenges to 394–9
legal framework weakness 403–4
manpower development 406
MYTO (multi-year tariff order) 393,
405, 407
pipeline vandalism 393, 394, 406
policy inconsistencies 395–6, 404, 406
political environment challenges 393
political interference 393, 401–2, 406
post-reform strategy 393
power outage 392
private sector investment 405–6
privatization process management
infractions 399–401
public/private partnership 405
regulatory framework weakness 403–4
regulatory uncertainty 404
transmission network weaknesses 393–4
transparency 400
weak regulatory/institutional/legal
frameworks 403–4
NIPP (National Integrated Power Project)
(Nigeria) 402
588 Index
NISP (National Improved Stove
Programme) 23–4
NLGACCERCER advisory body (China) 235–6
non-discrimination principle 67–70
Nordensvärd, J. 98
North America, petroleum imports 210
North Korea, energy transitions 20
Norway, LCET (low-carbon energy
technologies) 187–205
NPCC-RS (National Policy on Climate Change
and Response Strategy) (Nigeria) 210
NPL (Northwest Power Ltd) 400
nuclear build programme 275–9
nuclear energy
BRICS countries 285
build costs 280
discourse coalitions 273
energy technology choice 272
European policy 293–4, 297
France 22, 25, 27, 30
Fukushima reactor accident 274, 294, 298
major transitional shifts 18–20, 22
in Nigeria 220
nuclear power and nationhood 272
power generation costs 296
power programme drivers 273
Russia 285
sociological theories 272
in South Africa 271–87
in Sweden 110, 115
nuclear power politics, South Africa 273–86
Occidental Petroleum Corporation Oxy 448
ocean current theory 213
O’Connor, P. A. 17, 30
OECD 295, 360
Ogunleye, E. K. 369
oil
global prices 223
Kuwait 25–6, 30
major transitional shifts 18–20
Middle East supply 298–301
Netherlands 26
Nigeria 210, 221–5
OECD production 295
politically unstable suppliers 298, 299
Okoro, O. I. 218
Ontario see Canada
Onuvae, P. 210
Onyishi, T. 218
operational leakage 63
organized markets, benchmark generation
price formation 256
Paris Conference see COP21
path dependency, of energy transitions 20–1,
29–32
PBMR (Pebble Bed Modular Reactor)
programme (South Africa) 274
PCT (Patent Cooperation Treaty) 126
PDD (Project Design Documents) 543
Pearson, P. J. G. 29
Pechan, A. 92
PEMEX (Petróleos Mexicanos) 412
Peña Nieto, President Enrique 416,
419, 421
Pertamina (Indonesia) 492, 493, 503
Peters, Dipuo 282–3
Petri, P. 518, 524
Pham Do, Kim Hang 509, 515, 522
PHCN (Power Holding Company of
Nigeria) 392, 393, 400, 403
Pigouvian fee 41
Planetary Motion theory 213
Plummer, M. 518, 524
Pohl, J. 554
political constraints, and carbon
pricing 39–58
political transition challenges 88
Pollitt, M. G. 416, 423
polluter pays/proﬁts principle 92
poverty alleviation and clean energy, Rwanda
see Rwanda
Powell, J. L. 170
Power Africa 408
power generation costs, by energy
source 296
power patents 127, 128
PPA (Power Purchasing Agreement)
(Indonesia) 151
Prah v. Maretti 321
PRA (Particpatory Rural Appraisal)
(Rwanda) 465
Preston, F. 214
Prieto, P. A. 317
prime movers 18
Privissiero, M. 131
Proálcool programme 24
PROINFRA scheme (Brazil) 538, 541
PSCW (Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin) 314, 316
Public Choice renewables policy 80–96
PUC (Rhode Island Public Utilities
Commission) 322
pull mechanism 105
Puppim de Oliveira, J. A. 509
push mechanism 105
Putin, President Vladimir 285
PV (photovoltaic) power 8, 20, 86, 87, 90, 91,
154, 161, 234, 240–2, 306, 314, 320–5, 331
consumption by region 297
power generation costs 296
South Africa 381, 384
in US 314, 320–5
Index 589
RD&D (research, development, and
demonstration) see LCET (low-carbon
energy technologies)
REFIT (renewable energy feed-in tariff)
(South Africa) 382–4
regional dynamics overview 509
regulation, and innovation 8
RE IPPPP (Renewable Energy Independent
Power Producers’ Procurement Plan)
(South Africa) 371, 372, 376, 379,
380, 382–6
renewable energy (Brazil) see Brazil
renewable energy development (Europe) 295–8
Renewable Energy Law (China) 263
Renewable Energy Law (Germany) 107, 113
Renewable Energy Master Plan (Nigeria) 210
renewable energy technologies, as alternative
sources 304–5
Renewable Energy White Paper
(South Africa) 382–3
renewable price surcharge 263
renewables 7–9, 74
adaptive efﬁciency perspective 89
carbon taxes 83
energy transition as political
challenge 80–3
feed-in-tariffs 86–7, 90
ﬁnancing mechanism 87
German support policies for 84–8, 90–2
instrument change 84, 88–90, 93, 94
instrument choice 82, 83–8, 94
integrated power system policy 90
integrating renewables in energy
markets 88–94
long-run perspective 88–94
management premium 90
market premium approach 90
polluter pays/proﬁts principle 92
public choice perspective 83, 88, 90
renewable energy/fossil fuel systems
balance 5, 10, 21
rent management strategy 95
RES (renewable energy sources)
policies 80–96
RES support cuts 91
RES volatility 91
as solution to climate/energy policy
challenges 83–8
support policies for 80–96
systemic challenges 92–4
technology differentiation 87
transition challenges beyond RES schematic
overview 88, 95
transition instruments schematic
overview 85
see also Germany
Renewables Support Act 90
RENEW Wisconsin 316
Rennkamp, B. 229
RESA (Renewable Energy Resources Act)
(Germany) 147
research frontiers 572–5
resiliency planning, clean energy
innovation 573
RES (renewable energy sources) policies
(Germany) see renewables
RETs (renewable energy technologies) 231–3
RFS2 (Renewable Fuel Standard Program)
(US) 163
Richard, D. 330
Rio Grande do Sul State see Brazil
Roadmap for Power Sector Reform
(Nigeria) 391, 399
Rodríguez-Pose, A. 561
Rogers, E. M. 491
RO (Renewables Obligation) (UK) 108, 114
Rowcroft, P. 517
Roy, P. 241
RPS (renewable portfolio standard), European
energy security 305
Russia
energy supply to Europe 293, 298–304
natural gas supply 298
nuclear energy 285–6
and South Africa 282, 285, 286
and Ukraine 292
Rwanda
background information 455–8
biogas among Girinka beneﬁciaries 461–6
biogas among rural poor 460–7
biogas cooking problems 465–6
biogas and cow dung 454, 465, 466
biogas ditches 465
biogas installation costs 462–3
biogas subsidy 463
biogas technician training 464
biomass energy 456, 457, 458
cattle ownership 459–66
clean energy and poverty
alleviation 453–68
clean energy transition implications 466–7
constitution 455–6
deforestation 456, 458, 461
dependency syndrome 466–7
desertiﬁcation threat 456
development partners/donors 458, 464, 466
domestic biogas use 458–66
domestic energy policy 457–8
ecosystem 456
energy policy 457–8
energy sources 456–7
fuelwood burning 454, 457, 458, 461–2, 464
590 Index
genocide (1994) 455, 459
Girinka Programme 458–66, 467–8
government role 454–5, 464
household energy use 456–7
NDBP (National Domestic Biogas
Programme) 454, 458, 460–1, 467
poverty levels 454
Power Analysis tool 455
public/private partnerships 466
Sachs, J. D. 221
SCADA (supervisory control and data
acquisition systems) 330
SCC (social cost of carbon) 41
Schmid, E. 92
Schmidt, V. 105
Schreurs, M. 101
Schulz, N. 229
Schweppe, F. C. 330
SCM Agreement, WTO (World Trade
Organization) 351, 362, 363
SCOT (social construction of technology) 272
sector reform overview 369
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky 21
Shah, M. 183
Shleifer, A. 131, 165, 173
smart grids
actor perspectives on 331–5
aggregators 335
CAPEX (capital expenses) 333, 337–8,
339, 340–1
China dealing with electricity demand
surge 341–3
consumers 335
deﬁnition of 329–31
demand response 331
DG (distributed generation) units 331, 332
DSOs (distribution service
operators) 333–4, 338, 340–1, 344, 345
energy policy impact 338
ESCOs (energy service companies) 335
Europe 336, 340–1
and EVs (electric vehicles) 331
global trends 329–45
and ICT 329, 333
industry structure impacts 332, 336–7
institutional forums 360–3
integrated utility 333
new business models 335
OPEX (operational expenses) 333,
337–8, 340–1
policy perspectives on 336–43
real-time management/control 331
regulatory model impact 337–8, 343
retailers 334–5
sector liberalization 332, 343
socio-political tensions sources 336–8
terminology history 330–1
US 336, 338–40
smart meters 330, 338, 339, 341, 342, 344
Smil, Vaclav 17–19, 21, 29
Smith, C. T. 165
Smits, R. 115
Smit, T. 115
sobriety policies 75
social inclusion overview 451
social peripheralization 284
solar power see PV
solar variability theory 213–14
SON (Standards Organisation of Nigeria) 404
Soskice, D. W. 103–4
South Africa
adaptation policy 573
coal 271, 499
Competition Commission 497, 498
economic strength/inﬂuence 489
Eskom 274, 276, 277, 279, 283, 284, 371–2,
375–7, 385, 501
infrastructure 489, 498–9, 501
mineral resources 489
MoU (Memorandi of Understanding) 286
MRGP (maximum reﬁnery gate
price) 499–500
petrochemical companies relations 499
policy objective alignment 504
political economy analysis 490–1, 496–502
post-colonial democracy 489
renewable energy sector 371–86
successful energy initiatives 489
South Africa (electricity policy)
CSP (concentrated solar power) 384
Electricity for All programme 501
and electricity crisis 373–5, 379
electriﬁcation programme 496, 501, 502
Energy White Papers 375, 382, 383
and Eskom 371–2, 375–7, 385
IPP (independent power producers) 371,
376, 380–2, 386
IRP (integrated resource plan) 372,
380–2, 386
MEC (minerals-energy complex) 372, 373–5
post-apartheid policy 372, 377–9
REFIT (renewable energy feed-in
tariff) 382–4
RE IPPPP (Renewable Energy Independent
Power Producers’ Procurement Plan)
(South Africa) 371, 372, 376, 379,
380, 382–6
separate transmission utility 376
solar PV 381, 384
stakeholder engagement process 380
timeline 378
Index 591
South Africa (household thermal energy
choices) 488–504
groups, interests, and incentives 491, 497–9
interests and objectives 504
LPG (liqueﬁed petroleum gas) 488–9,
490–1, 496, 497–8, 500, 501, 502, 503
political institutions role/effectiveness 491,
499–500
political issues 503
state power/control 503
values and ideas 491, 501–2
South Africa (nuclear energy) 271–87, 381
baseload 284
business representation categories 278
corruption 285, 287
cost 280
discourse coalitions 272–3, 275–9, 286
economic interventionism 281–2
energy security 284
and Eskom 274, 276, 277, 279, 283, 284
geopolitical dimensions 285–6
international prestige 285–6
IRP (integrated resource plan) 274–5, 280
job creation 282–3
localization strategy 282
and NGOs (non-governmental
organizations) 275, 278–9, 283, 285
nuclear accidents 283–4
nuclear build programme 275–9
nuclear power politics 273–86
opposition coalition 275–87
opposition to political authority 280–1
public expenditure principles 281
public procurement procedures 281
renewable energy 284
Russian links 282, 285, 286
safety 283–4
secrecy 285
skills development 283
state actors 277–9
supporters coalition 275–87
technologies political discourse 279–86
technologies social shaping 272–3
trade unions 278–9
transparency 285
Southeast Asia, Mekong region see MR
(Mekong region)
South Korea, governance quality 136
Sovacool, B. K. 281
Spain, RES support cuts 91
Speck, D. L. 217
Speranza, C. I. 218
SST (social shaping of technology) 272
standard liberalization prescription 255
Strunz, S. 37
Studer, I. 369, 422
Sturma, B. 217
Subramanian, A. 73
Sustainable Development Goals 9, 575
Svensson, J. 131
Sweden
bioenergy 203
hydropower 112
LCET (low-carbon energy
technologies) 187–205
lighting 22–3
and nuclear energy 110, 115
rapid energy transitions 22
wind energy and simple CME (coordinated
market economy) 106, 109–12, 115–17
systemic transition challenges 88
Tait, L. 451
Tanner, T. 472, 479
tax incentives, European energy security 305
technological advancement 7–9
technology drivers 7–9
Thailand see MR (Mekong region)
Thum, M. 215
tidal wave power, power generation costs 296
tradable emission permits 63–4
transformative change, at all levels 21
TSO (Transmission System Operators) 113
Ugwu, O. 210
UK
natural gas 31
political power centralization 109
political power devolution 109
wind energy and simple LME (liberal
market economy) 106, 108–9,
113–14, 118
Umar, H. S. 212
UN Climate Change Convention (1992) 216
UNCSD (UN Conference on Sustainable
Development) 356, 360
UNDP (UN Development
Programme) 453–4
UN energy access policy goal 488
UNESCO, and ITT Initiative, Ecuador 430
UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change) 4, 6, 62, 70, 313, 355,
360, 361–2, 448, 483, 530, 532, 534, 540
see also CDM; COP; Kyoto Protocol
United Kingdom see UK
United Nations see UN
United States see US
United States-China Joint Agreement 235
UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015) 468
Urban, F. 98
US
air conditioning 22, 24–5, 31
592 Index
BCA (border carbon adjustments) 60–1
capital/municipal utilities ownership 322
capital ROE (return on equity) 324
capital ROI (return on investment) 324
carbon pricing policy 43
climate change strategy 6
coal 320–5
electricity grid federal funding 338, 339
energy governance 253
EROI (energy returned on invested) 314,
317–25
FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) regulation 253, 322–4
GHG abatement policy 313–14
hydrocarbon infrastructure, Wisconsin
strategic rent-seeking 313–17
hydroelectricity 20
industry structure 344
integrated utility structure 332, 337
interstate commerce legislation 322
oil 29–30
PV (photovoltaic) power 314, 320–5
rapid energy transitions 18, 22, 29–30
smart grid policy perspectives
summary 336
smart grid supply reliability 338–40
smart metering 338, 339, 344
USAID Development Credit Authority 408
US hydrocarbon infrastructure 313–26
biophysical approach 317–19
capital guaranteeing/disciplining 324–5
contradictions and conﬁguring legal
apparatus 320–5
decommodiﬁcation 321–4
efﬁciency logics and territory 318, 320–1
EROI (energy returned on invested) 314,
317–25
incumbency of hydrocarbon
infrastructure 314–26
jurisdiction 321–4
legal infrastructure 317–19
PV (photovoltaic) power 314, 320–5
state-recognized ﬁnancing
mechanisms 324–5
statutes 313
third-party installer mechanism 325
WE Energies 313–17, 321, 325
Wisconsin power utilities 315
Valencia, F. 416
Valentine, S. V. 281
Valenzuela, J. M. 369, 422
Verdolini, E. 101, 126, 127
Veysey, J. 411
Vickerman, Michael 316
Viet Nam see MR (Mekong region)
VIUs (vertically integrated utilities) 255, 258
Vogt, C. 217
Vollebergh, H. R. J. 132
Votorantim Hyrdopower Plant 536, 539
Wahjosudibjo, A. S. 148, 158
Warner, A. M. 221
Waxman-Markey Bill (2009) 61
WE Energies 313–19, 321, 325
WEPCO (Wisconsin Electrical Power
Corporation) 315
West Java see Indonesia
White Paper on Energy Policy (1998)
(South Africa) 375
White Paper on Renewable Energy (2003)
(South Africa) 382, 383
wind energy 8
actors 256–8
balancing area co-ordination 264–6
Brazil 535
China 250–67
China case study 258–66
CMEs (Coordinated Market
Economies) 104–6, 117
compound CME (Germany) 106–8, 112–13
consumption by region 297
cost-effectiveness 250
cost premium recovery 263–4
dispatch order 261–2
economic institutions 255–6, 258
economic/political actors 252
empirical analysis 106–17
ﬁxed cost recovery 262
generator cost recovery 261–4
Germany 106–8, 112–13, 118, 554–5,
557–8, 560
governance dimensions 254
governance of power systems 253–4
grid operations structure 264–6
horizontal integration, policy/regulatory
functions 257
India 239
Indonesia 154
industry restructuring models 255–6
LMEs (Liberal Market Economies) 104–6
and national characteristics 257
offshore wind 104, 112–17
onshore wind 104, 106–12
operating cost recovery 262–3
political economy framework 251–8
political institutions 105–6, 117, 253–4, 256–7
power generation costs 296
pull mechanism 105
push mechanism 105
R&D (research and development)
spending 105, 107, 110, 116
Index 593
wind energy (cont.)
simple CMEs (Denmark, Sweden,
Netherlands) 104, 106, 109–12, 115–17
simple LME (United Kingdom) 106,
108–9, 113–14
and state ownership 257
support mechanisms 261–2
theoretical framework 104–6
vertical integration 257, 266
vested interests 236–7, 244, 256–8
VIUs (vertically integrated utilities) 255, 258
VoC (varieties of capitalism)
perspective 103–6
wind farm planning/project
approval 259–61
Wolsink, M. 548, 549
World Bank
Economies of Adaptation to Climate
Change 6
Power Africa 408
WTI (West Texas Intermediate) oil prices 436
WTO (World Trade Organization)
and BCA (border carbon
adjustments) 68–72
Doha Round 363
DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) 68, 71–2
and FFSs (fossil-fuel subsidies) 351, 358,
360, 362–3, 364
non-discrimination principle 67–70
role of 311
SCM Agreement 351, 362–3
subsidy deﬁnition 358
Wüstenhagen, R. 548, 549
Xing, L. 517
YGCs (Yasuni Guarantee Certiﬁcates) see ITT
YSN (Yasuni National Park), Ecuador see ITT
Initiative, Ecuador
Yuliani, D. 158
Zhai, F. 518, 524
Zhu, X. 515
Zuma, President Jacob 277, 279, 280, 285
594 Index
